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War and British identity: A study of Mass Observers' perceptions of the use of British 
military force since 1982 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This thesis uses Mass Observation Project data as a source of evidence for individual 
British people’s interpretations of British involvement in recent overseas military 
conflicts. Considering five of Britain’s post-imperial and post-Cold War conflicts in the 
Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars, it approaches these cases as objects 
of historical memory and considers how individuals connect these conflicts to narratives 
of British identity. Using an interpretative and qualitative method of analysis, it finds that, 
though contemporary circumstance and context are crucial in determining what is written 
about each case, these conflicts are given meaning through invocation of Britain’s 
military past, primarily British experience in the Second World War. Observers’ written 
responses across the period reveal a pervasive belief in Britain as an historical force for 
good, the crucible of which is British opposition to the evil of Nazi fascism and 
dictatorship in World War Two, and its entry into that war to defend both itself and other 
European nations. These connections began to fragment within the context of the ‘War on 
Terror’ and the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Popular memories of the past have been critical in framing and clarifying what 
observers wrote about more recent conflicts, both among those who supported the use of 
force and those who did not, but have also been sustained as Britain continues to deploy 
military force in the present. Certain aspects of British experience in World War Two 
have been kept alive as they retain an explanatory power over contemporary 
circumstances while others are omitted as they are not thought to be relevant; observers’ 
written accounts show, in detail, how popular memories of the past have been affected by 
the changing context in which they are invoked and how military force is related 
intimately to narrative (re)constructions of national identity.  
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Introduction 
 
Research Question and Research Design 
 
The central question this thesis seeks to address is: 
 
How have Mass Observers connected the use of British force and British national identity in the 
Falklands (1982), Gulf (1990), Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) wars? 
 
The reasons for considering these cases – and for linking them to a subjective concept 
like national identity – are many. Certainly the Iraq conflict in particular sparked the 
interest of people who, like me, became politically aware during the early 2000s. It 
generated enormous media coverage within Britain due to the controversial circumstances 
of its occurrence, and elicited a level of popular protest unprecedented in the 
contemporary era.1 Its effects have been wide-ranging and lasting,2 affecting Britain’s 
foreign policy direction3 and generating new political debates related to the use of British 
military force.4  
The undeniable impact of the Iraq War led me to question how individual British 
people have made sense of Britain’s involvement not only in Iraq, but in the numerous 
interventions that preceded it and, in the case of Afghanistan, outlasted it. Consequently 
this thesis is a consideration of the non-military, domestic and ideational impacts of 
                                                     
1 James Strong, Public Opinion, Legitimacy and Tony Blair’s War in Iraq (London: Routledge, 2017); 
James Strong, “More Spinn’d Against than Spinning?: Public Opinion, Political Communication, and 
Britain’s Involvement in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq”, PhD dissertation (The LSE, London, 2012); Christoph 
Bluth, “The British road to war: Blair, Bush and the decision to invade Iraq”, International Affairs. 80, no. 5 
(2004): 871-892. 
2 Louise Fawcett, “The Iraq War Ten Years On: Assessing the Fallout”, International Affairs. 89, no. 2 
(2013): 325-343. 
3 David Wearing, “Militarism or Internationalism: British Foreign Policy at a Crossroads”, Soundings. 62, 
no. 1 (2016): 121-137. 
4 Philip Towle, Going to War: British Debates from Wilberforce to Blair (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2010), 1-10.  
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recent wars. It is not primarily an investigation of public opinion as it asks more 
specifically what effects Britain’s overseas deployments have had on perceptions of 
Britain’s history, identity and place in the world. It asks how individuals in Britain 
interpret modern conflicts, what they mean for the nation, and how they might affect 
perceptions of Britain’s history and identity. 
 Of course, personal interest is not sufficient in determining the focus of academic 
research. Nor is it sufficient in the selection of cases or phenomena.5 I have selected my 
cases because together they represent important events in Britain’s recent political and 
social history, and because they represent a distinct era of military activity largely 
unmoored from the end of empire or the Cold War. 
 It is worth restating here that armed conflict has been a persistent feature of 
British history. The United Kingdom has been a significant international and military 
actor since the inception of the British state in 1707, and was frequently engaged in 
continental and imperial wars including, but not limited to, the War of Spanish 
Succession, colonial conflicts in India, the American Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars.6 In the modern era Britain armed millions of soldiers to fight from 1914 to 19187 
and again from 1939 to 1945,8 and continued to conscript men of service age until 1960.9 
Britain was a major contributor during the Korean War (1950-1953)10 and engaged in 
multiple conflicts, police actions, crises and emergencies throughout the early Cold War 
era; notably in Greece, Palestine, Malaya, Egypt, Kenya, Cyprus and southern Arabia.11 
                                                     
5 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 15. 
6 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837, (5th ed. London: Yale University Press, 2014). 
7 Though conscription began in 1916 and ended in 1920. 
8 Daniel Todman, Britain’s War: Into Battle (London: Penguin, 2017). 
9 Richard Vinen, National Service: Conscription in Britain, 1945-1963 (London: Allen Lane, 2014), 4-5. 
10 Grace Huxford, “The Korean War Never Happened: Forgetting a Conflict in British Culture and 
Society”, Twentieth Century British History. 27, no. 2 (2016): 195-219. 
11 Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Far Away Places (London: MacMillan, 2013). See, also; Ian Cobain, 
Ewen MacAskill and Katy Stoddard, “Britain’s 100 Years of Conflict”, The Guardian (2014) Online, 
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The later Cold War (from the 1960s) saw British force used less frequently as the period 
of decolonisation came to an end, the conclusion of the Vietnam War and détente 
heralded reduced international tensions, and the eruption of violent conflict in Northern 
Ireland focused attention closer to home. Domestic and economic considerations 
prescribed a shift from the foreign policy of a great power to one focused more narrowly 
on Western and European cooperation.12  
The deployment of a Task Force to recapture the Falkland Islands by military 
means in 1982 followed a period of relative inactivity for the British military, yet it can 
be seen as part of a broader history of overseas conflict. Large-scale deployments 
followed in the Persian Gulf in 1990, in the Balkans from 1995, in Sierra Leone in 2000, 
and in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 and 2003 respectively. Conflicts including and 
since the Falklands War are however, distinguishable from those previous due to their 
very different context and circumstances in that none were linked to resistance to fascism 
or communism. As James Cronin describes, the Gulf War of 1990-1991 was part of the 
reordering of international politics which brought the post-Cold War world into view for 
its protagonists. Cronin writes of a fishing retreat near Lake Baikal, Russia, in which 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Edouard Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State, James Baker, 
“agreed that this [the USSR’s vote for Resolution 678 sanctioning the use of military 
force against Iraq] was the moment when the Cold War actually ended.”13  
                                                                                                                                                              
available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/ng- interactive/2014/feb/11/britain-100-years-of-
conflict (Accessed 23-08-2017).  
12 Helen Parr, “Britain, America, East of Suez and the EEC: Finding a Role in British Foreign Policy, 1964-
67”, Contemporary British History. 20, no. 3 (2006): 403-421; Alex May, “The Commonwealth and 
Britain’s Turn to Europe, 1945-73”, The Round Table. 102, no. 1 (2013): 29-39; David Sanders, Losing an 
Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945 (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 2017),120-131.  
 
13 James Cronin, Global Rules: America, Britain and a Disordered World (London: Yale University Press, 
2014), 207. 
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The  conclusion of the Gulf War revealed America’s apparent ‘unipolar 
moment’14 in which, among other vast changes within international politics, the USA and 
its allies (including Britain) were free to pursue new forms of military intervention. The 
overwhelming victory achieved by the allied coalition in the Gulf War arguably made 
military intervention more palatable as an instrument of foreign policy; it led to a 
“perspective that took as its starting point the so-called ‘revolution in military affairs’ that 
was brought about by advanced technology and that led, more or less directly, to a 
willingness to use the new and more sophisticated weapons and to adopt military 
solutions for the problems of the post-Cold War world.”15 
 Britain took part in the Gulf War, and has taken a leading role in military 
interventions since, albeit as a junior partner of the United States. However, I suggest 
here that Britain’s post-Cold War use of military force, and the new era of British foreign 
policy in which it was fostered, originated earlier with a successful campaign to retake the 
Falklands Islands after their occupation by Argentina. As Lawrence Freedman concludes 
his official history: 
 
At the end of 1982, in a paper for the British International Studies Association, I suggested that in its 
political aspects the Falklands might turn out to be a precursor of things to come, in the role allotted 
to the United Nations, the importance of the principle of self-determination, and a line-up that was 
neither East-West nor North-South, that it is reflected but was not dominated by either the cold war 
or anti-colonialism. At the time this was greeted with a degree of scepticism, but in retrospect this 
argument seems justified… so while in many respects this conflict still stands out as an anomaly in 
                                                     
14 For a consideration of American dominance after the end of the Cold War in the context of domestic and 
international transformation in the preceding decades, see: Hal Brands, Making the Unipolar Moment 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2016). 
15 Cronin, Global Rules, 216. 
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recent international history, the last war of a past imperial era, in others it can now be recognised as 
one of the first of the coming post-Cold War era.
16 
 
With historical retrospect, the period between 1982 and 2014 (the latter date marked by 
the return of British combat forces from Helmand, Afghanistan) is one denoted by a 
transformation in Britain’s world role. Britain’s post-Cold War experience has been one 
marked at least partially by continued military activity. Its major engagements in the 
Balkans, Afghanistan and twice in Iraq demand consideration if only because they 
represent a distinct departure from previous eras and a remarkably frequent use of 
military force. While there have been other deployments overseas – most notably in 
Sierra Leone in 2000 – I focus here on the Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq 
campaigns for two reasons; firstly because they are all high profile events which pertain 
to an important social impact, and secondly because deployments to Bosnia and Sierra 
Leone are not represented within the source data I have used. Both points are explained 
more fully in the following sections.  
 Of course, these conflicts were pursued within various circumstances and for a 
variety of reasons. The Falklands War was fought outside the paradigm of the Cold War – 
predicated on the recovery of sovereign territory - and was interpreted as a reversal of 
Britain’s domestic and international post-War decline.17 Foreign intervention in the Gulf 
was aimed at protecting Kuwaiti sovereignty and thereby affirming a US-led, rules-based 
international order.18 Intervention in Kosovo represented both a testing ground for, and 
arguably a vindication of, New Labour’s ethical foreign policy, serving to reinforce the 
                                                     
16 Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign: Volume II, War and Diplomacy 
(London: Routledge, 2005), 643. 
17 David George Boyce, The Falklands War (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 171-190. 
18 Lawrence Freedman and Ephraim Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991 (London: Faber and Faber, 1993).  
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principal and possibility of humanitarian military intervention.19 While these ideas 
figured heavily in the decision to use force in Afghanistan in 2001, and Iraq in 2003, both 
deployments formed part of the newly declared ‘War on Terror’; a policy prescription in 
which the norms of humanitarianism intermingled with a newly invigorated neo-
conservativism based on pre-emption, regime change and ‘liberal peacebuilding’.20 The 
material and political impacts of the Iraq War in particular have been far-reaching in the 
Middle East, the Western states that prosecuted it, and in the wider world.21 Iraq has cast 
a shadow over later interventions in Libya and Syria the aims of which have been 
narrowed to the ‘degradation and destruction’22 of specific terrorist groups. The 
subsequent modus operandi of British military intervention (until the time of writing) has 
been accordingly enervated, limited to the training of friendly local forces and supporting 
air strikes. 
                                                     
19 Roberto Belloni, “The Trouble with Humanitarianism”, Review of International Studies. 33, no. 1 (2007): 
451-474; Dan Bulley, “Home is Where the Human is? Ethics, Intervention and Hospitality in Kosovo”, 
Millennium. 39, no. 1 (2010): 43-63; Oliver Daddow, “’Tony’s War’? Blair, Kosovo and the Interventionist 
Impulse in British Foreign Policy”, International Affairs. 85, no. 3 (2009): 547-560; Oliver Daddow and 
Pauline Schnapper, “Liberal Intervention in the Foreign Policy Thinking of Tony Blair and David 
Cameron”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs. 26, no. 2 (2013): 330-349; Jamie Gaskarth, 
“Interpreting Ethical Foreign Policy: Traditions and Dilemmas for Policymakers”, British Journal of 
Politics and International Relations. 15, no. 1 (2013): 192-209; Dan Keohane, “From Suez to Kosovo: 
British Political Parties on the Use of Force”, Contemporary British History. 17, no. 2 (2003): 29-48; David 
McCourt, “Rethinking Britain’s Role in the World for a New Decade: The Limits of Discursive Therapy 
and the Promise of Field Theory”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 13, no. 2 (2011): 
145-164; David McCourt, “Embracing Humanitarian Intervention: Atlanticism and the UK Interventions in 
Bosnia and Kosovo”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 15, no. 2 (2013): 246-262; 
Paul Williams, “Who’s making UK foreign policy?”’, International Affairs. 80, no. 5 (2004): 909-929.  
See also: Jamie Gaskarth, Robin Porter and Timothy Edmunds, British Foreign Policy and the National 
Interest (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014). 
20 Alex Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam: The Iraq War and the ‘special relationship’ in historical 
perspective”, Review of International Studies. 33, no. 2 (2007): 189-203; Toby Dodge, “Intervention and 
Dreams of Exogenous Statebuilding: The Application of Liberal Peacebuilding in Afghanistan and Iraq”, 
Review of International Studies. 39, no. 5 (2013): 1189-1212; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Rhiannon 
Vickers, “’Blowback’ for Britain?: Blair, Bush, and the War in Iraq”, Review of International Studies. 33, 
no. 2 (2007): 205-221; Patrick Porter, “Last Charge of the Knights? Iraq, Afghanistan and the Special 
Relationship”, International Affairs. 86, no. 2 (2010): 355-375; Jason Ralph, “After Chilcot: The ‘Doctrine 
of International Community’ and the UK Decision to Invade Iraq”, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations. 13, no. 3 (2011): 203-325.  
21 Fawcett, “The Iraq War”. 
22 Britain’s contribution to the military effort against ISIS in Syria was outline by then Prime Minister, 
David Cameron in 2014. See, Peter Dominiczak, “Three-year battle ‘to degrade and destroy Isil”, The 
Telegraph (2014) Online, available at: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/11078812/Three-year-battle-to-degrade-and-
destroy-Isil.html (Accessed 19-12-2017). 
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The period is then, one of variation in circumstance. Not only do these conflicts 
represent a quantitative (in terms of the number of conflicts fought) and qualitative (in 
terms of the reasons for their pursuit) departure from the end of empire and the Cold War, 
they also represent a multifarious and complex period of shifting norms related to the use 
of British force, and the way in which Britain has been aligned in the international sphere 
in relation to other states and allies.23 They require study together in order to gain a sense 
of how these conflicts have affected British politics in the recent past, and thus its 
trajectory into the future. 
 Studies of ‘high politics’, foreign policy and strategy across this period abound. 
My aim here is to explore more intimately the relationship this period of military conflict 
has had with the citizens in whose names it has been prosecuted, and how these conflicts 
affect the ways in which individuals relate to Britain and its history. I approach them with 
an understanding that the prosecution of war is linked closely to the construction and 
reconstruction of shared ideas of national identity, articulated by British people who are 
not directly involved or included within the policy-makers, elites, politicians and experts 
who constitute the British state. Indeed, Britain’s identity and nationhood is bound at least 
partially to its military past and its involvement in wars. I explore, using an individual-
level analysis, how interpretations of Britain’s more recent conflicts relate to 
constructions of Britain’s history and identity.  
 
 
 
 
                                                     
23 Per Becker, “Vulnerability and Nationalism: The Support for the War Against Iraq in Five Established 
States”, Nations and Nationalism. 15, no. 2 (2009): 340-360; Danchev, “Tony Blair’s Vietnam”; Michael F. 
Hopkins, “Focus of a Changing Relationship: The Washington Embassy and Britain’s World Role since 
1945”, Contemporary British History. 12, no. 3 (1998): 103-114. 
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War, National Identity and Memory 
 
Firstly then, it is important to consider how war is connected to national identity. Military 
conflicts contribute to the construction of the identities of communities by whom, and on 
whose behalf, they are prosecuted. I draw on a concept of British nationhood here that 
contrasts the formal structures of the state, and is rooted in Benedict Anderson’s 
conception of an “imagined community”;24 one in which the self is linked to a communal 
identity that is psychologically and socially constructed. Britain is not a self-evident, 
primordial entity,25 but is referred to throughout this work, as Linda Colley has described, 
as a “culturally and ethnically diverse, problematic, protean and artificial [construct]”;26 
an “invented nation superimposed… onto much older alignments and loyalties.”27 Other 
community identities existed before the creation of a British nation-state in the eighteenth 
century – ethnic, religious28 and, in the case of England and Scotland in particular, 
national29 – and though it is difficult to disentangle British identity from other modes or 
                                                     
24 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 2006), 6. 
25 For an overview of theory related to nationalism and national identity, see; Umut Ozkirimli, Theories of 
Nationalism (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010).  
Most academic considerations of national identity draw on the ‘modernist’ conception of which the nation 
is not material or tangible, but is a social construct linking individuals to a wider national community. The 
conditions under which it came into being in North American and Europe were specific to the modern 
period. Large-scale printing, mass culture and society and industrial revolution helped to create a sense 
community much broader than the local. For modernist analyses, see, for example: Timonthy Baycroft and 
Mark Hewitson What is a Nation: Europe, 1989-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Stefan 
Berger, Germany (London: Arnold, 2004); John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1993); Vincent R. Comerford, Ireland (London: Arnold, 2003); Nicholas 
Doumanis, Italy (London: Arnold, 2000); Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2006); Henrietta Harrison, China (London: Arnold, 2001); Sinisa Malesevic, Nation-States and 
Nationalisms (Cambridge: Polity, 2013); Vera Tolz, Russia (London: Arnold, 2000).  
26 Colley, Britons, 6. 
27 Ibid., 6. 
28 For an overview of theoretical debates in this area, see: Rogers Brubaker, “Ethnicity, Race, and 
Nationalism”, Annual Review of Sociology. 35, no. 1 (2009): 21-42.  
For a consideration of the role of violence within the ‘Ethnosymbolist’ school of thought on national 
identity – one in which pre-existing religious and ethnic identities are said to be more important than purely 
modern circumstance – see: John Hutchinson, “Warfare and the Sacralisation of Nations: The Meanings, 
Rituals and Politics of National Remembrance”, Millennium. 38, no. 2 (2009): 401-417; Anthony D. Smith, 
“Ethnie and Nation in the Modern World”, Millennium. 14, no. 2 (1985): 127-142. 
29 Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood, “Introduction”, in A Union of Multiple Identities, edited by 
Laurence Brockliss and David Eastwood (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997); Norman 
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forms, I focus here on Britain because of its pre-eminence as a mode of national 
identification within the related literature,30 because of its closer alignment with the 
British state and military, and because military force has been pursued in the British 
national interest.  
 National identity is also fundamentally a temporal construct.31 Nations, including 
the British nation, exist because they are thought to possess a shared, common history by 
its members, one which conveys a sense of uniqueness and antiquity.32 Though of course 
this shared sense of a common past incorporates a wide variety of elements and events, 
war and military conflict have been crucial, particularly in Europe where “Most nation-
states that came into existence before the mid-20th century were created by war or had 
their boundaries defined by wars or internal violence.”33 Military violence is an 
extraordinary aspect within the construction of national identities as it involves making 
sense of extraordinary conditions; the emotive force of the nation as a form of 
identification for individuals results from its status as a focus for “blood sacrifice”.34 
Certainly, warfare has been a consistent feature of the construction, or ‘forging’, of 
British identity from its inception in the eighteenth century, predicated on a Protestant 
                                                                                                                                                              
Davies, The Isles (London: Papermac, 2000); Robert Tombs, The English and their History (London: 
Penguin Random House, 2015); Richard Weight, Patriots (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2002).  
For a consideration of contemporary Englishness within the context of a multi-national, British identity, 
see: Robert Colls, Identity of England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).  
30 Krishnan Kumar, “Negotiating English identity: Englishness, Britishness and the future of the United 
Kingdom”, Nations and Nationalism. 16, no. 3 (2010): 469-487.  
31 For a discussion of the ontological basis of nations as a ‘bounded community’ in which temporal space is 
central, see: Felix Berenskoetter, “Parameters of a National Biography”, European Journal of International 
Relations. 20, no. 1 (2014): 262-288. 
32 Anthony Smith, National Identity (London: Penguin Books, 1991), 11.   
33 Hutchinson, “Sacralisation of Nations”, 401.  
See also: Susan-Mary Grant, “Raising the Dead: war, memory and American national identity”, Nations 
and Nationalism. 11, no. 4 (2005): 509-529.  
34 Carolyn Marvin and David W. Ingle, Blood Sacrifice and the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), 1. 
See also: Sonya Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 11-13. 
For a sociological discussion of the importance of military sacrifice in the creation of community identities, 
see: Sinisa Malesevic, The Sociology of War and Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
180-191.  
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imperial mission and contest with Catholic, absolutist continental powers. Linda Colley 
describes the importance of military conflict in clarifying foundational ideas of British 
identity: 
 
It [British identity] was an invention forged above all by war. Time and time again, war with France 
brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an 
obviously hostile Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They 
defined themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world’s foremost Catholic 
power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, superstitious, 
militarist, decadent and unfree. And, increasingly as the wars went on, many of them defined 
themselves in contrast to the colonial peoples they conquered, peoples who were manifestly alien in 
terms of culture, religion and colour.
35 
 
Military conflict offered a way for the distinctions between national groups to come into 
focus through a process of ‘Othering’.36 Perceptions of British identity were clarified by 
contrast against those who were fought. Again, for Robert Tombs, famous battles against 
the French (in this case perhaps the most famous at Waterloo in 1815) were imbued with 
extra meanings about what it meant to be British:   
 
The dramatic and bloody battle – Wellington’s army suffered 15,000 casualties, nearly one man in 
four – gave rise to powerful legends, with echoes even now. Both sides thought that the battle was 
more than just a physical struggle. The two commanders and their armies seemed to represent 
national and ideological opposites. Wellington’s army embodied stoical resistance to Napoleon’s 
                                                     
35 Colley, Britons, 6.  
36 Othering is a term with specific meanings in social research which I deploy here, and throughout, in a 
broad sense of forming one’s own identity by contrast with a perceived ‘Other’. For an overview, see: Sune 
Qvotrup Jensen, “Othering, Identity Formation and Agency”, Qualitative Studies. 2, no. 1 (2011): 63-78. 
In regard to recent military interventions, see: Tarak Barkawi, “’Small Wars’ and Big Consequences: From 
Korea to Iraq”, Globalizations. 6,  no. 1 (2009): 127-131; Tarak Barkawi, “From War to Security: Security 
Studies, the Wider Agenda and the Fate of the Study of War”, Millennium. 39, no. 3 (2011): 701-716.  
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bold aggressiveness: tradition against revolution, British phlegm against furia Francese – 
‘established character’ against ‘angry and turbulent passions’, as a British newspaper put it later.37 
 
Of course, constructions of British identity have never been singular or static. Competing 
ideas and narratives are in constant negotiation as individual and group perspectives on 
the national past differ. Likewise the relationship between individuals and the national 
community transforms as circumstances change. A belief in Protestantism and imperial 
expansion are – though of course retaining an important legacy – no longer primary ways 
in which British identity is conceived, given the increasingly secular and multicultural 
nature of its society, and the profoundly transformative process of decolonisation which 
took place from the late 1940s.38 These transformations in British international and 
domestic politics have, it is argued, led to a contemporary re-ignition of a broad debate 
about ‘Britishness’ and the cohesiveness of British identity.39   
War however, remains a consistent feature in Britain’s more recent history and at 
this point it is important to explain how military conflicts have become central to the 
contemporary construction of British identities. I argue here that wars retain their place as 
part of a “common sense of the past”40 through the dynamics of memory, the study of 
which has undergone a ‘boom’ within academia over the last few decades,41 and it is from 
                                                     
37 Tombs, The English, 413. 
38 Colley, Britons, 7.  
For debate on the ways in which imperialism retains an important social grip in the contemporary period, 
and the ways in which it remains contested, see for example: N. C. Fleming, “Echoes of Britannia: 
Television History, Empire and the Critical Public Sphere”, Contemporary British History. 24, no. 1 
(2010): 1-22; Paul Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005).  
39 Bikhu Parekh, “Defining British National Identity”, Political Quarterly. 71, no. 1 (2000): 251-262; Bikhu 
Parekh, “Being British”, Political Quarterly. 78, no. 1 (2007): 32-40.  
For a discussion of the imminent ‘Break up of Britain’, see: Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of Britain (London: 
NLM, 1977). For a more recent discussion placed within the context of the end of the Second World War, 
see: David McCrone, “Unmasking Britannia: the rise and fall of British national identity”, Nations and 
Nationalism. 3, no. 4 (1997): 579-596.  
40 Malcolm Smith, Britain and 1940 (London: Routledge, 2000), 6. 
41 Duncan Bell, “Introduction: Violence and Memory”, Millennium. 38, no. 2 (2009): 345-360; Jay Winter, 
“The Generation of Memory: Reflections on the ‘Memory Boom’ in Contemporary Historical Studies,” 
Canadian Military History. 10, no. 3 (2001): 57-66. 
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studies of British war memory that I draw a theoretical understanding and to which I hope 
to contribute. 
In the twentieth century, Britain has been involved in two world wars, both of 
which elicited mass mobilisation, suffering and trauma.42 Naturally they involved the 
lived experiences of individuals, and pertained to the individual memories of the people 
caught up in them, yet those personal experiences are constantly in negotiation with 
broader, public interpretations in which lived experience forms part of a shared past.43 
Sources of evidence in which these shared, popular memories of the past can be 
uncovered are various, ranging from place names to personal diaries to popular film and 
literature, but are distinguished by popular appeal – that is to say that they are produced 
by or represent the shared beliefs of ‘ordinary’ people - rather than their academic or 
historical validity.44 
In recent decades memory has been conceptualised across a variety of vectors and 
scales,45 with increasing focus on the transnational character of remembrance.46 Memory 
                                                     
42 The study of memory is not necessarily related to trauma or sacrifice, but there remains an abundant, 
cross-disciplinary body of work related to the connections between the too. Loss or death in war catalyse 
the dynamics of memory and imbue remembrance with greater urgency. See, for example: T. G. Ashplant, 
Graham Dawson and Michael Roper, “The Politics of War Memory and Commemoration: Contexts, 
Structures and Dynamics”, in The Politics of War Commemorations, edited by T.G. Ashplant, Graham 
Dawson and Michael Roper (London: Routledge, 2000); Bell, “Violence and Memory”; W. James Booth, 
“Kashmir Road: Some Reflections on Memory and Violence”, Millennium. 38, no. 2 (2009): 361-377; 
Jeffrey K. Olick, “’Collective Memory’: A Memoir and Prospect”, Memory Studies. 1, no. 1 (2007): 20-25; 
Jeffrey K. Olick and Joyce Robbins, “Social Memory Studies: From ‘Collective Memory’ to the Historical 
Sociology of Mnemonic Practices”, Annual Review of Sociology. 24, no. 1 (1998): 105-41. 
43 For an overview of scholarship related to war memory, see the edited collections: Martin Evans and 
Kenneth Lunn, War and Memory in the Twentieth Century (New York: Berg, 1997); Patrick Finney, 
Remembering the Second World War (London: Routledge, 2011); Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, War 
and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
44 Popular culture, including television, film, radio and printed literature and images is a primary source of 
uncovering both popular attitudes and popular representations of the past. For examples of works in 
Britain’s historical identity and shared understandings of its past are revealed through film and printed 
images, see: Geoffrey Hurd, National Fictions: World War Two in British Film and Television (London: 
BFI, 1984); Michael Paris, Warrior Nation (London: Reaktion, 2000); Jeffrey Richards, Films and British 
National Identity (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997). 
Raphael Samuel listed and explored the various forms, expressions and sources of popular memory. See: 
Raphael Samuel, Theatres of Memory (London: Verso, 1994), 8-17.  
45 See: Patrick Finney “Introduction”, in Remembering the Second World War, edited by Patrick Finney 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2017).  
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of the Holocaust is perhaps the best example in this regard, offering not only a 
“touchstone for evil in the modern world”47 but also an experience which is relayed 
across regional and state boundaries.48 Yet memories of past conflicts remain disputed 
even as combatant nations engage in increasingly complex forms of integration.49 Thus 
war is remembered in Britain primarily as part of a national story – having been fought 
by and on behalf of the nation and its interests, or even survival, and against other distinct 
national communities – in which British experience was unique and imbued specific ideas 
of identity for its citizens50 though again, such memories remain contested among 
individuals and groups within society.51 
Often historians refer to these shared or common interpretations about the past as 
‘myths’.52 As Mark Connelly suggests, in relation to war memory, myth is not 
synonymous with “falsification”,53 rather it is meant to suggest the flexible and selective 
process of remembrance which is constantly active in the present, and which functions by 
                                                                                                                                                              
46 For scholarship focused primarily on the transnational and international proliferation of cultural/popular 
war memories, see the special edition: “Traveling War”, History and Memory. 27, no. 2 (2015).  
47 Daniel Levy and Natan Szaider, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (Philadelphia, PA: 
Temple University Press, 2006),18. 
48 Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust (New 
York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012); Michael Rothberg, Multidirectional Memory (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2009). 
49 Peter J. Verovsek, “Expanding Europe through Memory: The Shifting Content of the Ever-Salient Past”, 
Millennium. 42, no. 2 (2014): 531-550. For a specific example of tensions between contemporary national 
and transnational European memories of the battle of Waterloo, see: Jasper Heinzein, “A Negotiated Truce: 
The Battle of Waterloo in European Memory since the Second World War”, History and Memory. 26, no. 1 
(2014): 39-74.  
50 The ways in which memories of the past contribute to national identities in the present is explored in the 
edited collections: Richard Ned Lebow, Wulf Kansteiner and Claudio Fogu, eds. The Politics of Memory in 
Postwar Europe (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006); Jeffrey Olick, ed. States of Memory: Continuities, 
Conflicts and Transformations in National Retrospect (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003). For a 
discussion of the ways in which memories of the origins of World War Two have been figured along 
national lines, see: Patrick Finney, Remembering the Road to World War Two (London: Routledge, 2011).  
51 Sonya Rose, Which People’s War? National Identity and Citizenship in Britain, 1939-1945 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006), 290-293.  
For a consideration of the ways in which Chinese and Japanese memories of the Second World War, and 
inferences of national identity, have been mobilised by political elites in order to satisfy the political needs 
of the present, see: Yinan He, “Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-
2006”, History and Memory. 19, no. 2 (2007): 43-74.  
52 The concepts of myth and mythology within social research is often linked to work of Roland Barthes, 
where it is considered to be a linguistic device in which the past is crystallised into particular narrative 
forms. See: Roland Barthes, Mythologies (New York, N.Y.: Hill and Wang, 2012).  
53 Mark Connelly, We Can Take It! Britain and the Memory of the Second World War (Harlow: Pearson 
Longman, 2004), 1.  
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giving particular meaning to the past through narrative.54 While I do not use the term 
myth in this research – as I do not seek to appraise or suggest the existence of a 
mythology of Britain’s recent wars or any previous events – it is important to state that 
neither do I consider memory to be reducible to lived experience and recollection alone. 
Memories of past events such as military conflict are simultaneously personal and 
collective; private and public.55 As such they exist within the imagination of those who 
were not alive during their constituent events. Those born after 1945 still ‘remember’ 
Britain’s experience in the Second World War as it is transmitted over time. Scholars 
refer variously to ‘collective’, ‘social’, ‘popular’, ‘post’56 and – related specifically to the 
remembrance of other people’s trauma – ‘prosthetic’57 memory, all of which capture to 
some degree the broader, shared quality of invoking the communal past.58 Throughout 
this research I refer primarily to ‘popular’ memories; those which are transmitted across 
generations and contain within them specific narratives of the past, including Britain’s 
national experience and identity.  
The manner in which these popular memories are transmitted over time is 
important in defining their meanings and content. There are of course, social dynamics 
which affect what is remembered about past events and what is not. Unwillingness to 
reveal certain personal experiences like, for example, fear or regret, mean that they 
                                                     
54 Connelly is particularly critical of works which are intended simply to ‘debunk’ myths of the past, 
suggesting that there exists a truthful account of experience in wartime and that subsequent myths are 
inaccurate rather than selective or malleable. See, for example: Nicholas Harman, Dunkirk: The Necessary 
Myth (London: Holder and Stoughton, 1981); Clive Ponting, 1940: Myth and Reality (London: Cardinal, 
1990).  
55 Popular memories rest on the interpretative agency of individuals and the memories they draw on from 
lived experience, yet popular and public memories of the past shaped these individual narratives, even 
among those with first-hand experience of war or combat. See: Alistair Thomson, ANZAC Memories 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 11-15; Lucy Noakes, “Gender and British National Identity in 
Wartime: A Study of the Links Between Gender and National Identity in Britain in the Second World War, 
the Falklands War, and the Gulf War”, PhD dissertation (University of Sussex, Brighton, 1996), 15-17. 
56 Hirsch, The Generation of Postmemory. 
57 Alison Landsberg, Prosthetic Memory (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2004).  
58 For an overview of the various types and scales of memory related to World War Two, see: Finney, 
“Introduction”; Lucy Noakes, and Juliette Pattinson, “Introduction”, in British Cultural Memory and the 
Second World War, edited by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury, 2014). 
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inevitably remain personal and unshared, not contributing to public, popular memory.59 
The construction of popular memory always rests on the contribution of individual and 
personal memories, but the way in which the latter surfaces is always affected by the 
social pressures and cultural norms of everyday life. The effects of “accident, confusion 
and avarice”60 are an important part in the ongoing renegotiation of the past.  
Further, these immediate social pressures are accompanied by the broader impact 
of the political and cultural context in which popular memories are invoked and re-
invoked. Indeed, remembrance is an active process in which events are selectively tied 
together to create narrative and meaning,61 and in which the past is ‘mediated’ and 
‘articulated’ in the present; not simply recalled.62 Thus popular memories of wartime 
experience, and the narratives of Britain’s identity which they transmit, are constantly 
reworked in the present, as what is remembered about past wars is used to explain 
contemporary circumstance. Popular memories must retain both purchase with personal 
or lived experience,63 but must also retain a relevancy or “explanatory power”64 in the 
present in order to survive.65 This has led some scholars to emphasise the ‘invented’66 
                                                     
59 Angus Calder, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 1992), 119-121;Lucy Noakes, “The BBC’s 
‘People’s War’ website and memories of fear in wartime in 21st-century Britain”, in British Cultural 
Memory and the Second World War, edited by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014); Noakes, “Gender and British National Identity”, 7-8; Daniel Todman, The Great War: Myth and 
Memory (London: Bloomsbury, 2007), 222-224. 
60 Todman, The Great War, 223. 
61 Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper, “The politics of war memory”; Bell, “Violence and Memory”; Connelly, 
We Can Take It!; Mark Freeman, “Telling Stories: Memory and Narrative”, in Memory: Histories, 
Theories, Debates, edited by Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York, N.Y.: Fordham University 
Press, 2010); Hutchinson, “Sacralisation of Nations”; Jeffrey Olick, “Introduction” in States of Memory: 
Continuities, Conflicts and Transformations in National Retrospect, edited by Jeffrey Olick (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2003); Olick, “’Collective Memory’”; Olick and Robbins, “Social Memory Studies”.  
62 Susannah Radstone, “Reconceiving Binaries: the Limits of Memory”, History Workshop Journal. 59, no. 
1 (2005): 134-150. 
63 Lucy Noakes, War and the British: Gender, Memory and National Identity (London: I.B. Taurus, 1998), 
13. 
64 Todman, The Great War, 223. 
65 For a consideration of a ‘forgotten’ war, see: Huxford, “The Korean War”.  
66 Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); 
Eric Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”, in The Invention of Tradition, edited by Eric 
Hobsbawm and Terence O. Ranger (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
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nature of popular memories and to highlight the power relations at work when memories 
of the national past are articulated with urgency: 
 
[Popular memories are] constantly renewed in political and ideological contexts, as political leaders 
seek to turn them to their own advantage and as interpreters, notably in mass media of 
communication, seek to project new versions for our consumption.
67 
 
A definition of popular memory as an aggregate of personal experiences does not account 
for the ways in which politics alter what can be and is remembered; yet a purely 
‘invented’ conception does not make adequate space for the agency of ‘ordinary’ people 
in contributing to this ongoing process of remembrance, the personal and familial 
transmission of lived experiences,68 or the ‘social agency’ of the individual people 
engaged in remembering the past.69 Studies of popular memory must acknowledge the 
mutually constitutive nature of personal, private experience and collective, public 
narratives,70 and acknowledge that individual representations of the past “cannot, in 
concrete studies, be readily unscrambled from the effects of dominant historical 
discourses.”71 
Popular memories of the world wars continue to inform constructions of British 
identity in the contemporary era. The mass mobilisation involved in these conflicts meant 
that wartime experience was felt pervasively and profoundly across British society. The 
First World War reordered not only the political and ideological make-up of Europe,72 but 
                                                     
67 Martin Shaw, “Past wars and present conflicts: from the Second World War to the Gulf”, in War and 
Memory in the Twentieth Century, edited by Martin Evans and Kevin Lunn (New York: Berg, 1997), 193.  
68 Ashplant, Dawson, and Roper, “The politics of war memory”, 11.  
69 Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan, “Setting the framework”, in War and Remembrance in the Twentieth 
Century, edited by Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
70 Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 11-15.  
71 Popular Memory Group, “Popular memory: theory, politics, method”, in Making Histories, edited by 
Richard Johnson (London: Hutchinson, 1982).  
72 David Reynolds, The Long Shadow (London: Simon and Schuster, 2013). 
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also produced lasting popular memories rooted in the search for meaning in massive 
trauma.73 As contemporary circumstances changed popular memory of the First World 
War underwent subsequent transformation as later generations sought to use the past to 
explain the present.74 The war became the subject of voluminous popular literature, its 
cultural reception helping to figure what was remembered, and placing the image of 
British soldiers and trench warfare at the core of subsequent representations.75 The 
political and social impacts of the conflict have become less prominent in popular 
memory while an ambiguity over its legitimacy became a salient feature of its social 
legacy in later decades. At the time of the war, and immediately after, British people were 
supportive of the effort to halt apparent German aggression; only in the mid-twentieth 
century did ideas related to the futility or pointlessness of the war, fuelled by the context 
of the Cold War nuclear security dilemma, become associated specifically with the death 
and destruction of the trenches.76  
Though memory of the First World War shaped what was thought about Britain’s 
entry into and experience of World War Two,77 it is popular memory of the latter which is 
more widely thought to have informed contemporary constructions of British identity, and 
had a greater impact within society subsequently.78 World War Two has remained so 
prominent in British political and cultural life since 1945 both because of the massive 
                                                     
73 Paul Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Jay Winter, 
Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Jay Winter, 
Remembering War (London: Yale University Press, 2006). 
74 Todman, The Great War. 
75 Matthew S. Adams, “Herbert Read and the Fluid Memory of the First World War: Poetry, Prose and 
Polemic”, Historical Research. 88, no. 1 (2015): 333-354; Ian Isherwood, “The British Publishing Industry 
and Commercial Memories of the First World War”, War in History. 23, no. 3 (2016): 323-340; Helen B. 
McCartney, “The First World War Soldier and his Contemporary Image in Britain”, International Affairs. 
90, no. 2 (2014): 299-315; Todman, The Great War, 1-42. 
76 Marlene A. Briggs, “Dis/composing the First World War in Britain: Trauma and Commemoration in the 
Testimony of Harry Patch, 1998-2008”, History and Memory. 28, no. 1 (2016): 71-109; Heather Jones, 
“Goodbye to all that? Memory and Meaning in the Commemoration of the First World War”, Juncture. 20, 
no. 4 (2014): 287-291; Todman, The Great War, 221.  
77 Reynolds, The Long Shadow. 
78 For an overview, see: Smith, Britain and 1940; Connelly, We Can Take It!; Noakes and Pattinson 
“Introduction”. 
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sacrifice and trauma it engendered – and thus a need to make sense of this retrospectively 
– but also because popular memories of the war have retained an explanatory power over 
the present. As Lucy Noakes has identified, popular memory of the Second World War 
helped to explain and clarify perspectives on Britain’s conflicts in the Falklands and Gulf 
wars. Contemporary interpretations were refracted through gendered identities shaped by 
wartime experience decades later as men and women drew on differing personal and 
popular memories to make sense of conflict in the present.79 World War Two has become 
an increasingly important object of memory in Europe after the geopolitical and 
technological tumult of the end of the Cold War,80 despite its steady transition into purely 
popular, social or collective memory as its participant generation dwindle.81  
Of course popular memories of the Second World War have also been subject to 
change as a result of the shifting political and cultural circumstances in which they are 
invoked.82 Personal experiences that did not fit with prevailing narratives of identity in 
the war have been omitted as individuals involved did not publicly articulated their 
experiences, or as official commemorations have not made space for them. As social 
circumstances change, so can dominant narratives about the past. For example, the Royal 
Air Force’s Bomber Command received a memorial only in the late 1990s after a 
concerted effort on behalf of veterans for recognition of their contribution to Britain’s war 
effort. The preceding absence of a memorial reveals both the incongruence of Britain’s 
campaign of strategic bombing with a popular memory of Britain’s role in ‘the good 
                                                     
79 Noakes, War and the British, 167-170. 
80 Dan Stone, Goodbye to All That? The Story of Europe since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014); David Reynolds, “World War II and Modern Meanings”, Diplomatic History. 25, no. 3 (2001): 457-
472. 
81 Patrick Finney, “Politics and technologies of authenticity: the Second World War at the close of living 
memory”, Rethinking History. 21, no. 2. (2017): 154-170.  
82 For example, see: Finney, Remembering the Road, 14-22; Connelly, We Can Take It!, 11-14; Smith, 
Britain and 1940, 1-10; Noakes, War and the British 10-14; Noakes and Pattinson, “Introduction”, 4-10. 
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war’,83 but also the extent to which social circumstances can elicit change in national 
popular memory.84 Likewise, the emergence of new technologies and forms of 
communication can alter dominant memories of the past85 and reveal personal 
experiences that were otherwise absent or marginalised like, for example, internet 
websites such as the BBC’s ‘People’s War’ page which has elicited the entry of new 
narratives of the past into the public sphere.86  
 Further still, political forces in the present - in seeking to provide articulations of 
the past which serve contemporary political ends - have affected how the Second World 
War has been remembered at various points since. Often the construction and revision of 
a ‘people’s war’ narrative, in which the war effort was the result of, and attributed to, a 
newly engendered social and class unity, is credited with having helped to sustain 
subsequent political and economic arrangements within Britain domestically.87 Historians 
have identified a revised narrative of British experience in World War Two that took 
shape in the 1980s, less involved with memory of the ‘people’s war’ and focused 
primarily on a more direct celebration of military achievements of ‘the few’, an emphasis 
on ‘standing alone’ in 1940, and echoes of past imperial greatness.88 Yet political re-
appraisal like this does not equate to wholesale reconstruction. While emphasis can be 
placed on one conception over another, popular memories must maintain “some purchase 
                                                     
83 Brett Holman, “’Bomb Back, and Bomb Hard’: Debating Reprisals during the Blitz”, Australian Journal 
of Politics and History. 58, no. 3 (2012): 394-407.  
84 Frances Houghton, “Writing the ‘Missing Chapter’”, in British Cultural Memory and the Second World 
War, edited by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).  
85 Access to current affairs and news information through the internet has offered avenues for new research 
into the effects of memory, and the ways in which past events are explored as a frame for the present. For a 
consideration of this dynamic concerning air crashes, see: Ruth Garcia-Gavilanes, et al. “The memory 
remains: Understanding collective memory in the digital age”, Science Advances. 3, no. 1 (2017): 1-7.  
86 Noakes, “‘People’s War’ website”. 
87 See, for example: Geoff Eley, “Finding the People’s War: Film, British Collective Memory, and World 
War II”, American Historical Review. 106, no. 3 (2001): 818-838; Penny Summerfield, “Dunkirk and the 
Popular Memory of Britain at War, 1940-1958”, Journal of Contemporary History. 45, no. 4 (2014): 788-
811. 
88 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 276-280; Noakes, War and the British, 105-106; Smith, Britain and 1940, 
126-129; Ibid., 152. 
For a consideration of the place of the Falklands War within the broader context of ‘Thatcherism’, see: 
Richard Vinen, Thatcher’s Britain (London: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 134-153.  
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with people’s personal memories”.89 Again, popular memories and narratives of Britain’s 
role in military conflict should not be approached as political or elite constructs alone; 
space must be made for a consideration of the interpretations of the mass of ordinary 
British people who invoke and transmit them to subsequent generations.  
 Though subject to change, revision and reconstruction popular memory of 
Britain’s Second World War has remained anchored in a public narrative of legitimacy 
and vindication. Mark Connelly has described the broad contours of this dominant 
account of Britain’s World War Two experience: 
 
In 1939 Britain falls into war unprepared and lacking a genuine leader. In 1940 Britain gained the 
leader it deserved in Winston Churchill, faced humiliating defeat in France but thanks to an 
extraordinary rallying of the nation an Armada of small boats crossed the channel to rescue the 
soldiers on the beaches of Dunkirk. Britain then stood alone, without allies, surrounded by the 
enemy. The Battle of Britain was won by the Few in the skies over the rolling countryside of 
southern England. Defeat in this battle forced the Germans into an indiscriminate bombing 
campaign. Far from causing the collapse of Britain, the people drew together in an even tighter bond 
and they embarked fully on their People’s War. Surviving the Blitz did not bring about victory, 
however. Britain went on to suffer defeats in virtually every theatre of war until Montgomery came 
along and won a decisive victory in the desert. After that, with new allies, it was a glorious 
adventure. On D-Day ‘Monty’ led the way back to France, and the war culminated in the suicide of 
Hitler and the defeat of the Third Reich. In the Pacific the Americans dropped an atomic bomb, thus 
ending the war completely, although it has to be said that events in the Far East have not had a 
prominent profile in the British myth. In 1945 Britain deserved the applause of the world because it 
was the only nation to have been in from first to last. It had taken the formidable blows of the enemy 
unaided and won through.
90 
 
                                                     
89 Noakes, War and the British, 25.  
90 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 1. 
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Britain’s Second World War memory focused largely on Europe on the struggle against 
Nazi Germany, primarily concerned the population of the metropole at the expense of 
widespread recognition of the mobilisation of colonial troops,91 and referred to a 
profoundly justified and just use of military force. Of course, as suggested above, 
memory of the war has been invoked in subsequent decades and recast in various political 
guises to suit the needs of the present, yet these competing conceptions have not diverged 
radically from broader popular memory of the war in which Britain was identified 
unambiguously as a force for good in the world, having opposed the ‘evil’ of the Nazis,92 
and ‘stood alone’ in 1940.93 Certainly, the main constituent events of Britain’s Second 
World War memory share in this celebrated quality and have been coloured by a belief in 
the unity of the nation in the face of aggression and, for a time, possible defeat.94 Popular 
memory of the Second World War, in this sense, offers a clear and essentially consistent 
construction of a shared national past; an instance in which British identity was assured. 
 War memory must not however, be considered the product of world wars or 
consigned to events which occurred many decades ago. Recent ‘small wars’ remain 
                                                     
91 For a consideration of the relative place of empire within Britain’s Second World War memory, see: 
Patrick Finney, “Isaac Fadoyebo’s journey: remembering the British Empire’s Second World War”, in 
Remembering the Second World War, edited by Patrick Finney (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017); Martin 
Francis, “Remembering war, forgetting empire? Representations of the North Africa Campaign in 1950s 
British cinema”, in British Cultural Memory and the Second World War, edited by Lucy Noakes and 
Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia, 87-95; Wendy Ugolini, 
“Memory, ethnicity and the British Home Front”, in British Cultural Memory and the Second World War, 
edited by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattinson (London: Bloomsbury, 2014).  
For a consideration of the impact of imperial forces within the war, and their place within the continuing 
legacy of the conflict, see: Tarak Barkawi, Soldiers of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017).  
92 The policy of appeasement, and its legitimacy and effectiveness, remains an important part of British 
popular memory of the Second World War. See: Finney, Remembering the Road, 191; Ibid., 217; Connelly, 
We Can Take It!, 269-271. 
93 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 280-294; Smith, Britain and 1940, 7-9. 
94 Memory of the Blitz has been coloured heavily by a sense that the bombing suffered by Briton’s 
engendered a form of national unity and galvanised the war effort at home in the face of destruction, see: 
Calder, Myth of the Blitz. 
The Battle of Britain has also figured heavily in popular memory of the war, focused largely on the heroism 
of ‘the Few’, see: Martin Francis, The Flyer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Smith, Britain and 
1940, 52-69. For a consideration of the salience of memory of the retreat from Dunkirk, see also: 
Summerfield, “Dunkirk”.  
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important objects of study because of the identities the nations involved invest in them.95 
Likewise, the dynamics of memory operate from the occurrence of its constituent events. 
As Alistair Thomson identifies, “public representations of the past – including the very 
recent past that has only just been experienced – are thus used as an aid in the constant 
process of making sense of personal experiences”.96 The memories and legacies of all 
conflicts, of all scales, contribute to a common sense of the past and affect perceptions of 
Britain’s national identity and how individuals relate to it. 
Indeed, historians and commentators have studied Britain’s recent conflicts from a 
memory perspective, most notably considering the Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo wars.97 
Generally however, such studies have approached contemporary cases from a focus on 
commemoration or memory of the world wars rather than identifying Britain’s recent 
conflicts as a distinct era requiring singular attention. I focus in this thesis on Britain’s 
recent conflicts as objects of study in themselves. I consider their relationship with 
interpretations of national identity and historical memory, and how their prosecution was 
understood by British people. They are, from a material, social and political perspective, 
important events in their own right. 
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96 Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 12. 
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Britain’s Recent Wars in Context 
 
The 1982 Falklands War was interpreted by the government and much of the 
contemporary news media as both a military and political success. The defeat of the 
Argentine Junta was linked vociferously by the Prime Minster, Margaret Thatcher, to a 
history of British greatness focused on imperial prestige and the Second World War. This 
narrative formed part of a reinvigorated right-wing settlement for Britain98 in which she 
explained that “Britain has re-kindled that spirit which has fired her for generations past 
and which today has begun to burn as brightly as before”.99 Representation of the conflict 
in the media, both the reporting of individual incidents, battles and events, and what it 
reflected about Britain’s place in the world more broadly, were often positive and 
celebratory whilst conspicuously gendered and militaristic.100  
Such ideas, linking contemporary conflict to an unbroken and celebrated British 
past, were of course contested both within governing or media elites and the wider public. 
The sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, on 2 May served as a point of 
focus for those in parliament and civil society who objected to the rush to war like, for 
example, the Labour Member of Parliament Tam Dalyell.101 Indeed, the Sun newspaper’s 
headline following the ship’s sinking - “GOTCHA!”102 – seemed to overstep the mark 
and is now largely remembered as an instance in which legitimate war reporting was 
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abandoned in favour of insidious jingoism. However, even for those who objected to the 
war, the illegitimacy of Argentina’s occupation of the Islands was rarely in doubt. The 
opposition leader Michael Foot – a politician whose left-wing background and academic 
predisposition made him an unlikely belligerent – supported a robust response to “an act 
of naked, unqualified aggression, carried out in the most shameful and disreputable of 
circumstances”.103 The war’s detractors instead focused primarily on the apparent rush to 
use military force, and the Thatcher government’s use of the conflict for its own political 
and domestic purposes. The conflict is now thought of primarily as a defence of an island 
people, a line that forms the basis of both official government policy104 and the 
mediatised self-representation of the Islanders themselves.105 It was a conflict based on 
legitimacy. It showed that British military force could be used because it was right rather 
than because it was necessary, and that it could be politically expedient. Thus it “provided 
a bridge from the Second World War to Britain’s more recent military interventions.”106  
 The Gulf War of 1990/1991 generated a different public discourse. The conflict 
was seen as an important event in Britain yet it was global in scope, not a solely British 
effort as the Falklands campaign had been. While memories of the Second World War 
and its constituent events framed representation of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the 
popular press,107 the war was also identified as an American one fought as the global Cold 
War came to an end.108 The conflict was robustly supported by both the Thatcher and 
                                                     
103 United Kingdom, Hansard Parliamentary Debates, cc638. Series 6 Vol. 21, 1982.  
104 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, “2010 to 2015 government policy: Falklands Islanders’ right to self-
determination”, 2015. Online, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-
government-policy-falkland-Islanders-right-to-self-determination/2010-to-2015-government-policy-
falkland-Islanders-right-to-self-determination (Accessed 31-08-2018) 
105 Sarah Maltby, Remembering the Falklands War (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2016). 
106 Helen Parr, Our Boys: The Story of a Paratrooper (London: Allen Lane, 2018), 297. 
107 For examples and discussion of the manner in which the Second World War, and in particular narratives 
of appeasement, informed much of the immediate press coverage of the Gulf crisis, see: Noakes, “Gender 
and British National Identity”, 192-212. 
108 The Guardian lead following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was illustrative, declaring, “Superpowers unite 
on Iraq”, The Guardian, 03 August, 1990.  
25 
 
 
 
Major governments, and was broadly supported by the British public.109 Critics of 
Operation Desert Storm (the codename for US-led operations in the Gulf) in the national 
and, by now, global news media saw the conflict as part of American realpolitik or an 
effort to enforce a new, post-Cold War imperialism. Christopher Hitchens’ dissection of a 
war that was “yet another move in the policy of keeping a region divided and embittered, 
and therefore accessible to the franchisers of weaponry and the owners of black gold”110 
juxtaposed later support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq which he thought a more noble 
pursuit of expanding liberal freedoms.111 Such an interpretation seems to mirror in the 
reverse popular consent for British involvement in the Gulf War and a far more critical 
public attitude toward Britain’s part in the invasion of Iraq in 2003. 
In fact, perhaps the most striking aspect of the Gulf War’s subsequent 
commemoration is the extent to which British involvement is so little remembered. 
Unlike the previous Falklands conflict it did not form part of a broader discourse on the 
political direction of the state or society. Nor is it as frequently returned to within national 
media. British Gulf War veterans received a monument only as recently as 2016.112 The 
conflict was thought to be an important event at the time, yet it was over rapidly and had 
resulted in minimal material impact for British or American forces.113 From the point of 
view of the present, it can perhaps be compared to Britain’s Korean War;114 its most 
striking aspect is the extent to which the use of force on such a scale remains overlooked’. 
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 As in Desert Storm, Britain’s military contribution during the Balkan wars – in 
both Bosnia from 1995 and Kosovo in 1999 – was as part of a broader coalition and 
junior to that of the US. However, the British government assumed a more assertive role 
in pursuing an ‘ethical foreign policy’115 and took a more definitive lead in pursuing a 
muscular reaction to the unravelling of the former Yugoslavia. Tony Blair’s speech, given 
in Chicago in April 1999 framed the Kosovo intervention as part of a broader struggle to 
define a humanitarian approach to world affairs and a commitment to a policy of active 
military intervention:  
 
This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil of 
ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed... If we let an evil dictator range 
unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later.
116 
 
The domestic representation of the Kosovo intervention was linked intrinsically to 
perceptions of the break-up of Yugoslavia, and the abuses and violence that occurred 
there. The Holocaust emerged within press and print media as a focal point for assessing 
the contemporary situation117 as fleeing refugees became symbolic of the nature of the 
violence in the region.118 However, public commemoration of Britain’s involvement in 
Allied Force lacked the sense of grief, trauma or reverence associated with mass 
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mobilisation and large numbers of British casualties. Fought at arm’s length largely 
through airpower, the conflict is recalled as a test case for military intervention - lacking 
serious military risk for Western states - within a new constellation of humanitarian 
foreign policy aims. Most indicators of public opinion revealed a deployment that was 
less robustly supported by the wider public than had been the case in the previous 
Falklands and Gulf wars.119 Certainly, the return of British forces did not engender any 
widespread celebration of British victory. The Balkan Wars, and Britain’s part in them, 
were viewed in light of the grotesque violence which stirred an international response. It 
marked the beginning of Britain’s era of humanitarian foreign policy in which moral 
arguments about actively and unilaterally intervening in the affairs of other states elicited 
fresh debate and contest within the public sphere.120 
 Domestic debate in Britain regarding the use of military force again shifted 
following the World Trade Center attacks in New York on 11 September 2001. President 
Bush’s newly declared ‘War on Terror’ informed public discourse related to Britain’s 
military deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq, yet the specific circumstances of each 
affected the manner in which they were discussed and debated in Britain. The initial 
intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 occurred in the weeks following the September 11th 
attacks and was almost wholly an American-led operation. As such, in the first few years 
of the conflict the level of public and media scrutiny of events matched the low intensity 
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of military operations. Responding to the challenge posed by a resurgent Taliban, the 
British redeployment to Helmand province in 2006 meant both the numbers of British 
soldiers deployed increased alongside the levels of violence and casualties suffered. The 
Afghan occupation was scrutinised in greater detail within the press and media as the 
numbers of military and civilian deaths rose,121 and in subsequent years became a byword 
for drawn-out and lengthy occupation, lacking clear military or political goals.122 The 
summary of the immediate post-Helmand phase of the conflict posted on the Imperial 
War Museum’s website indicates the extent to which concern and confusion were at the 
heart of the war’s public representation: 
 
In Britain, media coverage – especially of repatriation ceremonies – helped to bring greater public 
awareness of the conflict. There was a growing unease about the original aims of military 
intervention and its likelihood of bringing peace. At the same time, there was a visible groundswell 
of support for troops fighting in Afghanistan. New service charities – the most high profile of which 
was Help for Heroes – successfully campaigned to raise money for the war's young veterans.123 
 
By July 2009, according to a Comres poll, just 35% of respondents believed the 
Afghanistan War was winnable while 31% believed Britain should devote more troops 
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and resources.124 The war’s representation in popular culture perhaps reflected the 
prevailing public mood. For example, the British film, Kajaki, was released to broad 
critical acclaim immediately after the end of British combat operations in 2014.125 Based 
on actual events, it tells the story of a group of British paratroopers who inadvertently 
move into a Soviet-era minefield while patrolling the surrounds of the Kajaki dam in 
northern Helmand Province. The plot seems to capture neatly the interpretation of the 
conflict by a disillusioned public; the soldiers are portrayed as brave, decent, even heroic, 
yet they are trapped by circumstance and are, almost from the beginning of the film, 
desperate simply to escape. The vast majority of the film’s duration is shot in a single 
location with the protagonists brutally injured and unable to move. Taliban insurgents or 
enemy combatants are almost entirely absent. The greatest hurdle facing the soldiers - like 
Britain itself - is how to extricate themselves from the increasingly desperate situation 
into which they have stumbled.  
 The popular interpretation of Britain’s war in Afghanistan cannot be understood 
however, without an assessment of the public reaction to the war in Iraq from 2003. 
Britain’s contribution to a largely American invasion was, from its inception, 
controversial and contested.126 The Blair government’s effort to temper American 
unilateralism and seek a broader, international consensus127 was complicated by a parallel 
attempt to secure domestic support by stressing the threat posed by the Iraqi regime.128 
Within parliament, the media and among the wider public, the government’s official case 
for war, based largely on the suspected Iraqi weapons programme, was never widely 
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accepted.129 In the House of Commons the government relied on the support of the 
Conservative opposition to initiate the use of force and suffered resignations by 
prominent members of the cabinet, most notably Clare Short and Robin Cook.130 Public 
protest against the war reached a level unique among the cases I consider.131 While much 
of the national press supported or acquiesced to the government’s position during the 
initial crisis and invasion, public hostility and a worsening political and military situation 
in Iraq transformed editorial responses and journalistic comment. The Blair government 
became an object of hostility, blamed for a colossal foreign policy mistake.132 The 
conflict is remembered as having generated extraordinarily well-attended street protests 
and having set the broader public against the government, though of course the narrative 
that the whole population were unanimously against the use of force is difficult to sustain 
when considering contemporaneous polling.  
 The conflict’s public legacy in Britain is now one based largely on its lack of 
legitimacy; that the government had been wrong to use military force in Iraq. Subsequent 
media analyses and editorials have focused on the incorrect assumption that the Hussein 
regime possessed a threatening stockpile of weapons, a narrative that was given new life 
in July 2016 after the publishing of the long-awaited Iraq Inquiry.133 Its findings were not 
favourable for the Blair government and seemed to vindicate those who remembered a 
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conflict pursued without public or popular support. Indeed, efforts by subsequent 
governments to use military force elsewhere, most notably in Syria in 2013, have come 
unstuck because of fears that Britain may find itself in another unpopular war. The 
Cameron government’s defeat in parliament was, on the BBC’s Newsnight programme 
broadcast on same day, blamed squarely on ‘the shadow of Iraq’.134 While British forces 
have been redeployed to the Middle East following the Iraq War, they are there in much 
smaller numbers and without ‘boots on the ground’.135 Such a campaign is assumed 
within the political elite in Westminster and much of the media establishment in Britain to 
be politically unpalatable, primarily because of the public memory of the Iraq invasion 
and its aftermath. The orthodox view of the conflict seems now to be what Alex Danchev 
has described as “Tony Blair’s Vietnam”; a political failure linked to personal disgrace 
and ruination.136   
 The memory context of Britain’s recent wars – their public interpretation and 
representation – varies across cases. It would of course, require another thesis to 
adequately explore their cultural impact in Britain using the press, parliamentary and 
literary resources considered above, thus I have not done so in any greater detail 
throughout subsequent chapters. My aim is instead to explore individual narratives within 
this broader context in order to understand how people make sense of war, and how they 
are linked to broader concepts of national identity and memory. While individual 
discussions and written texts are not produced in a vacuum, my thesis is an effort to 
consider the voices of individual British people during a period of frequent military 
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conflict for Britain, and to explore what this shows about how those people relate the use 
of force to Britain, its history and, as such, its identity.  
Using archival data produced by the Mass Observation Project (MOP) – which I 
consider in detail shortly – I seek to demonstrate how these recent conflicts were 
interpreted by ‘ordinary’ British people, how they were believed to have affected 
Britain’s identity and place in the world, and how they were understood through 
recollection and invocation of the further past. As explained above, collective and popular 
interpretation of events occurs alongside personal experience and reflection as conflicts 
unfold.137 Mass Observation Project responses – taken from directives issued during and 
immediately after recent conflicts138 – show how the dynamics of popular memory are at 
work within individual interpretations of contemporary events from the beginning, and 
are contested and reformed subsequently. This approach, in which the period of British 
conflict between 1982 and 2014 is considered as a distinct era in the generation of war 
memory, offers an original and unique contribution to knowledge in the field.  
 
Methodology and Mass Observation  
 
There are of course, a number of methodological approaches appropriate for exploring 
popular memories and available sources of evidence are similarly as varied.139 For 
example, film and literature offer ways for historians to consider how their subject matter 
is interpreted and viewed in the public sphere. Memories of war are revealed by their 
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shifting portrayal in high-profile films, television programmes, art, photography and 
novels.140  
 While consideration of cultural artefacts like these reveals how recent conflicts 
have been represented and understood in the public sphere,141 such an approach risks 
failing to adequately account for the ability of individuals to construct their own 
narratives,142 something that is an increasingly important focus for research related to 
foreign policy, war, memory and public opinion.143 Broad shifts in public and popular 
reception of past conflicts can be ascertained by considering popular culture and artefacts 
that circulate within mass society, yet this must also be complemented by individual-level 
analysis in order to see the specific ways in which British people make sense of the use of 
military force in both the recent and further past.  
 I draw on Mass Observation Project (MOP) data within this thesis in order to 
uncover individual interpretations of Britain’s recent conflicts. MOP responses offer a 
way of showing not only what individual British people thought about the nation’s 
involvement in conflicts since 1982, but also offer a way of exploring in detail how such 
opinions are formed, and why these individuals arrive at the conclusions they do. MOP 
responses allow for the exploration of subjective and abstract constructions of British 
identity. They reveal - within the written accounts of individual British people - the ways 
in which memory functions to create shared narratives of British experience in war, 
connecting present to past through a collective belief in a common history. Indeed, other 
scholars have drawn on the data held by the archive to furnish similar insights. For 
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example, Lucy Noakes has outlined how Mass Observation material can be used as a 
source of individual writing in which popular memories of the Second World War were 
crucial in framing and gendering what observers wrote about more contemporary 
conflicts.144 However, MOP data has not been used systematically in a study focused on 
Britain’s recent conflicts from 1982, or at least, not in a study in which that era of 
contemporary overseas military conflict is considered the primary object of study.   
It is worth at this point discussing the origins and development of Mass 
Observation itself in order to better understand the nature of the source material used in 
this research. Indeed, Mass Observation began as a prototypical exercise in social history 
founded in 1937 by two left-wing intellectuals, Charles Madge and Tom Harrisson, aimed 
at documenting and exploring the lives of working class people in Britain.145 Though 
Mass Observation was affected heavily by the conditions of the Second World War, and 
used frequently as a test for British morale by wartime authorities, it offered a way for 
individuals to give their own narratives and interpretations of particular events in their 
lives.146 Naturally, Mass Observation data has been used not only as a source for social 
histories of the Second World War,147 but as a place where individual experiences can be 
considered in light of popular memories and myths of the past. Detailed consideration of 
the archive’s data formed part of Angus Calder’s exploration of Britain’s Blitz myth, 
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revealing the extent to which individual experience was constitutive of, but often 
incongruent with, the shared narratives of determination, resilience and unity that 
prevailed at the time and since.148 
 The focus of this thesis is on Britain’s recent wars within the period between 1982 
and 2014, and as such I have drawn on more contemporary data. Having largely ceased as 
an academic exercise by the 1960s, Mass Observation was revived in 1981 – rebranded 
the Mass Observation Project - and although its focus and methods have become more 
uniform and academic in nature, recording ‘everyday life in Britain’149 remains the 
guiding principle. The Project’s coordinators continue to provide a panel of around five 
hundred150 ever-changing ‘observers’ with quarterly ‘directives’. They are asked to 
submit ‘responses’ to (normally) three or four questions or topics within each directive. 
The topics selected are largely random and are intended to cover as much of social life as 
possible. ‘Birthdays’, ‘the Royal Wedding’ and ‘Celebrity Big Brother’ are intermingled 
with ‘Morality and Religion’ and ‘Death and Bereavement’. Thus, the scope is broad and 
the MOP legitimately claims the mantle of “one of the major repositories of longitudinal 
qualitative social data in the UK.”151  
The individual, detailed and qualitative source data the MOP has produced has 
informed much recent work in social history related to, for example, gender politics in the 
                                                     
148 Calder, Myth of the Blitz. For more recent research in which Mass Observation has been used in this 
manner, see: Loukianos Hassiotis, “British Public Opinion and Military Intervention in Greece, December 
1944-January 1945: Stories from Mass-Observation”, Journal of Contemporary History. 50, no. 2 (2014): 
296-317; Jonathan Moss, et al. “Golden Age, Apathy or Stealth? Democratic Engagement in Britain, 1945-
1950”, Contemporary British History. 30, no. 4 (2016): 441-462; Lucy Noakes, “’Serve to Save’: Gender, 
Citizenship and Civil Defence in Britain 1937-41”, Journal of Contemporary History. 47, no. 4 (2012): 
734-753; Lucy Noakes, “A Broken Silence? Mass Observation, Armistice Day and ‘everyday life’ in 
Britain 1937-1941”, Journal of European Studies. 45, no. 4 (2015): 331-346. 
149 For an overview of the project and its remit see the MOP’s website, available at: 
http://www.massobs.org.uk/about/mass-observation-project  
150 Since 1981, over 4000 individuals have contributed as observers to the Project. As observers drop out 
and end their contributions they are gradually replaced by new volunteers. 
151 This is stated on the MOP’s website: http://www.massobs.org.uk/about/mass-observation-project  
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home,152 perceptions and practice of ethical consumption,153 changing discourses of class 
since the 1980s,154 and shifting memories of gender since the 1960s.155 Like Mass 
Observation before it, MOP data is a valuable source of social history in which individual 
interpretations can be considered within the context of broader social and popular history.  
 
The MOP Sample and Method 
 
I have considered the responses of 208 individual observers throughout this research. This 
sample was derived from a larger reading of 280 individual sets of responses, submitted 
to eleven individual directives.156 The sixty-two individuals whose responses I have not 
considered in this thesis were omitted because they did not mention any of the cases 
directly,157 they only transcribed Press reports or TV or Radio broadcasts,158 or what they 
wrote was illegible. I have not stratified this random sample by any other variable, thus 
they remain representative of the contributors to the Mass Observation Project only. I 
have for contextual purposes retained biographical information including age, location, 
employment background and living arrangements – all of which is kept, anonymously, by 
the Mass Observation Project.  
 The effect of this exclusion criteria is to create a sample of concerned or aware 
observers who paid relatively close attention to Britain’s involvement in its recent 
                                                     
152 Claire Langhamer, “The Meanings of Home in Postwar Britain”, Journal of Contemporary History. 40, 
no. 2 (2005): 341-362.  
153 Matthew Adams and Jayne Raisborough, “Making a Difference: Ethical Consumption and the 
Everyday”, British Journal of Sociology 61, no. 2 (2010): 256-274.  
154 Florence Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, “Archive Review: ‘Observing the 80s’”, Twentieth Century British 
History. 25, no. 3 (2014): 484-495. For a discussion of MOP’s ‘Observing the 80s’ website, see: Florence 
Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, “Archive Review: ‘Observing the 80s’”, Twentieth Century British History. 25, no. 3 
(2014): 484-495.  
155 Helena Mills, “Using the Personal to Critique the Popular: Women’s Memories of 1960s Youth”, 
Contemporary British History. 30, no. 4 (2016): 463-483. 
156 See Appendix II for copies of all directive sheets from which observers responses are drawn. 
157 This was the case among later directives in which observers more frequently chose to focus on other 
subjects and not consider directly the content of war-related sub-directives.  
158 Narrative involves the construction of meaning and should not be reduced simply to the recording of 
‘discourse’ which can include simply description. See: Riessman, Narrative Methods, 3.  
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conflicts, and who felt motivated to record (to varying degrees and in various levels of 
detail) their thoughts and feelings on the subject. They cannot be considered statistically 
representative of the British population, as is the case in polling or survey data. However, 
categorising their responses in this manner - based on quantitative analysis alone - does 
not make sufficient use of the content of what they write: 
 
The dominant meaning of ‘representativeness’ to which critics allude, or take for granted, privileges 
the individual, the single voice, and it is based on the assumption that people can only be seen to 
represent themselves. In this case, the quality of representativeness lies not in what they say, but in 
who they are (as defined by selected socio-economic characteristics which permit large scale 
generalizations about the whole population).
159
 
 
Thus what observers discuss cannot be approached as a sample of broader ‘opinion’, yet 
their private accounts are not written in a social vacuum. While polling and survey data 
reveal broad and generalizable results, Mass Observation responses reveal the ideas, 
narratives and nuances which are drawn from and constitute public opinion, insofar as it 
can be said to exist as an entity at all.160 I am interested here not so much in how 
observers’ responses can be connected to broader society, but in how observers 
themselves connect various ideas to contemporary events, and contemporary events to 
broader narratives of the national past.  
MOP responses are also largely voluntary and their content is determined 
primarily by observers themselves as they are asked to respond only to basic prompts. 
Their written accounts are not the result of structured questioning and they are given the 
freedom (and are encouraged) to write about what they desire or think relevant. Thus the 
                                                     
159 Sheridan, “Reviewing Mass-Observation”, 18. 
160 Christopher Hill, “Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy Since 1945: Research in Progress?”, 
Millennium. 10, no. 1 (1981): 53-62.  
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content of what they write marks observers’ responses out as a source of unique and 
reflexive “emotional richness”.161 Observers are subjects of research in the sense that 
what they write is used as a form of evidence for, in this case, interpretations of British 
military force since 1982, yet they also produce their own narratives which are 
necessarily selective and, importantly, written for somebody, at some point, to read. Anne 
Marie Kramer has described this as a form of ‘dual vision’ in which observers are aware 
both that they are the objects of social research, but that they are carrying it out 
themselves too.162 Thus it is important to bear in mind that observers have thought about 
what they write, and are attempting to present their accounts of Britain’s involvement in 
military conflicts as personal, genuine, informed or authoritative. The presentation of 
their narratives is surely impacted by the reality that they are ‘the observed’.163 However 
this dynamic produces the sort of reflexive, thoughtful and detailed narratives that this 
study aims to uncover and, though observers are aware that their responses may be read, 
they are anonymous. Britain’s involvement in recent conflicts, and what they have meant 
for its identity and history – both of which necessarily require construction and 
narrativisation - are subjects which are illuminated by the use of such individual written 
observers’ accounts. Indeed, for Martin Shaw, this richness is a distinct advantage over 
quantitative social research: 
 
Standard questionnaires and surveys do not allow access to multiple meanings and contradiction. 
They are designed to eliminate them. However, contradiction is central to social life and ways of 
                                                     
161Jenny Shaw, “Transference and Countertransference in the Mass-Observation Archive: and Under-
Exploited Research Resource”, Human Relations. 47, no. 11 (1994): 1392-1408, 1393.  
162 Anne-Marie Kramer, “The Observers and the Observed: The ‘Dual Vision’ of the Mass Observation 
Project”, Sociological Research Online. 19, no. 4 (2014): 1-11. 
163 Ibid. 
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researching it need to be found. The fluid, complex and interconnected MO data, on almost a 
random number of themes, is one such.
164 
 
Observers’ responses to Britain’s recent conflicts elucidate individual perspectives and 
views that are simply too complex, nuanced and subjective to be adequately catalogued 
by purely quantitative methods. Indeed, in avoiding the sort of preceding structuration 
and prompting that forms the basis of survey analysis or structured interviews, the 
researcher is able to uncover results that may not be anticipated at all.  
Observers are of course, a particular group of people who self-select and are 
actively motivated to write for the archive. Yet the ‘volunteered’ nature of their responses 
is a unique strength in delivering the voices of concerned individuals and people who feel 
that the perspectives of ‘ordinary’ people should be recorded: 
 
The desire to write for MO has been described as ‘an autobiographical impulse’, but the archival 
nature of the project clearly also attracts those with a historical consciousness. Correspondents give 
generously of their thoughts, feelings, experiences and opinions in part because they enjoy the 
process as self-developmental or even therapeutic, but also, at times, as a kind of social altruism, as 
an oppositional ‘ordinary’ voice against ‘official’ culture.165 
 
Certainly, the concept of ‘ordinary’ is not an objective marker of identity. As Matthew 
Hilton has shown, politics has become an increasingly important part of the lives of 
ordinary British people – those not involved in policy, decision-making or political 
leadership – just as the ‘ordinary’ has increasingly become part of political history.166 
Observers are concerned with recording and relating to historical events – including 
                                                     
164 Martin Shaw, Civil Society and media in Global Crises (London: Pinter, 1996), 12. 
165 Pollen, “Research Methodology”, 8. 
166 Matthew Hilton, “Politics is Ordinary: Non-governmental Organizations and Political Participation in 
Contemporary Britain”, Twentieth Century British History. 22, no. 2 (2011): 230-268.  
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military conflicts – that do not physically involve them, yet they often identify themselves 
as ordinary in opposition to what they perceive to be the ‘high politics’ of an elite or 
establishment,167 and offer testimony that is drawn from private and familial 
experiences.168  I consider observers’ accounts to be the product of a group of people who 
do not have particular historical expertise or political responsibilities in Britain’s use of 
military force in the contemporary period, but for whom memory of the past and 
constructions of national identity are important nevertheless in making sense of those 
contemporary circumstances. They offer a source of ‘ordinary’ opinion which is both a 
product of, and contributing to, popular and public constructions of identity and memory. 
 At this point it should be explained how Mass Observation Project responses have 
been approached and introduced within this research. Given the detailed and complex 
nature of the source material, the abstract nature of the objects of study, and the 
qualitative approach I seek to apply in researching them, I have presented a broad and 
inclusive reading of observers’ texts aimed at letting observers speak for themselves.169 I 
have not applied quantitative coding, categorisation or reductive analysis.170 Instead I 
have quoted at length (where required) from observers in order to demonstrate the 
specific and often complex ideas they convey within responses. Naturally I have not been 
able to quote all observers and so have deployed typical quotes which are representative 
                                                     
167 Dorothy Sheridan, Brian Street and David Bloome, Writing Ourselves: Mass-Observation and Literary 
Practices (New York: Hampton Press, 2000), 281-292.  
168 Lucy Noakes, “’My Husband is Interested in War Generally’: gender, family history and the emotional 
legacies of total war”, Women’s History Review. Online, available at: 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09612025.2017.1292634 (accessed 24-01-2018). 
169 For an in-depth overview and discussion of the ways in which interpretative ‘thick description’ is 
required in social research in order to uncover multi-layered and subjective meaning, see: Clifford Geertz, 
The Interpretation of Cultures (2nd ed. London: Fontana, 1993), 3-30.  
170 The application of such methods is made particularly difficult by the great variation in observers’ written 
accounts and, I suggest, unduly dismisses the contradiction and variation of their responses in order to 
provide more comparative results, of debatable utility. I remain interested only in observers discourse and 
how this reflects their attitudes toward Britain, its recent wars, identity and history. I have not gone into 
detail regarding the linguistic construction of their accounts, though attitudes, subject and meaning are 
considered relative throughout. For a more detailed consideration, see: Stephen Gibson, “’I’m not a war 
monger but…’: Discourse Analysis and Social Psychological Peace Research”, Journal of Community and 
Applied Social Psychology. 22, no. 2 (2011): 159-173.   
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of sentiments articulated in other observers’ responses. I have also attempted to convey 
the ideas which appeared most important to observers, providing an interpretation of their 
discourse and capturing the variation, nuance and subtly of their individual accounts 
while assessing their collected contributions as a whole. Though it is clear that individual 
observers are able to construct their own unique narratives, it is also apparent that many 
ideas are shared or contested, revealing the extent to which public and popular 
interpretation affect what they write. 
 A final advantage of using Mass Observation Project responses which must be 
noted is the longitudinal quality of the data. I have considered responses submitted to 
various directives concerning the Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars, 
and though few observers consistently wrote about Britain’s involvement in recent 
conflicts across this period,171 it is possible here to compare and contrast a single form of 
data over time and compare cases. Further, though I have not stratified the sample by age, 
it is also possible to see the extent to which ‘generation’ marks observers’ written 
accounts. Mass Observation offers an opportunity to explore how individuals construct 
their own identities in relation to important events in the past, and how they situate 
individual narratives within a changing contemporary social and political context. The 
content of observers’ responses is not produced in isolation. They connect contemporary 
events to the more recent past as a frame and explanation for the present, and to the more 
distant past as part of broader narratives of British history and identity. Such findings are 
made available on an individual scale by use of the Mass Observation Project’s data and 
satisfy a requirement of this research that Britain’s involvement in the Falklands, Gulf, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars be considered as a distinct set of events. 
  
                                                     
171 Of the 208 individual observers whose responses I consider within this research, thirty-five submitted 
responses to more than one directive.  
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I have relied exclusively on the Mass Observation Project as the primary source 
material for this research. As a consequence the project is necessarily affected by the 
limitations inherent in the use of Mass Observation Project data itself. As I have 
demonstrated throughout, my results and findings are not generalizable or representative 
and are based on a comparatively small group of self-selecting individuals. However, I 
have used this single source of evidence because the findings produced in the consequent 
research outweigh the limitations. What follows is a detailed and qualitative analysis of 
individual representations of Britain’s recent conflicts which can only be achieved by 
analysis of a volunteered, largely unstructured source of primary data. Similarly, the 
panel of observers contacted by the MOP offer a much broader range and greater number 
of individuals than would have been available had I attempted to organise focus groups or 
interviews and in addition allow longitudinal comparison which would not be possible 
otherwise. Thus the quantity of data I draw on here is large enough to warrant the 
omission of other sources of evidence that would not necessarily advance an 
understanding of the objects of research – abstract concepts of nation, memory and 
history – and would reduce the space available for a more rigorous dissection of MOP 
data.  
 I have focused solely on Mass Observation material because it offers a detailed, 
volunteered source of subjective written text, produced by ‘ordinary’ individual members 
of the British public. And because it represents a bank of individuals large enough to 
identify distinct patterns and themes relevant to the broader research aims of this PhD 
thesis. This is of course not to say that structured, quantitative analysis, surveys or polling 
do not offer valid results – they do – but that the aims of this research are more narrow, 
abstract and based on the individual, micro level. This thesis offers findings which do not 
contradict much of the public opinion research undertaken in relation to Britain’s recent 
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foreign policy, or indeed historical studies of memory focused on popular culture, but 
instead offers an account which is intended to compliment such work by focusing on a 
different form of data, the strengths of which outnumber its weaknesses within the 
context in which it is deployed.  
 
The MOP Sample and Demographic Details 
 
The sample of 208 individual observers I consider here responded to various directives 
issued between 1982 and 2014. Accordingly, it is important to note that this range of 
multiple directives varied in terms of what they asked observers to write about, what they 
asked observers to do,172 and where in the hierarchy of MOP responses they were 
issued.173 The Falklands, Gulf and Iraq wars were accorded dedicated directives which 
asked observers to record responses to those conflicts, and keep a “diary” of reactions 
thereafter. In 1999 the Kosovo War was accorded a sub-directive which meant observers 
were asked for their views on the current crisis and were not asked to keep a diary.174 I 
have also used responses to directives which asked observers to write about “issues in the 
news” or “the world situation” in 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2014. These latter directives were 
not aimed specifically at recording observers’ reactions to military conflicts occurring at 
the time, but they generally included a short prompt to which some observers responded. 
The content of their responses was collectively similar to that which emerged in the 
dedicated directives, though often in conjunction with broader global issues.  
                                                     
172 In some cases as in the Falklands, Gulf and Iraq dedicated directives observers were asked to keep a 
‘diary’ or reactions to the war as it unfolded, a request which was taken seriously by few observers.  
173 Directives contain within them ‘sub-directives’ which relate to one of the three or four themes which 
observers are asked to write about.  
174 Though the tardiness of some observers means that the directive contains responses written before, 
during and after Operation Allied Force between March and June 1999.  
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The 2008 directive which asked for observers’ “War experiences and reflections” 
is perhaps the most obviously dissimilar to both the dedicated war directives and the 
current affairs sub-directives. Issued after all the cases I consider – including the 
redeployment to Helmand Province in 2006 – it prompted observers to write about war 
over a longer time period and represented an opportunity to invoke personal and popular 
memories of the more distant past. Though observers did relate to contemporary 
circumstance here, the responses I have drawn on that were submitted to the 2008 
directive show the importance and relevance of popular war memories in fashioning 
narratives of British identity. It is important to note that in asking for ‘reflections’ on the 
theme of war itself, such responses were prompted differently and offer a subset of 
individuals who were less focused on any one specific military action.175 I have however, 
compared observers’ responses to all directives as a single source of evidence. The varied 
ways in which they are prompted is another reason why they are not directly comparable 
quantitatively. However, I suggest that this variation permits access to a broader and 
richer discourse than would be the case if I had confined this research to a discussion of 
observers responses to, for example, the dedicated directives only.  
The number of individual sets of observers’ responses I have included, related to 
each conflict, is as follows: 
• Falklands War: thirty-five observers’ responses 
• Gulf War: forty-two observers’ responses 
• Kosovo War: forty-eight observers’ responses 
• Afghanistan War: fifty-five observers’ responses 
• Iraq War: 102 observers’ responses 
 
                                                     
175 Though as I discuss in later chapters, reflection on the world wars was accompanied by discussion of all 
the cases I consider in this research at some point by observers writing responses in 2008.  
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As I show, the number of observers whose responses I have considered steadily rises in 
relation to each case.176 There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the structure of directives 
reflects the context of Britain’s wars. There are single directives related to the short 
conflicts in the Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo, and multiple directives related to lengthy 
occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus I have attempted to gain a sufficient amount of 
responses from these multiple directives in order to cover the occupation periods of the 
latter. This has resulted in a greater number of responses related to the lengthier wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq when compared to those previous. Secondly, the greater number of 
observers’ responses considered in later conflicts is also a result specifically of their 
content. What observers wrote about later conflicts became increasingly complex, 
confused and ambiguous and thus demanded a greater effort to reach saturation by 
considering a greater number of perspectives.177 I considered a smaller number of 
responses in relation to earlier conflicts as it became apparent that there was less variation 
in what observers wrote about them, and fewer anomalous submissions comparatively. 
Observers writing in 1982 were, I suggest, more clear and certain about what they thought 
about that conflict than, for example, those who wrote about the Kosovo War in 1999. 
This represents a finding in itself and is an important part of my overall analysis. I discuss 
it in greater detail as I move into discussion of each of the cases. 
 I have not systematically considered observers’ written accounts in relation to 
variables like gender, age or social background, yet some consideration of the 
demographic structure of the sample should be given. Perhaps most importantly, I 
emphasise that few observers I consider in this sample wrote in response to more than one 
                                                     
176 The total of those considered in each chapter (242) exceeds the total number of observers considered in 
this research (208) because some observers contributed to multiple directives which concerned different 
conflicts, thus they are counted twice here.  
177 For a consideration of the importance of saturation in the structuring of samples and qualitative research, 
see: Colley, “Is Britain a force for good?”, 6; Jane Ritchie and Jane Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice: 
A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (London: Sage, 2003), 77-108.  
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or two directives. Thus I neither seek nor am able to consider how individual observers’ 
perspectives on different conflicts vary or how their writings change through their life 
courses. I am interested in this research to ascertain the ways in which different cohorts of 
observers have written about various recent conflicts, and then compare the ideas and 
narratives which were articulated by these different cohorts. 
The effect of this structure is a broad consistency in the age range of observers 
writing at any one time.178 Thus I approach responses written by people who are generally 
middle-aged or elderly, but for whom generation is marked out by important events in 
their lives, or in the era in which they grew up. Often this was personal experience of the 
events of the Second World War or its immediate cultural aftermath.179 I explore what 
observers wrote about Britain’s recent conflicts and how they were related to broader 
interpretations of British identity and history, whilst also reflecting on how changes and 
continuities within observers’ written responses can be seen over time, and as observers 
cease writing and individuals born later begin to submit responses in their place. 
 Furthermore, it should be noted that I have included responses from more women 
than men. Of the 208 observers considered, 130 (63%) were women. Though this means 
that the sample is not representative of wider society, I refer again to the fact that I do not 
intend this research to be so. Neither do I seek to consider observers’ responses in relation 
to their gender. While the sample is not statistically representative, I have included both 
                                                     
178 The average age of those who submitted responses to the Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo directives was 50, 
53 and 61 respectively. Establishing the average age of those writing about the Afghanistan and Iraq wars is 
more difficult as those responses are spread over multiple directives and several years. However the average 
age of those who submitted responses concerned with Afghanistan was 59 in 2001. The average age of 
those who submitted responses concerned with Iraq was 58 in 2003. As older observers were replaced 
continually by younger observers this average would not have radically shifted in subsequent years. 
179 This supports findings made elsewhere regarding the importance of memory and involvement in wartime 
as a marker for constructions of generation. See in the British case: Penny Summerfield, “The generation of 
memory: Gender and the popular memory of the Second World War in Britain”, in British Cultural 
Memory and the Second World War, edited by Lucy Noakes and Juliette Pattison (London: Bloomsbury, 
2014). 
For an example of the contemporary mobilisation of Second World War ‘generation’ discourse in the 
United States, see: Noon, “Operation Enduring Analogy”.  
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male and female voices. Similarly, the sample contains observers from various 
backgrounds and from many regions, yet the skew toward the middle-aged and elderly 
means that young full-time workers are not well represented. Again, I approach observers 
written accounts in order to evaluate what they say about Britain’s recent conflicts and 
how they articulate it, not whether their educational, employment or social background 
affects this, though of course such a study offers a possible avenue for future research.  
  
Themes 
 
In order to retain the volunteered and complex character of observers’ writings I have not 
rigorously categorised or coded responses. Yet some interpretation of what is a large and 
disparate collection of written text is required. Despite variation in tone, structure and 
content, it is apparent that observers collectively focused on a number of key themes in 
which connections between Britain, its identity, its role in modern conflicts, and its 
national past were made. The themes that emerged most frequently – offering the most 
utility for exploring connections between war and national identity – were: the legitimacy 
of Britain’s recent conflicts; its military institutions and combat; leadership and domestic 
politics; and perceptions of the institutions, nations and Others with whom Britain came 
into contact. These themes are also salient aspects of studies of British war memory and 
identity, and more contemporary foreign policy and public opinion research, yet they are 
discussed here primarily because they were the most important aspects of observers’ 
written accounts. Thus selection of these themes is led by both a reading of related 
literature and, importantly, what observers most frequently chose to write about 
themselves.  
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Legitimacy 
 
Observers interpreted Britain’s recent conflicts as important events involving death and 
sacrifice, and as such were keen to evaluate whether the use of force was morally and 
politically justified.180 The legitimacy of force is of course, not objectively defined and 
norms on which military force is justified have altered throughout international history.181 
More recently in Britain the Iraq War has illuminated the ways in which legitimacy is 
contested in public.182 Yet, British people are able to arrive at their own understandings of 
legitimacy which are also contested and divergent. While arguments provided from 
‘above’ by political elites are of course important in guiding and contextualising 
‘ordinary’ opinions, Philip Towle has shown that debates surrounding the use of force 
within the public sphere are related intimately to the ways in which individuals 
understand the use of violent force, under what circumstances it is appropriate, and how 
they construct narratives of Britain’s identity as a military power in relation to these 
personal factors.183 As I seek to demonstrate in this research, observers’ interpretations of 
legitimacy were complex and varied, but they uniformly involved Britain’s position. 
Observers wanted to ascertain whether Britain, in using force in the contemporary period, 
could be considered a ‘force for good’,184 thus legitimacy represents a basic and 
                                                     
180 I apply a broad perspective on the definition of legitimacy here and take it to refer to the moral or 
political acceptability of the use of force. The ways in which legitimacy is conceived by observers is the 
object of study in this regard, not the theoretical nature of legitimacy or how it functions in wider society. 
For such a consideration regarding the Iraq War in Britain, see: Strong, Public Opinion, 60-64. 
181 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (London: 
Cornell University Press, 2004).  
182 Jamie Gaskarth, “Intervention, Domestic Contestation and Britain’s national role conceptions”, in 
Domestic Role Contestation, Foreign Policy, and International Relations, edited by Cristian Cantir and 
Juliet Kaarbo. (London: Routledge, 2016); Jack Holland, “Blair’s War on Terror: Selling Intervention to 
Middle England”,  British Journal of Politics and International Relations. 14, no. 1 (2012): 74-95; Strong, 
“More spinn’d”; Strong, Public Opinion, 64-66; Towle, Going to War, 142-155.     
183 Towle, Going to War, 11-23. 
184 Colley, “Is Britain a Force for Good?”  
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universally important marker for interpreting Britain’s national identity throughout the 
period from 1982 to 2014.  
 The ways in which legitimacy is derived are more complex. As polling and survey 
analysis has shown, the public are not simply worried about ‘body counts’ or relative 
losses. The ‘principle objective’ of military force must be considered legitimate; losses 
are acceptable in situations where force is acceptable, and vice versa.185 Observers’ 
responses offer individual-level evidence for this assertion. Further, while the apparent 
context and prevailing circumstances of Britain’s military conflicts have been important 
in fashioning ideas about legitimacy, observers do not simply consume media or 
governmental interpretations. They are often well informed but arrive at varied and 
divergent conclusions on the use of force. In fact, observers continually appraised 
contemporary situations by reference to Britain’s national past, embedding current events 
in narratives of national history and drawing on popular memories of past wars as a point 
of reference or benchmark.186 Perhaps most obvious in this respect were observers’ 
persistent invocations of Britain’s road to war in the late 1930s and a continual 
reconstruction of a narrative based on the failure of Britain’s policy of appeasement.187 
Both were mobilised by observers in order to clarify the circumstances in which military 
action could be considered justified and appropriate in the present. Such dynamics 
demonstrate the ways in which memory and contemporary circumstance inform each 
                                                     
185 Richard C. Eichenberg, “Victory Has Many Friends”, International Security. 30, no. 1 (2005): 140-177; 
Bruce W. Jentleson, “The Pretty Prudent Public: Post Post-Vietnam American Opinion on the Use of 
Military Force”, International Studies Quarterly. 36, no. 1 (1992): 49-74; Brian Lai and Dan Reiter, “Rally 
‘Round the Union Jack? Public Opinion and the Use of Force in the United Kingdom”, International 
Studies Quarterly. 49, no. 1 (2005): 255-272; Towle, Going to War.  
186 Popular memories of past experiences, like the Second World War, which are celebrated or remembered 
favourably can form the basis of ‘guides’ to action in the present. See: Connelly, We Can Take It!, 2.  
187 For a consideration of the importance of the period immediately preceding the outbreak of the Second 
World War in Britain, see: Connelly, We Can Take It!, 269-271; Finney, Remembering the Road, 188-217. 
For a discussion of the association of the ‘failure’ of appeasement and Neville Chamberlain, and its 
enduring appeal as a cultural motif in Britain, see: Julie V. Gottlieb, “Neville Chamberlain’s Umbrella: 
‘Object’ Lessons in the History of Appeasement”, Twentieth Century British History. 27, no. 3 (2016): 357-
388. 
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other and, importantly, show the extent to which observers are engaged in constructing a 
common history in which debates over the legitimacy of using force are fundamental. 
During later occupations in Afghanistan and Iraq, observers were less likely to draw on 
popular memory of Britain’s Second World War as it seemed to retain little explanatory 
power over contemporary circumstances. As a result it became more difficult for 
observers to both articulate the legitimacy of Britain’s contemporary military position, but 
also construct a broader, assured narrative of historical identity embedded in experience 
of World War Two. Thus connections between Britain’s current and past identities in war 
became increasingly fragmented within the context of British involvement in the ‘War on 
Terror’. 
 
The Military and Combat 
 
Naturally, any discussion of armed conflict – observers’ included – pertains to a purely 
military dimension. As Tarak Barkawi has argued, the social and identity effects 
associated with war cannot readily be detached from the circumstances of combat; “they 
[war’s social effects] have something to do with what happened in the war itself”.188 For 
observers, it is evident that the themes I discuss here are distinct but not inseparable. 
Interpretations of combat and military outcome affected their perspectives on legitimacy, 
yet what observers believed about the legitimacy of any single operation affected what 
they wrote about the soldiers and institutions which prosecuted it. Further still, the 
military and its institutions were also represented as a distinct part of Britain’s identity 
and history, which is greater than the sum of its military engagements.189 Indeed, as 
Anthony King has described, the sacrifice brought upon Britain’s forces has been 
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“honoured in spite of the cause”190 in recent deployments as the population conceive of 
the military in opposition to the government or state, and as a set of institutions with its 
own identity. Observers accounts of military action in each of the cases I consider 
frequently formed part of constructions of a British military identity, and revealed 
assumptions about the role of the military in British history and society, as well as the 
contemporary period.  
 The connection between Britain and its military centred primarily on discussions 
of military personal, alongside a broader consideration of military institutions, branches 
and tactics. Both were of course, affected by contemporary context. All conflicts gave 
opportunity for observers to discuss Britain’s military personnel, though instances of high 
profile land combat engendered a greater intensity of discussion, and contributed to the 
construction (and, in some cases, subversion) of the central figure of the ‘soldier hero’.191 
Despite their professional status, Britain’s armed forces, at a personal level, embodied 
bravery, sacrifice and a quality of character that persisted within responses despite the 
varied political circumstances of the deployments. The empathy and support directed at 
military personnel was accompanied within responses, by representations of British 
military power, broadly conceived. Here combat was not linked personally to the soldiers 
who fought, but instead to military tactics and technology. In particular the use of air 
power as a primary mode of combat in the 1990s and early 2000s helped to figure what 
observers wrote about Britain’s role in its recent wars and its identity. Though support for 
the military was a consistent feature of collected responses, questions and reservations 
over British tactics formed part of a critical attitude and contributed ideas of identity that 
                                                     
190 Anthony King, “The Afghan War and ‘Postmodern’ Memory: Commemoration and the Dead of 
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observers frequently disapproved of; carelessness, heavy-handedness or a failure to use 
force discriminately. 
 Importantly, Britain’s contemporary military identity, and what observers 
imagined warfare to be like in the contemporary period, was fashioned with persistent 
reference to the past. Memories of combat and warfare – sometimes personal, though 
increasingly popular or ‘prosthetic’ – helped observers make sense of contemporary 
circumstance, both what individual soldiers might experience or feel, and what certain 
tactics, like the use of air power, might entail.192 Most importantly, this connection 
between present and past created a sense of a specifically military identity in which 
Britain remained a martial power. Contemporary circumstance brought forth invocations 
of past military experience and memory, thereby reaffirming certain narratives of 
common and shared history.  
 
Leaders and Leadership 
 
Observers also related Britain’s contemporary wars to political leaders, most frequently 
reduced to the single figure of the Prime Minister. War leadership is an important aspect 
of wartime memories as individual leaders are thought to embody the experience of the 
nation or provide a figurehead for the state. For example, Winston Churchill’s wartime 
leadership has remained a central aspect of Britain’s Second World War memory 
embodying Britain’s national struggle; resistance to appeasement, determination, 
                                                     
192 The extent to which Britain’s military institutions embodied national experience in the Second World 
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resilience, the ‘bulldog spirit’.193 As with all aspects of popular memory, appraisals of 
Churchill’s leadership have been contested, yet it remains the case that the figure of the 
Prime Minister – and their perceived role in military conflict – acts as a salient indicator 
of popular interpretations of wartime identity, and serves as an important connection 
between the apparatus and policies of the state and government, and the British nation in 
whose interest they are supposed to act.  
 Prime Ministerial leadership was a frequently-discussed part of observers’ 
accounts across all cases (with perhaps, the exception of the 1990 Gulf War). Its 
importance here is due firstly for those reasons stated above; that two Prime Ministers in 
particular – Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair – were seen as an embodiment of Britain’s 
position or representative of British policy in the international crises and conflicts for 
which they were responsible. Secondly however, responses show how the nation was 
conceived of in relation to representatives of the state, often revealing a separation of the 
two. Involvement in conflicts in which legitimacy was thought not to be assured for the 
British, or in which the military outcome was in doubt, elicited a pervasive juxtaposition 
of governmental leadership with ideas of national identity. Observers did not make 
simple judgements on the decisions of government or the Prime Minister, but instead 
incorporated them into much broader narratives of identity in the contemporary conflict, 
and in relation to Britain’s national past, again, overwhelmingly referring to popular 
memories of the Second World War. Through both embodiment and contrast, all 
observers who wrote about leadership across these cases reflected what they thought 
about Britain’s role in recent conflicts, memories of the further past and broader 
narratives of national identity which they conveyed. 
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Others, International Institutions, Allies and Enemies 
 
Observers’ responses reflect a further critical aspect of the construction of national 
identities throughout, namely the identification of, and comparison with, Others.194 As 
Linda Colley has noted, Britain’s identity was one forged from its inception by the 
identification of the self in contrast to “an obviously hostile Other”.195 This dynamic 
helped to fashion popular narratives of British identity in the Second World War as the 
conflict came to be remembered as a struggle between a free, tolerant, democratic and 
peaceful people forced to fight by a tyrannical, dictatorial and aggressive Nazi 
Germany.196 Similarly, this process of othering must be afforded an evaluation in 
Britain’s more recent conflicts, a central aspect of which has been the ‘investment’ of 
Western identities in constructions of the unfree, liberated and oriental Other.197 Indeed, 
conflicts in the Balkans and Afghanistan in particular elicited constructions of savage, 
perennial violence against which an interpretation of British civilisation and modernity 
could be articulated by contrast. 
 This process was a persistent feature of observers’ responses throughout all cases I 
consider. It is important to establish however, that it applied to a range of Others, did not 
result in uniform or predictable conclusions, and constructions of Others were related 
intimately to circumstance. Throughout the period observers were eager to identify 
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Britain’s place in the world through a discussion of international institutions – and how 
Britain might be involved in or bound by them – and through constructions of the 
identities of its allies, most notably that of the United States. The context and history of 
the ‘special relationship’ was bound intimately to memories of both nations’ national 
pasts198 and interaction with allied nations provided an opportunity for British people in 
past conflicts to create a sense of self by contrast or comparison. In the Second World 
War British identity was constructed in comparison with and contrast against that of the 
Americans who were “over-sexed, over-paid and over here”, threatening British culture 
and sexual norms,199 and whose racial strife at home indicated an intolerant national 
character. As Sonya Rose has written, being British “meant being tolerant, at least more 
tolerant than white Americans”.200 Comparison with both the United States as a 
preponderant international and military power – a position revealed by Britain’s junior 
status within repeated military coalitions – and with European allies contributed to 
constructions of Britain’s contemporary identity by contrast. 
 Most frequently however, observers constructed a sense of British identity by 
contrast against its enemies. Even in cases where the legitimacy of an actual use of force 
was considered unwarranted or illegitimate, most observers were keen to stress the 
aggressive, expansionary, intolerant, brutal and dictatorial nature of the enemy. The 
persistent use of a ‘fascist’ epithet – directed specifically at Leopoldo Galtieri, Saddam 
Hussein and Slobodan Milosevic - indicates the pervasive memory of Nazi Germany as a 
frame of reference for interpreting contemporary enemies.201 Further still, Britain’s 
identity was given a temporal quality across cases by a widespread perception of having 
faced a particular and familiar kind of opponent in each of these cases. Only in Britain’s 
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most recent conflicts have anti-terror operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and 
drawn out occupation against sectarian groups, made this connection more problematic; a 
fact encountered by politicians in the United States and Britain who sought once more to 
redeploy the languages of anti-fascism in order to legitimise continued military 
engagement.202 This new context of elusive and unfamiliar enemies contributed to a 
broader phenomenon among responses in which ideas of resistance to fascism and 
dictatorship – at the root of popular memory of the Second World War – seemed 
increasingly irrelevant, further fragmenting observers’ connections between Britain’s 
identity in contemporary conflict and a celebrated and assured past wartime identity.  
 
Summary: Mass Observers and Recent Wars 
 
All of these themes represent aspects of observers’ discourse in which ideas of British 
identity were articulated, and all are aspects of their discourse in which popular 
memories, particularly that of the Second World War, were crucial in clarifying, an effect 
of which was the continuing creation and recreation of a sense of common history. As I 
seek to show, few observers drew on memory of the First World War – surprising given 
its continued prominence in the public sphere – or on memory of Britain’s empire, 
decolonisation and post-imperial conflicts; surprising given their closer chronological 
proximity and similarity in scale to more recent ‘small wars’. Observers remained well 
informed and, as a group of people motivated to write, were able to discuss the political 
and military circumstances of recent wars. Yet it is evident that conflict from 1982 to 
2014 was conceived of repeatedly and intensely as part of Britain’s national story, and not 
as isolated events. Each conflict was understood as a specific and unique set of 
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circumstances with its own causes and outcomes, but also contributed to a broader 
process of invocation of the national past in which Britain’s identity, most often based in 
the experience of fighting Nazi Germany, was continually reconstructed. 
Changing circumstances in the present have altered the ways in which observers 
remembered the past and constructed narratives of British identity yet this has not forced 
a radical revision of Britain’s identity during the Second World War. Instead, certain 
aspects of that war have retained a greater explanatory power over present circumstances, 
and are accordingly invoked more frequently by observers. Though the overall narrative 
of a ‘good war’ remains, its constituent events are recalled according to their utility in the 
present. Even throughout the Iraq crisis and the subsequent conflict – a deployment which 
the majority of observers believed to be unambiguously illegitimate – familiar memories 
of World War Two were invoked (now largely devoid of personal experience among 
observers) in order to contrast present circumstance, thereby delegitimising contemporary 
British policy. Despite a perception of decline in the standards of legitimacy across its 
recent wars – reaching a nadir in Iraq – these conflicts gave observers an opportunity to 
invoke memory of the Second World War and thereby reconstruct a morally assured and 
celebrated British identity. Their responses show how perceived political and military 
failures in the present can contribute to the reinforcing of a coherent national past.   
 However, the invocation of popular memories of the Second World, and the 
reconstruction of a related and specific narrative of British identity, occurred only when 
circumstances in the present permitted it, and when it was thought that they could help 
explain the contemporary context. As British involvement in Iraq, and later Afghanistan, 
moved from invasion to occupation, and from resistance to a dictatorship to suppression 
of militias and paramilitaries, observers became increasingly unlikely to make direct 
connection between contemporary conflict and World War Two. Thus the reconstruction 
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of an assured and moral military identity became fragmented as perceptions of both post-
invasion Iraq and the increasingly intense war in Afghanistan became unmoored from a 
narrative of historical experience dominated by World War Two. Observers instead began 
to focus on religion, ethnicity and domestic politics, none of which offered the same sort 
of historical or moral certainty. It is striking to consider both the apparent longevity of 
popular memories of Britain’s Second World War among collected responses, 
particularly as it moves from living memory and personal experience between 1982 and 
2003, and their subsequent absence as Britain became ever more involved in the 
contemporary ‘War on Terror’. 
 What follows is a chronological account of Britain’s Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq wars, as explained and understood by Mass Observers. Each of 
these conflicts is accorded a separate chapter within which I have structured analysis 
around discussion of the themes identified above. I begin by considering responses 
written in early-mid 1982 during the Falklands crisis and the subsequent military conflict. 
I then move to consider responses written in late 1990 and early 1991 as British forces 
took part in the military effort to remove the Iraqi military from Kuwait. The third chapter 
draws on responses written primarily in 1999 after the beginning of Operation Allied 
Force (NATO’s effort to force the Yugoslav military and Serbian militias to desist from 
their escalating campaign in Kosovo). The final two chapters consider the broadly 
contemporaneous deployments to Afghanistan from 2001 (itself escalated from 2006 after 
the redeployment of a much larger British force to Helmand Province) and Iraq from 
2003. These latter cases cover a much longer period of time both from an historical 
perspective, and within the breadth of Mass Observation material. Unlike the three 
previous cases, they lasted decades rather than months. I have attempted to cover them 
comprehensively by including a larger volume of responses from multiple directives. I 
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have however, afforded them similar space and consideration within the broader structure 
of the thesis.  
 Though of course, the representation of wars always has something to do with 
what actually happened in them,203 I have not sought to provide a detailed diplomatic, 
political, military or historical analysis in each case. Rather I have attempted only to give 
essential context to observers’ written accounts. The thesis is structured throughout with 
what Mass Observers wrote as the primary focus and thus I hope it can be read as a 
chronological journey through the written material of successive cohorts of observers 
rather than an evaluation or critique of Britain’s recent foreign policy or military history. I 
offer a short concluding chapter in which this period of Mass Observation Project 
material, written between 1982 and 2014, is considered in sum, and what it tells us about 
the way in which they approached this period of intermittent British military conflict and, 
by extension, the nation’s identity. 
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The Falklands War 1982 
 
In March 1982 Argentine marines took control of the island of South Georgia. Aware that 
the Junta was acting unilaterally on their claim to British territorial possessions in the 
region, officials in the British government and Ministry of Defence began working on a 
military plan to retake the neighbouring Falkland Islands, which were subsequently 
invaded and occupied by Argentine forces on 2 April 1982.204 Though both sides were 
called upon to negotiate by the United Nations and the United States following the 
occupation, the British government, with the support of Parliament, continued with its 
military response. The campaign centred on the assembly of a Naval Task force which, in 
addition to deploying a number of warships and submarines, would transport around ten 
thousand British personnel to retake the islands. Though considered a potentially risky 
venture, the conflict was ultimately a resounding victory for the British. The controversial 
sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano on 2 May largely ended any naval 
opposition (though the threat from Argentina’s air force remained throughout), and a 
series of decisive battles on the islands themselves ended in victory for Britain’s 
professional forces over what was primarily a conscripted Argentine force. A ceasefire 
was signed on 14 June after the surrender of the capital, Port Stanley.205  
The conflict had lasted nearly two months and two weeks, and though the war 
occurred at a point of increasing Cold War tension, it was a bilateral affair essentially 
unrelated to the any broader ideological struggle; the first, as Lawrence Freedman has 
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suggested, of Britain’s post-Cold War engagements.206 Indeed, fighting overseas in 
defence of British sovereign territory, in a bilateral conflict against a military Junta, 
offered an extraordinary set of circumstances for ordinary British people and, as I show in 
this chapter, elicited discussion of particular ideas of British identity and the invocation of 
specific popular memories of the past which were thought to be relevant. 
I consider responses to the 1982 Falkland Islands crisis directive (identified from 
here as the Falklands directive) submitted by thirty-five individual observers. The 
Falklands directive generated a total of 242 individual sets of responses (comprising 1199 
pages of hand written material) which were submitted to an initial special directive titled 
“The Falkland Islands Crisis: War with Argentina” issued in April 1982 (just after the 
Argentinian occupation of the islands), and a subsequent directive titled 
“Falkland/Malvinas Postscript” issued in the summer after the end of the conflict.207 The 
original directive asked observers to comment on the prospects of negotiations, whether 
Britain should use military force, and what they expected if so. It suggested that observers 
attempt to record their reactions to developments in ‘diary’ form. Coupled with the 
postscript directive which asked for observers thoughts after the conflict, the sample I 
consider here includes responses written at all points from April to the later summer.  
 The volume of responses that the Falklands directive generated demonstrates the 
importance ascribed by observers to the crisis unfolding in the South Atlantic. As I seek 
to show throughout, this rate of response was matched by the detail and intensity with 
which observers wrote about the conflict. They were evidently reacting to events that 
were presented to them through press, media and from the government. The prospect of 
British and Argentine soldiers being killed in the Falkland Islands elicited particular focus 
on the moral and political legitimacy of using force; observers were concerned primarily 
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with establishing whether it was right to pursue military conflict, and whether the 
conditions of the Argentinian occupation merited it. They also sought to make sense of 
the combat taking place on and around the islands, and establish Britain’s identity relative 
to its allies and enemies. All these aspects were written about with an urgency and 
attention that was linked to the particular aspects of killing, death and sacrifice associated 
with war. Yet it is also apparent that observers believed that a war fought against 
Argentina revealed something about Britain - its values, behaviour and place in the world, 
in short, aspects of its identity – and that these ideas were often clarified by invocation of 
the further past.  
 The Second World War was much closer to observers writing in 1982 when 
compared to observers responding to later directives. The mean year of birth of the 
sample of thirty five was 1931 and, of the thirty-five observers’ in the sample, fourteen 
were born before 1930. Most observers considered here either lived through ‘the last war’ 
or grew up in its immediate social, political and cultural wake. Thus the Falklands 
conflict elicited persistent invocation of the past, though, as I seek to show presently, 
personal recollections were articulated alongside re-invocation of broader popular 
memories of appeasement, Nazi aggression, and Britain’s road to war specifically. 
Most observers wrote about British involvement in the Falklands War in stark 
terms. Very few were ambiguous about its legitimacy, or lack thereof, and thus few 
hesitated in describing what it reflected about Britain’s role within it. A minority, just 
under a third, of observers objected to the conflict, most often emphasising the militaristic 
and rash nature of the British response. For most however, legitimacy was assured; 
Britain was thought to be a democracy, protecting itself against the illegitimate advance 
of dictatorial, ‘fascist’ regime, whilst also exercising its historically evident military 
prowess and quality. These ideas, particularly among those who supported the campaign, 
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were framed heavily by remembrance of the Second World War. The invocation of 
popular memories related to German aggression, Nazism and Adolf Hitler in particular 
helped many to clarify their perspectives on the present. Likewise, by extension, the 
conflict also offered an opportunity for observers to relive personal experience and 
reconstruct popular memories of World War Two, thereby reaffirming a broader sense of 
common history and unique British experience. As in later conflicts in Iraq and the 
Balkans, regardless of observers’ perspectives on the legitimacy of British involvement, 
the possibility of armed conflict elicited construction and reconstruction of Britain’s 
broader historical identity as both a military power and – centred largely on its Second 
World War – a force for good.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
Few observers were confused or ambivalent about the legitimacy of retaking the 
Falklands Islands by force.  Observers who chose to write about the conflict clearly felt 
the situation was grave and threatened the lives of British and Argentinian soldiers and as 
such, the desire to establish its legitimacy was a persistent feature of their responses. 
Though most were supportive of the British campaign, believing that it was fully 
justified, a minority (ten of the thirty five-observers considered here) were critical. 
Importantly, they did not often link their objections to pacifist beliefs, or suggest that the 
use of military force was wrong in all cases. Most emphasised instead the militaristic or 
reactionary nature of the campaign. One observer, writing after the war (in November 
1982), described the campaign as a “fiasco” and “a totally unnecessary war”.208 Another 
wrote a similar account during the conflict: 
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There is no moral justification for Britain’s going to war or threatening to do so… The despatch of 
the task force is a threat; if it succeeds it will enable the government of Mrs Thatcher to claim that 
only by backing diplomacy with force can peace and legitimate objectives be achieved.
209  
 
Some evidently felt that it was wrong for Britain to use military force as other options 
were available. Yet these observers were careful not to be seen to be writing in support of 
the Argentine claim or their occupation of the islands. Instead, they critiqued the 
reactionary nature of British policy which seemed to be based too heavily on a military 
response: 
 
What Britain should have done was to react with firm resolution against a dictator-invasion. This 
was of course vitally necessary - no-one is denying the argument for this. But to react into war-like 
intentions by sending the task force was absurd - well it would be if it were not so potentially 
dangerous.
210 
 
Such responses were fewer in number than those which were supportive. In fact, for those 
who were critical of Britain’s response, discussion of legitimacy was frequently 
accompanied by observers’ self-representation as a minority articulating a perspective 
opposite to perceived public opinion. One observer described the contemporary 
atmosphere; “if a word against [the retaking of the Islands by force] is said you will be 
accused of being unpatriotic”.211 Another wrote a similar account: 
 
I have felt totally alienated from popular opinion and so conscious of holding up a minority view 
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that in company I constantly hoped that the topic would not come up, especially with elderly 
relatives (my father excepted).
212 
 
Observers who opposed the Falklands campaign often had clear ideas about the 
illegitimacy of using military force as a tool of government policy, and believed strongly 
that a diplomatic solution to the crisis should be found, yet they were also, sometimes 
painfully, aware that their perspective was not widely shared within British society, and 
admitted quiescence in the face of apparent public support. The febrile atmosphere 
sparked by the war was evidenced by observers’ reluctance to discuss issues in public, 
and a feeling of isolation for those who objected. For one – their staunch opposition to the 
campaign quoted above – the contemporary media reaction to the crisis was “reminiscent 
of the jingo papers before 1914”.213  Britain’s apparent rush to use military force, and the 
militaristic attitude which seemed to enable it, could be understood by comparison with 
the perceived waste and futility of the First World War.214 
Other observers were less specific in their objections, focusing on the illegitimacy 
of using force without going into the specific details of Falkland Islands crisis or the 
status of the islands themselves. One stated that “where aggression was started it should 
have been stopped but in this case it shouldn’t have been allowed to start and I think 
when (I hope) it settles down there will be a peaceful solution”215 while another, writing 
after the conflict, concurred; “I don’t think wars really solve anything and I don't think the 
Falklands situation is resolved, at least not permanently.”216 
Likewise, some observers were dismayed when they weighed the possibility of 
death and sacrifice against the goal of recovering the islands. One wrote shortly after the 
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departure of the task force; “‘I find it very distasteful that we have sent out warships and 
put at risk the lives of our servicemen and women.”217 Another observer reacted 
instinctively to the unfolding crisis: 
  
As I watch and read the news and listen to the propaganda from both sides it all seems so 
anachronistic and so out of tune with my own feelings about international relations that the whole 
thing ‘jars’. I do not want Britons or Argentinians to die fighting one another.218  
 
Fundamentally all of these responses shared a sense of apprehension and disgust with the 
possibility of armed conflict in 1982. Yet the manner and intensity with which it was 
articulated varied. Some wrote clearly and concisely about the illegitimacy of Britain’s 
position and described how force could not be justified when diplomacy remained an 
option. Others were simply worried that a war to reclaim the Falkland Islands seemed 
disproportionate and unnecessary; a sentiment that was discernible to some degree among 
responses to all directives I consider in this research. Few observers believed that the use 
of military force was intrinsically illegitimate and no observers here were willing to 
suggest that Argentina had been right to occupy the islands. Observers who criticised 
Britain’s military response to the occupation of the islands were often explicit about being 
outnumbered within a society that seemed to overwhelming support the campaign. 
Importantly, very few observers described themselves as pacifists. A recurrent 
theme within responses to all the directives I consider in this research is the distinction 
made by observers between the legitimacy of military force itself, and the legitimacy of 
force in particular circumstances. The peripheral status of the islands or the apparent 
possibility for negotiation undermined the legitimacy of the military action pursued by the 
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British government, not any arguments related to the acceptability of force itself. These 
observers were far more likely to have objected to the jingoistic atmosphere which 
seemed to have resulted in or enabled the crisis to escalate rather than suggesting that 
control of the Falkland Islands should be conceded, or that Britain had a weaker claim. 
Importantly, no observers linked Britain’s Falklands campaign to a broader critique of its 
world role or its identity; the conflict was seen by its dissenters within Mass Observation 
largely as an isolated case.  
Most observers – twenty-five of the thirty-five considered here - believed that a 
military operation to recover the Falkland Islands was legitimate and justified, and that 
they were part of a supportive majority within society more broadly.219  They wrote 
variously that “I have believed all the time that we should act if negotiations fail, and 
have not met anyone who does not feel the same”,220 that “most people feel the Falklands 
Islands cannot be allowed to be taken away from us by force”221 and that “there can be no 
doubt that the majority view is that we had to take action to preserve UK sovereignty”.222  
The pursuit of a just war had, for one observer, seemed to foster a sense of 
national unity:  
 
The general feeling is one of patriotism among the people and even the political parties seem on the 
whole to be in agreement, apart from one or two who seem to think that we should not have taken 
steps to send either ships or troops to the area in spite of us having been invaded by the 
Argentinians.
223  
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Of course, the ways in which observers articulated this support varied. However, ideas of 
British territorial sovereignty, national ownership of the islands and the resulting 
imperative of self-defence most often coloured what supportive observers wrote. 
Retrieval and possession were crucial themes in such responses, reinforcing the sense that 
Britain had a right to regain what had been taken unilaterally and, in particular, 
aggressively by another state. One observer described how “if negotiations fail we should 
act, by taking the Falklands back by force if necessary”224 while another, writing after the 
conflict, celebrated a conclusion in which the “[the British] retained our right to the 
Falklands.”225 The sentiment was summarised by another: 
 
Never have I wavered, we must get them [the Falklands Islands] back… I feel we warned Argentina 
and they knew we were coming. It is Argentina who were the aggressors. Britain is in the right.
226  
 
Observers described Britain as a nation acting in self-defence. Indeed, some observers 
characterised the campaign to retake the islands as an obligation or a test of the right of 
all states and peoples to defend themselves against aggression. One observer’s narrative 
was typical: 
 
I have maintained the thoughts I had about the Falklands from start to now. We have backed away 
from any possibly nasty situation since the war and tried to placate and appease. It doesn't work - 
tyrants just get stronger. I feel we HAD to go in on a matter of principle.
227 
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The identification of tyranny further underscored a belief in the aggressive and 
unjustifiable nature of the Argentinian occupation but also, as I discuss in more detail 
shortly, contributed to a sense that the Falklands campaign was further justified because it 
was being pursued against a clearly understood and singularly illegitimate enemy regime. 
The need to act forcefully was given extra urgency by the allusion to appeasement; a 
powerful and frequent comparison within observers’ responses. 
Another observer described how Britain had to deploy its military forces or face 
the embarrassment of abdicating its right to self-defence: 
 
If negotiations fail should we act? At this point in time the answer has been given and we have 
acted. After deploying the task force I feel we had little choice but to act, we would have looked 
rather foolish having sent them there only to withdraw. Our credibility would have been destroyed… 
I feel that military action will prove to the rest of the world that we are not just going to be sat on 
and that we will react with or without the support of our neighbours and allies.
228  
 
Strikingly, these individuals did not link their arguments to detailed discussion of 
international agreements, convention or law, and they did not place the inhabitants of the 
Falkland Islands and their rights as a primary cause for action. Instead, they emphasised 
the legitimacy of Britain’s reaction as a rebuttal to the aggressions of a foreign power. 
Importantly, they were concerned primarily with establishing the legitimacy of the 
conflict by considering what it meant for Britain, and thereby narrating the conflict as a 
British experience. Legitimacy could be assured if it Britain could be identified as a 
defensive actor, resisting outside aggression. 
Frequently observers invoked Britain’s entry into the Second World War in order 
to make sense of the contemporary situation, drawing a comparison between the 
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aggressions of Nazi Germany in the late 1930s and the Argentine occupation of the 
Falkland Islands. One observer asked, “I also wonder sometimes, what is there to 
negotiate? What would have happened if we had negotiated with Hitler? You can’t 
negotiate with murderers.”229 Another suggested that the crisis had “seemed to me at the 
time, a repeat of Hitler and his gradual takeover of land.”230 A sense of legitimacy 
predicated on Britain’s right to resist and defend itself against undue aggression was 
central to the majority of observers’ responses but was also frequently articulated by 
reference to the national past. Direct comparison with Adolf Hitler’s tyrannical 
occupation of neighbouring countries and the perceived failure of appeasement both 
engaged observers in a reconstruction of a simplistic and moral narrative of entry into 
World War Two,231 and helped clarify Britain’s identity in the current Falklands conflict 
by association.  
Other observers interpreted legitimacy primarily as a defence of the rights of the 
Falkland Islanders themselves. One observer argued during the crisis period that “it is 
obvious that talks are not getting us nor the Islanders anywhere”232 while another wrote of 
the need to protect an exposed island community: 
 
Nobody I know wants war, and we all hope the problem will be solved peacefully. Some of my 
colleagues say, well, why bother about these little islands - there’s nothing there. I disagree with this 
attitude, and I feel deeply for the 1800 Islanders…If we stood by and did nothing, then other 
outposts might find themselves suddenly overwhelmed, e.g. Hong Kong or Gibraltar?
233  
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Among similar responses, observers argued that the failure to protect the Islanders from 
invasion and occupation would set a dangerous precedent, and imperilled the rights of all 
British subjects.234 Another observer made the point at length: 
 
Reasons given [for a military responses] are the obvious ones: that 1800 Islanders look to us for 
protection, that ignoring it or doing nothing lends encouragement to any militant state to walk in on 
any peaceful, unprotected territory...Whether we are censured by other countries in the longer term, I 
know that many people throughout the world now hold us in more respect than they have done for 
many years. This may not justify our action in the eyes of those who believe in peace at any price, 
nor those who think 1800 Falkland Islanders and a small acreage of not very fertile land are not 
worth bothering about, but it is important to those who know that a country which does not 
safeguard its citizens wherever they may be shows that it has no values of any real worth.
235  
 
Again, for the same observer, the Second World War was referred to in passing as a 
benchmark for the legitimacy of using military force for protection: 
 
On the broader aspects, although I believe military action should be absolutely the last resort, I must 
admit to satisfaction tinged with surprise that for once we are returning to the bygone standards of 
protecting Britons wherever they may be. Since WWII our record in this respect has been 
abysmal.
236 
 
As the crisis over the Falklands unfolded observers more frequently attempted to imagine 
what life was like on the islands, what occupation meant, and how this related to a 
possible military response. However, representations of the islands and their people did 
not prescribe conclusions on the use of military force to reclaim them. Indeed, some 
                                                     
234 Though the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands were not granted full citizenship of the United Kingdom 
until 1983, after they had been reclassified a citizens of British Dependent Territories in 1981.  
235 MO D157, male, born 1918. 
236 MO D157, male, born 1918. 
73 
 
 
 
observers who did not support a military campaign reinforced their argument by 
highlighting the political insignificance of the Islands or even ridiculing their remoteness 
and apparently primitive lifestyle; the “Falkland Islanders should be well compensated to 
leave with their sheep.”237 
Most observers who wrote about the island inhabitants were more sympathetic, 
articulating Britain’s obligation to defend the islands by force alongside romantic notions 
of island life and what was imagined to be a peaceful and vulnerable community. One 
observer wrote: 
 
My first reaction when sparse news started appearing in the papers about the Falkland Islands was – 
where are they anyway? Since then, so many people have said the same thing, and even now it’s a 
constant source of amazement that a little piece of Britain can exist so many miles away! Each time 
we see Islanders being interviewed on their exit from the Falklands, I expect them to speak with an 
accent!
238  
 
For like-minded observers, the Falkland Islands were more than just British territory. 
They were home to inhabitants of British ancestry, their right to freedom bound to their 
British nationality; the occupation seemed to be a direct attack on British people.239 
Others stressed that the Islanders had a right to existence free from occupation, 
foregrounding the precariousness of their existence, and thereby contributing to a sense 
that Britain, as a powerful and modern actor by comparison, was bound to protect them: 
 
Some of my colleagues say, well, why bother about these little islands – there’s nothing there. I 
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disagree with this attitude, and feel deeply for the 1800 Islanders who love their homes and tranquil 
life.
240 
 
Our people endured a life style which could not develop much beyond one which vanished in 
Europe and the rest of the developed world 40 or 50 years ago. They have accepted the restrictions 
placed upon them by the distances which separate them from the nearest developed countries (and I 
place Argentina quite low down the ‘developing’ ladder), and especially from their nearest relatives 
and home country, and deserve to be left in peace.
241 
 
Indeed, it was the Falklands crisis itself which brought observers into contact with the 
Islanders. Some simply admitted to not knowing where the Falkland Islands were, or who 
inhabited them. One observer described how “very few of us knew where the Falkland 
Islands were, my hairdresser told me that he thought that they were in the Orkneys as no 
doubt many more people thought that they were”242 while another recalled how they had 
“looked [the islands] up in an encyclopaedia to find out more, as reports were rather 
vague.”243 Unsurprisingly, observers who did not know much about the islands or the 
people who lived on them were unlikely to make them a central aspect of their 
discussions of the legitimacy of a possible conflict.  
In fact the status of the Islands’ inhabitants was a weak determinant of the British 
military campaign’s legitimacy within observers’ collected responses, perhaps 
surprisingly so given the subsequent media representation of the Islanders244 and the 
importance of their right to ‘self-determination’ within subsequent British government 
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policy.245 Very few saw the despatch of a task force as a humanitarian action (a discourse 
which becomes prevalent among responses to later conflicts) or linked the retaking of the 
islands to ideas of human rights. In those cases in which the Islanders were central to 
responses, legitimacy was based largely on the need to protect people of British ancestry 
from the possibility that they may have to live in a foreign state or culture. Certainly no 
observer believed that the inhabitants of the islands were being brutalised or physically 
harmed, and that this provided an imperative for intervention. 
Instead, it was the aggression of the Argentines that was most obvious. Observers 
were concerned primarily with establishing the legitimacy of the conflict in terms of what 
it meant for Britain as a nation – its identity – rather than what it meant for individual 
people affected by it. When confronted with a hostile occupation of Britain’s sovereign 
territory, they most frequently described a military campaign that was justified as an act 
of self-defence in Britain’s interests, fought in order to retain Britain’s right to its 
sovereign territory or possessions. Likewise, responses submitted by those who objected 
revealed the extent to which legitimacy and identity were linked. They considered 
Britain’s use of force to retake the islands to be unneeded and unwarranted while 
diplomatic options remained, identifying Britain as an aggressor, regardless of the 
illegitimacy of the Argentine occupation. Indeed, observers writing in 1982 were much 
surer about their own views, and what the war revealed about Britain’s identity within it, 
rarely discussing the details of international law or conventions. Though the Falklands 
War seemed to be supported by a majority of observers (in contrast to later conflicts 
which were more frequently thought to be unjust), it is this broader clarity with which 
both supporters and opponents narrated British identity in the conflict which separates 
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their responses from those written by observers concerned with later campaigns, 
particularly those in Kosovo and Afghanistan.   
This clarity was, particularly for those who were supportive, linked intimately to 
observers’ attempts to better explain the present by referring to the past. However, when 
considering legitimacy specifically, they rarely wrote about personal memories or lived 
experiences, despite in many cases being old enough to have lived through World War 
Two. Instead, popular memories of Britain’s entry into the Second World War most 
frequently informed how legitimacy could be understood in the present. Observers 
reconstructed a narrative of legitimate defence against Nazi Germany’s aggressive 
expansion and connected it to Argentina’s perceived ‘expansion’ into British territory. 
Those who supported the British campaign felt confident about stating their support when 
they were able suggest a direct connection between British resistance to Nazi Germany 
and British resistance to Argentina, or when – as I discuss shortly – they were able to 
actively compare Galtieri or his regime to that of Adolf Hitler. Prompted by 
contemporary circumstances, supportive observers engaged in a re-invocation of specific 
popular memories which were thought to better explain or clarify Britain’s contemporary 
position. 
Of course, not all observers supported Britain’s Falklands campaign. Some drew 
on memories of waste and futility in the First World War in order to lend weight to their 
own critique of contemporary policy. However, for the majority who supported the 
campaign its legitimacy derived from its status as a defensive action, an idea which was 
itself clarified by re-invocation of a singularly moral vision of British entry into World 
War Two. Thus, British involvement in the Falklands War also represented an 
opportunity for observers to reconstruct and perpetuate a narrative of historical British 
identity that was much broader than involvement in the contemporary conflict, and was 
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embedded in popular memories. In attempting to explain whether the Falklands campaign 
was right or wrong, these observers focused squarely on the legitimacy and morality of 
Britain’s resistance to Nazi Germany rather than constituent aspects of the war like, for 
example, the retreat from Dunkirk or the Battle of Britain. The circumstances of the 
present elicited not only a re-invocation of British participation in World War Two, but 
involved the reconstruction of a narrative of identity within it that was fundamentally 
secure and celebrated. The current conflict offered an opportunity for observers to 
simultaneously articulate Britain’s contemporary identity, and a much broader, temporal, 
and assured identity which involved the reconstruction of Britain’s celebrated entry into 
the Second World War and a refashioned narrative in which appeasement was understood 
as a failure to combat aggression.246 
 
The Military, Combat and Victory 
 
The outbreak of military conflict naturally prompted observers to focus specifically on 
Britain’s military institutions, personnel and the combat undertaken in the Falklands. 
They were interested to know how the campaign progressed and what was happening to 
those who were in harm’s way. What they wrote about the campaign additionally 
reflected their ideas about Britain’s military as a source of its identity. British personnel 
in particular were often represented as an embodiment of contemporary British martial 
prowess and as a temporal link between the present and Britain’s history as a military 
power.  
 Observers’ responses are of course individual and vary greatly in content and 
detail. Yet they were overwhelmingly supportive of Britain’s forces who were thought to 
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be determined, brave and heroic, and who embodied the broader sense of legitimacy 
which was established by the majority of observers. All the main branches of the military 
were considered to be emblematic of Britain’s identity, but it is quite clear that as the 
campaign progressed observers’ focus shifted from the departure of a task force which 
engendered memories of Britain’s glorious naval history, to the professional forces on 
land and in the air where the character of frontline infantry in particular was central. Ideas 
of personal bravery and heroism coloured a widespread interpretation of combat in which 
victory in the Falklands represented a vindication of Britain’s martial prowess. 
Such narratives were wholly congruent with dominant interpretations and memory 
of Britain’s recent military past, notably the difficult yet triumphant defeat of Nazi 
Germany in the Second World War. Indeed, the prospect of armed conflict was linked by 
some to personal memory of past war. For one observer, imagination of combat and its 
effects in the Falkland Islands engendered memories of family experience during the 
Second World War: 
 
[The observer’s mother] lives in sheltered accommodation with people of her age and older, and 
they are all against action! Although she is only 68, she obviously has such strong memories of the 
last world war and she and all her contemporaries have no desire to re-live those times. On the other 
hand, people in my age bracket (30s to 40s) generally speaking are much of the same attitude – go 
and fight them! We have very vague memories of 1939 to 1945! However, my mother is quick to 
point out that she and her contemporaries felt much the same at the beginning of World War II, and 
her mother as very much against it – too many memories of 1914-18! How history does repeat 
itself.
247 
 
The possibility of combat specifically, and imagining what it involved for soldiers and 
their families, prompted observers who were old enough to recall their own personal 
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wartime memories; a dynamic discernible among responses concerning the subsequent 
Gulf War too. Lived experience of wartime seemed relevant in explaining the cost of 
military conflict for friends and families of those who fought and served as a point of 
reference for different generations.248 Attitudes to contemporary conflict were shaped 
specifically by experience of those in the past. 
Other observers focused on Britain’s military institutions as a focus for its 
identity, invoking a national military past and tradition. For several, the despatch of a 
naval task force was particularly impressive. The sight of British ships departing for war 
conjured imagery of a glorious naval identity:  
 
It [the departure of the task force] was a completely novel experience. It was like a recreation of all 
those great naval occasions that one knows from history books or dim black and white newsreels: 
the Armada, Spithead reviews etc. Surely this sort of mass parade of ships of war going off to fight 
hadn’t happened since Nelson’s day. I have always assumed that in the Two World Wars our 
fighting ships would have just sort of slipped out of harbour discretely, not drawing attention to 
themselves.  I watched the live transmission of the Fleet’s sailing in my office with a colleague. 
Both of us were dumbfounded, incredulous. Still, it seemed unreal. It seemed medieval; it seemed 
like a pageant; it seemed like something from C. S. Forester’s Hornblower books… I certainly did 
feel a twinge of old-fashioned patriotism in the days following the sailing of the fleet. Warships do 
look pretty dressed with bunting and their crews lining the decks; spring sunshine at Portsmouth 
makes the sea and ships look very romantic. The Navy is certainly a much more romantic fighting 
force than the Army or air-force: it is also heavily bound up with great moments in British 
history.
249  
 
Though not all observers went into quite so much detail, it is evident within collected 
responses that the despatch of the task force was frequently associated with a particular 
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sense of British pageantry, identity and history, and foregrounded within popular 
culture.250 Strikingly, very few observers were concerned specifically with the 
controversial sinking of the Argentine crusier, General Belgrano.251 One observer 
focused instead on the loss of HMS Sheffield on 10 May, 1982: 
 
Yesterday we heard of the sinking of the Argentinian ship, and although one shouldn’t most people 
said that will show them, after all they started it, but today we mourn our own dead and the loss of 
HMS Sheffield and also worry about the wounded… My husband was on the previous HMS 
Sheffield (shiny Sheff as she was known) the plate was all Sheffield steel, she sunk the Bismarck and 
he was on the guns at the time. We went to the launching of this Sheffield in 1971, it was the Duke 
of Edinburgh’s birthday and we all sang Happy Birthday, so we as a family feel the loss today.252 
 
This observer was keen to stress the personal connections they had to the British navy as 
it assumed a critical combat role approaching the islands. Naval battles and losses 
engendered direct connection to similar experiences in the Second World War. The 
Navy’s ships were often linked to Britain’s history and associated with the most well-
known symbols of British identity.  
 Certainly, the fortunes of British forces in the campaign were central aspect of 
observers’ responses as they attempted to keep up to date with events in the theatre. One 
was distressed as “more planes are being shot down and our own ships are being hit”253 
while another considered the use of otherwise dormant military assets: 
 
The weapons producers and NATO have had a marvellous time evaluating their latest hardware, 
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used in anger for the first time. The weaknesses and unexpected bonuses have shown up clearly. The 
Harrier, to name one, can no longer be passed off as a joke aeroplane.
254 
 
The use of high-profile and technologically advanced weaponry was considered by 
another observer, though described in a rather more critical and cynical tone: 
 
I have sensed a distinct desire on the part of the Prime Minister, some members of the Cabinet and 
the Admiralty in charge to have a ‘go’ and try their fancy weapons.255 
  
During the initial stages of the crisis, the assembly of a naval flotilla in particular elicited 
invocation of Britain’s seafaring past and its historical status as a strong naval power. As 
the task force approached the islands and combat began in earnest observers became more 
concerned about the performance of Britain’s aeroplanes and fighter pilots,256 and the 
advanced technology with which they were associated.257 
As British forces embarked onto the Falkland Islands, observers instead began to 
focus on the developing land war. This shift ran parallel to the increasing prominence of 
the individual personnel who were deployed to the theatre within their responses, 
particularly the frontline infantrymen who were characterised as bearing the brunt of the 
conflict and involved most heavily in the fighting. Indeed, this focus, largely at the 
expense of sailors and reserve troops who faced great risk aboard the Navy’s ships, 
evidenced observers’ persistent elevation of the experience of combat as a marker for 
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heroism and military identity during the conflict;258 a trend which persists throughout 
responses to all directives I have considered.  
Observers infrequently discussed the use of tactics or weaponry. Rather they 
focused on more abstract ideas related to the quality and character of Britain’s frontline 
soldiers. The bravery and dedication that they demonstrated was often linked to a sense of 
national pride, but also represented a contemporary exposition of a long history of British 
heroism: 
 
…our young men are still patriotic and brave, ready to defend the honour of the land of their 
birth...Remembrance has brought down a share of peace, because I realise such things are our 
heritage. The young men are still the same and I do wish those who are fighting God speed.
259  
 
The forces deployed to the Falklands embodied an ethic of sacrifice and duty which 
moved many observers. Another offered a typically emotional response after the 
conclusion of the conflict: 
 
There was a lump in my throat, but mingled with the feeling of grief for the men that did not return 
and those that were maimed and injured was a feeling of immense pride. Pride for these men, of all 
ages who achieved what they did not only against the invaders, but… against the elements, terrain 
and having to have everything required sent to them from far away. Would that these qualities 
shown in adversity could also be foremost in everyday life.
260  
 
Of course, though popular, the sentiment was not hegemonic. Some observers found it 
difficult to express anything other than sadness at the loss of life experienced in the South 
Atlantic: 
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The sadness is, of course, seeing the light of courage in young faces and ending - like innocent 
lambs to the slaughter. If pushed to self-defence, war must be a last resort and not a first.
261 
 
Others who did not believe that Britain should use force to retake the islands did not 
portray the military effort in a positive light. One suggested that “the response of the great 
majority of people in Britain indicates a thirst for a glorious victory, perhaps because of 
our recent poor showing in football.”262 However, very few were critical in this regard. 
Among the responses in which combat or the military were discussed, most suggested 
that – despite the tragic loss of life involved in a military campaign – the sailors and, 
latterly, soldiers and pilots deployed to the Falklands had exhibited remarkable heroism. 
The defeat of the Argentines reinforced a sense of vindication and triumph among 
observers, with returning soldiers celebrated as deserving victors. For one, watching the 
victory parade held in October 1982 “was most stirring and one can imagine the 
atmosphere along the actual route of the procession.”263 Another stated; “certainly the 
Forces deserved to be acclaimed and feted.”264 One observer suggested further that the 
parade was a worthy celebration of Britain’s heroic veterans, but that she and her friends 
had been “disgusted that arrangements were not made for the wounded to be in it. They… 
were the real heroes.”265 The notion that returning soldiers had demonstrated their heroic 
character and deserved national recognition was not challenged, yet such responses show 
how observers were not necessarily willing to condone or support ‘official’ 
commemorations. Indeed, as I argue shortly, they often fully supported the campaign and 
the military, contrasting this explicitly with a much more critical or sceptical view of 
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government and political leaders. The absence of disabled veterans within the victory 
parade (something which caused a minor national controversy at the time)266 was 
identified and criticised, revealing a more personal and emotional sympathy that existed 
alongside a celebration of martial prowess and victory. Observers did not consider 
military personnel to be a wing of the state or a tool for the government to exploit; in 
some cases they were identified in opposition to political power.  
Thus, observers viewed Britain’s military as representative of the nation as well as 
the state. Victory in the Falklands had been won by Britain, not the British government. 
Certainly, the conflict expunged any sense that Britain’s forces were not up to the task, or 
had suffered shame or embarrassment. Indeed, as one observer wrote after the conflict, 
victory had meant that “The Prestige of the UK has now risen throughout the world.”267  
Anxieties over the outcome or human cost of the conflict were replaced as the 
military returned triumphant. The account of one observer is demonstrative. During the 
initial fighting on the islands pride and patriotism mixed with concern for the wellbeing 
of soldiers: 
 
As my husband is an Ex Royal Navy man, I do share with him very patriotic views, and of course at 
the present time I am very proud of our boys out there, they have done a grand job and I hope and 
pray that we can recapture the Falklands. But the cost in human life is a very high price if this is 
what we have to pay. Many a mum, dad, wife etc. is I expect wondering at the present if their own 
dear one is safe.
268  
 
For the same observer, all that seemed left to debate after the forces’ return was how best 
to accommodate the military triumph achieved in the South Atlantic: 
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I listened to the Falklands Service and I am afraid I agree with the critics that the fact that we were 
victorious is something to be proud of… and the efforts of the young men and women who risk their 
lives in our defence is something to be proud of an applauded.
269 
 
Likewise,  one observer described how “most people feel proud to be British at this time, 
and feel we still make the best fighting force in the world.”270 For another, victory in the 
Falklands had shown the continuing effectiveness of Britain’s military: 
 
The military angle is interesting. None of our troops are old enough to have seen this kind of 
action...The troops on both sides were new to real war, but the value of British training and 
discipline was obvious… The Junta clearly made a monumental error when they apparently thought 
we wouldn't fight back, further compounded by the assessment that we couldn’t win.271  
 
For these observers, the despatch of naval and ground forces, and the bravery and 
competency of the soldiers who fought on land, were thought to demonstrate a direct link 
between Britain’s contemporary use of force and a celebrated martial identity. The 
military was in this sense, not only emblematic of a broadly justified conflict in the south 
Atlantic but also represented the most recent exposition of a continuing military tradition. 
For one observer the Falklands War represented a connection between past and present 
which recalled Britain’s history as an imperial power: 
 
Our Empire seemed as far away as the moon and stars. Now most of our Empire has gone, the moon 
and stars are nearer to us today. Here we are fighting, for what at a hasty glance, seems to be a little 
group of islands... I am in the evening of my days but I am back in that little village church school, 
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singing ‘Land of our birth, our faith, our pride, for whose dear sake our fathers died, O, Motherland, 
we pledge to thee, head, heart, and hand through years to be.
272  
 
History and identity, though rarely linked to Empire so explicitly, were important for 
those attempting to understand the campaign itself. Few observers went into detail about 
the weapons or tactics deployed in the Falkland Islands. Most were instead emotionally 
invested in abstract ideas of the quality and character of military personnel; bravery, 
determination, resilience, strength. They embodied not only the legitimate victory won 
against Argentina, but also the legitimacy and heroism of military service itself. Their 
efforts represented an experience that was unique for Britain and distinguished a sense of 
martial superiority.   
 It is important to note however, that observers imagined the conflict in its totality 
and appear to have refocused their attentions as events in the south Atlantic unfolded. 
During the initial despatch of the task force, several observers were keen to stress 
Britain’s identity as a sea power. The departure of ships from Britain conjured images of 
a mythic past which, for an older generation, included not only the Second World War 
but also an idea of Britain’s global, imperial past. However, the conflict ended as a 
ground war and observers increasingly wrote about it as such, moving emphasis from 
ships and the navy, to the army and the central figure of the infantry soldier. This shift of 
focus from sea power has not altered since within observers’ collected responses as 
British forces have continued to be deployed primarily on land.  
 The nature of the combat, its imagination rooted in the bravery and heroism of 
frontline troops, and Britain’s ultimate triumph was received with pride by most of the 
observers who wrote about combat and the military specifically. Though, several 
suggested that the war represented a lamentable loss of life – or even a waste - most 
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described Britain’s military involvement in the war as part of a wider story of military 
legitimacy; both that Britain remained a force for good, and that military service itself 
was legitimate and deserving of respect and appreciation. The circumstances of the 
Falklands War engendered a reconstruction of British identity in which ground warfare 
and a personal, sympathetic and individualistic narrative of soldierly heroism and triumph 
were particularly important. Even among those who were most critical of Britain’s 
campaign to retake the Islands by force, very few challenged this pervasive belief in the 
heightened status of military personnel and a construction of masculine military 
heroism.273  
 
Leaders, Leadership and Margaret Thatcher 
 
Observers considered the Falklands crisis in light of Britain’s contemporary political 
leadership and individual leaders. While much of this discourse was dominated by the 
incumbent government, focused primarily on the then Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, 
observers did attempt to place Britain’s use of force in 1982 within the wider political 
context. 
 Indeed, frequently observers suggested that the British state, and in particular the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, had been at fault in failing to anticipate Argentina’s 
occupation of the islands.274 Individuals who did not fully support a military campaign to 
retake the islands were keen to stress that the conflict had been the result of political 
failure, and that the government’s response was similarly misguided. They suggested that 
the situation in the South Atlantic had been “badly handled”,275 “mishandled”,276 or that 
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“we should never have got into this position.”277 Others described their “tired dismay over 
the entire pantomime”278 and that blame for the outbreak of war must be placed with a 
British government which “did not take him [Argentine President, Leopoldo Galtieri] 
seriously.”279 
 Indeed, even among observers who supported a military response the idea that the 
British state was at least partially to blame for the outbreak of war was a popular one. One 
observer wrote how the British “had little choice but to act”280 militarily but went on to 
write, “was it mishandled from the start? I think quite honestly, yes. It seems as if we 
were treating the situation as a problem which would go away if we ignored it.”281 
Similarly another observer wrote how “the situation was mishandled before the crisis 
started… [but] we should act, by taking the Falklands back by force if necessary.”282  
 Observers mostly believed that the British were right to defend themselves, their 
territory or subjects once the Argentines had occupied the islands but suggested that the 
British government had not done enough to avert such aggression. One described how 
“many people, including myself, feel that the government acted rather belatedly if they 
did indeed know of Argentina’s intentions well before April”283 while another wrote in 
greater detail: 
 
Once the Argentinians invaded the Falkland Islands I think the only action the government could 
take was to send out troops. However, from the information we have been told I certainly think the 
whole affair was mishandled… Why, when there have been ‘signs’ of an invasion for so many years 
have not any governments brought the problem into the open and tried to sort it out? I can 
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understand why a government wants to keep a territory that may be beneficial to it in the future but I 
do not understand why they ignore it until it is too late and lives are lost.
284 
 
Another observer blamed the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, for the initial failure in 
leadership. Having now resigned, the government could concentrate on pursuing a 
legitimate cause: 
 
Apart from thinking that the whole issue should never have been allowed to reach this point, and 
agreeing with the resignation of Lord Carrington because of this… I feel there is [now] more chance 
of a threat to world peace if we do not act than if we do.
285  
 
Poor leadership marked the eruption of a crisis in the South Atlantic. The inability of the 
government to show Argentina that the Falklands Islands would be defended had led to a 
situation in which they now had to be retaken. The minority of observers who rejected 
using force to reclaim the islands were naturally critical of Foreign Office failures, yet 
even among the greater number who supported a military campaign the idea that political 
forces could be apportioned blame was also popular. Failure to head off the war in the 
first place was not considered to be a British fault, rather it could be more narrowly 
attributed to a political elite and, in some cases, a single person in Carrington. This 
narrative was similar in nature to the ‘guilty men’286 thesis which observers frequently 
ascribed to when referring to Britain’s entry into the Second World War.  
 As the Thatcher government responded to the Argentinian occupation, and the 
task force departed for the islands, observers considered the role assumed by the Prime 
Minister. While some did discuss in passing other figures like Lord Carrington, or 
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prominent parliamentary opponents like Tony Benn or Tam Dalyell, most focused solely 
on Thatcher as leader of the government and as a figurehead for Britain internationally, 
setting a trend among all collected responses considered in this research in associating 
political leadership and decision-making specifically with the office of the Prime Minster. 
 The eruption of the Falklands crisis, and a belief on the part of most observers that 
it was right to retake the islands by force, mixed uneasily with diverging and often highly 
charged political views on Margaret Thatcher’s government. After all, she had been 
Prime Minister for nearly three years by the time observers began writing about the 
Falklands War,287 thus what observers submitted in 1982 was marked by a great deal of 
variation and complexity. Some clearly felt that the conflict was evidence of the Thatcher 
government’s warlike, aggressive and divisive politics. Others felt the conflict was an 
exposition of the government’s strength and determination. In both cases the Prime 
Minister became an embodiment of the British state or policy in the crisis and subsequent 
military conflict.  
Individuals who rejected the legitimacy of the war were often forthright in what 
they wrote in this regard, representing Thatcher’s role in the crisis as cynical and 
opportunistic: 
 
The government have managed to change the headlines from mass unemployment which is still with 
us, to mass slaughter of human beings - no matter what race. I am for peace and diplomatic 
discussion, not at the point of a gun.
288 
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...the overriding motive, is that a show of British force will (a) unite the nation, or at any rate the 
greater part of it, and obliterate from the minds of the great majority of people the ineptitude of the 
government in permitting the situation to reach crisis point; and (b) enable the P.M. to project herself 
as a second Boadicea or a female Winston Churchill, the achievement of which will win more votes 
than any other issue.
289 
 
The point was further reinforced by another observer, writing after the conclusion of the 
conflict, who explicitly contrasted political failure and the sense of heroism and duty that 
led ordinary people into the armed forces: 
 
Thatcher’s bloody war proved only one thing… that good and brave men have to do as they are told 
once the ‘leaders’ decide to avenge, and it is sad that such brave courageous individuals are misled 
about what true heroism is.
290 
 
Other observers were however, less critical and were often quite clear that the conflict 
represented a boon for the Thatcher government domestically. They wrote variously that 
“Mrs Thatcher’s popularity has increased”291 and that “support for the government has, if 
anything, grown as the war has progressed.”292 Several suggested further that such a 
forceful and righteous reaction to the Argentine occupation was directly attributable to the 
quality and character of the Prime Minister, and that her strong leadership had fostered a 
sense of national unity, reflected through support in Parliament: 
 
We fortunately have a prime minister that doesn't seem to be falling apart with the difficult task that 
she is facing, and at least the majority of all parties are with her on this.
293 
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There is no doubt at all that, at present, the majority support both the stand the Government has 
taken and the military effort which is backing it up.
294 
 
Evidently, for observers who were both critical and supportive of the campaign, Thatcher 
represented an embodiment of Britain’s position in the conflict, be it an unwarranted 
reaction or a determined and justified defence. Perspectives on her handling of the crisis 
seemed, for some at least, to offer clear evidence of the substance and style of her 
leadership itself.  
 Indeed, some observers bought heavily into Thatcher’s own interpretation of a 
‘Falklands Factor’ in which the resolve and success demonstrated in the South Atlantic 
had begun a reversal of Britain’s post war decline.295 For one observer “a new feeling of 
pride and togetherness became apparent in the country”296 while for another “people seem 
to be taking extra pride from the fact that our servicemen are capable of putting up a good 
show.”297 The effect of the war on domestic society was even noticeable in the work 
place: 
 
Last Sunday I watched on TV the return of the Canberra [as] I think most people did, it is amazing 
the amount of public interest that is around at the present time, if only this spirit could somehow be 
around all the time…The response [at work] was superb no one refused to work extra time, suppliers 
were very co-operative with delivery. Some people came back from holidays early as their expertise 
was required.
298 
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However, perhaps most strikingly given Thatcher’s close association with the conflict in 
the following decades, several observers were conspicuously lukewarm about Thatcher’s 
personality, or her government’s record, and sought to detach her leadership from a cause 
that was considered to be justified but national in nature. One observer, after having 
decried the protests of Tony Benn and Judith Hart in attempting to obstruct a legitimate 
effort to retake the islands, was also critical of Thatcher’s role in the military effort; “I 
feel Margaret Thatcher had to save her face and send troops in.”299 Similarly, the pride 
expressed by another observer on seeing the return of victorious British soldiers was 
accompanied by a statement that “I, like them [the observer’s friends], did not approve of 
Mrs Thatcher being there with the Mayor [at the victory parade]”.300 
Likewise, some believed that the Thatcher government was seeking to make 
political capital out of a war which, though justified had little to do with her. One 
suggested sardonically that “it is a known tactic for a government to divert attention away 
from problems at home – jokes were heard as to whether Mrs Thatcher had to let things 
get this far for the same reason.”301 Others were particularly cynical about Thatcher’s 
connection to and interpretation of the conflict: 
 
I feel that military action will prove to the rest of the world that we are not just going to be sat on 
and that we will react with or without the support of our neighbours and allies... I feel that domestic 
policy is affected by the fact that the Tory government can now be seen to be strong and decisive, 
although the situation was mishandled in the beginning, if ‘victory’ ensues then this will be forgotten 
and the Tories will win the next election.
302 
 
Another observer concurred, writing after the conflict: 
                                                     
299 MO C140, female, born 1951. 
300 MO F194, female, born 1918. 
301 MO B70, female, born 1950. 
302 MO C138, female, born 1944. 
94 
 
 
 
 
With hindsight, I suppose the outcome was successful; however, the conflict led directly, I am 
convinced, to the rehabilitation of Margaret Thatcher, who had been struggling to maintain 
popularity before it happened. She rode on the back of the Falklands conflict until the end of her 
premiership, and went on to do untold damage to this country.
303 
 
Here, the idea that the Prime Minister embodied a national spirit, or could take personal 
credit for Britain’s victory over Argentina, was not entertained. The conflict was 
considered by these observers to be a cause that was larger than the premiership of 
Margaret Thatcher and her apparent efforts to appropriate the legacy of the war were 
criticised by individuals who otherwise supported it. While leadership was frequently 
used as important signifier of Britain’s identity in the Falklands War, some observers 
instead described Prime Ministerial leadership to have been essentially incidental, 
drawing a sharp distinction between political power and policy on the one hand, and a 
national struggle – embodied more authentically by the travails of the armed forces – on 
the other.  
Observers were then, willing to criticise political leaders despite essentially 
agreeing with their positions and policies. They were willing in 1982 – as in later cases – 
to apportion blame for the eruption of a lamentable conflict to elements of the British 
state. In addition to vague allusions to a ‘mishandled’ crisis, several observers were keen 
to point out that the necessary deployment of the British military had resulted from a 
signal failure to Argentina over the status of the islands, and seemed to suggest that 
Britain had appeased the Junta before having to pay the price; a narrative seemingly 
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closely aligned to a pervasive belief in the abject failure of Britain’s appeasement of Nazi 
Germany.304 
However, it is not the aim of this research to assess the extent to which the 
Falklands War impacted on the popularity of political elites, the government or Margaret 
Thatcher within observers’ responses. Evidently, some felt strongly that Thatcher was 
responsible for the campaign, an association which could be positive or negative 
depending on broader perspectives on its legitimacy. I do suggest however that these 
responses show how government or party politics were subordinate within responses to a 
broader conception of the Falklands War as one involving the British nation. While 
Thatcher was in some cases thought to personally embody the identity of the nation, in 
other cases observers criticised her ‘appropriation’ of an otherwise justified use of British 
force. The prospect of military conflict led observers to discuss it as a British experience 
rather than simply a political decision. 
This delineation of political leadership within a broader interpretation of national 
experience meant that official failure or party politics in the present could be separated 
from broader constructions of Britain as a military force for good. Observers mostly 
supported the government’s policy but saw the war as part of a national story, and were 
more ambivalent about crediting political leaders who were a smaller, more transient part 
of a broader historical narrative. In later conflicts, particularly the invasion of Iraq in 
2003, which was roundly criticised within responses, this identification of political failure 
helped observers to preserve and reinforce a broader belief in the legitimacy of British 
military force, and Britain’s historic identity as a force for good, as blame for the conflict 
could be placed squarely with politicians and leaders in the present. 
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The UN, USA and Europe 
 
As Philip Towle has shown, members of the British public do not lack sophisticated 
knowledge about international affairs and are capable of assessing the ramifications of 
diplomatic crises.305 Observers were evidently aware of the prevailing international 
context in 1982, including knowledge of Britain’s place within the nuclear security 
struggle. Yet observers were generally quick to identify the extraneous nature of the 
Falklands crisis in relation to the wider Cold War. The sense that the crisis may represent 
something potentially escalatory was evident in only one response: 
 
That we are now on the brink of war is not totally surprising. There has been an increasing feeling 
over the last two years that the world was on the brink of something… What is surprising is the 
direction from which the threat has come: not Europe or the Middle East, but the South Atlantic.
306 
 
Writing after its conclusion, another observer instead identified the contained and 
conventional nature of the war with reference to its implications for Britain’s future 
security; “The view from many quarters as a result of the crisis has been agreement that 
Britain does not need nuclear weapons and defence spending should go on what we are so 
clearly using against the Argentinians now.”307 In sharp contrast to the later Gulf War, 
observers were generally not worried that a war in the South Atlantic could trigger a 
regional or global disaster, despite its emergence during a period of heightening 
international tension. Instead, observers maintained a more narrow diplomatic focus 
centred on Britain’s relationship with the United Nations, its allies in America and 
Europe, and of course, its enemy, Argentina.  
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The war elicited strongly-held views on the nature of diplomacy and the need for 
Britain and Argentina to avoid war through cooperation. Observers desired a strong 
United Nations, capable of enforcing negotiation between belligerent states. They argued 
that “the United Nations should have stepped in and forced (peacefully) the invaders to 
withdraw”,308 that “we should have immediately called in the UN”,309 and that “I would 
like to see an international peace keeping force which has more power than the present 
UN forces… [able] to produce a military force equal to or greater than any aggressors.”310  
 Frequently observers described the United Nations as a legitimate source of 
resolution for disputes such as that over the Falkland Islands. Some who rejected the 
justification for a military response were eager to suggest that the UN ought to provide an 
alternative diplomatic route. Among supporters of Britain’s position, it was assumed that 
the United Nations could provide a more forceful rebuttal to the Argentine ‘aggressors’.  
 For others however, the failure to resolve the crisis before a resort to force 
demonstrated the weakness of the United Nations as a platform for settling international 
disputes. Many questioned the effectiveness of an institution that had seemed to permit 
the occupation of the islands in the first place, and then the despatch of the naval task 
force after: 
 
Why, oh why, hasn’t the UN Secretary General done something open and positive to help keep the 
peace?
311 
 
The UN must find ways to cope. When this debacle is over the UN must debate.
312 
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The ineffectuality of the United Nations [was demonstrated by the failure] to bring about a peaceful 
settlement when faced with two countries absolutely adamant that both of them are in the right.
313  
 
Others drew on their knowledge of the League of Nations, connecting present to past 
through an articulation of failed multilateralism and international gridlock: 
 
The status of the United Nations as a war-averting force has now diminished to that of the League in 
the ‘thirties.314 
 
Among observers who supported Britain’s Falklands campaign, some were concerned 
with the perceived failure of international arbitration. They assumed that the legitimacy of 
Britain’s position would have been reflected through the institutions of the UN and that 
Britain ought to have avoided acting alone: 
 
Whatever happened to the United Nations, or our dream of a United Nations? It seems that they have 
very little effect as it actually comes to it. After all, if Argentina won’t comply with UN resolutions 
then I feel they should not belong and should be ostracised by the other nations.
315 
 
Likewise, for another observer, the Argentine occupation of the islands demonstrated the 
need for multilateral security that could head off such aggression: 
 
…there must be a civilised and sensible way of not allowing any one country to decide that another 
territory belongs to them and on their own accord without prior application or discussion walk in and 
take over... The United Nations would be the obvious body to approach with grievances of this kind, 
although they do not seem to have been able to assert any great authority when disputes of this 
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nature arise, sometimes seeming inadequate and causing more aggravation than solution, and leaving 
matters in a more fragile state.
316 
 
At the most basic level, all observers who wrote about the United Nations were 
universally supportive of an international body capable of resolving conflicts before its 
parties resorted to force. Certainly, no observers argued that the UN ought to be 
abandoned, or that Britain ought to leave it. Instead many lamented failure to resolve the 
Falklands crisis without resort to force which further exposed its weakness. 
 However, where some assumed that a ‘strong’ UN would halt British overreaction 
or aggression and thereby constrain the ability of the British state to pursue an unjustified 
conflict, others assumed that it would simply have saved the British from having to 
remove the Argentines themselves. Observers rarely sought to explain whether the use of 
force could be sanctioned within international law, and certainly no observers explicitly 
based their judgements on the campaign’s legitimacy by referring to its ‘legality’ in this 
sense. Instead, though observers were concerned with ideas of multilateral security and 
peaceful resolution, what they wrote in this regard reinforces a wider finding that their 
perspectives on Britain’s role in the conflict, and its justification or legitimacy, were 
understood through construction of Britain’s national identity. They were, on the whole, 
more concerned with establishing whether the campaign could be considered defensive in 
nature – whether it could be incorporated directly within a broader narrative of British 
resistance to expansionary aggression – rather than whether Argentina’s occupation 
contravened, for example, the Charter of the United Nations.  
 Few observers discussed allied states or nations within their responses, perhaps 
reflecting the bi-lateral nature of the conflict. Indeed, only five observers wrote in detail 
about Britain’s allies in 1982. They suggested that Britain ought to look to its allies in 
                                                     
316 MO B53, female, born 1926.  
100 
 
 
 
Europe and America, but that their neutrality – most obviously realised by US Secretary 
of State, Alexander Haig’s shuttle diplomacy – was troubling when the legitimacy of 
Britain’s position seemed so obvious: 
 
The US incurred some condemnation during its ‘even handed’ phase. Some people thought Haig’s 
attempts were ‘a cheek’, especially when the results appeared to be little more than the Argentinians 
allowing us a token presence under their flag. As of old, the messenger was blamed for the content 
of the missive. With the recent US announcement backing UK came the natural ‘about time, too’ 
reaction.
317 
 
Many people feel also it [a British military campaign] will show who we can trust in the EEC and if 
the USA will help, and how far they will go in talk and action… They [the USA] sit on the fence and 
try and stay on both sides, and have never learned, that you have to have conviction of right and 
wrong at the start and not wait to see.
318 
 
For these observers the legitimacy of Britain’s military effort to retake the Falkland 
Islands was not in doubt, even when it seemed that close allies held reservations or were 
committed to a diplomatic resolution. Britain could not afford to ‘sit on the fence’. 
American inaction in the current crisis was not only lamentable, but evident of an 
historical difference between allies. Observers were referring implicitly to the United 
States entry into the world wars in 1917 and 1941. In suggesting that American 
‘neutrality’ could be understood as part of a specific historical narrative, observers were 
prompted to rehabilitate an interpretation of British involvement in World War Two that 
was unique by virtue of having been “the only nation to have been in from first to last.”319 
The process of othering that these observers engaged in did not rest solely on 
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contemporary circumstance, but involved the re-invocation of popular memories that 
could give meaning – over a much longer time period – to historical differences in 
national identity, not simply differences in policy or context. 
For another observer, Britain’s principled lone stand was articulated in contrast to 
the lack of commitment exhibited by European partners: 
 
I think that as we decided to send our troops and stand up to Argentina then the EEC and other 
countries should stand with us. If they had been put in our position I can only assume they would 
have done the same. I also think they have no right to call for a ceasefire now and for our troops to 
be withdrawn as if they had taken stronger sanctions with Argentina we might not have to have 
taken invasion action.
320 
 
Again, invocation of ‘the last war’ clarified the apparent hypocrisy of European allies for 
another observer: 
 
When it comes down to self-interest our allies in the EEC certainly showed a remarkable lack of 
support for us, a good many of whom would not be free to decide anything if it had not been for our 
effects in the last war. So much for a United Europe. Their showing on the issue will give a fillip to 
the anti-marketers, I fear.
321 
 
For another observer, comparison between Douglas Haig and Neville Chamberlain 
associated American policy with an enduring belief in the failure of appeasement and the 
“myth of Munich”.322 Though most observers who discussed the diplomatic context did 
not embed their discussions quite so heavily in memories of the Second World War, the 
account is again instructive in showing how British identity – rooted in a celebrated and 
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legitimate ‘lone stand’ in 1940 – could be reconstructed more fundamentally as observers 
sought to make sense of the contemporary Falklands crisis:   
 
Mr Haig’s shuffling appears to be as much use as Mr Chamberlain’s bit of paper. And note how the 
USA is sitting on the fence as they did at the beginning of both World Wars!.. The EEC, devious as 
ever, used the fact that it was supporting us to weedle better farm prices out of us (I wonder how the 
French would react if someone invaded Sardinia? (sic)… The Irish behaved exactly as they did in 
World War II and, really, no-one expected them to change.
323 
 
Observers made sense of the contemporary period, and the diplomatic relationship with 
other allied states, by drawing on a broader narrative of British identity. Present 
circumstances, including the prevailing international and diplomatic context, could be 
clarified and better understood when compared to familiar and assured narratives of 
British experience in the Second World War. During the Falklands campaign – unlike 
observers’ responses to British involvement in later conflicts – neutrality, British isolation 
and 1940 were events and ideas that seemed to retain an explanatory power over the 
present and affirm the legitimacy of Britain’s position. These observers interpreted the 
contemporary context in a manner which foregrounded the “’big facts’”324 of 1940, 
providing space in which Britain’s distinguished lone resistance in Europe could be re-
invoked and reinforced. Yet of course, few observers discussed the international 
diplomatic context directly, at least when compared to those discussing the legitimacy of 
the British response, or the nature of the opposing regime. While this process of othering 
of allied nations prompted observers to focus on Britain’s celebrated ‘lone stand’, it is 
important to note that it was not as salient a feature of their responses as narratives related 
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to German aggression in the later 1930s, the brutal tyranny of the Nazis and Adolf Hitler 
specifically, or the apparent failure of Britain’s policy of appeasement. 
Similarly, later involvement in multi-national, US-led coalitions, engendered 
within observers responses a re-invocation of Britain’s morally secure and celebrated 
resistance to Nazi Germany in order to clarify contemporary circumstances, yet they 
rarely drew on a narrative of celebrated lone resistance. These particular aspects of 1940 
lost the specific relevance within later responses that they had within those written in 
1982. Though memories of Britain’s Second World War were present across Britain’s 
recent wars, the ways in which they were articulated and the specific aspects that were 
drawn upon varied according the circumstances of the present that they were mobilised to 
help explain.  
 
The Enemy Other: Galtieri’s Argentina 
 
Observers writing about the Falklands War were eager to represent Britain’s enemy in the 
conflict. The ‘othering’ of the Argentinian regime was important for a cohort of observers 
who sought to describe the brutal and dictatorial nature of the Argentine Junta as alien to 
Britain. Yet how much observers knew about the Junta or its domestic policies is not 
clear; certainly no observers described the recent history of Argentina in detail, or the 
actions of its government before the Falklands crisis within the wider region or world. 
Instead, similarly to what they wrote about the islands themselves, observers were more 
confident and assured about the nature of the regime they faced when it could be 
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understood by direct comparison with more familiar enemies. Nazi Germany and the 
ubiquitous figure of Adolf Hitler often served as a frame of reference in this regard.325  
Indeed, for supporters of Britain’s Falklands campaign, the identification of the 
Junta as a particularly brutal, dictatorial or fascistic one seemed to lend more weight to 
the argument for a forceful military reaction to the Islands’ occupation; it was incumbent 
on the British to respond to “a regime as nasty as the Argentinian Junta.”326 In some cases 
observers associated the Falklands campaign with a broader, British resistance to 
dictatorship. Britain was thought to be not only defending itself or its subjects, but also 
continuing a tradition of helping to “clear the world of power minded dictators.”327 
Similarly, another observer described how the crisis over the Falkland Islands also 
involved the status of the Argentine government and its perceived ideology: 
 
I do not agree with the Argentinian dictatorship and all my friends and relatives agree with this. 
They are downright killers and had no right to walk in and take over the Falklands Island people... I 
think the next problem is trying to sort the Argentinians government out now so that a settlement can 
be achieved.
328 
 
Indeed, for one observer, the ideological position of the Argentine Junta helped to 
determine the legitimacy of the British campaign: 
 
Had Argentina been a more progressive, humanitarian regime, one wouldn't have minded in the least 
their taking of the Falklands over (Had they been more progressive etc. I suppose they wouldn't have 
wanted to take the Falklands anyway).
329 
                                                     
325 For a consideration of the importance of Hitler’s persona within popular memory of Britain’s Second 
World War, and his persistent re-emergence within later conflicts, see: Connelly, We Can Take It!, 269-271.  
326 MO B83, female, born 1944.   
327 MO B66, female, born 1930.  
328 MO C140, female, born 1951. 
329 MO D169, male, born 1949. 
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Observers, particularly those among the majority who reasoned that Britain’s campaign 
was justified, articulated a narrow and specific representation of the enemy, one marked 
out by its tyranny, dictatorship, brutality and illegitimacy. Such ideas were of course, 
alien to British moderation, freedom and democracy; their emphasis further aided in the 
construction of sense of British national identity by contrast. The specific circumstances 
of the Islands’ occupation prompted observers to identify a hostile Other against which 
British traits, characteristics or values could be asserted.  
 Observers were able to draw such a concise representation of the Argentinian 
Junta, with little empirical evidence or discussion of its actions, by embedding their 
discussion in popular memories of enemies that were thought to be similar. Direct 
comparison with Adolf Hitler and the Nazis clarified what observers thought about 
Galtieri and the Junta by association. One typified the connection, writing: 
 
We can’t leave them [the Falkland Islanders] to the mercies of a regime in whose country thousands 
of people just “disappear” - this is reminiscent of Nazi Germany. I can imagine how their hearts sank 
when they were invaded - once again reminiscent of the Channel Islanders witnessing their invasion 
by the Nazis.
330 
 
As I have shown above within the discussion of legitimacy, observers persistently saw a 
connection between the contemporary conflict and British entry into the Second World 
War. An important aspect of this connection was the re-invocation of popular memories 
of Nazi aggression and Brutality, and the ubiquitous figure of Adolf Hitler as a 
personification of this evil.331 Likewise, observers were often particularly concerned by 
                                                     
330 MO B89, female, born 1931.  
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“a fascist regime ruling the Argentinians”,332 or a regime bearing “all the Fascist 
hallmarks”.333 While the focus on Adolf Hitler as a sort of shorthand for dictatorship, evil 
or illegitimacy was a feature of later responses, it is evident that observers writing in 1982 
were more likely to stress the ‘fascistic’ nature of the Argentine regime in particular. 
Seemingly, for a generation much closer to the Second World War, conflict was 
understood by referring more explicitly to ideology and fascism rather than (as in later 
conflicts in Iraq and the Balkans) the evil embodied by dictators themselves.. Observers 
responses written in 1982 show the extent to which, as Dan Stone has argued, popular 
memories of Britain’s Second World War were more heavily rooted in a broad anti-
fascist consensus that has become more open to revision following the end of the Cold 
War.334  
 Yet invocations of these memories also demonstrate the extent to which observers 
were reconstructing and reaffirming a wider narrative of British identity. As in later 
conflicts in Iraq and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, contemporary circumstances 
shaped the reconstruction of a specific interpretation of Britain’s past and its identity. The 
confrontation of military dictatorship, with a leader who could be identified as a 
figurehead of the regime or a personification of its policies and ideology, meant allusions 
to Nazism and Adolf Hitler retained an explanatory power, and were thus themselves re-
invoked as part of a much broader history in which Britain was thought to be tolerant, 
moderate, democratic and morally superior by contrast. A specific understanding of 
Britain’s role as a force for good in World War Two was given a new utility as observers 
sought to understand the present conflict. In attempting to characterise the difference 
between Britain and Argentina, they contributed to the reconstructions of a specific 
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narrative of British identity based on continued opposition and resistance to aggressive, 
dictatorial Others.  
 
Conclusions 
 
What observers wrote about Britain’s involvement in the Falklands War was not 
homogenous or universal, but was instead complex, individual and subjective. However, 
within this complexity there were recurring themes and particular ideas which were 
apparent. At the most basic level it is evident that most observers were aware of the 
specific circumstances and context of the Falklands crisis, and that they had access to 
enough information to make specific judgements about Britain’s position and government 
policy. Observers knew that the conflict was fought over British territorial possessions in 
the South Atlantic, that the British despatched a task force, and that the British won a 
military victory on the islands. The perceived circumstances of the war, like all cases I 
consider in this research, were crucial in determining what observers wrote about British 
involvement within them, and what they reflected about Britain as a nation.  
Observers were though, concerned with evaluating what the conflict reflected 
about Britain and its identity. Confronted with the likelihood of military action, they were 
keen to assess the moral and political legitimacy of Britain’s involvement. This was 
articulated with greater clarity by observers, at least when compared to later conflicts in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan. Observers who discussed the Falklands War were confident in 
asserting that the British campaign was right or wrong and within this comparatively 
polarised discourse, most believed Britain was justified in retaking the Falkland Islands 
by force. This contrasts the later invasion of Iraq which was similarly polarised in the 
sense that most observers who wrote about it articulated clear conclusions on its 
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legitimacy, but was widely thought to be an illegitimate and aggressive use of military 
force. 
 Though what observers wrote consistently varied, it is evident that what they 
thought about the campaign’s legitimacy derived from a discussion of defence. For those 
who supported the British response, invocations of German expansionism and British 
appeasement lent weight to a notion that Britain was once more resisting the illegitimate 
ambitions of a dictatorship. For the significant minority of observers who objected to the 
conflict, the war was rarely linked to any broader pacifist beliefs; these individuals were 
mostly shocked by the apparent jingoism within government and the country at large, and 
a preference for military violence when diplomacy remained an option. They did not 
suggest that military action itself was illegitimate, simply that it was illegitimate in this 
case. Thus, despite reaching a much different conclusion on the nature of the Falklands 
campaign – often explicitly identifying themselves as part of a critical minority – they too 
articulated their perspectives by focusing on what the conflict revealed about Britain. 
They were similarly interested in defence and aggression, characterising Britain’s 
response to the crisis as overly aggressive and militaristic; a narrative foregrounded in 
some cases by invocation of the futility of the First World War. Such ideas were however, 
within the context of observers’ collected responses, much less frequent than a more 
persistent, direct connection with the perceived legitimacy and morality of Britain’s 
Second World War.  
 Further, it is striking to note how few observers foregrounded their representations 
of the Argentine occupation as an attack on the Islanders themselves as opposed to an 
attack on Britain. Observers understood the crisis without detailed knowledge of the 
history of the islands, the nature or recent history of the Junta or its claim to the Islands’ 
sovereignty. They made sense of it by referring to it as a national experience that could 
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not be reduced to political decisions. Despite engendering divergent opinions on its 
legitimacy, the Falklands War was approached by observers as part of a broader national 
story and was made sense of by considering what it meant for Britain. The Islanders were 
brought into view for observers by the prospect of military conflict. A characterisation of 
primitive and tranquil island life suggested that they were deserving of protection, but 
also revealed Britain’s contemporary identity as a modern, powerful actor. Observers 
emphasised the ‘Britishness’ of the Islanders, but they were simultaneously thought to be 
other. 
As I have shown throughout this chapter, observers engaged in constructing 
broader narratives of identity which necessarily involved the re-invocation of certain 
popular memories. Naturally contemporary circumstances affected what observers were 
able to write about Britain’s involvement in military conflict, yet those circumstances 
were frequently understood by association with particular memories which gave them 
meaning. For example, a widespread belief in the heroism of Britain’s victorious soldiers 
was of course prompted by the military victory achieved in the South Atlantic, but was 
understood as part of Britain’s military tradition and identity. Observers saw the soldiers 
who fought in the Falklands War as an embodiment of the nation and its military 
tradition, whose actions were thought to have heightened British prestige and represented 
a modern-day expression of a much older, historical identity. The conflict gave observers 
opportunity to reflect Britain’s history as a military power, and in most cases, to reaffirm 
the legitimacy of British military service itself, further distinguishing a sense of unique 
national community.   
 Primarily however, observers engaged in persistent reconstruction of the morally 
secure, justified defence against the aggression of Nazi Germany. Indeed, the cohort of 
observers writing about the Falklands War were often old enough to draw on personal 
110 
 
 
 
memories of World War Two, yet such recollections were figured by an overarching 
popular understanding of shared, British experience.335 Britain’s road to World War Two 
- the events leading up to the conflict, focused on the legitimacy of resisting the 
aggressive expansionism of Nazi Germany and the perceived failure of appeasement - 
were aspects that were particularly important. Their re-invocation was driven by the need 
on the part of observers to explain the contemporary legitimacy of Britain’s Falklands 
campaign. The frequency in which these events were invoked demonstrates the extent to 
which the origin of Britain’s Second World War represents an object of historical 
memory which demands its own appraisal.336 Likewise, but with less frequency, the 
bilateral nature of the Falklands conflict, and a perception that American and European 
allies were not fully supportive of the British position, prompted some observers to recall 
Britain’s ‘lone stand’ in 1940. Isolation and allied neutrality could be explained as virtues 
by direct association with the Second World War, drawing on a myth of British 
participation that “deserved the applause of the world because it was the only nation to 
have been in from first to last.”337  
Ultimately I argue here that observers mostly conceived of the Falklands War as a 
legitimate conflict, but were particularly clear and confident about this representation 
because it could be incorporated within a morally secure and well understand narrative of 
historical identity. Though observers were focused primarily on explaining the 
circumstances of the present, they did so by presenting them as part of a broader story, 
thereby recovering a narrative of national experience in the past. Conflict in the present 
offered an opportunity and an impetus for observers to engage in much more 
fundamental, wholesale reconstruction of national identity, the crucible of which (due to 
its apparent utility in explaining present circumstances) was the absolute legitimacy and 
                                                     
335 See: Thomson, ANZAC Memories, 11-15. 
336 Finney, Remembering the Road, 217. 
337 Connelly, We Can Take It!, 2.  
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morality of British resistance to Nazi Germany. Though of course, popular memory of the 
Second World War existed with or without involvement in later military conflicts, the 
Falklands War offered an opportunity to reclaim it and reaffirm its status as a foundation 
of a moral vision of British identity. 
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The Gulf War 1990-1991 
 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 elicited a strong reaction from Western and 
neighbouring Arab states, newly freed from the intense Cold War security struggle 
following the revolutions in Eastern Europe a year previously, and now keen to assert a 
muscular multilateral security.338 The response was led by the United States and – 
following an ultimately fruitless effort to get the Hussein regime to cooperate 
diplomatically - involved the build-up of military assets in neighbouring Saudi Arabia, 
codenamed ‘Desert Shield’. Eventually coalition personnel deployed to the region would 
number approximately one million, over half of whom were American. Britain, however, 
contributed nearly fifty thousand personnel; the second largest national contingent in the 
coalition and the single largest British overseas military deployment since the Korean 
War.339 Coalition forces began a large-scale and intense bombing campaign against Iraq 
on 17 January 1991 after the Hussein regime failed to withdraw by the 15 January 
deadline mandated under UN Resolution 678. This was followed by a short ground war 
which lasted approximately one hundred hours and ended in a ceasefire on 28 
February.340  
                                                     
338 William Thomas Allison, The Gulf War 1990-1991 (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 63-67; 
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Similarly to the previous Falklands War, Britain had been involved in a short and 
decisive victory. Yet the conflict had been fought as part of a broader, US-led coalition, 
and involved a deployment of military power on an order of magnitude greater than in 
1982. The conflict represented a point of departure from the Cold War, and revealed the 
preponderant position of the United States; its ‘unipolar moment’.341 Yet, like all cases I 
consider, the conflict pertained to a social or cultural dynamic for ‘ordinary’ people living 
in Britain. I suggest in this chapter that the Gulf War was also understood by observers as 
part of a British history or story, interpreted by the invocation of specific popular 
memories, and involving the construction and reconstruction of particular ideas of 
national identity.   
I consider a random sample of responses from forty-two observers which were 
submitted to the 1990 ‘Gulf Crisis’ directive (referred to as the ‘Gulf directive’ from 
here). The Gulf directive was issued 17 October 1990, two months after the Iraqi invasion 
of Kuwait and the consequent coalition build-up of military forces in Saudi Arabia, and 
elicited responses from 631 observers, comprising 4435 pages largely hand-written 
material. It asked observers to “record your immediate reactions to the situation in the 
Middle East covering the following if you can: feelings about the main political figures 
involved, your reactions to military and diplomatic developments” and to “continue to 
keep a kind of log of your reactions to events.”342 Most observers either wrote lengthy 
responses over the period from its issuance to the end of the war and submitted them as a 
whole after, or sent in multiple responses over time. Thus, like responses concerning the 
previous Falklands War, the Gulf directive garnered perspectives and opinions throughout 
the initial crisis, the outbreak of military conflict, and its eventual ending and outcome.  
                                                     
341 For brief consideration of the Gulf War in the context of the end of the global Cold War, see: Cronin, 
Global Rules; Brands, Unipolar Moment.   
342 See Appendix II for a list of full directive sheets. 
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The Gulf directive generated an unusually large volume of responses from 
observers, far more than the previous Falklands directive or any subsequent directives 
related to Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. This figure attests to the contemporary 
importance attached to the Gulf War, a notable finding in itself given its lower profile in 
public and official commemoration in Britain since.343 Again, like those responses written 
in 1982, the volume of submissions received was matched by the general enthusiasm and 
intensity with which observers wrote about a possible, and then realised, war with Iraq. 
Furthermore, observers were concerned with establishing the circumstances and context 
of the Gulf Crisis, but also drew on popular memories of the past in order to make sense 
of the present. Though detailed discussion of Prime Ministerial leadership was not a 
primary focus for observers, they were once more keen to evaluate whether the use of 
British force was justified, what combat was like, and what the crisis revealed about 
Britain’s relative diplomatic position and its relationship with allies and enemies.  
Observers drew on popular memories of the more distant British past, most 
prominently Britain’s entry into the Second World War and the tyrannical aggression of 
Nazi Germany. As in 1982, the cohort of observers writing in 1990/1991 were frequently 
old enough to draw on memories of lived experience of the 1930s and 1940s, thus 
personal testimony melded with, and was often thought to lend weight to, more frequent 
and pervasive invocation of popular memory and Britain’s national experience. Indeed, 
observers clarified the nature of the threat from Iraq by drawing comparison with the 
Nazis, and articulated their thoughts on its legitimacy by associating the regime, and 
person, of Saddam Hussein with that of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler. Once more, this 
revealed a continuing preference for legitimate defence or protection against the advance 
of a dictatorial other. Further, the possibility of a particularly large-scale, destructive, 
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risky and escalatory conflict in the Gulf was clearly foregrounded by more recent 
experience of the Cold War arms race. The rapid victory scored by the coalition, without 
the use of Weapons of Mass Destruction, invalidated such anxieties. The relevance of 
Cold War tensions now largely dismissed, observers again focused primarily on World 
War Two as a point of reference when discussing contemporary conflict as others had 
done during the previous Falklands War. Despite much different political, international 
and military contexts, the Gulf War was incorporated within broader narratives of identity 
which were shared across cases, and were embedded heavily in persistent re-invocation of 
Britain’s participation in World War Two.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
Observers were mostly supportive of the military campaign in Kuwait and Iraq, though 
observers were, collectively, not as certain about the legitimacy of conflict as the previous 
cohort writing about the Falklands War had been. Of the-forty two observers whose 
responses to the Gulf Crisis directive I have considered in this chapter, eighteen believed 
military force was justified against the Iraqi regime, while fourteen believed it was not. 
Ten observers were unable to arrive at a specific conclusion on the legitimacy of Britain’s 
role in the Gulf War at all. Thus, while it is accurate to suggest that, as a proportion of 
observers, those who supported British involvement in the Gulf conflict were fewer than 
those who had previously supported the Falklands campaign, the most noticeable 
difference is the extent to which observers were less certain or unsure about the 
legitimacy of using military force. 
 For most who supported Britain’s involvement in the conflict, legitimacy was 
based on a resistance to the aggressive expansion of the Iraqi regime. One observer wrote, 
117 
 
 
 
“I think that if a country is in danger from an enemy then it has to be defended… I see no 
alternative to our troops being sent to the Gulf”344 while another asked, “Did Saddam 
really imagine he could just walk in to another country, and the rest of the world would 
allow him to do so? At once I thought ‘no, no, no’”.345 Observers couched their belief in 
the legitimacy of defending Kuwait by referring to the militaristic and tyrannical actions 
of its neighbour. One wrote how “there is no doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein is an 
aggressor and as such must be put in his place”346 while another observer described how 
“this might indeed be a fearful war, but so also would the consequence of letting Saddam 
Hussein gain any advantage from his aggression.”347 
 Others focused on the possibility of Iraqi ambitions for further aggressive 
expansion and in particular, the likelihood that the Iraqi regime might develop or use 
chemical, biological or nuclear weaponry. One observer identified the halting of Iraq’s 
nuclear programme as the conflict’s primary justification: 
 
The war has surely come about to prevent a dictator having the means to wage nuclear war in the 
near future, his invasion of Kuwait and occupation of that country providing the free world with the 
perfect excuse to attack the dictator and his armed forces. We all hoped sanctions would bring 
Saddam Hussein down without recourse to waging war against Iraq but that has proved to be 
ineffective in the time the free world had without causing dangers that were impossible to ignore.
348 
 
For another observer, nuclear proliferation was thought to be more important than the 
safety of hostages taken by the Iraqi regime (some of whom were British)349 during the 
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invasion of Kuwait; “I think, harsh though it sounds, the lives of Western Hostages may 
have to be disregarded for the sake of millions of others that could be lost if the Iraqis 
were ever to get their hands on atomic weapons.”350 In another response, intervention was 
fully justified by Hussein’s history of warlike aggression and brutality, part of which was 
the use of chemical weapons on innocent Iraqi and Kurdish civilians:  
 
The trouble is we let Hussein get away with blue murder in the Iran-Iraq war and did nothing even 
when chemical weapons were used…. Now it is suspected Saddam Hussein has not only chemical 
weaponry but nuclear armaments as well. He is ambitious and no fool and we have realised the 
danger too late… They have committed atrocities there even torturing people and murdering 
children so somehow you have to take up arms and stop it.
351  
 
For another observer, the defence of Kuwait was highlighted as an important aspect in 
justifying the use of military force: 
 
It [the response to the Gulf crisis] will have to be a real solution which gives freedom back to 
Kuwait (whether they seek democracy must be their decision; freedom from occupation is their 
right), and at the very least strips Saddam Hussein of his poison gas/chemical weapons/nuclear 
weapons threats, and renders him incapable of terrifying Saudi Arabia, Israel or anybody else. If that 
is achieved, there are many other would-be dictators in the Middle East and elsewhere who will have 
cause to pause and wonder.
352 
 
The coalition campaign in 1991 was aimed narrowly at removing Iraqi military forces 
from Kuwait and restoring Kuwaiti sovereignty.353 It is then interesting to note how little 
specific mention of Kuwait itself featured within responses to the Gulf crisis directive. 
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Observers much more frequently articulated a broader disgust with ‘Iraqi aggression’ or 
the threat from the Hussein regime. They were more concerned with legitimate resistance 
against what was characterised as a brutal and tyrannical expansionary threat in Iraq. 
Indeed, in some cases, as I consider shortly, the possibility that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait 
was simply the beginning of a much larger expansion, or a much larger war, was a 
significant aspect of what observers wrote.  The allusion to ‘giving pause’ to other 
dictators reveals the extent to which these observers conceived of the Gulf War as part of 
a wider struggle against dictatorship, tyranny, aggression and military expansion.  
   While this shared interpretation of legitimacy was informed by the specific 
context of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the more recent history of aggressive Iraqi 
militarism, it was frequently clarified alongside invocation of popular memories of 
Britain’s road to World War Two, Nazi aggression, and a pervasive belief in the failure of 
appeasement in the 1930s: 
 
…Saddam has been reading his Western history and he can take a bit off at a time just like Hitler 
did… It is just like Hitler and the Allies were in 1939, too little and too late.354  
 
None of us want war, certainly not those of my generation, who saw the death and destruction of 
the last war, however even the most appeasement minded are asking what happens if Saddam is 
allowed to keep his spoils? Did appeasement restrain Hitler?
355 
 
Lived experience formed part of some observers’ recollections, the effect of which was to 
lend an authority to their comparisons between past and present, and to clarify with 
greater confidence their perspectives on the current crisis in the Gulf and Britain’s role in 
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it. Personal experience was articulated as a basis for the re-invocation of popular 
memory: 
 
I am old enough, however, to remember Neville Chamberlain coming back from Munich and saying: 
‘out of this nettle of danger, we pluck this flower of safety’. He also said ‘peace in our time’. How 
relieved we all felt – how misguided we were. It is understandable that people of my generation are 
suspicious of peace pacts when they remember those days.
356 
 
For those of us who had been alive during the Second World War we remembered Hitler – another 
Dictator’s tactics. He only wanted a little piece of Czechoslovakia, which he swore belonged to 
Germany, and he would be satisfied. So he was allowed to get away with it. I hoped sincerely this 
1990 dictator would not… But this time, the United Nations were not prepared to let him get away 
with it, as countries who had belonged to the League of Nations had done when Hitler started his 
war mongering in the 1930s. Those of us who were born and had lived through the First and Second 
World Wars knew it was no good appeasing a Dictator and that it would not be long before he 
wanted more territory.
357  
 
I was a soldier in the last war – in an infantry battalion. We were lucky enough to escape the desert 
warfare and our action was restricted to West Europe but I’ve just had another look at our 
Regimental History and reminded myself that from our battalion of approximately 750 men, we had 
140 killed. The number wounded exceeded this a lot… I am, therefore, no blind supporter of war, 
but I am not a pacifist. I have a fervent passion for peace but there are times when the only answer to 
naked aggression is force.
358 
 
Though the exact nature of their recollections varied, the occurrence of the Gulf War gave 
an opportunity for observers who lived through the 1930s and 1940s to draw on personal 
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experiences as children or young adults, reaffirming the Second World War as a cultural 
marker for their generation.359 Yet this personal recollection occurred under the umbrella 
of well-known and familiar narratives of British identity and its entry into World War 
Two, again highlighting the extent to which memories of lived experience were 
recomposed as observers drew on popular memories.360 In later conflicts, as those who 
lived through the Second World War era dwindled, observers continued to invoke popular 
memories which were thought to be relevant or important, demonstrating the extent to 
which both those with and without personal memories were able to construct narratives of 
the national past. Those who did draw on personal memories often suggested that this 
leant greater weight or authority to their accounts, yet they were engaged in the same 
process of constructing a specifically national story within which contemporary 
circumstances could be understood.  
When considering whether the Gulf campaign was justified, observers who 
supported the military campaign against Iraq were less concerned by the specific status of 
Kuwait than they were about what the conflict revealed about Britain’s identity. 
Observers conceived of legitimacy in the Gulf War most confidently when they suggested 
that Britain’s contemporary identity was congruent with a familiar and well-rehearsed 
story about Britain’s resistance to German aggression. Britain’s entry into World War 
Two offered both a frame of reference and a benchmark for observers seeking to identify 
the legitimacy of a contemporary conflict. For those who articulated it in 1990 and 1991, 
the comparison seemed reasonable and legitimacy could be assured by association. 
 Thus the Gulf War gave observers not only an opportunity to suggest that Britain 
was right to use military force, but also to construct a much broader narrative of historical 
identity in which the contemporary circumstance could be incorporated. Once again this 
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was rooted heavily in popular memory and reconstruction of British identity in the 
Second World War. The process was, despite much varied circumstances, similar to that 
which took place within observers’ responses to the previous Falklands directive and was 
again determined heavily by the perceived circumstances of the present. In seeking to 
understand why Britain was involved the Gulf conflict observers were drawn to a 
discussion of why Britain had been involved in World War Two. As a consequence they 
focused heavily on British entry into the Second World War at the expense of its 
constituent events. When attempting to explain legitimacy in the present observers further 
reinforced the absolute legitimacy of Britain’s use of military force in 1939, and a 
specific narrative in which Britain’s policy of appeasement in the later 1930s was 
articulated reductively as a the failure to adequately deal with German aggression. As in 
1982, those who referred to it reaffirmed the importance of the Second World War as a 
marker for Britain’s contemporary identity, but again reconstructed a narrow, morally 
assured and celebratory narrative of British identity within it.  
Of course, not all observers supported a military conflict. Fourteen of the forty-
two considered here believed it was wrong to use military force against Iraq. It is 
important to recognise at this stage that no observers were sympathetic toward the Iraqi 
regime or felt they had a legitimate claim to Kuwaiti territory. Instead they were 
concerned that a war with Hussein’s military machine would be too destructive (for Iraqi 
civilians in particular), given that diplomatic options apparently remained available, and 
that the justification for using force was therefore insufficient. One observer condemned 
“the use of force to resolve disputes”361 and went on to write: 
 
I want no part in it. I feel very, very upset but a member of a very small minority… How many Iraqi 
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families are sorrowing for their loved ones and how many will be blaming ‘us’ – and I am one of 
them – for their present and future miseries?362 
  
This observer, like some who objected to Britain’s Falklands campaign previously, 
characterised herself as part of a minority. As in 1982, those with a critical opinion 
believed public opinion was firmly behind the use of military force.  
The possibility of diplomatic or peaceful resolution formed the basis of another 
observer’s objections, though they were careful not to condone Iraq’s initial aggression: 
 
I rarely watch the TV news as I am a devoted radio 4 listener, but even there the media coverage was 
more about Britain’s perspective and involvement than Kuwait’s or its people. I agreed that Iraq 
could not just march into a country but I feel that sanctions could have been used for longer… I feel 
no pride for our forces involvement in all of this.
363  
 
Another observer focused on the apparent hypocrisy of action against Iraq in 1990, given 
its abuses in previous decades. The fear of a particularly devastating war – a feature of 
many responses written before the land war in February 1991 – further undermined the 
case for military intervention: 
 
To pretend that this is a just war seems to me utter hypocrisy: no war as terrible as this one can 
possibly be justified. Evil Saddam Hussein may be (as he has shown in his persecution of the 
Kurds), but no one protested at the time when he let loose his deadly nerve gases. It took the 
expulsion of a corrupt ruling family from a tiny state to arouse the might of America and thus 
threaten world peace.
364 
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For another observer the Gulf War was represented as part of a broader history of 
needless sacrifice and destructive waste. Criticism of the current campaign was framed by 
recollection of the loss of life suffered during the Falklands War, but also by invocation 
of the perceived futility and waste of the First World War: 
 
All I remember of the Falklands is the 400 young men deliberately ‘murdered’ on the Belgrano; with 
leaders like this it seems the First World War syndrome is back again. Cannon fodder so that our 
leaders can drive their Rolls... When a boatload of Argentinians landed on a remote island we set off 
like bats out of hell to ‘save’ about 1400 people from rule by foreigners… His [Hussein’s] people do 
not deserve to die in their hundreds of thousands.
365 
 
The notion that British soldiers endured needless sacrifice at the whims of senior officers 
and staff – a central aspect of prevailing popular memory of the First World War366 - was 
not a sentiment that was widespread among responses written in 1990. Yet this response 
does demonstrate the extent to which popular memories of past wars were important in 
clarifying the ideas of observers who objected to Britain’s use of force in the present, as 
well as those who supported it. The invocation of ideas of futility, waste and illegitimate 
militarism helped subvert apparent popular support for the coalition campaign. 
 Other observers objected to a military campaign against Iraq on the grounds that 
the status of Kuwait obscured ulterior, largely American, motives related to the security 
of oil resources. One observer wrote, “how much exactly the politics of oil comes into the 
situation is unclear”367 while another asked, “could it be that the oil is more important 
than lives?”368 A similar sentiment was articulated in another response; “I am aware that 
President Bush has said that this is not ‘just about oil’ but one wonders what would have 
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happened if a little country with no strategic importance had been invaded by a greedy 
neighbour?”369   
 Other observers were more pointed in their criticism. For one, the plight of 
occupied Kuwait was simply an excuse for the United States and its allies to use military 
force to pursue its own narrow self-interest:  
 
I have also heard it said that the only reason that the USA is interested in what is going on is because 
there is oil in Kuwait and that if there were a war then it would be on account of oil and not out of 
sympathy for suffering people. I am inclined to believe this, because it sounds like the way 
politicians behave.
370 
 
Likewise, one observer described a conflict predicated on “oil and the West’s access to 
it”371 while another wrote about an acquisitive conflict which threatened the broader 
region: 
 
Ordinary people… are worried for the ‘boys out there dying for petrol… It seems my worst thoughts 
earlier are true – the war was to restore the West’s ailing economies… Hussein just put his head on 
the block, but it might equally have been Iran, Turkey or Syria. So our shares rise and our interest 
rates fall on the bodies of the thousands of soldiers and civilians, and on a land made 
environmentally barren.
372  
 
Some observers clearly believed that Britain was involved in an aggressive conflict, the 
legitimacy of which was fundamentally undermined by the existence of Middle Eastern 
oil wealth. Yet it is important to stress that such ideas were not typical or common as a 
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proportion of the responses considered in this chapter. Most observers believed that the 
stability of the Middle East had been threatened by Iraqi aggression in 1990, not by 
British or American responses to it. Indeed, for another observer, the existence of Middle 
Eastern oil did not necessarily delegitimise a war predicated primarily on the illegitimate 
expansion of Iraqi power: 
 
Of course the whole battle has had the forces of good on its side – we must not let an aggressor win 
against an innocent party. But the hidden agenda is still the oil and the potential for Saddam Hussein 
to hold the rest of the world to ransom.
373  
 
Observers were again concerned with understanding the legitimacy of the Gulf 
campaign by considering how it related to British identity. Similarly to responses 
concerned with the previous Falklands War, those who supported the conflict often 
directly linked it to an assured, moral and legitimate entry into the Second World War, 
incorporating contemporary circumstances within a broader narrative of British 
resistance to dictatorial aggression. For those who objected to the campaign, allusions to 
futility and waste, infrequently linked to popular memory of the First World War, 
helped clarify the Gulf campaign as unwarranted or needless. These observers shared a 
concern with identifying legitimacy by considering whether Britain was thought to be 
acting in the defensive and importantly, did not suggest that military action was itself 
illegitimate. Invocation of the past helped to clarify observers’ perspectives in the 
present.  
 However, dissimilar to responses written in 1982, ten of the observers I consider 
here did not offer a definitive evaluation of the legitimacy of Britain’s position. One 
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described her distaste at being “in two minds”374 while another described having “such 
mixed feelings toward this [Gulf] crisis.”375 For several observers the need to resist Iraqi 
aggression was obvious, yet it jarred with a sense that Britain should not be so quick to 
use military force or that British (or American) motivations in pursuing a conflict were 
not as they seemed: 
 
I’m not sure what I feel about the Gulf Crisis. Sometimes I feel furious that Saddam Hussein could 
get away with invading Kuwait and that he ought to be removed by force. Sometimes I agree with 
peace campaigners who want to make sure there’s no war in the Middle East.376 
 
This subject is too big for me to come to terms with. I cannot say I wholly trust our own aims or 
cannot always believe the representatives from our allies. Time and time again, when we really 
learnt the truth of these terrible happenings in the world, there are usually dirty tricks on both sides 
that are revealed. I think Saddam Hussein to be an evil power hungry despot but having said that, I 
really cannot believe everyone on the other side is squeaky clean.
377 
 
One observer captured a sense that the use of military force against Iraq was less 
obviously justifiable than the previous Falklands campaign; “I do not feel that this is as 
completely justified a war as the Falklands War was, nor do I think it will arouse the same 
kind of patriotic feelings in people, but that remains to be seen.”378 Observers who were 
unsure about the legitimacy of British involvement in the Gulf conflict felt that 
multilateralism, American leadership, WMD, oil security and the lack of a threat to 
Britain or its territory – though they did not necessarily delegitimise the use of military 
force - were complicating factors.  
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Perhaps the most striking aspect of responses from observers who were unsure 
about the legitimacy of current conflict, especially when compared to those who were, is 
the comparative lack of reference to popular memories of past wars, most notably the 
Second World War. These observers evidently did not see specific similarities between 
the Gulf conflict and resistance to Nazi Germany. This may be due to the passing of the 
‘wartime generation’ and the fading of the Second World War from living memory, yet 
popular memories remain prominent among responses to later conflicts and, at least 
among observers, the age range of those writing in 1990 and 1991 was not radically 
different to those writing in 1982 when observers more comprehensively referred to 
popular memories of the Second World War and Britain’s entry into it. Instead, I suggest 
that it was the specifics of the contemporary circumstances that elicited a greater level of 
confusion or ambiguity. The possibility of a cataclysmic use of force (something 
considered in more detail shortly) or ulterior desires for oil security were considerations 
that were not present in 1982 and could not be as effectively explained by drawing on 
Britain’s involvement in the Second World War. Contemporary context was crucial in 
informing what observers wrote, but clear conclusions were reached when they could be 
given meaning incorporation within a broader narrative of national identity. 
Ultimately however, most observers conceived of a justified conflict against Iraq 
in 1990/1991, a finding that conforms to polling analyses conducted at the time.379  What 
individual observers wrote about the conflict’s legitimacy often varied but, as I suggest 
throughout this research, observers were less concerned by the specific political, legal or 
technical ramifications of military conflict when considering its legitimacy and were 
instead occupied with what it revealed about Britain, and whether it was congruent with 
broader shared narratives of Britain’s historical identity. Here then, the Second World 
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War once more emerged as an important marker. While some who criticised the coalition 
campaign alluded to a narrative of futility and waste – drawing on popular memory of 
sacrifice in World War One – more believed that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait could be 
explained by direct association with Nazi Germany’s expansionism immediately before 
the outbreak of the Second World War. Even among observers who criticised the use of 
military force, it was this underlying dynamic of legitimate defence against expansionary 
aggression which informed what observers wrote about legitimacy.  
Thus observers made sense of the contemporary context by referring to the past, 
but – by extension - also engaged in a reconstruction of a seemingly assured and morally 
secure narrative of past military action, that existed prior to contemporary events, and was 
centred largely on Britain’s experience in World War Two. Observers who disagreed with 
the use of force in the present did not seek to undo this narrative of British identity. They 
were instead more likely to suggest that contemporary conditions did not meet this 
benchmark. Even in the most critical examples, futility was not considered to be intrinsic 
in the use of force but was linked instead to the objectives of the campaign; some felt the 
campaign against Iraq was wrong, but no observers believed that it was always wrong to 
use military force. Though some observers characterised the Gulf conflict as a complex 
one and were less likely to re-invoke popular memory by way of clarification – at least 
when compared to responses to the previous Falklands directive – on the occasions in 
which observers did refer to the past, they reconstructed a narrative of British 
involvement based on the absolute legitimacy of resisting Nazi expansionism, and 
referred to appeasement as shorthand for a moral failure to deal with such aggression. 
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The Military, Combat, Expectation and Transformation  
 
The Gulf War was a large-scale operation. The coalition built up in response to the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait numbered nearly one million personnel, over half of whom were 
deployed by the United States. However, Britain’s contribution – second in size only after 
that of the US380 – numbered around 47,000 military personnel.381 Though perhaps not 
aware of these details specifically, observers were quite clearly aware of the significance 
of the Gulf crisis as a potential (and then realised) military event. Writing during the crisis 
period and Desert Shield, observers imagined a potential conflict larger in scale than the 
previous Falklands War. Again, an older cohort of observers – many of whom were born 
before the Second World War – drew on lived experience as the 15 January deadline for 
Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait approached: 
 
Having gone through the last war I find it incredible that any sensible person can contemplate it yet 
again.
382  
 
I wait with horror for January 15th although the Iraqis said they will not fire first. I pray fervently for 
a solution but the demise of Hitler was not achieved without terrible loss of life, destruction and 
suffering first.
383 
 
But then I too did not want to articulate my feelings. I had lost my first husband in the last war, a 
bomber pilot. All those of my generation must have undergone similar anguished experiences. The 
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younger generations would have no first-hand knowledge of the reality of war. Their wars were 
vicarious on screen, in books, in games.
384  
 
Observers often framed imagination of the actual combat or likely results of a war against 
Iraq in relation to what they remembered about their earlier years. They were thus able to 
describe personal experience of wartime conditions, lending an authority to their accounts 
and a weight to their opinions on the likely consequences of a war in Iraq. Where the 
legitimacy of the conflict was often framed by the invocation of popular memory of 
Britain’s entry into the conflict – resistance to Nazi expansion and the failure of 
appeasement – elderly observers considered the nature of modern combat and its 
consequences by recalling the emotional loss and sacrifice which they had endured as 
children or adolescents. 
Mostly however observers imagined a conflict in Iraq that would be unlike those 
experienced previously. They believed that the war risked escalation and that the use of 
arsenals built up over the preceding Cold War era might create a truly global catastrophe. 
Variously observers suggested that “this is world war three”,385 that “this could turn into a 
world war, with use of nuclear and chemical and germ weapons”,386 or that “I feel sure 
that there is going to be a ghastly conflagration and what will come out of it will probably 
create as many problems or more than we have already experienced.”387 Other observers 
used the term ‘holocaust’ to describe what they imagined a war in the Gulf might entail: 
 
My main reaction to the war in the gulf is fear and dread for the young men who are involved in the 
build up to war… I am convinced that the holocaust will be so horrific that the planet will never 
recover, and there will be no winners… I cannot come to terms with all these people just going to a 
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war that will be unimaginably terrible, and the outcome of which will be massive numbers of dead 
and maimed.
388 
 
I’m horrified to think of the dreadful suffering our troops are facing, when we see on TV the plans 
being made for hospitals to be ready to receive the thousands of casualties that will no doubt result 
from such a holocaust.
389 
 
Some observers were particularly worried about the prospects of British soldiers facing 
chemical weaponry in Iraq. One described how her “only puzzlement now is how long 
does Saddam Hussein hope to last out or is he going to use chemical weapons to 
aggravate the situation even more”390 while another asked “Can they last long in their 
[Nuclear, Chemical and Biological warfare] suits if real hand to hand fighting begins?”391 
 In some cases anxiety over the use of WMD extended to the wider region or the 
globe, and the possibility of conflagration. One observer feared the consequences “if Iraq 
is able to fit chemical warheads to its missiles.”392 For another, the Iraq crisis posed a 
potentially global catastrophe: 
 
The situation in the Middle East worries me very much indeed. The Iraqi president will use chemical 
and biological weapons without compunction (both illegal) and if ever he were to get atomic 
weapons, the result would be unthinkable. He has to be stopped.
393 
 
The prospect of conflict against Iraq elicited some personal remembrance of the fear and 
loss of war, but most observers seemed concerned with the prospects of a specifically 
                                                     
388 MO A1223, female, born 1925. 
389 MO D2438, female, born 1924.  
390 MO A2464, male, born 1960.  
391 MO A1473, female, born 1942.  
392 MO A883, male, born 1933.  
393 MO C1786, female, born 1950.  
133 
 
 
 
modern conflict, potentially involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. While no observers 
connected a potential or realised conflict in the Gulf directly to the Cold War arms race in 
their written accounts, it is clear that many drew on a language of escalation and global 
devastation that connoted the tensions associated with the global security struggle of the 
previous decades.394 The possibility of miscalculation and disaster informed what they 
wrote before the ground campaign; many observers seemed genuinely to have expected a 
‘holocaust.’ 
 As the coalition air campaign began in January 1991, observers also focused on 
the threat to the natural world, describing their shock at the scale of ecological 
devastation and adding to the sense that the conflict was particularly degrading and 
dangerous. One observer wrote about “The awful suffering to the birds, goodness only 
knows what the long-term effect on the creatures of the seas. I guess we will be reaping 
his [Hussein’s] wicked harvest for years and years.”395 Another described the desolation: 
 
The TV News was devastating reporting the oil that was being poured into the Gulf, illustrated by 
pictures of cormorants covered in oil and either dying or dead. I could only mutter, ‘oh my god’ over 
and over again, remembering a beautiful programme on the natural life forms of that area that I had 
seen some months earlier on TV. So lovely, so fascinating, now to be horribly suffocated and 
killed.
396  
 
As coalition forces were built up in Saudi Arabia observers stressed the extraordinary 
scale of the coming war effort, and identified the existence of unconventional weaponry 
on both sides; aspects of the Gulf War that were not apparent during the previous 
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Falklands conflict. As Desert Storm began, the burning of oil wells and environmental 
destruction wrought in Kuwait further added to an apocalyptic vision of the conflict. I 
suggest here that while observers frequently invoked popular memories of Britain’s road 
to the Second World War when evaluating the moral or political legitimacy of using 
military force against Iraq, or the nature of the Iraqi regime, they were less inclined to 
draw on lived experience or popular memories of the Second World War to imagine 
outcome of military action. Instead, those who sought to imagine the conflict’s likely 
consequences described one that was resonant with the prevailing fears and anxieties of 
the Cold War. The use of hi-tech and unconventional weaponry – which many assumed 
would take place – figured what observers wrote war against Iraq before the February 
ground campaign, and was framed by what observers knew about the nuclear arms race, 
cataclysm, conflagration and escalation.   
 As Desert Storm began, most observers conceived of the campaign as one 
primarily based on air power. The RAF contributed to an operation, beginning on 17 
January 1991, which involved not only large numbers of aircraft (upward of 100,000 
sorties flown throughout the campaign) but also involved the use of high-tech ‘smart’ 
bombs. Some 88,000 tons of air ordnance was dropped on the Iraqi military, the largest 
single bombing campaign since Operation Rolling Thunder, the US Air Force’s bombing 
of North Vietnam.397  
 Some observers were impressed by the involvement of the Royal Air Force. They 
wrote that “We must be surprised and delighted that from day one of waging war the air 
supremacy has been ours. Iraq had a large and battle proven air force… It does appear 
that this may be the first war won by weapons delivered through the air.”398 For another, 
the romance of aerial combat was exuded by “our magnificent Tornado Fighters of the 
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RAF [who] were praised for the low level flying over enemy territory, to carry out their 
raids.”399 Such references characterised Britain’s airpower as a heroic vocation. They 
were rare however, offered only by these two observers. 
 Most were critical of the coalition air campaign. As Desert Storm progressed it 
became apparent that the RAF was involved not in daring raids or dogfights, celebrated 
aspects of Britain’s experience in the Second World War in particular,400 but in the 
bombing of largely undefended Iraqi ground forces, military installations and civilian 
infrastructure. In particular, the bombing of Iraqi soldiers retreating from Kuwait401 was 
met with indignation by both observers who supported British involvement and those who 
didn’t:  
 
The TV pictures yesterday of the massacre of the fleeing Iraqi army was the most terrible and 
squalid report of this entire war. Hardly a war – a weapons test on ‘gooks’ by the US and others… 
The allies must be guilty of near-genocide in their attack on the retreating Iraqi army. A senseless 
slaughter.
402 
 
The ‘evil effects’ of the bombing campaign seemed to some observers, to delegitimise the 
coalition intervention itself: 
 
The evil effects of the war continue, even though it is over. The fact that so many Iraqis were killed 
in comparison with members of Allied troops does not make the situation better: in some respects it 
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seems worse, because it makes it seem that the Western powers were like bullies, killing people who 
had the misfortune to be under an oppressive and evil regime and were conscripted against their will 
into the army.
403 
 
The change recorded within responses submitted by one individual was indicative of how 
the coalition bombing campaign was received. During the initial stages he wrote of the 
accidental bombing of an air-raid shelter in Bagdad as “a tragic mistake”404 yet by the end 
of his correspondence the tone and focus had changed markedly: 
 
Unnecessary repeated bombing of the Iraqis when retreating from Kuwait to Basra; nearly all the 
vehicles appear to be civilian ones, hardly a tank or other tracked vehicle to be seen.
405  
 
Observers were clearly uncomfortable with the level of destruction wrought by the 
coalition and, by extension, Britain’s air forces. Some were particularly critical of the 
‘modern’ aspect of the coalition’s campaign, suggesting that the new smart weaponry 
deployed in the Gulf obscured the inevitable suffering involved. A teacher who 
vehemently opposed the conflict offered such a response: 
 
Once the war began I thoroughly disliked the jingoistic pride my students had in the technology of 
conflict – it was too far removed from life and death. If a building could be blown up by targeting a 
bomb through an air vent was it still so marvellous when people were inside?
406 
 
Naturally, observers who focused on the aerial campaign in this manner found it difficult 
to articulate a positive military identity for Britain during the conflict. The bombing of 
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Iraq, for one observer, elicited recollection of an uncomfortable aspect of Britain’s 
Second World War: 
 
Remember Dresden! Such a fear, while Iraqi civilians, according to a Spanish journalist in 
yesterday’s Guardian, are bombed and killed. Apparently he visited a small town and found it almost 
flattened – no strategic importance at all and full of refugee families from Baghdad.407 
 
Invocation of the strategic bombing of Germany served in this example to underline the 
illegitimacy of using air power against Iraq, and shows the extent to which Britain’s 
experience and identity in World War Two could be invoked by observers in order to 
negate British action in the present. In later conflicts, notably in Kosovo in 1999, 
observers were inclined to draw on memory of the bombing of Germany and the Blitz in 
order to frame British use of air power and articulate a broadly critical and disproving 
opinion, though the relationship between adopted tactics and the underlying legitimacy of 
intervention remained complex.  
 The Gulf War in its totality was not viewed primarily as a ground engagement by 
observers. Very few chose to discuss Britain’s ground forces as a previous cohort had 
done during the Falklands War, and no observers discussed the Royal Navy in detail 
despite its role in destroying Iraqi vessels and intercepting Iraqi anti-ship missiles.408 
Only in one response was Britain’s ground force considered at length. This observer drew 
on popular memory of Britain’s North Africa campaign during World War Two as a 
reference for describing the British contribution: 
 
On 24th February, the Allies had had enough, and the land war commenced. It was a magnificent 
sight, and you could tell, every care was being taken to preserve the lives of the soldiers… The 
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Seventh armoured brigade, The Desert Rats – a familiar name from the last war. And the operation 
was a well named one; Desert Storm… We thank God, but won’t forget the men who will not return 
and gave their lives for freedom.409 
 
She went on to describe the contribution of military personnel to the coalition as an 
embodiment of Britain’s identity in opposing the tyranny and aggression of Hussein’s 
Iraq; “the desert became the stores arsenal of the free world. Men appeared clad in 
camouflage uniforms, gigantic tanks and vehicles rolled across the sands.”410 Only in this 
one response did a detailed discussion of Britain’s frontline soldiers emerge. In fact, in 
two other responses written by observers who were highly critical of Britain’s 
involvement in the Gulf War, soldiers seemed to embody the futility of the war: 
 
Soldiers die without understanding [that] completely innocent people are killed for no reason, falsely 
believing that they are making patriotic sacrifices.
411  
 
They [soldiers] chose that way of life and all the peace-time advantages it brings. I have no 
sympathy for them now they are caught up in something they and their families did not expect. They 
had a choice to join up in the first place and they have made it.
412 
 
Observers were as likely to critique military service as they were to celebrate it on the few 
occasions frontline soldiers were discussed during the Gulf conflict. Indeed, the ground 
war in Kuwait and Iraq began on 24th February 1991 and lasted around a hundred hours 
and, of the nearly fifty-thousand British personnel deployed, forty-seven were killed, thus 
                                                     
409 MO D2092, female, born 1919.  
410 MO D2092, female, born 1919. 
411 MO A2212, female, born 1956.  
412 MO A2464, male, born 1960.  
139 
 
 
 
it is perhaps unsurprising that so few observers chose to discuss Britain’s frontline 
soldiers specifically. 
The Gulf War was conceived of differently to the previous Falklands War. The 
latter was represented as a ground war in which the important events had been decisive 
land battles fought by professional soldiers on the British side, the quality and character 
of whom was often framed by invocation of Britain’s celebrated military history. By 
contrast, the Gulf War was widely considered to be an imbalanced use of massive, 
modern air power. Though some observers did discuss British ground forces, or portray 
the RAF in a positive, daring light, most articulated discomfort with Britain’s adopted 
tactics and strategy. The conflict was rarely linked to past glories or military triumph and 
instead elicited anxiety or dissatisfaction. Allusions to the strategic bombing of Germany 
in the Second World War demonstrated simultaneously the continued explanatory power 
of popular memories of that war, and the extent to which observers were uncomfortable 
with aerial bombardment as a marker for Britain’s identity during the Gulf conflict.   
 Though Desert Storm dealt severe damage within Iraq and crippled its military, 
the conflict certainly did not result in any of the catastrophic consequences many 
observers had feared before its conclusion. Thus, regardless of their beliefs in the 
legitimacy of Britain’s involvement or the use of massive air power, frequently observers 
were forced to confront the fact that the military campaign had ended in way that they had 
not foresaw. One wrote during the ground war that “The allies are meeting with very little 
opposition and Iraqi soldiers are giving themselves up without fighting. It seems an awful 
thing to say but it’s all a bit of an anti-climax considering the ‘mother of all battles’ we 
were promised!”413 For another, the rapid capitulation of the Iraqi military seemed 
unbelievable: 
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I thought perhaps it would continue for months or years. I was very doubtful that the government 
was telling the truth, and I thought that we had perhaps been presented with an optimistic view of 
winning the war within a short time. Fortunately it was not prolonged.
414 
 
Iraqi capitulation dispelled pre-existing fears about escalation or conflagration, nuclear or 
otherwise. In responses to later directives, no observers suggested that intervention in 
Kosovo, Afghanistan or even Iraq would result in a regional or global ‘holocaust.’ The 
conclusion of the Gulf War therefore represents a departure within observers’ responses 
from the prevailing military logic of the Cold War in which large scale use of military 
force risked escalation and devastation, to a much less risky reality of limited and 
conventional war. By contrast, popular memories of Britain’s Second World War have 
endured throughout as a frame of reference for observers seeking to represent Britain’s 
role in recent conflicts. This persistent importance of British involvement in the Second 
World War as a frame of reference is, I argue, a result of observers’ collective and 
continued focus on the legitimacy of the conflicts in which Britain was involved. Only 
briefly during the initial stages of the Gulf crisis and war did observers worry about 
whether the use of force was risky, or even possible. Those fears dispelled, ideas of 
Mutually Assured Destruction, conflagration and escalation retained little explanatory 
power during subsequent conflicts. Memory of World War Two remained more visible 
and vibrantly contested within their responses, despite being more distant from the 
present.415 
 Observers naturally focused on the outcome of the conflict after the rapid success 
of the coalition campaign. For many, the fact that Saddam Hussein remained in power in 
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Iraq despite the use of massive military force was highly unsatisfactory.416 Only two 
observers described a successful mission when they wrote that “It is definitely right for 
the US and Allies not to interfere… and to withdraw as soon as possible”417 and that “The 
UN cannot legally intervene in the [subsequent] civil war [in Iraq].”418 Most who wrote 
about the military outcome specifically were disheartened or frustrated to see the Iraqi 
regime left in power, having conceived of the conflict as one predicated more broadly on 
the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. Thus, it came as a shock that the coalition would use 
its massive military advantage for the purpose solely of removing Iraqi forces from 
Kuwait: 
 
Saddam Hussein is still in power and Major is talking of sanctions!! What a bloody cock-up! So now 
we win the peace do we?
419 
 
Well now it is all over and done with but in retrospect I don’t think we did enough, we came home 
too soon, Hussein should have been captured to stand trial for all the dreadful things he has done to 
people, their lives and the consequences of the damage to the environment which will persist for 
many generations.
420 
 
Whilst I am a Christian it does seem to me that the Allies failed in what they set out to do and by not 
either removing him from the scene or at least, ensuring his detainment on a war crimes charge. I’m 
far from sure that what we have seen represents the end of the story. I only hope that common sense 
will prevail.
421  
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What has been achieved apart from the liberation of Kuwait? Saddam Hussein is still leader, the 
armed forces do not appear to have turned against him, on the contrary by all estimates they are now 
shelling and attacking all those in Iraq who oppose Saddam Hussein.
422  
 
Securing Kuwaiti sovereignty alone, though a military victory, was not an adequate 
settlement given the totality of Iraq’s defeat. Thus a sense of victorious triumph was not a 
feature of observers’ written accounts. The tactics adopted, based largely on air power, 
were thought to be ethically ambiguous by most observers, and the result of the conflict 
did not appear to be a victory in anything other than a technical sense for most. 
Foregrounded by Britain’s resistance to tyrannical aggression in the 1930s and 1940s, 
many observers conceived of the war against Iraq to be one predicated on similar 
circumstances. They were naturally disappointed by the limited nature of its outcome. 
Indeed, observers did not attempt to link the military action against Iraq to memories of 
past victories or well-known narratives of British military heroism. One observer 
lamented the ambiguous conclusion of the conflict by drawing on her memory of a 
previous case, “Unlike the Falklands, this [the Gulf War] is a war without a real 
ending.”423 This is an increasingly familiar sentiment among responses to later directives 
as observers recalled Britain’s Falklands War as an instance of justified, defensive and 
limited military action which, importantly, represented a singular and celebrated military 
triumph. 
 In later conflicts, the spectre of escalation and broader catastrophe having 
dissipated, observers focused on the prospects and ethics of Britain’s conventional forces. 
The Gulf War represents an instance in which military triumph was lacking, primarily 
because of the ambiguous nature of air power in observers’ minds, but also because land 
                                                     
422 MO A883, male, born 1933.  
423 MO C1786, female, born 1950.  
143 
 
 
 
forces were used briefly and were afforded little place within what observers wrote. This 
is repeated in the Kosovo War in 1999 and again during the initial intervention in 
Afghanistan. While frontline troops took centre stage from the Iraq War in 2003, none of 
these later conflicts delivered the sort of celebrated and unambiguous military victory 
achieved in the Falklands War. The Gulf War was materially successful in the sense that 
Iraqi forces were removed from Kuwait. Observers however, made sense of the conflict 
by referring to broader narratives of identity and popular memory. Having foregrounded 
the conflict as a struggle against dictatorial aggression and the Hussein regime rather than 
the status of Kuwait specifically, observers were more disappointed with the outcome 
than British or American policy makers.   
 
Leaders and Leadership 
 
Observers rarely related the Gulf conflict to domestic leadership or the person of the 
Prime Minister, certainly not to the extent that a previous cohort had when writing about 
the Falklands War, and likewise not to the extent that subsequent cohorts did when 
evaluating Tony Blair’s role in the Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq wars. The comparative 
absence of detailed discussion of leadership here was due perhaps to the departure of 
Margaret Thatcher, and her replacement by John Major, in November 1990 as the Gulf 
crisis unfolded. Observers were presented with a new national leader who had inherited 
the crisis in the Middle East, and seemingly could not be personally associated with 
Britain’s part in the Gulf coalition.  
Of course some observers did consider the impact the new Prime Minister might 
have on British policy. One was pleased to see Major assume control of a serious 
situation: 
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Thank goodness Mrs Thatcher was made to resign before this war started. I can imagine her strident 
tone and criticism of the media for showing both sides of the war. Instead we fortunately have the 
calm tone of Mr Major, her successor.
424 
 
Another observer similarly discussed the need for serious leadership during the crisis, 
though the Prime Minister’s lack of personal experience of World War Two in particular 
was troubling: 
 
I feel happier now that Mrs Thatcher has ceased to be PM. I admire her for all her good and hard 
work for Britain but latterly she worries me as she seemed to be becoming very belligerent… Mrs 
Thatcher however, lived through the 39-45 war, like me, and Mr Major did not. I just hope he keeps 
his cool and thinks of the heartache and anguish that war could bring.
425  
 
As I have suggested throughout, the possibility of war against Iraq brought memories the 
Second World War into sharp focus for observers. Having lived or personal experience 
both served as a generational marker for observers and leant an authority to their 
perspectives on the current conflict. Frequently a claim to understand what could be 
expected in wartime was articulated alongside a broader belief in the legitimacy of using 
military force; the horrors of war did not necessarily undermine the use of military 
violence, but served instead as a reminder of the seriousness of the issues at hand. 
Other observers were rather more disappointed by Major’s leadership as the crisis 
unfolded. One objected to Britain’s involvement in the conflict, highlighting the 
lamentable continuity between the Thatcher and Major governments in pursuing 
American interests; “It is of course a great disappointment to find that Mr Major is no less 
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belligerent and no more independent minded than was Mrs Thatcher vis a vis American 
policy”.426   
For most however, John Major’s leadership was simply not considered an 
important aspect of their accounts. Having inherited British involvement in the unfolding 
international crisis, he was represented as an unknown quantity or a diplomatic 
lightweight. One observer sardonically described how “Mr Major actually says these are 
‘exciting’ times – perhaps he ought to be sent home to play with his train set.”427 The 
rapid conclusion of the ground war further compounded a sense within responses that 
Major’s role in the war had been minimal. It was not associated with his political or 
ideological program, or his leadership style in the manner that previous and subsequent 
conflicts were with both Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair.  
 Perhaps because Prime Ministerial leadership did not feature heavily among 
responses to the Gulf Crisis directive several observers focused instead on a wider range 
of domestic political leaders and notable people. After criticising John Major’s 
amateurish leadership style, one observer went on to consider individuals who best 
represented anti-war opinion:  
 
The Labour party keep on about making sanctions work but most of them seem to accept the 
inevitability of war after a few more months. A notable exception is Tony Benn.
428 
 
Another lamented the failure of opposition leaders to take a stance against the policy of 
the Thatcher and Major governments: 
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The Labour party under Neil Kinnock (groan) has lost an opportunity to expose such yawning gaps... 
The Welsh windbag thinks that if he runs with the dogs of war, an election victory will see the 
Tories off. I am convinced that to be so unprincipled will be to forfeit such a prize.
429  
  
These comments show the extent to which the Gulf War was thought by observers to 
affect domestic politics and that, among those who were critical of British involvement, 
the apparent unity in parliament was particularly unwelcome. Yet they were few in 
number suggesting that observers were less concerned about the domestic impact or 
political ramifications of Desert Storm, at least when come compared to the previous 
Falklands campaign or those subsequent, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
  The reasons for this are difficult to establish. Certainly it is not the case that the 
Gulf War was considered a peripheral or unimportant event. In fact many observers 
identified the possibility of war with Iraq as potentially extraordinarily destructive and the 
sheer volume of responses submitted to the directive suggests that observers were highly 
motivated by the prospect of conflict. Instead, observers rarely discussed John Major 
because they did not conceive of his leadership as that of a wartime leader. He was not be 
associated personally with Britain’s entry into the Gulf War and therefore was rarely 
thought of as a figurehead for Britain’s policies or position. In previous and subsequent 
conflicts political leaders were though to embody Britain’s political position in the 
conflict and, in some cases, represented a demarcation between the nation and the state. 
In the Gulf War, few observers were able or willing to make such a connection. Had the 
conflict been interpreted much more critically – seen as a more aggressive or offensive 
act on Britain’s part – Major’s status with responses may have been different.  
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The UN, USA and International Politics 
 
Observers conceived of the crisis triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait as one of global 
importance, involving a variety of actors and institutions outside of Britain. Responses 
included discussion of the United Nations and Britain’s alliance with America. Less 
frequently observers discussed the regional political context in the Middle East. Though 
some did link the Gulf crisis to wider problems – in particular the Arab-Israeli conflict – 
it is quite evident that most were focused primarily on relations between Iraq and 
members of the coalition arrayed against it, including Britain.  
 Often however, observers suggested that the recourse to war in 1990 demonstrated 
the failure of international diplomacy and leadership. Observers lamented “the hypocrisy 
shown by all sides”430 and described how “the heads of government should be made by 
their populations to sit down and stay there until a conclusion is reached to every ones 
satisfaction.”431 As I have suggested earlier, observers in some cases felt confused or 
ambivalent about the possibility of a conflict in Iraq, failing to reach a conclusion on 
whether Britain should take part at all. For one observer, the intractable nature of the 
dispute was compounded by the spiralling escalation witnessed during Desert Shield: 
 
The whole thing feels like a mad game played by world leaders – sell them arms, call hostages 
‘guests’, let some people (journalists, relatives) into Iraq but not keep them as hostages, put more 
and more troops in Saudi Arabia so that the numbers match the Iraqi troops.
432  
 
The Gulf War prompted observers to discuss the status of the United Nations as a forum 
for resolving international. During the initial crisis period following the Iraqi invasion of 
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Kuwait observers wrote of a “hope [that] all the United Nations stand up to him 
[Hussein]”433 and “that if all nations took the United Nations ideals seriously and acted on 
their resolutions, the world would certainly be a much better place for everyone”.434 For 
another observer, apparent diplomatic consensus in condemning the Iraqi invasion 
engendered optimism for the UN: 
 
I thank whatever gods may be for Gorbachev, Bush and the renewed effectiveness of the United 
Nations. If this man [Hussein] can be stopped without war, they will do it.
435 
 
However, like the Falklands War previously, the failure to modify Iraqi actions, and the 
recourse to war, revealed for some the perennial failures of the organisation, described by 
one observer thus: 
 
The UN have and always will be of no use to anyone. They haven’t got a clue. They should be 
disbanded and another group formed to deal with the age were living in. There is a great need for 
countries to meet together and thrash problems out, but how and where? I just know that the United 
Nations has had its day.
436 
 
For another, the formation of a coalition that was not mandated directly by the UN was 
met with disappointment: 
 
I feel that the United Nations condemned the invasion [of Kuwait], as I understand it but they left it 
to individual nations to supply troops, maybe there is some legal reason for the United Nations 
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setting up a force which to me would seem more logical as the invasion seems to be condemned by 
most of the world.
437  
 
The Gulf War was the first large-scale, multi-national conflict to occur outside the context 
of the global Cold War. Some observers clearly felt optimistic about the possibility that 
the United Nations might take a more muscular role in ensuring multilateral security and 
ending international disputes, and several were keen to identify Britain as a responsible 
actor within it. As in the previous Falklands War however, such hopes seem largely to 
have been dashed by Iraq’s failure to withdraw from Kuwait and the ultimate resort to 
military force, again engendering a characterisation among responses that diplomacy 
through the UN had failed.   
 In fact, Britain’s contribution to the coalition as a junior partner threw up a new 
dimension to their submissions which would be repeated among responses to later 
directives concerning Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Some observers were concerned 
that, in lacking a dedicated UN force, Britain was taking part in an operation that was too 
obviously dominated by the United States, something which brought along its own 
diplomatic and political problems: 
 
The Americans seem curiously ignorant about Muslims and their faith, considering the black 
Muslims in the US…the US do not want to bring in Palestine probably because of the friends of 
Israel in the US. We seem to be bending over to support America and denigrate any other line… 
Thank goodness the Germans and French appear to be coming to their senses. Let’s hope it’s not too 
late. This European movement towards negotiations and pro-sanctions is the only lifeline there is.
438  
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I appreciate that America is a major force within the United Nations, but did they have to take such a 
notable stance and lead? And what on earth was Britain doing running along after her coat-tails? Are 
we really such a Great Power again?
439 
 
Another observer was more critical about the dominant world role assumed by the United 
States. She suggested that narrow American self-interest and domestic political 
considerations undermined the possibility of UN-led multilateral security and were 
exacerbating the crisis over Iraq and Kuwait. Her account centred on a simplistic 
description of Zionism in the United States: 
 
It must seem obvious to any thinking person with the imagination to envisage what this projected 
war will be like if it does actually take place that genuine efforts at a diplomatic solution must be 
made, but that the American government is completely unwilling to even try to negotiate. One can 
only conclude that this is because diplomacy would sooner or later inevitably involve the inclusion 
of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse and no American president can afford to alienate the Jewish vote. 
Therefore a devastating war may begin just to protect the Republican leadership in the United States 
and perpetuate the oppression of the Palestinians by the Israelis. Another example of American 
dishonesty was the way in which reluctant members of the United Nations were induced to vote for 
the crucial United Nations resolutions by offers of financial help as a reward: in other words they 
were bought.
440 
 
Though varying in intensity, these responses reveal a critical attitude to the United States, 
dissatisfaction with Britain’s comparative junior role, and a preference for stronger 
international institutions in resolving international crises. Yet they also reveal certain 
ideas and narratives of identity which observers conferred onto Britain’s closest ally. The 
United States was described as overbearing, self-interested, intolerant, ignorant and even 
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dishonest. Anxieties over the alignment between Britain and the US revealed a preference 
for British status and independence, but also suggested that most observers considered 
Britain to be more tolerant, moderate and cautious by comparison. Again, a preference for 
a defensive and unaggressive posture – a key aspect of observers’ discussions of 
legitimacy – was reinforced by a representation of an ally determined to make war. This, 
in particular, was a salient feature of responses to subsequent directives, most notably 
those concerning the 2003 Iraq War. 
Observers rarely considered in detail the politics of the region or Iraq’s post-
colonial, sectarian or pan-Arabic history. One observer embedded discussion of the 
contemporary crisis within a consideration of the broader region and Arab-Israeli conflict: 
 
The main political figures involved, well apart from Saddam, there are about 15 groups who think 
that Israel has no right to exist; some of their leaders are the murderer Abu Nidal and various other 
similar, anonymous but still deadly. When/if Saddam has finished with Kuwait which is only a small 
country of which we know (almost) nothing, then he and Syria might form a new Moslem alliance 
and have a go at Israel.
441  
 
In one other response an observer questioned the origin of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by 
referring to the region’s colonial past: 
 
I have a feeling that everything was out of control very quickly after the invasion of Kuwait. I read 
somewhere recently that Saddam Hussein was led to believe that the Americans were not 
particularly interested in his ideas about Kuwait. Kuwait seems a very unnatural place with so much 
money concentrated in such a small place – and with it not even being a democracy – one wonders 
how it could have been there at all. I haven’t got a very clear idea about the history of the Middle 
East but have heard it is said that a civil servant took out a ruler and drew a straight line on a map 
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across the desert and thus created a border between Iraq and Saudi Arabia sometime after the First 
World War when we were still in our Imperial heyday as a nation.
442  
 
The status and history of Kuwait was not a salient feature of observers’ responses. When 
it was discussed observers admitted to knowing little about the history of the region or 
Iraq’s claims to it. Though observers’ views on Britain’s involvement in the Gulf War 
were determined by what they knew about it contemporary circumstances, the haziness 
with which they discussed the specifics of the region’s politics demonstrated further the 
way in which the conflict was understood by considering what it meant for Britain rather 
than Kuwait or the wider Middle East, and how it could be incorporated within broader 
narratives of British history and identity. Discussions of colonialism or imperial control – 
particularly important within the broader history of both Iraq and Kuwait443 - were largely 
absent in this regard.  
 Observers recognised that Britain’s role in the Gulf crisis, and the subsequent 
conflict, was multilateral and junior to that of the United States. Once again, they broadly 
reaffirmed a sense that Britain – like all nations – ought to be bound by a strong and 
decisive United Nations, yet they were often fatalistic about its prospects and saw the 
failure to reverse Iraqi aggression by diplomatic means as another indication of the 
apparent weakness of the UN. With detailed discussion of regional politics largely absent, 
most observers saw the conflict as one between Iraq on one side, and an American-led 
coalition on the other. The subordinate role Britain played in the coalition revealed a 
latent desire for British agency and status on the one hand, but also a desire for 
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strengthened international institutions on the other. Indeed, the identification of the 
United States as a hegemon during the crisis drew comparison and contrast. Observers 
engaged in a persistent process of othering in which the rash, overbearing arrogance of an 
American ally could be contrasted with the tolerance and moderation of its British junior 
partner. This comparison is a persistent motif across responses related to later conflicts 
and is a direct result of contemporary circumstances, namely Britain’s repeated 
involvement in US-led military coalitions. Consistent reconstruction of the differences 
between Britain and America offered an aspect of continuity in which a narrative of 
British caution, moderation and tolerance was rearticulated and reinforced. 
 
The Enemy Other: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq 
 
Perception of Britain’s opponent during the Gulf crisis was a crucial aspect of observers’ 
collected responses. Largely their accounts reduced the Iraqi regime to the figure of 
Saddam Hussein who was portrayed as a brutal dictator. Hussein was described by 
supporters of a military intervention against Iraq as “mad or bad… paranoid and 
unpredictable”,444  “power hungry”,445 and a “murdering piece of shit”.446 
 Observers who responded to the previous Falklands Crisis directive had not 
suggested that the Argentinian occupation had resulted in brutal or abhorrent conditions 
for the Islanders, and had focused largely on the fascistic nature of the Junta. In 1990 
observers who wrote about the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait sometimes stressed the plight 
of Kuwaitis under the oppressive yoke of Hussein’s brutal regime: 
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We know from his past that human lives mean little to Saddam Hussein, [evidenced by] his killing 
of the Kurds by chemical weapons, and… his reckless attacks on the Kuwaiti population.447 
 
…the people in Kuwait were experiencing terrible conditions, not only from bombings, but rape and 
pillage from the army who had invaded them. It sickened everyone who saw their plight.
448 
 
Observers’ views on the Iraqi regime clearly affected what they believed to be a desirable 
outcome for the Gulf conflict itself. As suggested earlier in this chapter, many were 
discomfited by Hussein retaining his position in Iraq after the war, despite the narrower 
war aims identified by the coalition: 
 
The allies have done a marvellous job, but the problem now will be to stop Saddam Hussein from 
trying again. He must be made to pay for his crimes. Kuwait has been devastated and the 
environment damaged beyond belief. He still had our POWs (presuming they are still alive) and 
hundreds of Kuwaitis who have been rounded up and shifted out.
449 
 
Evidently, observers were keen to stress the otherness of Hussein’s regime. They marked 
it out as particularly brutal, evidencing attacks on civilians in Kuwait and in Iraq. Though 
perspectives on the legitimacy of using military force against Iraq often varied, observers 
who discussed the Iraqi regime were wholly convinced that his leadership was 
illegitimate. 
Hussein was of course, not to be taken lightly as an opponent and was thought by 
some observers to display a low cunning or opportunistic intelligence: 
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Considering the forces and world opinion against him it is probably not surprising that he is only 
able to continue with the support from his own people by religious fervour mixed with political 
scheming. He is a master of the media coverage and a great tactician and I feel he is just playing 
with the responses of the West who have raised such a large and cumbersome war horse against him 
they cannot hope to keep pace without media bias.
450 
 
With a whole population ready to support their leader in what he has led them into and then add the 
ingredient of religious fervour, no doubt the populace is convinced that their God and leader have 
given them a special dispensation to create havoc. There seems little hope in trying to resolve the 
conflict by diplomatic means when the perpetrator has convinced himself and his people that it was 
right to do what he did.
451 
 
Another observer, previously critical of the use of military force against Iraq, was 
similarly unequivocal in placing blame for the current situation with Hussein’s regime: 
 
Having said that I don’t believe we will suffer as the people in the Gulf will suffer, and all because 
of what seems to be a madman in charge of a country which has lots of oil, and having somehow 
won a war against Iran thought he could walk into that very small country of Kuwait and take over 
without any reaction from anyone else.
452 
 
Most observers, both critical and supportive of Britain’s contribution to a military effort 
against Iraq, articulated a uniform narrative of illegitimate, aggressive dictatorship in 
relation to Iraq. Largely this was condensed to a focus on the person of Saddam Hussein 
who was described variously as a tyrant, despot, madman, and killer, and whose evil and 
aggressive ideology had been implemented through a mixture of brutal, totalitarian 
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control, opportunism and trickery. Western hostages, including “innocent children… 
trapped [in Iraq]”,453 were identified as having suffered “very insanitary”454 conditions 
and faced a “terrible plight”,455 further confirming the appalling nature of Hussein’s 
regime.  
 Importantly, observers persistently characterised Saddam Hussein and the actions 
of his regime as comparable to those of Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany in the 1930s. 
These observers interpreted Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by drawing on popular memories 
of appeasement and Britain’s eventual recourse to war in 1939.456 One observer suggested 
that “To compare Saddam Hussein with Adolf Hitler in his disregard for human life is a 
very fair comment”457 while others went into greater detail: 
 
My immediate feelings after the seizure of Kuwait by Saddam Hussein was one of dismay. It 
brought back memories of Hitler and German troops marching into the Rhineland and the demands 
for Alsace-Lorraine. After Kuwait what would be Saddam Hussein’s Austria and Sudetenland? I had 
lived through these times and knew the danger of appeasement. I saw the President as another Hitler 
who had to be stopped at all costs. I still do.
458  
 
Saddam Hussein is another Hitler. He has already proved that he would use any weapons, (gas 
already used against Iranians and Kurds…); tell lies (he gave solemn promises to the Kuwaitis that 
he would not invade about 48 hours before doings so); stoop to any trick (hostages indiscriminately 
taken and places near the military etc. establishments as a ‘human shield’ against retaliatory strikes); 
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have erected stylised sentimental pictures and posters of himself everywhere; use cunning and lying 
propaganda which is nevertheless persuasive to the unintelligent and naïve.
459  
 
When confronted by the Gulf crisis observers focused on the nature of the Hussein regime 
at the expense of the specifics of its actual invasion of Kuwait. An important aspect of 
this discourse was the construction of an identity in which Saddam Hussein personally 
embodied a particularly unsavoury and brutal form of totalitarianism or dictatorship. 
Though observers who wrote about Argentinian Junta during the Falklands had described 
the occupation of the islands as typical of aggressive dictatorship, linked in some cases to 
‘fascism’, observers writing about the Hussein regime were often more specific and 
visceral, focusing on the abhorrent nature of Hussein’s personal leadership and his 
disregard for human life. His regime was marked out by observers not only as illegitimate 
or repellent, but often specifically as evil.  
 This particularly emotive and lucid characterisation was framed heavily by 
popular memories of Nazi Germany and Adolf Hitler in particular. Observers were 
clearly disgusted by the use of chemical weapons and Iraq’s aggression but they were also 
keen to assess more fundamentally the nature and identity of the regime which pursued 
them. Direct connection with Hitler both clarified what observers wrote about Saddam 
Hussein while further revealing the continuing explanatory power that popular memories 
of Britain’s entry into the Second World War retained over the present. Unlike the 
previous conflict in the Falklands, observers focused heavily on Hussein rather than any 
‘fascist’ ideology, thereby personifying the threat faced in the Gulf, and further centring 
their re-invocations of the Second World War on the figure of Adolf Hitler, considered a 
shorthand for evil. Both Hussein and Hitler were characterised by their otherness, 
conveyed a sense of British moderation, humanity, democracy and morality by contrast. 
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 Thus the Gulf War also represented an opportunity for observers to re-invoke 
memories of Adolf Hitler, and reconstruct a narrative of British identity in which he took 
a prominent position. Observers rearticulated a pervasive and specific popular memory 
based on brutality, tyranny and evil. His post-War cultural ubiquity460 was, as observers’ 
responses show, driven at least partially by a desire to help explain the identity and 
illegitimacy of Britain’s contemporary opponents and enemies. For most writing about 
the Gulf War past and present could be connected directly, forming part of a much 
broader reconstruction of a common British history centred on opposition to, and contrast 
with, totalitarianism and dictatorship, of which the identification of the Hussein regime 
was the latest manifestation. Hitler’s status as a benchmark for evil was sustained, 
however partially, by the utility in helping to make sense of contemporary circumstances 
which observers ascribed to it.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The circumstances and context of Britain’s involvement in the Gulf War were much 
different from those of the Falklands campaign. Observers were accordingly aware of the 
different situation and saw Britain’s Gulf War as a singular and unique event which 
elicited a variety of individual views and opinions.  Though observers were mostly in 
favour of military action, as those writing in 1982 had been, they were generally more 
ambivalent and uncertain about it, and they were keen to stress the far greater stakes 
thought to be involved in a potentially massive war in the Middle East. Likewise they 
were aware of, and considered at length, the fact that Britain was contributing to a broad, 
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US-led coalition rather than pursuing a bi-lateral conflict against an opponent which had 
invaded British sovereign territory.  
 Yet observers again interpreted contemporary events, and gave meaning to them, 
by considering what they meant for Britain. Confronted by the possibility of death and 
sacrifice in war, they sought not only to describe events, but to evaluate what British 
involvement revealed about Britain’s national identity. They were, as in all cases I 
consider, particularly concerned about the political and moral legitimacy of the use of 
military force. As in 1982, observers sought to invoke popular memories which could 
help explain present circumstances more clearly. The contemporary conflict in the Persian 
Gulf was frequently incorporated into a much broader historical narrative – most often 
focused on the Second World War - which could help clarify why Britain was fighting, 
and whether it was right or wrong. Many believed that contemporary conditions could be 
directly associated within the legitimate military struggle against Nazi Germany in the 
1930s. Those who objected did not do so on pacifist grounds, or as a stance against neo-
imperialism; they were instead far more likely to suggest that war against Iraq didn’t meet 
standards of legitimate defence. Though some observers described the Gulf War as a 
particularly complex conflict, and did not clarify their arguments by drawing on popular 
memories, a greater number did make sense of present conditions by referring to a 
celebrated and morally assured narrative of historical British identity. The Second World 
War remained ubiquitous despite its temporal distance and the apparent complicating 
factors associated with the Gulf campaign specifically. 
 As in 1982, many observers were old enough to have lived through the Second 
World War, thus it emerged as a specific marker of their own generational identity.461 Yet 
personal memories were generally articulated as part of a broader reference to popular 
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memory. Only when some observers came to imagine combat conditions in Iraq and 
Kuwait did personal experience of bereavement and wartime trauma figured their 
reactions. Mostly observers were concerned with incorporating the Gulf conflict into a 
national story, their personal experiences essentially lending greater weight to the 
arguments they were making about British experiences. Observers referred overwhelming 
to popular memories related specifically to Britain’s morally assured and legitimate entry 
into the Second World War, the failure of appeasement and the ‘evil’ of Nazism and 
Adolf Hitler. When observers recalled Neville Chamberlain’s return from Munich they 
were drawing on personal experience in order to build a convincing narrative of British 
history. This re-invocation of popular memories specifically helped to explain present 
circumstances by association, and provided a guide to action in the present. The use of 
military force against Saddam Hussein – invariably cast as a ‘new Hitler’ – was in many 
cases supported at least partially because of a fear of appeasing a dictator or Britain 
allowing him “to get away with it.”462  
 Thus, the specific conditions of the Gulf crisis, and the course of the subsequent 
war, determined the manner in which observers drew on these popular memories of 
Britain’s past. Indeed, the Gulf conflict occurred at an important juncture in British and 
world history at the end of the Cold War,463 and it is quite clear the possibility of massive 
escalation of conflagration in the Middle East was informed by what observers knew or 
remembered about Cold War security and Mutually Assured Destruction. The rapid, 
conventional end to the conflict undermined the validity of such comparisons, making 
them seem absurd in retrospect. By contrast, observers’ persistent efforts to define the 
legitimacy of Britain’s Gulf campaign engendered a focus on why Britain had become 
involved in World War Two, at the expense of memories of its constituent military events 
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or the subsequent Cold War. As Dan Stone has argued, the post-Cold War era has seen 
the re-emergence of ‘memory battles’ related to the Second World War, at a point in 
which it begins to fade from living memory.464 The specifics and particularities of British 
involvement in the Gulf War mark an important point of departure among collected 
responses in which popular memory of the Cold War security struggle gave way in 
totality to a much broader and pervasive focus on the Second World War, one which 
would be reinforced in subsequent conflicts also.  
 Thus, observers reconstructed a specific narrative of Britain’s past in a similar 
manner to those observers who had attempted to explain Britain’s experience in the 
Falklands campaign. They reaffirmed a morally secure narrative of legitimate defence 
against Nazi aggression in the Second World War – focused more heavily on the person 
of Adolf Hitler rather than a broader reference to ‘fascism’ - and, whether they believed 
the use of force against Iraq was fully legitimate or not, they incorporated the Gulf War 
within this broader understanding of Britain as a legitimate military power, and a force 
for good. Entry into the Second World War – reconstructing as a moral failure to confront 
determined aggression - served both as a benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of using 
force in the present and as a crucible for representations of Britain’s broader identity as a 
national community. In evaluating Britain’s role in Desert Storm, observers not only 
created a sense of national identity in the present, but also reconstructed a much broader 
narrative of historical identity based on British involvement in events that occurred in the 
further past. 
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The Kosovo War 1999 
 
The war in Kosovo, like those that occurred in neighbouring Croatia and Bosnia, involved 
the mobilisation of paramilitary forces and the prosecution of violence along ethnic, 
religious and national lines. However, the conflict, and consequent NATO involvement, 
was linked fundamentally to the politics of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia and the 
end of the Tito regime. Slobodan Milosevic’s rise to power first as President of Serbia, 
and then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),465 was based on a commitment to 
protect ethnic Serbs within other republics and autonomous regions who were thought to 
be oppressed or disenfranchised,466  and involved the mobilisation of an identity politics 
in which Kosovo was represented as a crucible of Serbian nationhood.467 This led to the 
dissolution of Kosovan autonomy and the imposition of Serbian control in 1990,468 
engendering an increasingly violent civil conflict in Kosovo and resistance from 
organised military and civilian groups among the Kosovar Albanian population.469 With 
the collapse of the neighbouring Albanian government in 1997 the Kosovo War 
accelerated quickly as weapons were moved freely across the border. Ultimately, while 
the conflict took on the characteristics of a conflict between competing ethnic groups, it is 
important to state that the war was the result of the political transformation of the 
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previous decades, and was intimately bound up in the unstable collapse of communism in 
both the states of the former Yugoslavia, the wider Balkan region and the world. 
 NATO’s intervention was thus initiated as a reaction to escalating violence within 
Kosovo with concerns about the possibility of genocide or ‘ethnic cleansing’ made more 
urgent by recent events in the Balkans. Indeed, the NATO campaign in Kosovo was the 
result of a turn in both North America and Western Europe toward ‘ethical’ or 
humanitarian foreign policy, a process itself driven by the perceived failure of non-
interventions in the initial Bosnian conflict from 1992 and the Rwandan genocide in 
1994.470 Confronted by increasingly brutal abuses by the FRY military and Serbian 
militias – such as the massacre at Racak in January 1999 in which over forty Kosovar 
Albanians were killed by the FRY Special Anti-Terror Unit471 – NATO states embarked 
on a military intervention against the FRY, codenamed Operation Allied Force, which 
involved a campaign of aerial bombardment targeting military and civilian infrastructure 
across Serbia and, for some time, Montenegro. Allied Force lasted until 10 June 1999 
until the FRY regime capitulated and withdrew under the terms of a ceasefire in which 
NATO forces, as part of the Kosovo Force (KFOR), entered the region as 
peacekeepers.472 Unlike the previous Falklands and Gulf Wars, British forces did not 
engage in ground warfare before the ceasefire. Likewise the intervention itself was 
associated closely with ideas of humanitarian intervention and ethical foreign policy 
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which had little precedent those earlier conflicts. The Kosovo War did not result from an 
attack on one state against another but was instead an active intervention, within a single 
sovereign state, aimed at protecting civilians from violence.473 Once again, within Mass 
Observation responses, these specific circumstances were both framed by, and 
contributed to, broader narratives of Britain’s contemporary identity and the invocation of 
popular memories of the past.     
I consider in this chapter responses from forty-eight observers to the spring 1999 
sub-directive titled “Current Issues” which asked observers to record their thoughts on 
“contemporary issues” including, despite the conclusion of armed conflict after the 
signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in December 1995, “Kosova and the war in 
Bosnia”.474 The directive was issued in mid-March 1999, just days before the beginning 
of Allied Force. The less prominent status of the Kosovo intervention relative to the other 
conflicts I have considered in this thesis is evidenced by its subordinate position within 
the MOP hierarchy (lacking a dedicated directive like the previous Falklands and Gulf 
wars) and the comparatively smaller number of observers (239 individuals) who wrote 
responses about it. 
 However, those observers who did write about the Kosovo War were engaged in 
detailed and intense discussion of the conflict, and were often well informed. The primary 
difference between responses written in 1999 and those submitted to previous directives 
is the lack of a significant number written before the opening of combat operations during 
a preceding ‘crisis period’. By the time that observers were writing about it, Britain had a 
defined policy of intervention and, unless they responded immediately on receipt of the 
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directive, Operation Allied Force was already underway. Their accounts were received by 
the MOP mainly between March and June 1999, and while they focused on many of the 
same themes that were apparent among responses to previous and subsequent directives – 
the legitimacy of British action, the nature of the combat, leadership, allies and enemies – 
they were writing about an ongoing operation or about one that had recently ended. 
 Observers identified the circumstances of the Kosovo War and were aware that 
the possibility of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide in Kosovo was particularly urgent, 
framed heavily by genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda immediately previously. 
However, in contrast to the previous Falklands War in particular, many were unsure about 
or critical of the legitimacy of Allied Force. They frequently characterised the violence in 
Kosovo as the result of intractable or perennial ethnic conflict. The situation was for 
some, compounded by a perceived heavy-handed and ineffective bombing campaign 
undertaken by NATO. The absence of ground forces meant there was little sense of 
celebration, victory or triumph in observers’ responses.  
 As a proportion of those considered in this chapter, fewer observers had been alive 
during the Second World War than among those who had written in response to the 
Falklands and Gulf directives. Of the forty-eight observers considered here, thirty were 
born before 1940 and nineteen were born before 1930, meaning those with memories of 
the Second World War as children or teenagers were in a minority. Yet popular memories 
were invoked in order to help explain British involvement in another military conflict 
both by those who could claim to be drawing on lived experience and those without. 
Further, it is possible to see among their responses how the specific context of the Kosovo 
intervention helped to determine which narratives of Britain’s past experience remained 
relevant. The possibility of ethnic cleansing in Kosovo meant observers were more likely 
to invoke Holocaust rather than the expansionism or irredentism of Nazi Germany to help 
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explain circumstances in the present. For some this framing formed part of an 
interpretation of the Kosovo conflict as a complex and intractable situation that military 
intervention could worsen. For others it leant weight to support for military intervention 
to avoid such horrors. However, frequent invocation of Britain’s Blitz compounded a 
sense that the military strategy adopted within Allied Force was not congruent with 
celebrated aspects of Britain’s Second World War history. Observers focused primarily 
on the perceived devastation wrought by bombing rather than any successes achieved by 
brave or heroic pilots,475 or indeed, the martial heroism of British ground forces. The 
invocation of popular memories of relevant aspects of the war once again helped to 
clarify the contemporary situation but could, importantly, be used to undermined or 
subvert Britain’s policy and position in the present. While observers were not wholly 
enthusiastic about the use of military force in Kosovo, in many cases British involvement 
in a military conflict nevertheless contributed to the construction and reconstruction of 
certain narratives of identity, and the re-invocation of a secure and morally assured 
military history heavily invested in the absolute legitimacy of the effort to defeat Nazi 
Germany.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
As in all cases, observers were concerned with establishing the legitimacy of Britain’s 
part in the military intervention in Kosovo. However, a minority of observers – twelve of 
the forty-eight observers considered in this chapter - believed military intervention in 
Kosovo had been justified, primarily as a humanitarian operation aimed at protecting 
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Kosovar Albanians. One observer offered a typical account, writing after the NATO 
campaign: 
 
I have no doubt that NATO’s action in attacking [the Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia by air was 
correct... However, I have strong doubts as to whether Milosevic will speedily agree to withdraw his 
forces from Kosovo, and while he does not, the Albanian people of that province are being terrorised 
and slaughtered.
476 
 
Again, another observer described how she had supported the Blair government’s 
decision to use military force. The humanitarian strife seen in Kosovo was evidence of 
the tyrannical actions of FRY regime: 
 
It was so upsetting to see the rows of bodies of people massacred the heartbroken wives and 
children, the villages razed to the ground. I felt as Tony Blair did that we must hurry and stop them 
whatever it takes… Many people have asked why we had to get involved in the area but the thing is 
– do you just let tyrants get on with it and do what they want or do you do something about it?477 
 
Evidently, observers who supported the military campaign in Kosovo characterised it as 
an effort to stop the brutal violence prosecuted by the FRY regime. Allusions to letting 
‘tyrants get on with it’ revealed again the extent to which intervention was framed by a 
broader understanding of appeasement, reconstructed as failure to deal with an enemy 
soon enough. Yet this interpretation remained flexible. Where previous responses 
concerning the Falklands and Gulf conflicts were centred on resistance to territorial 
expansion, in Kosovo observers were concerned instead about escalating violence. 
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Another observer offered a detailed and passionate argument for military action in 
Kosovo focused on the human suffering of Kosovar Albanians. Perceived arguments 
against military intervention were deconstructed, critiqued and derided: 
 
Several people I talked to would say things like ‘oh I don’t think war is the answer, I think we 
should use sanctions against Serbia.’ I pointed out to them that sanctions were already in operation 
against Iraq, since the war to liberate Kuwait, and were now being opposed by many ‘humanitarians’ 
because the innocent Iraqi people were being adversely affected whilst the country’s leadership 
continue to live in the lap of luxury. Such limp anti-war sentiments annoyed me because these 
people have no real idea what to do about determined military aggression, beyond a woolly 1960s 
‘war is bad’ attitude. Their one realistic alternative to war, economic sanctions, has been 
significantly discredited by our experience of sanctions against Iraq. So nowadays they’re reduced to 
blaming Britain/NATO/the UN for not anticipating the original aggression and somehow heading it 
off diplomatically. Of course war is a filthy, disgusting and degrading activity. But sometimes it’s 
the only alternative to allowing the bad guys to flourish.
478 
 
Observers who supported military intervention in Kosovo, as in all cases, were often keen 
to stress that they did not approve of war or military violence. They believed that the use 
of force must be a last resort, and must only be used when an opponent could not be 
countered through peaceful means. Though the wars in the former Yugoslavia were 
considered to be brutal and complex – something discussed in more detail shortly – 
observers who were in favour of a military campaign against the Milosevic regime saw 
Britain’s role in stark terms with a clear moral imperative.  
 For another observer, this moral clarity was articulated by invoking popular 
memories focused on the ‘evil’ of the Nazis, and Britain’s legitimate resistance to it. She 
criticised those who complained about “how awful the [Milosevic] regime is” but wanted 
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“Milosevic deposed as long as someone else does it for them”,479 going on to explain her 
support for intervention in Kosovo by reconstructing a narrative centred on the failure of 
Britain’s pre-Second World War policy of appeasement: 
 
This whole attitude [of opposing intervention] is reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain and his pieces 
of paper. Murdering butchers don’t understand diplomacy. They mistake it for weakness and at least 
our message to Milosevic must be that we are not fools and we will not stand by and allow him to 
mastermind another holocaust. Perhaps if Neville Chamberlain and those like him had not taken the 
word of a murdering thug, there might not have been the senseless carnage that there was in the 
1930s and 40s.
480 
 
As a military intervention in Kosovo drew near, observers attempted to make sense of 
Britain’s identity within it by drawing on, and recreating, specific narratives of British 
involvement in World War Two. For the observer quoted above, the apparent failure of 
appeasement prescribed action in the present, and was underscored by a tacit belief in the 
similarity between Milosevic and the ‘murdering thug’, Adolf Hitler. By association, 
Milosevic’s regime seemed more clearly to represent a legitimate threat against which 
Britain was justified in deploying force. For an observer born after the Second World 
War, popular memories framed the contemporary situation, offering a guide to action 
against Milosevic,481 but also permitting the reconstruction of a broader narrative of 
British resistance to brutality and aggression.  
 It is important to note however, that observers were fully aware of the specifically 
humanitarian context of the Kosovo intervention. For some observers, legitimacy was 
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assured only by logically considering how civilians facing violence in the region could be 
helped:  
 
There are two questions; 1) should Europe try to find an answer to stop the persecution? 2) Is 
military intervention justified? The answer to question 1) as put is easy. However if peaceful 
intervention is unsuccessful should the effort be called off and the people of Kosovo be left to their 
fate, even though it has been agreed that the situation is intolerable? This leads to Q2. In terms of 
logic from Q1 the answer must be no. However that presupposes that although negotiations have 
failed, force will succeed. There is little ground for hope along this line. Short term negotiations 
(that word again) after military retreat may produce short term solutions, but how long will it last? It 
is therefore a no win situation in which the main opponent has played a cunning game and one in 
which he may have further surprises.
482 
 
Some observers ascribed the legitimacy of the Kosovo intervention solely to its 
humanitarian character. For one, the current conflict could be contrasted with the 
perceived realpolitik of the previous Gulf conflict: 
 
I am generally a pacifist, and when there was the Gulf War I was highly suspicious that the 
involvement of Britain and the USA was motivated by concerns about the oil supply, but in the case 
of Kosovo I think it is obvious that there were only humanitarian reasons for NATO going to war 
with the Serbs… I have been shocked to see so many liberal-minded people opposed to NATO 
intervention, writing letters to The Guardian in protest… I do not approve of war, but in this 
particular case I do not see that it could have been avoided.
483 
 
Another described explicitly their belief that military intervention could not be justified 
purely as a humanitarian operation, citing the violence of the previous Bosnian war: 
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I hate war but since the last Bosnian war I stopped being a pacifist as I think self-defence is a sad 
necessity as it is defending those unable to defend themselves. It is wrong in my view to sit back and 
watch others violate others. Yet I thought what about Rwanda? Kurdistan? East Timor? Sierra 
Leone? Etc. Who is helping the people there?
484 
 
Observers characterised the Kosovo intervention as one aimed at protecting civilians and 
preventing violence against innocent people. These circumstances were often understood 
through the invocation of memories of the past which were thought to retain an 
explanatory power, but they also dictated which popular memories were referred to. For 
those who supported intervention, ethnic cleansing and genocide could be understood by 
invoking the Holocaust. The association both framed the contemporary violence as 
particularly disgusting and evil,485 providing a moral imperative for intervention, but also 
recreated a sense that Britain remained continuously opposed to such brutality.486 One 
observer wrote, “The more I see and hear of the crisis in that area the more I am reminded 
of the horrors of the Nazi regime in the 30s and 40s”487 while another explained that “The 
persecution of the Albanian Kosovans was totally unacceptable and can only be compared 
to the Nazi persecution of the Jews.”488 Other observers further expanded the point: 
 
Kosovo and the war in Bosnia is just another terrible case of ‘man’s inhumanity to man’. We 
thought that the World War Two treatment of the Jews was dreadful but here we are again with 
people being persecuted for their religion.
489 
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The cruelty was something akin to Hitler and his attempts to get rid of the Jewish people. I thought 
have we learned nothing in the past 50 years? It’s happening all over again.490 
 
During both the Falklands and Gulf wars, observers writing about those conflicts rarely 
alluded to the Holocaust specifically, focusing instead on popular memories of Nazi 
militarism and aggressive expansionism against other European states. The nature of the 
conflicts in the Balkans and Kosovo, entailing ethnic cleansing and genocide, and lacking 
inter-state conflict, prompted observers to recall circumstances that were thought to 
provide an explanation for the contemporary violence. Though none of these observers 
suggested that Britain fought World War Two in order to stop the Holocaust, its 
identification as a ‘touchstone’491 for evil once more reinforced a pervasive belief in 
Britain’s moral and legitimate resistance to Nazi Germany, thereby reconstructing a 
specific narrative of British identity based on resistance to brutality, tyranny and evil.  
 Indeed, an intervention in Kosovo aimed solely at the protection of civilians 
represented a departure from previous British conflicts, challenging the instinctively 
critical position adopted by some observers. Contemporary circumstances and what 
observers knew about them drove their conclusions on the appropriateness of the use of 
British force. Yet all of these individuals were interested in establishing whether Britain 
was acting in the defensive, be it against the aggressions of a brutal FRY regime, or in the 
defence of innocent civilians who could not defend themselves. Allusions to ethnic 
cleansing, genocide and the Holocaust were indicative of the changed context of the 
Kosovo War when compared to the previous Falklands and Gulf conflicts, but they also 
formed part of a familiar construction of a broader British identity,492 coloured by a 
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defensive posture and resistance to extremism and aggression, that could be read in 
responses written in relation to previous (and subsequent) cases.  
Importantly however, a majority of observers who wrote about British 
involvement in Kosovo believed it was not a justified use of military force. Twenty-five 
of the forty-eight observers considered in this chapter described an illegitimate military 
intervention. Some objected on the grounds that military force would be too destructive 
and would make an already desperate situation worse. They wrote variously that Allied 
Force “only exacerbated the situation”,493 that it “did nothing but stir up more hatred”,494 
or that it was “completely unjustifiable and merely made a bad situation worse”.495 
Another observer, who had written previously of his support for a military intervention 
against Iraq in 1990, wrote: 
 
The firing of houses which serves no purpose at all; it is just vandalism, the senseless bombing by 
NATO of useful buildings and bridges that the ordinary Serbs use, bombing that can only have made 
matters worse, the list is endless… I am more opposed every day the bombing continues… I was 
against military action, and still think it was a distasteful and costly and unnecessary fiasco. Billions 
of pounds worth of damage, the R. Danube closed to trade affecting several countries not in any way 
involved.
496  
 
For another observer, the identification of Slobodan Milosevic as a pariah during the 
crisis, an aspect of responses returned to shortly, did not mean that military intervention 
could be justified: 
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I and many of my friends feel that the air strikes in Kosovo will prove to be a ghastly and expensive 
mistake. So, Milosevic is a wicked man, but there have been many others since 1945, when NATO 
and others have stood by, or in the case of the United States interfered with awful results, e.g. 
Vietnam and Somalia.
497 
 
These observers were aware of what had occurred in Kosovo and the wider region, and 
they were aware of the humanitarian principles on which Allied Force had been based. 
However, they did not think this form of conflict was justified or could be effective, given 
that it involved further destruction and a potential threat to the civilians it was aimed at 
protecting. This is particularly apparent among observers’ discussions of the NATO 
bombing campaign, considered in more detail shortly.  
It is interesting to note further that the latter extract again involved invocation of 
the past as a frame for the present and that the wars in Vietnam and Somalia were 
considered to have been failures. The intervention in Kosovo was not considered in light 
of previous British conflicts, but represented as part of a narrative of unjustified or failed 
American interventions, suggesting that even observers who steadfastly rejected British 
involvement in the Kosovo War were unlikely to construct a narrative of British historical 
failures or abuses. Indeed, this does not occur meaningfully within responses submitted to 
any of the directives I have considered. Observers, even those who were highly critical of 
British involvement in Allied Force, were reluctant to question the legitimate history of 
British military action. 
 Like those who supported the intervention, these observers made sense of the 
conflict by creating a narrative of British identity, and were worried not only about the 
effects of using military force, but also that this destruction suggested Britain was 
contributing to violence and strife. Some were uncomfortable with Britain’s pro-active 
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and interventionist identity in 1999. However, no observers suggested that force could 
never be justified. As I argue throughout this research, most writing about recent conflicts 
were comfortable with Britain’s historical identity as a military power and the possibility 
that it could be involved in armed conflict. 
 Though some were evidently concerned by the destruction wrought by Allied 
Force – a familiar objection among responses submitted to previous directives - a far 
greater proportion of observers objected to British intervention in Kosovo when 
compared to previous cohorts writing about the Falklands and Gulf wars. This is 
explained primarily by a large group of observers writing in 1999 who characterised 
Allied Force specifically as an intervention into the ‘internal’ affairs of another state. 
They were keen to stress that neither Britain, its allies, nor neighbouring states had been 
attacked by the FRY. They did not object to the use of force on the grounds that it was 
destructive or violent, rather it was thought to be politically unjustifiable. The lack of an 
expansionary or irredentist threat to Britain foregrounded a response from one observer:  
 
While Slobodan Milosevic is an evil man, this was an internal conflict in what is legally all 
Yugoslavia... Also I don’t agree with British lives being lost for a cause which doesn’t threaten this 
country at all. NATO was supposed to be a defensive force, and now our airmen are involved 
without Britain knowing how long the conflict will last and if air power fails, as looks likely, our 
troops will be involved.
498 
 
Ultimately Allied Force cost no British personnel their lives.499 Yet observers writing 
before the defeat of the FRY could not know how long it would last, or whether ground 
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forces would be deployed. The possibility of British fatalities drew attention to the 
legitimacy of the conflict but also revealed more about how observers identified Britain 
within it. They were willing to countenance the sacrifice of British soldiers only if a 
legitimate narrative of defence could be established.  
 Indeed, other observers represented Allied Force as a NATO operation that 
contravened its own charter: 
 
The dangerous and ill-considered bombing by NATO has been a disaster. In the first place, NATO is 
by constitution a defensive organisation of nineteen countries, not one of which has been attacked by 
Serbia. Because the USA and UK knew full well that the United Nations would not sanction such 
attacks on a sovereign country, it was decided that NATO would break its own constitution and 
launch attacks. The excuse used was that ‘humanitarian concerns’ over-rode other factors. The 
hypocrisy involved is startling, when one thinks of many other similar conflicts in other parts of the 
world have been ignored.
500  
 
I was under the impression that NATO was formed to protect us and I’m all for that but no other 
country was threatened, it was a conflict (and still is) between Serbia and Albanians (sic). Greece, 
Italy and ourselves were not threatened (I think what I’m trying to say is that I thought NATO was a 
defence force?).
501  
 
Again, observers were not critical of NATO, its military structures or Britain’s 
contribution to it. They were instead critical of the specific operation undertaken in 1999. 
Allusions to NATO’s constitution as a ‘defensive’ organisation seemed to not only 
undermine the logic behind a NATO-led military intervention outside of the borders of its 
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member states, but also defined Britain’s place in the world by its involvement in 
organisations and institutions that were based on collective defence against an external 
threat.  
 Other observers focused on the principle of national sovereignty as a marker for 
the conflict’s legitimacy. For one, humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was characterised 
as a knee-jerk and emotional reaction, fuelled by the cultural and technological context of 
the period: 
 
I find it incomprehensible that so called intelligent, educated people should intervene in another 
sovereign nation’s policies. Before the advent of instant communications, especially the television, 
no British Prime Minister would have done such a thing. I do not watch television but I see carefully 
posed pictures in the daily paper we take – the Telegraph – deliberately designed to tug at ignorant 
peoples’ heart strings.502   
 
The absence of a legitimising argument for intervention against the FRY was clarified by 
comparison with a previous case by another:  
 
The Falklands conflict was a different matter because it was British territory that the services were 
defending. I know that this is Europe but it’s really a civil war between the different peoples of 
Yugoslavia.
503 
 
The Falklands War was recalled as an instance of legitimate defence of British territory; 
an interpretation that became increasingly prevalent among observers’ responses to later 
conflicts considered in this research. Despite the current campaign lacking justification or 
legitimacy, this observer was able to refer to historical instances in which Britain’s 
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identity as a force for good was assured. Contested legitimacy in the present could be 
articulated within a broader narrative of British national or military identity which was 
thought to be more secure and rooted in a belief in Britain’s history as a force for good. 
This is a striking feature of responses to later directives as observers became collectively 
more critical of British military campaigns, particularly that in Iraq from 2003. 
 
Importantly however, unlike those above, some observers were unsure about whether 
Allied Force was a justified use of military force or not. As in responses concerned with 
the previous Gulf War, a significant number of observers – eleven of the forty-eight 
considered here - did not offer a definitive conclusion on the intervention’s legitimacy. 
Further, like those responses written in 1990/1991, this was not because observers were 
unaware of or failed to comprehend the issues they were writing about. In fact, many 
were aware of the regional context in the Balkans and of Britain’s foreign policy. There 
was instead a pervasive sense among collected responses that the strife encountered in the 
Balkan region, including the crisis in Kosovo, was perennial and intractable. Their 
characterisations of the region contributed to confusion and torment over whether to 
intervene militarily. Observers wrote variously that “It [the Balkan region] has always 
been a volatile area of the world”,504 that “The Balkans has long been an unsettled area… 
and is currently an example of an unnatural alliance, the former Yugoslavia, falling 
apart”,505 and that “They [the Balkan peoples] fight because the men have always 
fought… All the Balkan countries settle their disputes with uncaring brutality, that’s how 
they are, always have been.”506 The narrative was detailed by another: 
 
Tribal friction from time immemorial was the start of all this trouble, it is easy to understand how 
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groups of people who have lived isolated together for centuries are being dominated by other groups 
they encounter. This region was especially subject to this as it is the boundary of Europe and Asia 
and has a mixture of many ethnic groups, Huns, Goths, Mongols, Vandals to name but a few, all 
settling in an area with natural barriers keeping them uneasily apart.
507 
 
Often observers were simply appalled at the level of brutality seen in Kosovo and the 
Balkan region more broadly, and described being unable to rationalise or make sense of 
it. This violence was particularly shocking given it was taking place in Europe and so 
close to ‘civilised’ Britain: 
 
We are only a few hundred miles from the former Yugoslavia yet it seems centuries ahead in 
civilisation. Still raping and pillaging as in days of yore. One band of peoples displacing another 
when they are near neighbours.
508  
 
This war in Kosovo is to me a most unbelievable thing in this day and age. For civilized people to 
rape and murder on such a scale in this day and age is unbelievable to me. Religion is just an excuse 
in my opinion and there is no excuse for murdering innocent people at all.
509  
 
It’s almost unbelievable that these appalling things are happening so close to us and so close to the 
21st century. I can’t make sense of all the hatred and brutality shown to the people of Kosovo.510 
 
Of course, this portrayal of the Balkan region and the various ethnic groups inhabiting it 
was not created during the 1990s. The eruption of violent conflict after the break-up of 
the Yugoslav state did however act as a catalyst for the articulation of these familiar 
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tropes.511 Amid the unsettling confusion of Britain’s entry into the Balkan wars, observers 
turned to stereotypical descriptions of innate conflict and savagery which seemed to 
explain the contemporary violence. The possibility of military intervention leant greater 
urgency to their assessments, even among those who were unsure about whether it was 
right or wrong, resulting frequently in the construction of a stereotyped Balkan Other.512 
At the heart of this process of interpretation was an underlying narrative in which Britain 
was considered safe, humane and civilised by comparison with the uncontrolled, barbaric 
violence of ‘the Balkans’.  
 For these observers the perennial and brutal violence occurring in Kosovo 
undermined the possibility of British intervention; the region was inscrutable and its 
problems unsolvable. Indeed, for one observer, the nature of both Balkan society and the 
violence witnessed in the FRY made it impossible to decide on the legitimacy of Allied 
Force: 
 
What will happen when the ‘foreign’ troops now overseeing the ‘peace’ are eventually withdrawn? 
How does one take a ‘Balkan’ situation and resolve the ethnic and religious mixes which had been 
problematic for centuries? If these military interventions stop the fighting will they have produced 
more complications than they solve? Borders are never clear cut, people of the various cultures live 
‘cross border’ and can feel isolated.513  
 
Other observers wrote about having “very mixed feelings about the whole thing”514 and 
that “whatever we do it seems we can’t win.”515 One described further: 
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Not that I am taking sides in this dispute, I do not know enough to comment on who had right on 
their side. I merely feel that it is so sad that a country which seemed stable for so long could erupt in 
civil war so easily… As for the intervention of the United Nations (sic), USA and Britain etc. I am 
not sure whether the situation is not worsened by their presence, if only by prolonging the conflict… 
I’m afraid the whole business is extremely depressing.516 
 
For these observers, intervention in Kosovo was complex and, importantly, was not 
framed by persistent reference to Britain’s Second World War. These observers were both 
unsure of whether it was right for Britain to become involved in the war in the first place 
and, for those writing after Allied Force, whether it had achieved anything of worth. It 
was thus difficult to describe the conflict as either conforming to a particular narrative of 
British identity, be it rooted in the legitimacy of principled, defensive military action, or 
as incongruent with it. Yet merely the possibility of military force and the eruption of a 
crisis in which Britain might be involved elicited a characterisation of a Balkan Other and 
engendered a process of othering in which much broader, abstract ideas of civilisation and 
modernity could be ascribed by putative contrast.517 
Observers were not of course, apathetic. Failure to arrive at a narrative of 
legitimacy could often appear to be torturous for those trying to make sense of the 
conflict: 
 
I know that in the end many people will die in this conflict, and I also know that bullies need to be 
dealt with, but it is as if we have learnt nothing over the past hundreds of years, if the only way we 
can try to bring about some sort of resolution to this crisis is by war. I have no alternative ideas 
however, and just hope that this tragedy is over soon and the people can live together again.
518  
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It is hard to know what is happening in Kosovo. How can one man (Milosevic) be the cause of so 
much suffering inflicted on the Kosovo Albanians. I got a similar feeling of helplessness that I had, 
and have with Rwanda. Human nature seems to go berserk. Having said that, I have no answer. On 
principle I am against war and killing and uneasy with arguments for ‘just war.519 
 
Like all observers, these individuals understood the legitimacy of the Kosovo intervention 
by, I suggest, attempting to establish a coherent narrative of Britain’s identity within it. 
This difficulty in arriving at a conclusion on its legitimacy was rarely a feature of 
responses to the previous Falklands directive which had more frequently been directly 
incorporated within a narrative of British identity as a bulwark against aggressive 
expansion. Observers who were equivocal about British intervention in Kosovo were so 
not only because of the apparently complex and unclear nature of the politics underlying 
the Balkan conflicts, but also because humanitarian intervention represented a challenge 
to an underlying belief in the legitimacy of defence, and Britain’s identity as a nation that 
acted only in defence against aggression.  
 In fact, strikingly, references to previous conflicts - most notably the Second 
World War - are conspicuous by their absence within these latter responses. Unlike those 
who fully supported or rejected the legitimacy of Allied Force, observers here did not 
widely draw on popular memories of Britain’s experience of past wars, and thus did not 
suggest that the Kosovo intervention could be considered in light of any specifically 
British experiences in past crises or conflicts. Popular memories helped observers to 
clarify contemporary events through similarity, association or contrast. In cases where 
they were not thought relevant, and remained unarticulated, ambiguity and indecision 
resulted from a failure to narrate the current operation clearly within a broader, British 
history. 
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Ultimately however, the majority of observers who wrote about the Kosovo conflict were 
quite certain about its legitimacy or lack thereof. Within that majority, British 
involvement in Allied Force was supported by fewer observers when compared to the 
larger number who believed that it was an unjustified use of British force. As with all 
cases I consider in this research, very few observers objected to the use of British force 
out of hand, or because military force itself was too destructive to countenance. Instead, 
the possibility of a humanitarian intervention within a sovereign state - lacking pre-
existing invasion across national boundaries on the part of the FRY regime - was difficult 
for many to reconcile with a pervasive belief that Britain should only use force when a 
legitimate, aggressive threat could be established. While for some the possibility of ethnic 
cleansing and genocide represented such a threat, for most neither Britain, NATO allies, 
nor any other states in the region had been affected directly consequently rendering any 
military campaign intrusive and unjustified.  
 Though they were not, by comparison, as supportive as previous cohorts of 
observers had been when writing about the Falklands and Gulf wars, those who wrote 
about the Kosovo intervention did invoke popular memories related to the Second World 
War, albeit focused on aspects that were thought to retain the most explanatory power 
over the present. Invocation of the Holocaust was a salient feature for observers seeking 
to make sense of ‘ethnic cleansing’ and genocide. For some, direct association between 
the past and present further reinforced a belief in the legitimacy of intervening to stop the 
violence. Observers much less frequently connected contemporary circumstance to 
popular memories of Britain’s entry into the Second World War, or an interpretation of 
Britain’s legitimate resistance to German territorial expansion. For most moral lessons 
about intervening against an aggressive, irredentist regime did not retain much 
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explanatory power over the present and, as a result, this guide to action which had helped 
assure the legitimacy of the Falklands and Gulf wars was largely absent within responses 
written in 1999. The importance of the period immediately preceding Britain’s 
declaration of war in 1939 as a specific object of popular memory520 is attested when 
considering the manner in which observers understood contemporary conflict when it was 
not widely invoked. It is not a coincidence that a much more critical attitude to using 
military force in Kosovo occurred without direct comparison to Britain’s response to 
German expansion and its entry into World War Two. 
Yet observers were engaged in a reconstruction of specific narratives of British 
identity. The focus on ethnic cleansing and genocide engendered a re-invocation of the 
Holocaust which was, as Levy and Sznaider have argued in a broader, transnational 
cultural context, revealed as a ‘touchstone’ for evil.521 Thus observers did not necessarily 
have to fully support Allied Force, or suggest that it was similar in nature to British entry 
into World War Two, in order to recreate a broader narrative of British identity which 
was based, fundamentally, on the morality of resisting the horror and brutality of 
Nazism.522 As observers sought to make sense of the violence occurring in the Balkans 
they engaged in not only a construction of British identity through a process of othering 
of Balkan peoples and violence, but also in a reconstruction of a broader narrative of 
ethnic and genocidal violence outside of which Britain could be identified, even if they 
thought it did not demand a military response in the present. Memories of the Holocaust, 
Nazi brutality and the evil of Adolf Hitler were all crucial aspects which observers drew 
on not only to help explain the present, but to create a much broader, temporal sense of 
national self, viewed by observers through a specifically moral lens. As I suggest within 
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the latter chapters of this research, a secure and moral narrative of British identity could 
be reinforced as part of an articulation of contrast between past and present, or by way of 
explaining contemporary events without endorsing the policies of the British state. 
 
The Military, Bombing and Peacekeeping 
 
British forces entered Kosovo as part of NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and did not face 
heavy combat (having been deployed after the withdrawal of FRY military forces). 
Observers did not often write about this phase of deployment or about any possible spill 
over into a larger conflict. They had been concerned instead with Allied Force and 
Britain’s contribution to the air campaign as the primary instrument through which the 
Milosevic regime had been compelled to concede.523  
 Yet some observers were concerned that the war in Kosovo may lead to a larger 
conflict, though such anxieties were confined largely to the Balkan region and did not 
involve any expectation of escalation involving the use of chemical, biological or nuclear 
weapons. One observer considered the prospects of a spill over into neighbouring 
countries:  
 
I’m very worried about how it will end. If it will end. It would be so easy for the conflict to spread 
outwards and involve other countries. Albania and Macedonia are already being destabilised and it 
wouldn’t take much for others to be drawn in too. I wish I had a solution but I don’t, but I know war 
never really solves anything and the whole thing fills me with distaste.
524 
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Another observer offered a similar account. After writing that “I remember feeling scared 
at first that it would escalate into a wider conflict – there was talk of WW3 of course” she 
went on to write: 
 
Having said that, it seems there is no alternative. Milosevic is carrying out the most hideous 
atrocities within Kosovo and has to be stopped. There are parallels with Nazi Germany, although it 
is a simplistic to draw comparisons, and the evil has to be countered.
525 
 
Unlike the previous conflict against Iraq in 1990/1991, observers did not conceive of a 
conflict of extraordinary scale or heightened risk for the region or the world. Though they 
were naturally concerned about the possibility of destruction and violence, they were 
more concerned about establishing the conflict’s legitimacy rather than whether it may 
spiral out of control. As I suggested in the previous chapter, the conclusion of the Gulf 
War had, at least partially, expunged fears of global cataclysm resulting from the use of 
military force for the observers writing about it. The response quoted immediately above 
is representative of, I suggest, observers’ focus on the legitimacy of the intervention in 
Kosovo which, in turn, determined which popular memories of the past were thought to 
be relevant. The circumstances of military conflict in the post-Cold War era sustained a 
broader fixation on the Second World War as a focal point for constructions of British 
identity.526   
 Most observers focused specifically on the NATO bombing campaign. Those who 
wrote about it mostly believed the use of aerial bombardment to be needlessly destructive, 
prone to destroy lives and livelihoods, and indiscriminate enough to undermine the 
‘humanitarian’ objective of the campaign itself: 
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I find it distressing to be sitting in the sun and leading a civilised life while British bombs are raining 
down on innocent people. Civilians must be killed in such raids and more innocent than guilty 
people hurt. The bombing was started, so we are told to stop just this situation coming about.
527  
 
We can’t sit back and let all this happen, but the NATO air raids don’t seem to have achieved a great 
deal. The campaign of ethnic cleansing was intensified, and recent mistaken bombings of civilian 
targets and the Chinese Embassy have handed propaganda victories to President Milosevic and have 
caused tension worldwide. I’m disillusioned with the progress of the bombing, at the loss of life 
which continues among innocent Serbs as well as the Albanians in Kosovo, and at the lack of any 
realistic alternative to what’s happening now. I don’t have any answers but I wish someone did.528 
 
What good have these tactics had? The exodus of thousands of people, Albanians, fleeing to other 
countries, putting a strain on these countries, all of the buildings flattened and now the Serbs are 
leaving.
529  
 
Bombing seemed for most who wrote about it, to be a blunt instrument that unjustifiably 
affected the lives of civilians living in the FRY, and in fact contributed to escalating 
violence rather than curtailing it. Like those who were critical of coalition bombing in 
Iraq and Kuwait, another observer felt compelled to undermine any sense that the modern 
weapons used by British and NATO forces meant that aerial bombardment would be 
more humane or precise: 
 
So, the bombs have fallen, damage has been done, troops have been killed and civilians have been 
killed. Why do reporters speak of civilian casualties as if with surprise? How can one bomb areas 
which contain or are near to civilian residents or passers-by without hurting anyone? That’s not to 
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mention the off target bombs, of which there will be some no matter all the sophisticated 
gadgetry.
530  
 
Observers did not write about the heroic efforts of air force pilots or the sorties 
undertaken by the RAF. They wrote about bombing in broad terms, without linking it to 
the individual members of the armed forces who were carrying it out. This is in stark 
contrast to observers’ discussions of frontline soldiers in which individual soldiers 
became the focus of observers’ respect and, increasingly from the early 2000s, sympathy. 
The ethical dilemmas associated with bombing meant the tactic was not a source of pride, 
and did not reflect well on Britain or its armed forces, unlike the heroism associated with 
fighter combat, dogfighting or ‘daring’ raids.531 It was thought to be needlessly 
destructive and impersonal; the high technology of Britain’s air forces was not understood 
as a point of pride during Allied Force.532 
In addition to ethical concerns some observers worried that bombing would also 
be militarily or politically ineffective. Frequently they suggested that bombardment 
would force Serbians to close ranks and galvanise support for Milosevic: 
 
Since the bombing attacks began – and predictably – the Serbians have been drawn together as never 
before; there is now no longer any opposition to the policies of Milosevic, and ethnic cleansing has 
increased. One opponent of Milosevic was quoted last week as saying that the bombing has 
completely destroyed the existing opposition movement.
533  
 
The Serbs we know have rallied behind Milosevic and why? Because they are very angry, quite 
rightly, at NATO destroying their livelihood, for what purpose, after four weeks it has achieved 
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nothing concrete so far, all it has done is destroy concrete, and kill a number of Serb and Albanian 
civilians. Yes if we flattened Belgrade and destroyed all their power stations and field supplies we 
might achieve our objective but by then all Albanians will have been expelled from Kosovo and 
there’ll be very little left of their property and businesses to return to… What I don’t think he 
[Milosevic] bargained for was NATO bombing Serbia, mainly Belgrade. He must have thought the 
West knows it didn’t bring Britain in 1940, Germany in 1944, nor Iraq in 1992 (sic), to their knees, 
and it certainly didn’t mean the end of Churchill, Hitler or Saddam Hussein.534  
 
Bombing was once again considered to be an unethical and ineffective tactic. For this 
latter observer, the campaign against Milosevic’s regime formed part of a broader 
historical narrative in which Britain had both suffered and taken part in bombing 
campaigns, all with the same result; the reinforcement of popular resistance and 
opposition. Such ideas are a prominent feature of British popular memory of the Blitz.535 
Indeed, in other responses, invocation of the past was again crucial in framing what 
observers imagined bombing in Kosovo and Serbia to be like, and what its likely outcome 
would be: 
 
The Second World War blitz and the bombing of Dresden only served to unite the people and make 
them more determined to resist the enemy. All the bombing and napalming of Vietnam did nothing 
to bring the war to an end; neither did the attacks on Baghdad during the Gulf war achieve what was 
hoped. It should have been obvious to NATO that strategic bombing was going to unite the Serbs, 
not divide them, so that even Serbs who six months ago were protesting on the streets against 
Slobodan Milosevic supported him once their country was under attack.
536  
 
I had not realised the plight of the Albanians in Kosovo until I read that NATO was to commence 
bombing Serbia. I have never believed that bombing solved anything. During World War II we 
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stood by our leaders, however we felt about them; not against them when Hitler bombed us. I am 
sure that Serbians who were not too keen on their leader did stand firm behind him once they were 
up against another enemy. However, I do believe that NATO could not ignore the plight of the 
Kosovo Albanians and had to take some action when talking failed.
537 
 
Observers remained critical of bombing across the period from 1982 to 2014, yet it is 
important to note here that observers generally did not have first-hand experience of 
bombing (increasingly so as those who were alive during the Blitz in Britain dwindled in 
number), and certainly did not have experience of the bombing that took place in the 
previous Gulf War or the Kosovo intervention. They were engaged in imagining what it 
was like and they did this both through what they read and saw in media reports, but also 
in large part by invoking specifically popular memories of aerial bombardment. Personal 
experience of bombing or its after effects was not referred to. Instead observers engaged 
in discussing bombing as a national experience, one in which ideas of unity and resilience 
were crucial, and were often able to reconstruct a narrative of British identity that existed 
apart from its contemporary experience in conflict, contrasting the present policy of the 
British state. Observers were often deeply uncomfortable with what they saw as NATO 
forces assuming a role once filled by the Luftwaffe or even bomber command.538  
 None of this is to suggest that observers were anti-war or objected to the use of 
force per se in Kosovo. In fact, observers frequently suggested that the ineffectiveness of 
an air campaign alone would at some point, inevitably lead to a ground invasion. One 
observer wrote during Allied Force that, “Much informed opinion has been aired on this 
catastrophe and it seems now that the air offensive will not be enough and that ground 
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troops will have to go in.” 539 Another suggested that an intervention in Kosovo could 
only be justified if it was prosecuted fully by a ground force: 
  
I have very mixed feelings about the whole thing. Obviously something had to be done to stop the 
ethnic cleansing and I believe NATO should have stepped in earlier to prevent the slaughter of so 
many people but such intensive bombing seems to be killing too many innocent civilians, including 
those we are trying to help and it seems to me that a ground force is the only real answer in 
preventing more atrocities and keeping any sort of peace.
540  
 
Other observers wrote similarly that “ground troops must be used”,541 that “action of 
some sort on land is obviously required”542 and that “they [NATO forces] might have 
progressed further if they had sent in ground troops as well.”543 These observers were not 
squeamish about deploying soldiers to Kosovo, and they considered at length the 
legitimacy of the various options available to Britain and its allies. Indeed, such responses 
suggest that observers were concerned primarily about the legitimacy of the mission, 
rather than how many British lives might be lost. They offer support for more recent 
public opinion and polling analyses that have suggested that the goals and outcomes of 
intervention figure what level of casualties are considered acceptable.544 How observers 
may have reacted to an actual deployment of British ground forces against the FRY’s 
military in 1999 is of course, not possible to know. 
 Further, it is clear that observers’ responses reveal deeper assumptions about 
preferences for ground combat as a more legitimate mode of waging war. Indeed, as in all 
cases I consider, observers were largely supportive of the British army. Among the few 
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responses in which they were discussed, the later deployment of British ground troops as 
part of the Kosovo Force revealed embedded ideas of humanity and professionalism, and 
the legitimacy of military service as a vocation. One observer described the good work 
being done by soldiers serving in Kosovo: 
 
The troops on the ground have done a wonderful job right from when they provided many of the 
refugees with tents and a supply of fairly good water, which probably saved the catastrophe of 
epidemics.
545 
 
Observers did not repeat the ideas of triumph or military victory that underscored many 
responses to the Falklands directive. Deployed after FRY forces withdrew, observers 
praised the peacekeeping and humanitarian work undertaken by soldiers on the frontline: 
 
I think it is good that Britain is taking on a heightened world role. The involvement in Kosovo and 
East Timor, albeit on a far smaller scale, can only be good for the forces. Our army is increasingly 
geared towards this type of work, gone are the days of massed tank regiments, ready to fight out the 
cold war on the flat central European plains. The professionalism of the forces in these conflicts is 
impressive and can only serve to heighten British credibility in the post-cold war world.
546 
 
For another, the ability of Britain’s soldiers was contrasted putatively with Russian and 
American forces: 
 
General Jackson in Kosovo seems a very able man. It must be very difficult commanding so mixed a 
bunch of soldiers from NATO countries, especially having to deal with Russian soldiers whose 
leaders, to put it mildly, suffer hurt feelings, and obey politicians forever restricting his movements. 
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Frankly I don’t think the Americans could deal with all that. They seem either gung-ho or looking 
over their shoulders to home opinion.
547 
 
The respect and reverence for British soldiers is a well-attested, underlying aspect of 
observers’ responses throughout the period from 1982 to 2014. In 1999, some observers 
again felt able to describe British forces as a positive embodiment of Britain’s role in the 
crisis, helping to restore stability in the region, and comparing favourably to the armed 
forces of other nations. Reference to ‘gung-ho’ American personnel spoke to broader 
dynamic in which a sense of British competence and moderation was inculcated by 
contrast to the perceived belligerence of allied soldiers. 
Yet it is clear that Allied Force was largely conceived of as an ethically 
ambiguous air campaign, without the use of frontline ground forces. Discussion of British 
soldiers emerged in a number of observers’ responses, but they did not discuss combat or 
military heroism in the absence of widespread ground combat. The professionalism and 
humanity showed by Britain’s soldiers embodied its identity after the conflict as a 
competent and compassionate peacekeeping force, but was also distinguished by the 
much more personal tone adopted by observers when compared to earlier, and more 
frequent discussions of the air campaign. They were more willing to attribute the 
successes of British peacekeeping and occupation to Britain’s service personnel than they 
were to suggest that the destruction of the bombing campaign had been the result of the 
Royal Air Force’s pilots.  
Observers were evidently concerned specifically by the tactics adopted in Allied 
Force, and were more sceptical about bombing when compared to ground combat. Yet the 
fact remains that NATO’s bombing campaign did compel the Milosevic regime to 
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withdraw from Kosovo and thus achieved its primary objective.548 Why then was it so 
unpopular for observers? Why did observers seemingly prefer to deploy ground forces 
when this would almost certainly have cost more British lives? Some perhaps believed 
that a ground war might spare more civilians and thus conform in principle to the 
humanitarian objective of the operation. Yet it is not clear that this would have been the 
case and in fact, few observers argued this point in writing. Instead, as with most aspects 
of the conflict, observers imagined the combat and its consequences by invoking popular 
memories of the past that provided an explanatory power over the present, despite 
differences in circumstance and context. Certainly, the sort of precision bombing 
undertaken in 1999 – though destructive – was unlike the massive and indiscriminate 
targeting of civilian population centres that took place in the 1940s, yet what observers 
wrote about the likely outcomes or desirability of Allied Force was informed by a 
reconstruction of bombing in World War Two and, in particular, a specific narrative of 
British suffering and resilience during the Blitz. Observers were uncomfortable with 
Allied Force not only because it seemed to affect ordinary civilians in the FRY and 
Kosovo, but also because it seemed to be a deviation from what they considered to be 
Britain’s celebrated experience during World War Two as a nation that, in Mark 
Connelly’s words, “stood alone and took it on the chin.”549 It was uncomfortable for 
observers who subscribed to, and were willing to reconstruct, Britain’s Blitz ‘myth’ to see 
the Royal Air Force engaged in a bombing campaign, further attesting to the 
uncomfortable and problematic place of strategic bombing within popular memory of 
Britain’s Second World War. Observers rarely identified Britain as a nation which 
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engaged in bombing, despite the fact that Britain’s campaign of strategic bombing in the 
1940s far exceeded the destruction wrought by the Luftwaffe during the Blitz.550   
 Thus, the events that took place as part of Allied Force also represented an 
opportunity to refer to a more comfortable and morally assured version of British 
involvement in war and contribute to a “common sense of the past”551 that existed apart 
from current events and was reconstructed on the basis of a putative contrast with the 
present. Driven by contemporary circumstance, observers were able to re-invoke a 
narrative of determined and stoic resistance during the Blitz that prefigured involvement 
in the Kosovo War, and made it possible to represent contemporary circumstance as a 
deviation from, rather than a result of, Britain’s historical identity and its legitimate 
involvement in past wars. Interpretations of the present conflict prompted many observers 
to engage in a comprehensive discussion of Britain’s identity that was not limited to the 
contemporary campaign, but involved the refashioning of a more broader history. 
  
Leaders, Leadership and Tony Blair 
 
Leadership was an important aspect of what observers wrote about Britain’s part in Allied 
Force. Most frequently this centred on the figure of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair. 
During the initial intervention against the FRY, similarly to responses written during the 
1982 Falklands War, some observers described a crisis that was at least partially 
attributable to British or NATO failures: 
 
Surely it was not beyond the intelligence of the NATO high command that, given Mr Milosevic’s 
track record, the reactions we have seen i.e. more action against the Albanian Kosovans leading to 
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the massive refugee crisis, should have been expected. We have now got two major problems 1) 
what to do about the refugees and 2) how to continue with the offensive against Serbia… While not 
professing to have any answers I think that Western politicians got themselves into a corner with 
their constant threats and deadlines and extension of deadlines so that eventually some armed 
intervention was inevitable.
552  
 
Another suggested that Britain’s leaders were naïve to react to the crisis with such haste: 
 
I don’t think any of the politicians really though this through before they started the bombing. 
Haven’t they learnt anything from the past history of Europe in the twentieth century?553 
 
Some observers believed that failure on the part of the British government to identify and 
correctly diagnose the situation had made it more difficult to pursue other options. Yet 
this was not a salient feature of most responses. Most observers writing in 1999 did not 
go into detail about whether Britain’s intervention was the result of a signal failure. 
Indeed, Britain could not be thought of as having invited aggression as some had 
suggested in 1982.  
 In fact, of the observers who discussed contemporary political leadership, most 
were focused solely on the office of the Prime Minister. While they were evidently aware 
of the New Labour government’s commitment to ethical and humanitarian foreign policy, 
of which intervention in Kosovo was a test,554 there was no single interpretation or 
assessment of Tony Blair’s role in the conflict. Some were deeply critical of what they 
saw as Blair’s haughty and strident manoeuvring, while others were more sympathetic 
praising his navigation of a difficult situation and his willingness to confront the abuses 
occurring in Kosovo. For one observer the Prime Minister embodied a new, ethical 
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approach to foreign policy, and represented the most positive aspects of a British 
humanitarian military intervention: 
 
I think Blair has done a wonderful job, and had a great influence on the conflict. I feel we are again a 
nation to be looked up to, for all we have done and our taking of many hundreds of refugees into our 
keeping. May this stupid, senseless war soon come to an end.
555 
 
Some observers also refracted a sense of intractability or difficulty through their praise 
for the Blair’s leadership. He appeared to represent the awkward position in which Britain 
found itself over the Kosovo crisis, but remained composed and principled under 
pressure: 
 
As to the practicalities of the situations, I have to say that I am grateful not to have to take the 
decisions as our prime minister has had to do. I suspect, given the background – or continuing 
threats to act militarily if no agreement was reached – he had no option but to do as he has done.556  
 
For another, the use of military force against the FRY represented a mistake within an 
otherwise positive record in government: 
 
I greatly admired Tony Blair over his efforts with Northern Ireland and really felt for him when it all 
fell to pieces. I deeply disagreed with him over Kosovo, but had to admire the way he stood up for 
what he thought was the right thing to do against a number of other NATO leaders. I did not like the 
way he ‘bestrode the world like a Colossus’ both during the war and recently in Pristina, but perhaps 
it was only human!
557 
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These observers were commenting not only on what they thought of Tony Blair, but how 
his actions and behaviours related to Britain’s policies towards Kosovo, and its identity 
within the conflict. The close association between Tony Blair’s government and 
humanitarian ideals was not questioned here, even if its outcomes were not fully 
supported. Blair was represented sometimes as naïve or self-aggrandising but mostly as a 
principled and determined figure. While it was hard to establish whether the intervention 
had been right or wrong, there was no suggestion that there existed any ulterior motives. 
Britain, under the leadership of the Blair government, had become involved in a conflict 
out of a genuine humanitarian impulse, though many remained uncertain about whether 
the use of force was actually justified.  
 Other observers were more critical. One questioned Blair’s handling of an 
apparently difficult conundrum: 
 
Clinton does not want the American public watching pictures of body bags or smouldering 
American aircraft on their television news. Nor, I’m quite sure does Tony Blair who would be 
blamed for our part in this mess. How did the generals convince Clinton and Blair and other west 
European leaders that this time bombing cities would have the desired effect? Perhaps they didn’t, 
perhaps Clinton and Blair think we have to teach Milosevic a lesson, he can’t be allowed to get way 
with what he hand his army and police are doing? But what is the lesson? Why did they believe that 
this time it would cause a tyrant to give up? I was baffled from day one of the bombing and I am 
more baffled today.
558  
 
Evidently, the nature of the conflict in Kosovo impacted observers’ accounts of Prime 
Ministerial leadership. In this response the use of air power as a primary mode of military 
action was considered to be the product of Blair’s weakness and desire to avoid ‘blame’ 
for deeper involvement in the war.   
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 Other observers placed blame for an illegitimate military intervention squarely at 
the feet of the Prime Minister. Blair’s desire for public recognition as a ‘war leader’ and 
his heavy handed method of operation in regard to government and parliament suggested 
that intervention in Kosovo was not predicated on principle alone: 
 
I don’t feel impressed by the sight of President Clinton and Tony Blair posing as great war 
leaders… I think the war was instigated by President Clinton, backed by ‘bomber’ Blair for their 
own glorification, and I am sad that our Tory party feel they must support it.
559  
 
In the UK, all of this has been carried on without the sanction of parliament. A debate was held, 
but when those MPs opposed to the bombing campaign tried to force a vote, subterfuge was used 
to deny that opportunity. So much for democracy. In the last few days it has become clearer and 
clearer that those expressing opposition are to be subjected to extreme vilification – the 
government must not be criticised.
560  
 
There was evidently, a party political undercurrent to what observers wrote about political 
leaders. Like responses written about the previous Falklands War, those who were not 
politically aligned with the current Prime Minister were often less willing to credit them 
with success, and more willing to emphasise flaws in leadership ability or personal 
character. Yet, what observers wrote here was again important in reflecting what they 
thought about Britain more broadly. Most observers who wrote about intervention in 
Kosovo either objected to it, or were unsure about its justification or legitimacy. In 
describing Britain’s contribution to Allied Force as the result of a failure of leadership by 
the Blair government, or as a product of his character, observers were able both to signal 
their disapproval of the contemporary use of force without suggesting that the 
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intervention represented a fundamental challenge to Britain’s broader identity as a force 
for good. 
It is important to note however that fewer observers were as concerned with 
writing about Blair’s leadership during the Kosovo War as the previous cohort writing 
about the Falklands had been with the leadership of Margaret Thatcher, or subsequent 
cohorts would be when writing about Blair’s role in the Iraq War. This was, I suggest, a 
reflection of the more ambiguous and reserved nature of observers’ responses. Fewer 
observers were sure about the legitimacy of intervening military as part of Allied Force 
by comparison. Thus fewer observers were willing to blame or credit the Blair 
government either way. Perceptions of legitimacy certainly impacted on what observers 
wrote about other aspects of British involvement in the conflict, including contemporary 
leaders and leadership. 
 Yet, what observers did write about the Prime Minister in 1999 affected, and was 
affected by, how observers conceived of Britain’s identity in the conflict. For some Blair 
was characterised as an honest and principled leader, whose intervention in Kosovo was 
well-meaning, if misguided. This narrative reflects an important aspect of observers’ 
wider beliefs about Britain’s part in the conflict, namely that they thought it to be a 
principled act but not necessarily one that was appropriate or justified. Likewise, those 
who were more critical of British involvement were able to suggest that it resulted from 
governmental failure, contributing to, I argue, a broader representation in which 
contemporary circumstance was incongruent with a more secure and celebrated narrative 
of British identity, rooted in legitimate defence against aggression. For those few 
observers who were willing to blame the Kosovo intervention on Blair’s incompetence or 
desire for ‘glorification’, the current war could more easily be constructed as a sort of 
deviation from an underlying or historically evident national character. This is a feature of 
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observers’ responses that can be seen among those written in 1999 but which becomes a 
distinctive feature of those concerning later conflicts, particularly the Iraq War.  
  
The UN, USA and the Kosovo Liberation Army 
 
Observers were also concerned about the implications that military intervention against 
the FRY might have on the status of the United Nations as a forum for the peaceful 
resolution of dispute. For one, an unwarranted intervention in another state’s affairs was 
considered at odds with the principles of the UN: 
 
Such action [against the FRY] is against international law and is without the authority of the 
Security Council. However Tony Blair and Bill Clinton wish to show the World that they are great 
war leaders.
561 
 
Other observers were more concerned by the apparent ineffectiveness of the UN revealed 
by the outbreak of another war. They wrote variously that “I strongly believe that the 
United Nations should have taken a firm line with Milosevic long ago”562 and that “It is a 
great pity that the UN could not have been active in seeking a solution at a much earlier 
stage.”563 For another, the rigidity of states’ rights to sovereignty was the primary 
obstacle: 
 
So far as international law is concerned, NATO’s actions are probably illegal as Yugoslavia is a 
sovereign state and according to the UN charter, is entitled to do what it likes within its own 
territory. I believe that when this bloody engagement has ended, a strong case could be made for an 
amendment to the UN charter which would permit action to be taken against sovereign states if it 
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could be clearly demonstrated that the government of those states was acting atrociously towards a 
significant section of their own population.
564 
 
Observers were concerned with how the Kosovo intervention might affect the United 
Nations and the possibility of multilateral security. As in both the Falklands and Gulf 
wars, observers frequently seemed disappointed that – regardless of what they thought 
about the legitimacy of the conflict – the United Nations had not been able to avert the 
use of military force or provide a diplomatic solution.  
However, it is important to note here that no observers rejected the legitimacy of 
Allied Force solely because it did not have the full backing of the UN or international 
law. Instead, they made sense of the legitimacy of the conflict before going on to discuss 
the inadequacies of international organisations. As with observers’ discussions of NATO, 
what they wrote about international institutions, and British membership of them, was 
informed by what thought about the circumstances of the current conflict and not the 
other way around. Such discussions revealed once again that observers were often keen to 
stress that Britain ought to be involved in multilateralism and international institutions, 
but that perceptions of identity – heavily rooted in interpretations of Britain’s past – more 
readily figured what they wrote about contemporary crises and conflicts. 
Allied Force was prosecuted by a NATO coalition yet, as in the previous Gulf War, 
most of the firepower was supplied by the United States.565 Many observers reflected on 
Britain’s position relative to its primary ally and, as in previous responses, most were 
critical of the apparent submission of British agency to American power and persuasion:  
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Why do people think America is the boss and when they say ‘jump’ every nation jumps. America 
should not be the global policeman. We need an international police force of all nations to monitor 
human rights violations.
566 
 
It seems NATO is led by America (when it suits them) and I feel they are far too hasty; bomb first, 
think about the consequences after. I was under the impression that the forming of NATO was to 
ensure there would not be any more war in Europe… what I don’t like most of all is the power 
America has over us.
567  
 
I believe we only entered this war because the British government was too insecure to say no to the 
USA when they wanted to get involved. American governments have always believed that you can 
bully people into surrender, although history proves otherwise.
568 
 
For some then, the Kosovo intervention, and the assembly of a NATO coalition, gave 
another opportunity for observers to express dissatisfaction with Britain’s relative junior 
status – a feature of previous responses to the Gulf Crisis directives, and an increasingly 
important part of subsequent responses concerning Afghanistan and Iraq – and to portray 
an American Other that was more belligerent, rash and warlike than Britain. A persistent 
feature of responses to all the post-Falklands directives; the preponderance of American 
power led observers to create a sense of British identity based on caution, tolerance and 
moderation that contrasted the overbearing belligerence which was attributed to the 
United States. 
 Others were also concerned with identifying groups within the FRY on whose 
behalf Britain was deploying military force, namely the Kosovo Liberation Army 
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(KLA).569 Interestingly, some drew heavily on memories of the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland and made comparisons between the KLA and the Irish Republican Army, 
embedding a suspicious attitude toward the possibility that Britain may be lending 
support to a ‘terrorist group’: 
 
Support for the KLA may have been misguided. This is an organisation which had it been operating 
in any Western country would have been called a terrorist group. How would we feel if the 
Americans, French and Italians started bombing British bases in N.Ireland in support of the IRA? I 
do not suggest that the two situations are directly comparable but we have been seen to support a 
terrorist organisation against the government of that country.
570  
 
Now that Yugoslavia has been bombed for not allowing Kosovo terrorists to break up the country it 
will be interesting to see if Spain is bombed for not granting ETA part of Spain, or Sri-Lanka for not 
giving in to the Tamil Tigers, or Algeria for not giving in to Muslim terrorists. At least the UK is 
safe having surrendered to the IRA, although we haven’t yet handed over Northern Ireland to the 
Irish republic. No doubt that will happen eventually.
571 
 
It was an internal affair; Kosovo wanted independence from Bosnia (sic) and had a terrorist army to 
bring that about. All over the world there have been similar conflicts, but we haven’t got involved. 
America has, without success. If only Tony Blair would get similarly tough with the IRA.
572  
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For some observers, connection between the IRA and the KLA complicated any sense of 
moral clarity in intervening in Kosovo. As described above, very few believed that 
military force was justified purely on humanitarian grounds. Concerns over the nature of 
the Kosovo Liberation Army suggest further that observers generally conceived of a more 
complicated complex situation and were worried about the consequences of using 
military force. The need to protect Kosovar Albanians was challenged by some observers 
when they focused on the perceived illegitimacy of the groups representing them.  
Observers conceived of a conflict in Kosovo that involved a range of actors to 
which they ascribed certain ideas of identity. While what they wrote was related to the 
specific context of the Kosovo War and perceptions of its legitimacy, this process of 
othering also helped observers to position Britain in the conflict and construct a sense of 
identity by contrast. In addition to allied nations, primarily the United States, observers 
were particularly concerned with identifying those who Allied Force was aimed at 
supporting. Critical descriptions of the KLA as a ‘terrorist group’ not only compounded a 
sense that the politics of the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, and thus the politics of the 
contemporary violence, were not clear cut, but also distanced Britain from terrorism, the 
targeting of civilians and separatism. What observers thought about the United Nations, 
the KLA or the United States was not figured solely by descriptions of its activities or an 
evaluation of its aims or structures. 
As in all conflicts I consider, the possibility of war pertained to a specific dynamic 
in which other participants and belligerents were described, and in which observers 
dwelled on the differences between them. The Kosovo intervention was an unusually 
limited deployment for the British military across this period, being much shorter and less 
costly in terms of casualties than other operations, yet it once again prompted a focus on 
Britain’s identity relative to those other groups that were caught in its violence. The result 
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was the reproduction of narrative of identity based on ideas of civilisation, caution, 
tolerance and moderation, and a more holistic and comprehensive construction of British 
identity. 
 
The Enemy: Slobodan Milosevic’s Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
 
In keeping with responses submitted to previous directives in 1982 and 1990, observers 
were collectively more concerned with identifying Britain’s opponent during the Kosovo 
War than its allies. Frequently the enemy was condensed largely to the figure of one man, 
Slobodan Milosevic, who came to embody the absolute immorality and illegitimacy of 
the FRY regime, and the inhumanity of its policies in Kosovo. Typical responses asked 
“How can one man be the cause of so much suffering inflicted on the Kosovo 
Albanians?”573 and whether “President Milosevic and those who have followed his orders 
ever be brought to justice?”574 For another, Milosevic’s manipulation of Serbian 
nationalism was a salient aspect of their wider perspective on the legitimacy of a military 
intervention 
 
They [those who did not support military intervention] seem to think that President Milosevic would 
have seen reason sooner or later and he could have been persuaded in a nice civilised meeting to lay 
off the Albanian Kosovans, when it is glaringly obvious that someone like that is not going to see 
reason and come to a cosy agreement, and besides, the Serbs had already walked out of the talks. As 
far as he is concerned, it is not about being fair and reasonable to the Albanians, but about the 
assertion of Serb strength and power and his own popularity with his people as the great leader of 
the Serb nation. Now that he has lost the war, of course, his image has collapsed, and he is not 
popular, but before that he was able to use Serb resentment of and prejudice against Albanian 
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Kosovans to gather support around himself as the national leader, as there is nothing like having an 
enemy for reinforcing a sense of collective identity.
575  
 
Again, in a similar fashion to some who had stressed the low cunning of Saddam Hussein 
during the Gulf crisis, observers who were more cautious or critical about intervening 
against the FRY regime stressed the difficulty of facing an enemy like Milosevic: 
  
Milosevic may not be an educated man but he is no fool, he excels at playing one person off against 
another and at breaking promises. He thought and I think the west had said they wouldn’t invade 
Kosovo with ground troops, because we would suffer so many causalities and would be very 
unlikely to defeat the Serb army which would fire down upon us from the wooded hills.
576  
 
Observers were never supportive or sympathetic. Milosevic’s regime was universally 
considered to be illegitimate, dictatorial and brutal by observers. However, some 
counselled caution or suggested that despite the abhorrent character of Milosevic’s 
government, intervention could not be justified. Britain was right to oppose Milosevic’s 
policies yet this did not necessarily form part of a clear overarching narrative on the 
legitimacy of British military action. 
 Further however, observers were engaged in identifying the Milosevic regime by 
constructing comparisons with Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, the latter – as in previous 
responses concerning Saddam Hussein in particular - revealed as a benchmark for 
brutality, tyranny, aggression and evil: 
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Watching the news today made my blood run cold and I felt that something really terrible is 
happening to the people of this region. It seems they have a madman, comparable to Hitler, in charge 
of their fate, and NATO are trying to bomb him into submission.
577  
 
Allusions to Hitler created a sense of persistent British resistance to dictatorship, and 
imbued Milosevic’s regime with an unambiguously immoral quality by association. 
Britain’s ‘good war’ in World War Two was again reconstructed as observers focused in 
on the ‘evil’ embodied by Hitler: 
 
What I find puzzling is that the Yugoslavian people are so incensed that we, their former allies, have 
turned against them. Milosevic must have done a very good propaganda job on them if that is what 
they believe. When were allies, fighting alongside each other it was to stop the evils of Nazism; to 
stop Hitler from butchering the Jews and anyone else who got in his way. How is that different from 
what Milosevic is doing today? He is ordering his forces to wipe out ethnic Albanians in the same 
way that Hitler murdered Jews.
578  
 
I have been moved to tears so many times over the last few weeks and cannot comprehend how 
Slobodan Milosevic can be doing the dreadful deeds that he is. Adolf Hitler died in his bunker 
during the 1939-45 war, but his spirit has been reborn in Slobodan Milosevic. He needs to be 
captured as soon as possible, along with his top military powers, tried in a war crimes court and 
sentenced to death.
579 
 
Observers referred to a well understood narrative of brutality and evil, conceptualising the 
nature of the Milosevic regime by association. As I have discussed previously in this 
chapter, often such responses focused specifically on the Holocaust as a benchmark; 
resistance to Milosevic could be narrated by referring to past British resistance to the 
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policies of the Nazis and Hitler. Such comparisons gave a specifically moral quality to 
their representations of Milosevic and his regime. They believed that not only were his 
policies wrong, that they were the product of a much more fundamental immorality or 
evil. 
Of course, contemporary conditions affected which popular memories were 
thought to be relevant or retain a power to explain the present. Once again, observers 
were confronting an opposing regime that wielded a conventional military apparatus, was 
not liberal or democratic, and was thought to be dominated by a powerful individual. As 
in both the previous Falklands and Gulf wars, observers drew on memories of Nazi 
dictatorship, most often reduced to the personification of its evil in Adolf Hitler, in order 
to clarify what they wrote about the contemporary context. Likewise, observers were 
drawn to reconstruct a narrative of British resistance to the oppression and brutality of the 
Nazis, centred in some cases on their prosecution of the Holocaust, rather than on the 
aggressive expansionism of Nazi Germany. Thus observers further reinforced a sense of 
British identity that was assured and moral by contrast, but which differed subtly in 
construction to that which prevailed among responses to previous directives. Their 
perspectives on the legitimacy of Allied Force were comparatively more ambiguous, yet 
the recollection of Nazism and Hitler remained absolute and unchallenged. 
  
Conclusions 
 
The smaller volume of total responses to the 1999 directive and its subordinate place with 
the MOP hierarchy demonstrates the less prominent position of the Kosovo conflict 
within both the minds of observers and the structure of the Mass Observation Project 
itself. Yet, for the observers who did respond to the directive and discussed the military 
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intervention against the FRY regime, it was considered an important event framed not 
only by the prospect of violence within Kosovo but the more immediate history of Balkan 
conflicts in the previous decade.  
Once again allusions to print press, radio and television media suggest that 
observers kept up to date with developments in the war, and their often detailed accounts 
show that they were well informed.580 Importantly however, it is clear that observers did 
not conceive of the deployment of British forces as part of Allied Force as a detached, 
singular event, nor did they simply consume news reporting or official analyses; they 
were engaged in placing the Kosovo intervention within a remembered past, recreating a 
sense of an established identity which remained flexible as new circumstances were 
negotiated.581 Again, familiar aspects of the Second World War continued to occupy 
much space within responses but in addition observers invoked Britain’s more 
immediately previous conflicts in the Falklands and Gulf wars. Even among those 
observers who did not invoke popular memories of past conflicts, the prospect of military 
action gave greater urgency to the identification of allied and hostile others, and 
contributed to a broader, shared belief in a common identity. 
Observers identified a different contemporary circumstance in 1999 relative to 
previous conflicts. Within their collected responses a purely humanitarian argument 
existed in tension with prevailing assumptions about the legitimacy of resistance to 
expansion and aggression, national defence and the sovereignty of other states. The 
representation of a region engulfed in perennial and intractable violence was similarly at 
odds with, for example, a singular narrative of interrupted island life which emerged 
within responses written in 1982. Observers were comparatively more critical of Allied 
Force than those who had written about the military effort to retake the Falkland Islands. 
                                                     
580 Towle, Going to War, 132-141.  
581 For example, see: Finney, Remembering the Road, 14-22; Connelly, We Can Take It!, 11-14; Smith, 
Britain and 1940, 1-10; Noakes, War and the British 10-14; Noakes and Pattinson, “Introduction”, 4-10. 
212 
 
 
 
Some were unsure, confused or held deep reservations about prosecuting force in 
response to the ‘internal’ problems of another state. The possibility of humanitarian and 
ethical foreign policy was praised by some observers, but most seemed unsure about its 
practice in Kosovo. 
Contemporary circumstances were understood more clearly by observers when 
they invoked popular memories of Britain’s past, most notably those related to the Second 
World War. However, though Britain’s identity in the Kosovo conflict was understood as 
part of a broader, common history, it is clear that the comparisons observers made 
between the Kosovo intervention and past conflicts were neither as frequent nor as direct 
or prescriptive as those written in responses to previous cases. The context of 
humanitarian intervention within a sovereign state affected what memories of the past 
were relevant, and thus in turn affected how observers evaluated the legitimacy of the 
present conflict. When compared to the Falklands and Gulf conflicts, British entry into 
World War Two was used less frequently as a guide “to action” or to “provide parallels 
for contemporary events”;582 the legitimacy of resistance to territorial expansion could not 
be asserted by association. Indeed, the fact that so many observers were unsure or 
opposed to military intervention in Kosovo, despite perceived similarities between 
Milosevic and Adolf Hitler, or similarities between Balkan violence and the abject horror 
of the Holocaust, reveals the continuing importance memories of German expansion and 
British appeasement in observers’ constructions of moral or political legitimacy.   
In other areas, most notably concerning the actual military operation against the 
FRY, popular memories were invoked as part of a widespread rejection of British and 
NATO tactics. Britain’s contribution to the bombing campaign was unpopular with 
observers who were highly critical of the perceived threat to civilian life – particularly 
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given the apparent humanitarian justification – but also suggested that such an activity 
was incongruent with Britain’s experience during the Blitz. Observers attested to a 
popular memory of that episode based on stoic resistance and determination.583 They 
drew equivalence between Britain’s contemporary tactics and those of the Luftwaffe in 
the 1940s and suggested that such a campaign was doomed to failure as it would 
galvanise support for the Serbian population as had, observers believed, been the case in 
Britain in 1940. Here – as is increasingly apparent among observers’ responses to later 
directives – a celebrated memory of the Second World War continued to be invoked by 
observers but often as part of a problematic comparison in which Britain’s contemporary 
identity seemed at odds with its legitimate and victorious resistance to Nazi Germany. 
Observers were less concerned with the philosophy or politics of humanitarian ideology, 
or the technicalities of international law, than they were with incorporating contemporary 
British force within a national narrative. Once again, national identity was an important 
subject within responses not because it was incidentally affected by involvement in 
military conflict, but because the possibility of war itself was understood by creating and 
recreating particular narratives of identity, especially when it involved no direct, personal 
experience.  
Indeed, even as a minority of observers could claim to have personally 
experienced the Second World War they collectively continued to invoke and refashion 
specifically popular memories, and reconstruct a broader narrative of British national 
identity that did not depend on personal or lived experience. This process was – as in all 
cases - affected by the contemporary context in which observers invoked them, yet 
Britain’s experience in the ‘good war’ was not challenged and, though its celebrated entry 
into the conflict with Germany was less frequently referred to, invocations of Nazism, 
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Hitler, the Blitz and the Holocaust formed the basis of a reconstruction of a morally 
assured effort to defeat Nazi Germany. This narrative was subtly different to that focused 
on British resistance to territorial expansionism and invasions, but was one which 
remained imbued with a fundamental morality.  
The broadly ambiguous context of the present could be made sense of by referring 
to a more secure history. Conditions in the present once more permitted observers to 
retreat into the past and as such they engaged not only in creating a sense of identity in 
the present military campaign, but also more comprehensively refashioned and 
reconstructed an interpretation of British history band identity. As in all cases I consider, 
observers’ discussions of the Kosovo conflict were not confined to a discussion of 
political decisions or military violence, but necessarily involved a more fundamental 
imagination of the national community itself. 
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The Afghanistan War 2001-2014 
 
The war in Afghanistan began in October 2001 and was a response to the 11 September 
terrorist attacks in New York. The initial offensive was overwhelmingly an American 
deployment, and was aimed at destroying Al Qaeda infrastructure and training camps, and 
removing the Taliban regime that harboured them.584 Britain’s contribution was, at this 
stage, limited to supporting American operations.585 The initial bombing campaign was 
undertaken by the United States Air Force alone and succeeded in forcing the Taliban to 
withdraw (primarily into neighbouring Pakistan), after which coalition forces began the 
deployment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). American and British forces 
remained in the country, the latter confined largely to Kabul and its surrounds as part of 
the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), yet by 2003 they faced a deepening 
insurgency from returning Taliban forces.586 Thus NATO took control of ISAF,587 
expanding the occupation to the whole of Afghanistan, and resulting in the redeployment 
of a much larger British force from 2006 responsible for securing the Taliban stronghold 
of Helmand Province.588 Consequently, British forces faced an intense struggle to retain 
control of the province’s towns and villages and, though a number of personnel had been 
killed in the previous five years, the vast majority of the 456 British military deaths 
                                                     
584 For a discussion of the conflict in the context of rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, see: See, Ahmed 
Rashid, Taliban (London: I.B. Taurus, 2009), 217-247. 
585 Royal Air Force, “Operation HERRICK, Afghanistan”, 2018. Online, available at: 
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586 Theo Farrel and Antonio Giustozzi. “The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-2012”, 
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587 The title given to US, British and allied forces occupying Afghanistan alongside the newly created 
Afghan National Army (ANA).  
588 An initial force of around 3000 combat troops rose steadily to a peak of 9500 by 2008. See: BBC News, 
“UK troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of key events”, 2015. Online, available at:  
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sustained during Operation Herrick – the British codename for combat operations in 
Afghanistan – occurred between 2006 and 2014.589  
The Afghanistan War represents a much different case to those considered in 
previous chapters in this research. Excluding Operation Banner in Northern Ireland, the 
war in Afghanistan was the most deadly fought by British forces since Korea, and was the 
longest since World War Two. Further, it was predicated on the removal of an 
internationally unrecognised regime that had supported terrorist attacks rather than one 
that had invaded a neighbouring state or been engaged in ethnic cleansing or genocide.590 
Again these circumstances were interpreted by observers in light of what they meant for 
Britain’s contemporary identity as an international and military power. Yet, as I seek to 
show here, neither the length of the war nor its comparatively high death toll appear to 
have resulted in particular concern among responses. The conflict was instead articulated 
(somewhat counterintuitively given heavy price paid by British forces there) as a 
peripheral event and was largely overshadowed by a more controversial campaign in Iraq. 
The conflict was rarely incorporated within specific narratives of British identity, or 
understood by direction connection with popular memories of past conflicts or events; a 
departure from previous cases. 
 I consider responses written by fifty-five observers between 2001 and 2014 which 
were, unlike those considered within previous chapters, drawn from multiple 
directives.591 The total number of observers considered in this chapter is greater than 
those previous primarily because I have attempted to gain a sufficient range of 
                                                     
589 For a breakdown of British fatalities in Operation Herrick, see: Ministry of Defence, “Operations in 
Afghanistan”, 2016. Online, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/fields-of-operation/afghanistan 
(Accessed 31-01-2018). For a journalistic narrative of the British deployment to Afghanistan, see: Jack 
Fairweather, The Good War: The Battle for Afghanistan 2006-2014 (London: Jonathan Cape, 2014).  
590 Ethnic cleansing was however, a salient feature of the period of civil war immediately preceding the US-
led intervention. Rashid, Taliban, 55-66. 
591 The topics and subjects which these directives covered by asking observers to record in their responses 
can be seen in Appendix II.  
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perspectives at each point in time, from each directive, and thus reach a point of 
‘saturation’592 in the broad ideas and narratives that they articulated. However, these 
responses equal just over half those considered in the subsequent chapter on the Iraq War. 
This is largely because, as I explain throughout, observers voluntarily focused on the Iraq 
conflict at the expense of that in Afghanistan. Most of the responses considered here were 
taken from the first three directives issued in 2001 and 2002 which prompted observers to 
discuss the initial US-led intervention from October 2001. I have however included 
responses written after this period; those submitted to the 2008 directive in particular, 
which asked for observers’ “War experiences and reflections”. These submissions 
revealed the extent to which the conflict in Afghanistan had become elided with a more 
controversial war in Iraq.593 It is important to note then, that while observers were 
concerned with the military conflict which occurred in Afghanistan, they were, by 
comparison, often more focused on the contemporaneous war in Iraq from March 2003, a 
conflict which they more frequently and directly connected to Britain’s history and 
identity. 
 Yet of course, many observers did refer explicitly to the Afghanistan War, and 
Britain’s role within it. Though they represented the initial invasion as a confusing or 
poorly-understood military action, the redeployment to Helmand Province in 2006 (and 
the subsequent ground combat and increasing military deaths) refocused observers’ 
responses on the conflict. Its specific circumstances and its occurrence within the broader 
cultural and political milieu of the ‘War on Terror’ meant that observers found it difficult 
to articulate the conflict as part of a secure or familiar narrative of British history. Popular 
memories of Britain’s Second World War, so important in clarifying what observers 
                                                     
592 Ritchie and Lewis, Qualitative Research Practice, 77-108. For a discussion of achieving saturation in 
interviews of ‘ordinary’ people focused on Britain’s involvement in recent military conflicts, see: Colley, 
“Is Britain a force for good?” 
593 The directive sheets from which observers’ responses are drawn here – namely, those issued in 2001, 
2002, 2005, 2008 and 2009 – are available in Appendix II.  
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wrote about previous conflicts, were conspicuous by their absence. The war in 
Afghanistan represented a more complex and peripheral event for Britain, and one in 
which familiar narratives of identity appeared to become fragmented. Observers became 
increasingly likely to interpret the conflict by considering how it affected Britain’s 
domestic society, race, ethnicity and religion; a far less comfortable or secure means of 
articulating a narrative of national identity.  
 
Legitimacy 
 
As in all other cases considered in this research, observers who wrote about the 
Afghanistan War at all points between 2001 and 2014 were concerned with evaluating its 
legitimacy and whether Britain had been justified in using military force. However, it is 
obvious that they were not sure about what the conflict meant for Britain and found it 
difficult to make sense of the military intervention, particularly in its initial phase in 2001. 
Importantly though, observers were not overwhelmingly opposed to using military force 
against Al Qaeda or the Taliban; instead they conceived of a conflict in which it was 
difficult to know what was happening, why it was occurring and crucially, what Britain’s 
role within it was. The contemporary circumstances of the War on Terror (linked heavily 
to religious extremism and domestic terrorism)594 complicated observers’ perspectives on 
the legitimacy of the conflict, the result of which was a widespread ambivalence toward 
the war and a sense that it remained peripheral for Britain. These findings demonstrate 
how the construction and mobilisation of popular memories past conflicts, and the 
incorporation of present circumstances within broader narratives of British identity, 
                                                     
594 For a study of the cultural reception and construction of the War on Terror, see: Paul Douglas 
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Wake of 9/11”, PhD Dissertation, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., 2014. Online, available at: 
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worked to clarify and reinforce observers’ perspectives on the legitimacy of military force 
in the present. Their absence contributed to a pervasive ambivalence and ambiguity 
within what they wrote. 
 Of the fifty-five observers who wrote about the Afghanistan War, twenty-four 
believed the British campaign was justified while twenty were undecided. Just six 
individuals, writing mostly in 2001 and 2002 during the initial intervention, were certain 
that Britain’s use of military force was justified. Even within this small group the reasons 
for their support varied. One described how it was right to remove “a truly vile and 
universally detested [Taliban] regime”595 while another believed it would afford “the 
country [Afghanistan] some stability.”596 A similar idea was expressed by another: 
 
I would love to be anti-war but not going [to war in Afghanistan] would have condemned vast 
numbers to more violence… I believe in intervention and do not go along with the concept of an 
inviolate nation state.
597 
 
Some observers described the initial intervention in Afghanistan using the same language 
of humanitarianism which many had used to describe the previous military intervention in 
Kosovo. Again, for a small number of individuals, the idea that military force was being 
deployed to liberate or protect oppressed peoples legitimised its use. 
For others however, the conflict was linked intimately to the September 11th 
terrorist attacks and the newly declared ‘War on Terror’: 
 
If the Taliban regime was the source of, or harbouring the terrorists who engineered the atrocity of 
September 11th, and who were planning further such acts, then the war is totally justified. It has also 
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freed the people of the country from a particularly oppressive regime, although being realistic that 
was a “side-benefit” and I doubt a significant concern in the minds of the US and British leadership, 
more a convenient added justification for going to war.
598  
 
One observer wrote immediately before the war in 2001 that she could not “see a purely 
diplomatic solution.”599 Writing again after the initial intervention she described an 
apparently successful anti-terror campaign:  
 
I have written about this subject [the initial bombing campaign] when it was in full swing. It was 
against the Taliban and Al Quaida. I think it definitely made an impact on Islamic terrorists, not only 
blowing up their training camps but freezing any bank account set up for the purpose of financing 
terrorist activities.
600 
  
Even among these early responses however, a likely war in Iraq began to overshadow 
what observers wrote about Afghanistan. As a specific reaction to terrorism, the 
Afghanistan War was considered justifiable by comparison: 
 
We are not being threatened, Iraq hasn’t declared war on America or us, it was a bit different in 
Afghanistan, they sent those two planes deliberately into the twin towers.
601 
 
It is interesting to note here the extent to which the contemporary circumstances of the 
War on Terror intermingled with humanitarian ideals within the responses of observers 
who supported British involvement in the initial action. While contemporary 
circumstances were clearly important in determining what they wrote, it is evident that 
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they were interpreted differently by different individuals. As I suggested in the previous 
chapter, some observers had enthusiastically supported the possibility of humanitarian 
military intervention and ‘ethical foreign policy’ in relation to Kosovo. In 2001, a small 
number again characterised the contemporary deployment in this manner, despite the 
intimate and obvious connection American and British policy in Afghanistan had with 
terrorism and Al Qaeda.602 
 Yet very few observers supported the military intervention in Afghanistan as 
either a humanitarian or anti-terror operation. In fact, twenty-four of the fifty-five 
observers considered here described a use of military force that did not have a sufficient 
justification. For some observers, the illegitimacy of the Afghanistan invasion was rooted 
in a belief that it would cause death and destruction, worsening the situation, and thus 
undermining a humanitarian argument: 
 
The people need aid not bombing… There will always be terrorism. The best way to reduce it is for 
powerful countries to be considerate to their weaker neighbours. Kindness counts [and] the world 
hates bullies. Don’t spend money on state of the art armaments when it could be used for improving 
the lives of those in poor undeveloped countries. Make friends not enemies. Promote care, not 
belligerence.
603 
 
Writing retrospectively in the summer of 2002, another observer described the 
intervention in Afghanistan as a humanitarian failure: 
 
It [the initial invasion] would have been a worthwhile benefit if Afghanistan had been able to 
formulate a stable, democratic government. So far, that has not happened. Unless the West commits 
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to the kind of effort towards stability and reconstruction that they promised months ago, it may 
never happen.
604  
 
As in the previous Kosovo conflict, a number of observers characterised the use of 
military force as self-defeating, and likely to cause more violence rather than end it. In 
some cases they characterised the conflict as one based, at least partially, on humanitarian 
grounds but felt that a military intervention was a mistake because it would result in the 
deaths of civilians or those oppressed by the Taliban regime. 
 Others were more concerned with the lack of a discernible threat emanating from 
Afghanistan, despite the September 11th terrorist attacks having been inspired by Al 
Qaeda. They criticised an intervention against a regime that had not threatened or 
attacked Britain specifically. One observer described Britain “trying to find an 
international role”605 and an intervention in Afghanistan that “in the end will change 
nothing.”606 Another wrote that “I don’t support Britain’s involvement in Iraq or 
Afghanistan or anywhere else: it’s not our business and we have enough problems here to 
attend to”607 while a further response read; “What are we gaining from it all?”608 
Certainly, the few observers who thought the conflict to be justified were outnumbered by 
those who characterised it as unwarranted or lacking British interests. 
Why then, given the febrile atmosphere of the period immediately following the 
September 11th attacks, did not more observers support a campaign directed against Al 
Qaeda? The idea that they did not understand or know about the Taliban or Al Qaeda is 
not sufficient given the extent to which they were discussed and represented within 
responses (something returned to shortly). Likewise, observers clearly believed the 
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September 11th attacks to have been extraordinarily important events, not only in terms of 
their human cost, but in terms of their impact on international politics. Very few 
observers were dismissive; most were naturally aggrieved by appalling loss of civilian 
life. Instead, I suggest that observers once again interpreted the legitimacy of using 
military force in Afghanistan by considering what it meant for Britain. As in responses 
written by previous cohorts, observers attempted to understand the conflict by evaluating 
whether Britain was acting in the defensive. One observer, writing in 2008, reflected a 
view that was prevalent in a number of accounts, suggesting that military force could only 
be justified in defence:  
 
I do believe that on the whole our troops should only really be deployed only when absolutely 
necessary to defend our own country and territories... I respect the job that the military do but do not 
support as much the political decisions which are made to send these troops out. I did not really 
support Tony Blair’s decisions to send troops to Afghanistan but would not feel moved enough to 
march in an anti-war protest as I think that is disrespectful to the military.
609 
 
The Afghanistan War demonstrated how the legitimacy of British military force was 
derived from its deployment as a resort against aggression. Observers were again 
involved in identifying whether contemporary circumstances could be considered to be 
defensive in nature. Most writing from 2001 characterised the military operation to 
remove the Taliban and pursue Al Qaeda as one that was reactionary and lacked the sort 
of imminent threat of aggression that legitimised the use of military force. It was an 
interpretation which contrasted the sort of expansion or territorial aggression which had, 
for previous cohorts of observers, legitimised the use of force in the Falklands and Gulf 
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wars. Once again, most observers conceived of defence as resistance to invasion or 
expansion by one state against another.  
 As the conflict unfolded from October 2001, observers became increasingly 
worried about the direction of the war.  Many began to suggest that it would not be short 
or decisive, further compounding a wider sentiment that it had not been sufficiently 
justified in the first place: 
 
I think this war was a stupid war and was a gut reaction from the United States with Britain as a lap 
dog following in their footsteps. There was no way they were going to find Osama Bin Laden in the 
vast territory and cave complex. That was the whole objective of the war and they failed, as it was 
doomed to failure.
610  
 
By bombing everything that moved and asking questions afterwards, the Taleban seems to have 
been defeated – but we haven’t yet won the peace. The main objective was to get rid of the 
terrorists’ leader and his minions – and they have not been found.611 
 
The war in Afghanistan was ostensibly against terrorists, but has killed, wounded and rendered 
homeless some of the poorest people on earth, living in the harshest conditions of extreme heat and 
cold and famine – without capturing the terrorists.612 
 
Importantly then, for some observers the outcome of the military operation in 
Afghanistan affected its perceived legitimacy. They seemed particularly aggrieved that 
not only had military force been used initially, but also that its intended result – the 
capture of Bin Laden and the destruction of Al Qaeda – had not occurred. Unlike previous 
conflicts which were short and decisive, observers’ discussions of the Afghanistan War 
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often pertained to an extra dimension in which the wisdom of using military force was 
questioned retrospectively as conditions worsened. Observers’ perspectives on the 
legitimacy of the use of force increasingly involved discussion of its utility alongside 
interpretations of its initial moral or political justification.  
It is however, important to point out that nearly half of the observers considered in 
this chapter did not believe the British campaign was a justifiable use of military force 
and that a creeping belief in the futility of the conflict only compounded this initial 
characterisation rather than altered it. It is a subtle distinction, but important nevertheless; 
very few observers described the military outcomes of the invasion and occupation as 
having changed their views on the legitimacy of the British campaign. Thus, despite an 
identification of different circumstances when compared to previous short and decisive 
conflicts, the manner in which they understood legitimacy remained fundamentally the 
same. They once again interpreted legitimacy by constructing a narrative of national 
identity centred on defence against aggression, not whether the use of force had been 
successful. Among those who did not support British involvement in the initial 
intervention, observers were unwilling to establish either the Taliban regime or Al Qaeda 
as a legitimate or sufficient threat. Neither had attacked Britain, or invaded a neighbour or 
an ally. Contemporary circumstances were crucial in determining what observers wrote 
but, as in all cases I have considered, they had to be contextualised and given meaning by 
referring to pre-existing ideas and narratives.  
 Similarly, observers confronted Britain’s Afghanistan campaign by referring to 
what they knew about the region itself and its inhabitants. As in the previous Kosovo 
conflict, constructions of an Afghan Other often rested on ideas of backwardness, 
hardship, tribalism, inhospitableness and internecine conflict: 
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…despite ‘spinning’ to the contrary, it appears that most UK troops have gone to that poor, 
benighted country to little other effect than to succumb to a vicious intestinal disease requiring 
repatriation.
613 
 
Afghan tribes have fought each other for hundreds of years. They are not going to stop now. Bush 
and Blair are living in cuckoo land if they think they can stop that.
614  
 
Inhospitable country, refugee problems of fleeing Muslims, mountains, no cover except caves, few 
access roads through the mountains…615  
 
However, unlike the previous Kosovo conflict, some observers constructed a narrative of 
Afghan identity based specifically on a perception that they were uniquely ungovernable, 
unconquerable and predisposed to resist outsiders. These ideas were most often 
articulated as part of a characterisation of the current conflict as one that was not only 
misguided, but futile: 
 
It’s a bit confusing, after all we supported the Taliban against the Russians when they invaded but 
strange to relate the Russians are trying to be mediators and diplomats.
616 
 
It is impossible to win a war there [in Afghanistan] as the Taliban and Kipling knew, and the 
Russians found out.
617  
 
One observer wrote later in 2008 after the redeployment of British forces to Helmand 
province: 
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132 British soldiers have lost their lives in Afghanistan. British forces have been in action out there 
before – as early as 1839 and I am not sure what they can really achieve. Bring our boys and girls 
safely home.
618  
 
Another wrote at length: 
 
My great grandfather fought his way through the Khyber Pass in the 1890s in a bid to bring 
Afghanistan under control and here we are over a hundred years later trying to do the same thing. 
No-one has yet succeeded in taming this country of war lords and ungovernable tribesmen, so why 
we are embroiled in the problem again is beyond my understanding. We should have learnt from the 
Russians’ failure in the 1980s. If the might of the Soviet Union couldn’t bring this country to heel, 
then there really isn’t much point in anyone else trying. After September 11 attacks, the USA had to 
be seen to be taking some sort of action and tried to destroy camps within Afghanistan that they said 
were training terrorists for al-Quaida and they threatened to overthrow the Taliban government if 
they didn’t hand over Osama Bin Laden and others. This dragged them into an alliance with unstable 
warlords against the Taliban, eventually dragging the British in too to support them. It is an utter 
disaster, a war that cannot be won.
619  
 
The possibility of armed conflict prompted observers to articulate Britain’s identity by 
expressing the alien character of the peoples against whom, or on whose behalf, force was 
being used. In Afghanistan allusions to empire and Britain’s imperial Afghan Wars were 
not celebrated, but served as a warning that Britain had been involved in the region 
before, and yet remained separate and distinguishable from it. Observers’ perspectives on 
the Afghanistan War – whether it was justifiable and whether it could be won – were 
informed by invocations of failed attempts at imperial conquest, and a stereotypical 
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assessment of Afghanistan as a primitive and hostile place. Once again, the prospect of 
war led observers to construct a narrative of British identity by articulating historical 
differences with a primitive and uncivilised Afghan Other.620 
 Perhaps the most striking aspect of observers’ discussions of the legitimacy of the 
war in Afghanistan is however, the extent to which they were unsure whether it was right 
or wrong. During the previous Gulf and Kosovo wars a number of observers had 
described how it was impossible to arrive at a definitive conclusion about the legitimacy 
of those conflicts. In relation to the Afghanistan War, a much greater proportion of 
observers were similarly unable to arrive at a clear conclusion. Of the fifty-five observers 
whose responses I have considered in this chapter, twenty did not offer a specific 
judgement on the legitimacy of Britain’s involvement in the Afghanistan War, contrasting 
the twenty-four who believed it was not legitimate and the six who did. Frequently, those 
who were not certain described the difficulty of reconciling arguments both for and 
against military intervention: 
 
I read everything and agree with most commentators and letters, those stressing food aid and those 
advocating war, those talking of support for Pakistan and refugee camps and those saying we’ve 
ignored them too long, but I don’t know what to think myself. I think there must be another way 
rather than outright war, surely that is what the terrorists want, to cause devastation on a world wide 
scale and set Islam against the West.
621 
 
Afghanistan is another problem area. Part of me says ‘get out of it and let them get on with their own 
war’ and the other part says ‘if we do that many innocent people would have to live under the 
Taliban which is not a bundle of fun.’ I am however, closer to ‘get out’ than ‘stay there’. Let the 
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Taliban rule and see how long they can last. They all fall eventually: Napoleon, Hitler, Stalin and the 
rest, but in the meantime they have done untold damage.
622  
 
These observers were interested and concerned by Britain’s involvement in a military 
conflict in Afghanistan and, as in the previous Kosovo conflict, confusion, ambivalence 
or ambiguity within responses should not be read as apathy. The campaign was 
characterised as a complicated one, involving both the threat from international terrorism 
and the humanitarian abuses of Afghanistan’s ruling regime. These competing ideas were 
difficult for some to organise into a coherent narrative of legitimacy or lack thereof.  
Others writing after the initial defeat of the Taliban in 2001 and 2002 were not 
persuaded of the justification of the conflict. They deferred judgement, suggesting that it 
remained unclear whether it had been right to use military force: 
 
To everyone’s surprise –and I think that is probably not much of an overstatement – the Taleban has 
crumbled in large areas of Afghanistan. Some papers and commentators are gloating over the people 
who called for an end to the war and I’ll admit that my own gloom was too pessimistic. However we 
are far from achieving the original goal – capturing Bin Laden and making the Al Quaida network 
inoperative.
623 
 
I am not sure about this war. Yes, the old regime was awful but so many people died in this war, and 
we still have to see what the new regime is going to be like. I reserve judgment until 5 or 10 years 
have passed and we can see the results.
624 
 
I suppose I must reluctantly concede that something had to be done about Afghanistan vis-à-vis the 
Taliban, and there are faint but promising signs of better prospects ahead for that country. (I do take 
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a particular interest in it because I have been there, in 1976)… As with all wars, that in Afghanistan 
may have solved one problem but it has created a host of others.
625 
 
These responses underscore the much different context that observers had to make sense 
of in the years following 2001 relative to previous, shorter conflicts in the Falklands, Gulf 
and Kosovo wars.  
A sense of confusion or obscurity was engendered further by the apparently 
obscure or confusing state of the military campaign. Some observers described being 
unsure of exactly what was going on in Afghanistan at all in the years following the initial 
invasion. They represented the war as difficult to understand and peripheral for Britain: 
 
I am not so sure there is still a war in Afghanistan. As far as I can see now the Taliban have been 
defeated things are very much back to what passes for normal in that country.
626  
 
Taliban have been finally defeated but Al-Quaida still flourishes and must be defeated. Talk of aerial 
bombardment and friendly fire. Have we won? NO Flags and no celebrations.
627  
 
One observer reflected on the Afghanistan campaign as the Iraq War loomed in early 
2003: 
 
I hope and pray that this war [in Iraq] can be avoided but I am not hopeful – if things go awry then I 
will attempt to keep some sort of diary but I got fed up with Afghanistan one – the whole thing 
seemed to just tail off. I don’t think this coming one will. At the moment it seems too ghastly to 
contemplate.
628  
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Responses like these contributed to broader sense that the war in Afghanistan was not as 
urgent or as important an engagement for Britain in its early stages. Indeed, by 2002 
observers repeatedly described a military intervention that had simply fell off the agenda: 
 
What war? All I know is American troops entered that country and later some of Britain’s did, what 
for? I’m not sure. I haven’t read that they’ve achieved anything after killing and driving off some 
Taliban members.
629  
 
What are were talking about here? Is there a war in Afghanistan? How little we hear about it if there 
is!
630 
 
I can’t remember much about this war. I don’t think we were told a lot about what actually happened 
and what loss of life there was on both sides. I think our troops were eventually brought out but are 
American troops still there? I don’t know.631 
 
Now, in October 2002, the war in Afghanistan seems to have vanished from the news, and I find this 
in itself quite sinister, given the problems of that warlord-fragmented country…632  
 
There has been merely a deafening silence [regarding Afghanistan]. I know the British army are still 
out there simply because my brother-in-law (a UK army medic) was recently there sorting out 
outbreaks of some gastric bug. Otherwise you could be forgiven for thinking it had all vanished 
again.
633 
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Observers were collectively less sure about Britain’s role in the Afghanistan War - and 
whether it should be involved at all - than other cohorts of observers had been regarding 
the Falklands and Gulf conflicts, and the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ambiguity 
that is prevalent within their responses was underscored by a pervasive sense that 
Afghanistan was a far-off and unconquerable place - its inhabitants alien and 
extraordinarily resistant to outside intervention - and that the conflict, in its early stages at 
least, had been a peripheral non-event. 
In fact the Iraq War drew focus away from that in Afghanistan as observers began 
to discuss them interchangeably. Typical examples described how “Afghanistan, now 
Iraq… are not really settled”634 and that “After the mess in Afghanistan they [the UK and 
USA] now have a mess in Iraq.”635 The elision continued after the redeployment of large 
numbers of British troops to Helmand Province in 2006.  Observers described how “the 
reason for their [British soldiers’] presence in Afghanistan, Iraq may well be as 
incomprehensible to the personnel involved as it is to ourselves”,636  that “Iraq and 
Afghanistan seem to have no end, with more men dying every day”637 and following the 
ending of British combat operations in Iraq in 2009, that “our military people swap the 
frying pan of Iraq for the fire of Afghanistan.”638 Observers were far more clear and 
critical about the war in Iraq and this affected what they wrote about Britain’s 
involvement in Afghanistan. Though many observers were critical about Operation 
Herrick it is evident that they also wrote about it with a lesser intensity – at least when 
compared to responses concerning other recent conflicts - and found it difficult to narrate 
Britain’s identity within it.  
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 What explains this pervasive ambiguity within responses written about the 
Afghanistan War when compared with other cases? It was not the case that observers 
were unable to access media or news information. Nor could it be explained because of 
the material costs of the war which were higher than the more controversial and 
polarising conflict in Iraq. In fact, it was I suggest, the manner in which observers 
interpreted and reconstructed narratives of British identity which explains this puzzlingly 
confused and ambivalent attitude toward the Afghanistan War. Indeed, unlike previous 
conflicts, observers did not draw widely on popular memories of the Second World War 
and incorporate the current conflict within a narrative of British resistance to aggression 
or dictatorship. Their discussions of legitimacy were not clarified by comparisons with 
legitimate British resistance to German expansionism or the evil of the Nazis. Its 
particular circumstances – as an intervention, on anti-terror grounds, against an 
unrecognised regime which had not invaded or threatened any of its neighbours – did not 
permit comparison with popular memories in the same way that previous conflicts had. 
More ambiguous allusions to empire or the Soviet war did not create any similar sense of 
national cohesion or a common sense of the past. Despite its singular strategic, political 
and military importance for the British state, Britain’s involvement in Afghanistan 
remained at arm’s length for observers. The conflict represents a fundamental departure 
from previous cases in that it did not help to sustain a broader reconstruction of a morally 
assured and widely celebrated narrative of British historical identity, the foundation of 
which was Britain’s legitimate struggle against Nazi Germany 
 What observers wrote here confirms a wider finding within this research; namely 
that legitimacy was understood most confidently when it could be connected to or 
contrasted with Britain’s celebrated resistance to the expansionary aggression of Nazi 
Germany, and that British entry into World War Two in particular was thought of as a 
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crucible of Britain’s contemporary identity. Due to the circumstances of the present, 
connections between the present and the past which had underscored an assured and 
moral narrative of British identity in previous conflicts began to fragment. They were 
replaced, as I show presently, by a more uncomfortable propensity to link the conflict 
culture, religion and race, rather than national history. What observers’ reactions to the 
Afghanistan campaign demonstrate is the importance of small wars in recreating a sense 
of national identity, but also the manner in which their circumstances can radically alter 
the connections that are made. The conflict was paradoxically both thought to be 
peripheral by observers, but also disruptive in terms of its impact on broader 
interpretations of identity and the invocation of popular memories. 
 
The Military, Counter-Insurgency and Occupation 
 
Despite its minimal contribution when compared to that of the United States,639 observers 
often wanted to make sense of a conflict in which Britain was a participant. They drew on 
familiar ideas of indiscriminate and unwarranted bombing as previous cohorts had during 
the Gulf and Kosovo wars. No observers expressed outright support for such a strategy. 
Indeed in only one case did an observer suggest that “The bombing seems to be having an 
effect on the Taliban and the Americans and Northern Alliance are moving towards 
Kabul.”640 Yet the same observer went on to highlight the apparent unpopularity of this 
strategy by writing, “I get the impression that is why there is so much bombing now they 
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are trying to get to a point where they can make more progress on the ground which 
would be more acceptable to a lot of people.”641 
 In fact, most who wrote about the initial campaign were critical of the use of air 
power which they believed to be unduly destructive or likely to galvanise resistance. 
Often however observers stressed that the bombing was being undertaken by the 
American military, and that it revealed an American heavy-handedness (a theme to which 
I return shortly): 
 
Carpet bombing of mountains by veteran B-52 heavy bombers seems a bit over the top… I saw civil 
buildings hit and dead and injured civilians and was sickened. Even today if you bomb from a safe 
high level you can’t be sure if you’ve picked out a true legitimate target or where the bombs will 
land…642 
 
To see the state of Afghanistan compared to the USA is lamentable and yet the Americans are still 
bombing the bare hills and plains. The Afghans have always been a tough race, proud and 
independent so one can only admire their resistance.
643  
 
I think the excessive use of force (bombing) has been unproductive because it was always futile to 
think that Bin Laden was the sort of person who could be bombed into submission, knowing the 
complicated landscape as he does.
644 
 
Another observer, writing during the initial deployment of American and British forces to 
Afghanistan suggested that ground forces would be needed to secure the region: 
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I still feel that any success in Afghanistan will be gained not by bombing but by painstaking, time 
consuming and very ingenious infiltration and intelligence work by ground forces. I agree with those 
who feel that bombing is not the way to win this ‘war’.645 
 
After the apparent success of the campaign in disabling the Taliban, she continued to 
stress the incompatibility of a bombing strategy with the perceived aims of the 
intervention itself: 
 
I suppose those of us who had doubts about the strategy of bombing rather than of guerrilla tactics to 
smoke out Osama Bin Laden have been proved wrong. Certainly reports of the Afghan reaction to 
the routing of the Taliban seems joyous enough so some good had come of it but the spider at the 
centre of the web, who has now boasted on video that he was behind September 11, is still at 
large.
646 
 
Like those who wrote about the conflicts in the Persian Gulf and Kosovo, observers were 
critical of the use of air power as they believed it to be both unethical and dangerous for 
civilians, and ineffective in breaking resistance or morale. Thus, observers did not believe 
that bombing alone could be justified as part of a humanitarian intervention or as an anti-
terror operation; it was thought to be making life worse for ordinary Afghans while 
failing to seriously affect Al Qaeda or Bin Laden. Despite the different context of the 
Afghanistan War, observers again articulated an understanding that the contemporary 
campaign was indiscriminate, undesirable and illegitimate.  
 The bombing was however, an American operation. Observers were able to 
describe it as antithetical to a broader belief in Britain’s identity as a legitimate military 
power but also suggest that this use of air power demonstrated the belligerence of its ally, 
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the United States. It was marked out as a ‘lamentable’ and ‘excessive’ use of force by the 
Americans, contributing to an interpretation in which Britain was thought to be moderate 
and reasonable by comparison. 
 Few observers were concerned with representing the ground combat that was 
taking place in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002. Those who did write about it described a 
war about which little was known, and which had seemingly settled without obvious 
triumph or defeat for British forces: 
 
Now Kabul is free it looks as though the Taliban are retreating to Kandahar and may be much harder 
to defeat there. The problem now is restoring the capital to order and installing a democratic 
government. At least aid can be distributed and the horror of mass starvation is receding… Breathe a 
sigh of relief an interim administration is taking shape leaving out the old warlords and including all 
the different ethnic groups plus 2 women. The fighting is almost over and sanity can return to this 
poor country. No one thought it would be this quickly resolved. The basic win situation has been 
accomplished now the hard talking starts.
647  
 
I have been so long and so late in doing my writing that the war in Afghanistan is what is called 
“over” and it must be somewhat better. There are cars in the streets, the zoo is open again... Homes 
are ruined, families split up, there are no crops in the fields, the list of miseries is long and terrible. 
But there must be more hope in the air, and I do hope that one day it will once again be a place of 
ancient history and with tourists taking trade there.
648  
 
During the previous Kosovo conflict, the introduction of a small peacekeeping force had 
been interpreted positively by some observers, representing soldiers as considerate, 
humane and charitable. Observers wrote similar accounts regarding the deployment to 
Afghanistan after the apparent triumph of American and British forces over the Taliban: 
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As in Sierra Leone, I think that outside forces (including British) have contributed hugely to any 
peace in the country.
649 
 
Although it may not be much reported, soldiers often get involved with the local population, trying 
to make life better, especially for the children. I remember a newspaper feature from Kabul 
commenting that ‘the relief agencies (the Red Cross in this instance) like to think they are the only 
ones who care’ but that, unlike them, the soldiers were helping people with their own money in their 
spare time. I have heard several reports of Red Cross workers treating soldiers with contempt and 
quite unprovoked rudeness (whether they were in British uniform or UN blue berets).
650  
 
Deployed as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), British ground 
forces were largely confined to Kabul and its surrounds from 2001 until 2005, with only a 
few hundred frontline troops deployed to the country at any one time. It is then 
unsurprising that few observers considered frontline personnel in depth during this period. 
The initial intervention in Afghanistan was narrated by observers largely as the Kosovo 
campaign had been; a bombing campaign with minimal ground assistance. Though 
peacekeeping duties were often viewed positively, with Britain’s soldiers identified as 
particularly humane, competent and compassionate, there lacked any sense of victory or 
triumph.   
From 2003 the Taliban, having retreated to remote areas within Afghanistan or 
over the border into Pashtun areas of Pakistan, began an insurgency campaign against 
American, British and Afghan National Army forces. The situation was addressed in 2003 
as NATO took control of ISAF and introduced a new plan for the phased occupation of 
the entire country through the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
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(PRTs).651 By 2006, British forces were deployed to Helmand Province in the south of 
Afghanistan and were immediately engaged in an intense struggle to occupy and hold the 
area’s infrastructure and major towns.652 At its peak the British deployment in Helmand 
reached 9500 combat troops stationed at 137 bases.653 
 As Britain’s forces became engaged in a difficult counter-insurgency,654 observers 
began to place frontline soldiers at the centre of their responses, revealing a personal and 
individualistic focus on their motivations and character. Support for the military was 
impressed by one observer who described how she “did manage to persuade my son’s 
headmistress that she should bring the whole school out to cheer the local regiments on 
their parade of honour after their return from Afghanistan and Iraq.”655 Others however 
were not enthused by the use of Britain’s professional, volunteer forces in a conflict 
lacking a clear justification: 
 
I have a low regard for the armed forces as a whole, and I feel particularly insulted by government 
ministers regularly telling me how proud we should collectively feel of our servicemen. I accept 
absolutely that it is the government, not the squaddies themselves, who choose which wars to fight – 
but people who join the army do so knowing that they can be sent anywhere to fight anyone at the 
whim of the government of the day, so they are just as culpable (in my opinion) of any immoral 
military action.
656 
 
Again, observers did not believe that military force itself was illegitimate, though some 
were critical of the volunteer or professional status of serving soldiers. For these 
                                                     
651 Fairweather, The Good War. 
652 The Helmand redeployment began with an initial force of 3300 personnel, combat troops drawn 
primarily from 16 Air Assault Brigade, 3rd Parachute regiment.  
653 BBC News, “UK troops in Afghanistan: Timeline of key events”, 2015. Online, available at:  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-35159951 (Accessed 31-01-2018). 
654 Robert Egnell, “Lessons from Helmand, Afghanistan: what now for British counterinsurgency?”, 
International Affairs. 87, no. 2 (2011): 297-315.  
655 MO A3434, female, born 1965.  
656 MO B4236, male, born 1928.  
240 
 
 
 
individuals, the contentiousness of the campaign in Afghanistan affected the status of the 
soldiers who were fighting it: 
 
The army today seems to want to be loved and appreciated, but how can they expect that when many 
people are totally opposed to their involvement in the first place? I totally disagree with the 
government’s attempts to get us to love and honour these people who in my name are killing 
innocent people… I do feel grateful to those in the First and Second World Wars who gave their 
lives for the greater good. There is no doubt that without their sacrifice, the world would have been a 
much darker place and we have much to thank them for. But I do find it more difficult to be grateful 
to members of today’s armed forces because the wars they have become embroiled in have not 
protected us and made us safer, but have contributed to the spread of terrorism and made our lives 
much less safe.
657 
 
This response in particular reveals the extent to which observers’ perspectives on 
Britain’s military forces was circumstantial. Not only the nature of the counter-insurgency 
combat, but also observers’ ambivalence toward to wider aims and legitimacy of the war, 
affected what they wrote about the role of soldiers within it. In doing so they drew on 
popular memories that helped to explain the present, suggesting that the ambiguity of 
contemporary military service could be contrasted with the moral clarity of sacrifice 
during the world wars, pursued for ‘the greater good.’ Popular memory of conscription or 
mass mobilisation in the Second World War could serve to undermine the perceived 
adoration of professional forces, but crucially did not disrupt a pervasive belief in the 
legitimacy of British military force itself. Indeed, it reinforced a sense of morality, 
legitimacy and unity in the Second World War against which contemporary deployments 
could be contrasted.  
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However, few observers were critical about Britain’s military forces, despite often 
protesting Britain’s continued involved in the Afghanistan conflict. Most who wrote 
about serving soldiers and ground forces were concerned with reconciling the apparently 
peripheral and ambiguous status of the Afghanistan War - now frequently elided with a 
much more unpopular deployment in Iraq - with the status of the soldiers who fought it. 
Here British forces were represented as victims of the war rather than the prosecutors of 
‘immoral action’ or an unjustified intervention. Observers often wrote about their 
personal sympathy for soldiers dutifully struggling through a difficult and ambiguous set 
of circumstances: 
 
However one might feel about those who voluntarily sign up to the modern-day services, and I 
personally regard this as a curious career choice, I do feel that we ought to show at least a modicum 
of respect to service people, especially since they do more conflict resolution and peacekeeping 
these days. Recent press coverage of shops and pubs refusing entry to service people in uniform are 
rather depressing. If such treatment was still meted out on the grounds of colour or gender then the 
government would come down on those responsible like the proverbial ton of bricks.
658  
 
I shake my head in disbelief at current local wars in Iraq, Afghanistan or elsewhere on the planet. 
The least I can do is to buy a poppy in recognition of the men and women who were caught up in a 
conflict they were expected to serve. I empathise with those parents whose sons or daughters have 
been killed or maimed during their service in Iraq or Afghanistan. Wherever there is suffering 
caused by man’s inhumanity to man, often implicating innocent victims, I am sensitive to people’s 
heartbreak.
659   
 
Such responses drew on a language of loss and sacrifice, and argued that soldiers ought to 
be shielded from blame for the circumstances in which they found themselves. Quite 
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clearly, a pervasive characterisation of the conflict as one in which the legitimacy of 
British involvement was lacking or unclear affected what observers wrote about the status 
of the soldiers fighting it. For others this engendered a direct contrast between military 
heroism and the ‘political’ decisions on which the conflict in Afghanistan was blamed: 
 
I’ve never had any experience of the armed services, but I have total admiration for anyone who 
has. For an 18 year old guy to join the army and then get involved in a war miles and miles away 
in places like Afghanistan or Iraq, all for something like £6.80 and hour is beyond belief. To hear 
some idle, lazy, opinionated ‘oiyk’ mouthing off their objections to war and conflict, and aiming 
their bile at the individuals in the armed services appals me... they ought to vent their spleen at 
the government rather than the ‘front-line Tommys’.660 
 
I support the Help for Heroes campaign, and wear the wristband and have the car sticker. I also 
have the car sticker for the yellow ribbon which is to show support for the British Armed Forces. 
I support the soldiers, it is the politics/government I do not trust or agree with.
661
 
 
I do have some sympathy for ‘our’ soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly those of course 
who have returned injured or traumatised (or dead). I feel it’s the politicians who are the real 
villains. But in war, very ordinary people can commit the most appalling acts, as well as acts of 
great kindness and self-sacrifice. I find it hard to understand how decent people can bomb third 
world towns, cities and villages… I would hate to be a soldier out there, and do have respect for 
the courage of soldiers in battle.
662  
 
An allusion to the bombing of the ‘third world’ reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of 
the contemporary campaign, but also created a sense in which the use of force in 
Afghanistan was less heroic than other conventional deployments. Heroism was again 
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linked to ideas of even, conventional combat. Sympathy for soldiers was, for some, linked 
less to the risks they face, and more to a notion that they could not live up – through no 
fault of their own – to a particular heroic military identity:   
As the conflict in Afghanistan escalated from 2006, observers more 
frequently wrote about the increasing death toll suffered by British forces. The 
apparent lack of a clear justification for the deployment of military force was made 
more obvious by the ‘waste’ of soldiers’ lives: 
 
I think that we should bring all the troops home from these two countries [Afghanistan and Iraq]; 
I don’t really feel that they are achieving anything and too many young lives are being wasted in 
these campaigns. I feel that this is Tony Blair’s fault by agreeing with everything George Bush 
said. I wonder how Blair or Bush would feel now, if their sons were coming home seriously 
wounded, or dead? Every day there seems to be the announcement in the media of another young 
soldier’s death and they don’t always mention his comrades who were wounded and who will 
have to live the rest of their lives with missing limbs and other horrendous injuries. When these 
young men are older and frailer will they be cared for and given the help they most certainly will 
need by the country that sent them to war?
663  
 
In fact, the war in Afghanistan claimed more British lives than any of the other conflicts I 
consider within this research, and it represented the largest loss of British soldiers within 
a single overseas operation since the Korean War.664 Between 2001 and 2014 some 454 
British personnel were killed in Afghanistan.665 Their repatriation through the Wiltshire 
town of Wootton Bassett became an important aspect of observers’ responses during this 
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period.666 As Anthony King has argued, public reception of Afghanistan’s returning war 
dead revealed a departure from previous modes of remembrance and represented a shift 
toward a more personalised and domesticated process of military commemoration.667 
Personal empathy was a key feature of observers’ responses, yet for some, this was linked 
to a critical evaluation of the utility of Britain’s interventions in those regions: 
 
But still we have wars, the repatriations of bodies through the streets of Wootton Bassett in 
Wiltshire, the names read out on the radio, the bickering about whether or not we have enough 
helicopters in Afghanistan, whether said helicopters have enough armour, whether there are enough 
ground troops; on and on it goes, more deaths, more reactionary terrorism here at home, more 
troops, more propaganda that we’re doing the right thing etc. Not much in the way of questioning 
‘why we’re there’?668 
 
In previous conflicts, particularly that in Kosovo in 1999, observers had in some cases 
suggested that the use of ground forces was preferably to aerial bombardment as it was 
perceived to be a more legitimate and humane method of warfare. While observers 
perhaps did not see either the Kosovo or Afghanistan conflicts necessarily as a stark 
choice between air or land operations, it is evident that as casualties mounted observers 
willingness to support ground combat was tested too. In Kosovo it could not be known 
how observers would have reacted to the use of infantry and ground forces, or a lengthy 
conflict or occupation, as these remained hypothetical. In Afghanistan, when such 
operations became realised, they were not popular. However, the loss of British soldiers 
was always considered alongside the reasons for their loss. Again, observers were unsure 
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why British soldiers were dying in increasing numbers during the later stages of the 
Afghanistan War: 
 
The war in Afghanistan was supposed to be a war on terror with the direct aim of capturing Bin 
Laden and destroying Al-Quaida. Seven years later we still hear daily about the fighting, the loss 
of life and the casualties but no a mention of the two things which spawned the action… Most 
people I speak with associate the occupation with the opium production. The opium fields of 
Afghanistan provide the West with drugs which are destroying society and causing a massive 
increase in criminal activity. If it is this which we are partly trying to wipe out can we, after all 
the years of fighting and all the loss of young soldiers’ lives, actually see any difference?669 
 
Likewise, other observers believed the repatriation of those killed in Afghanistan drew 
attention to the futility or illegitimacy of the conflict itself: 
 
The number of military personnel killed as the result of our presence in Afghanistan has now 
reached 165 (on May 31st), with 12 souls being lost this month alone. Many people throughout the 
country are asking a) why are we there? B) what is it costing when this country is in such dire 
economic straits? And C) what have we achieved and what can we hope to achieve by being there? 
Answers, if there can be any, on a postcard please to a certain G. Brown and T. Blair.
670 
 
Elsewhere in the world British soldiers continue to die and receive horrendous injuries in 
Afghanistan, and were set to keep dying as the year progressed. It was a futile conflict if ever there 
was one. If only politicians had more interest in the past.
671 
 
By 2008 and 2009, observers were increasingly focused on the deaths of British 
soldiers.672 While most were careful not to criticise the character of soldiers or undermine 
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their sacrifice, many described their deaths through a language of waste and futility, in 
some cases focusing on the town of Wootton Basset as a site of repatriation. The prospect 
of increasing military deaths from 2006 did not delegitimise the conflict itself, but meant 
observers focused with greater urgency on why Britain was continuing to fight it. This 
growth in concern for frontline soldiers also demonstrates an important factor in 
observers’ collected responses, namely the much greater focus on the British Army 
relative to either its Naval or Air forces in the later periods of occupation in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. The specific military contexts of both, widely conceptualised by observers 
as counter-insurgency or ‘guerrilla’ wars, reintroduced the central figure of the frontline 
soldier, resulting in a more personal and sympathetic account of military combat673 
relative to the sanitised and ethically ambiguous aerial bombardments pursued in previous 
conflicts. 
 Observers imagined what the war was like and, as in all conflicts I have 
considered in this research, representations of Britain’s ground forces specifically often 
stressed the qualities of ‘soldier heroes’; courage, discipline, professionalism, 
determination and martial prowess.674 The pervasive characterisation of soldiers as the 
victims of governmental or elite failures – victims of the war which they were sent to 
fight – demonstrates how observers were mostly concerned with reconciling a belief in 
Britain’s celebrated and legitimate identity as a military power, and a widespread belief in 
the heroic identity of military personnel, with its contemporary role in a complicated, 
ambiguous or unwarranted conflict in Afghanistan. Soldiers were increasingly described 
                                                                                                                                                              
672 British forces sustained casualties much more rapidly following the redeployment to Helmand Province, 
peaking in 2009. See: BBC News, “UK military deaths in Afghanistan”, 2015. Online, available at: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10634173 (Accessed 04/10/2016). 
673 For a consideration of the ways in which contemporary conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq have reordered 
the manner in which military sacrifice and remembrance are constituted within Britain, see: King, “The 
Afghan War”.  
674 The Soldier-Hero is a figure with a broader history and pedigree. I suggest here that such imagery and 
imagination was rekindled, at least within observers’ responses, by involvement in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
Wars. See: Dawson, Soldier Heroes, 1. 
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by observers as an embodiment of Britain’s identity in the conflict itself; led into 
unjustifiable violence by political failure. The redeployment to Helmand, centred on the 
frontline forces of the British Army, revealed how observers conceived of military service 
as an important marker for Britain’s identity, sustained by but separable from 
contemporary circumstance, despite “only a tiny proportion of the population [having 
had] any direct experience of the army as it is today”.675  
  However, it is important to emphasise that observers’ perspectives on the British 
military were framed heavily by the conflict in Iraq which was understood by most 
observers who wrote about it to have been unjustified. Observers who wrote about 
soldierly victimhood in Afghanistan from 2006 often did so with controversial invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, and its subsequent decent into bloody occupation, in mind. Thus it is 
particularly striking to note how the specific circumstances of Britain’s longest and 
bloodiest single engagement for over fifty years were so easily elided with the less costly 
campaign (in terms of British fatalities) in Iraq,676 and elicited little discussion 
specifically when compared to the other cases I have considered in this research. 
Observers were not worried about body-counts or military outcomes alone. Instead, the 
material costs of the war were interpreted in light of its legitimacy, what was known 
about its circumstances, and how it related to Britain’s past and identity. Observers were 
generally unsure about the legitimacy of the war in Afghanistan, at least in its early 
stages, and rapidly began to focus instead on the Iraq War; a conflict which observers 
discussed with much greater clarity. Though the perceived circumstances and outcomes 
of the Afghanistan War engendered an interpretation of victimhood, this was always 
                                                     
675 Antony Beevor, “The Army and Modern Society”, in The British Army, Manpower and Society into the 
Twenty-First Century, edited by Hew Strachan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 66. 
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foregrounded by broader perceptions of legitimacy, which were in turn affected heavily 
by observers’ interpretations of the contemporaneous war in Iraq.  
 
Leaders, Leadership and Tony Blair 
 
As in previous cases, observers related the Afghanistan war to the leadership of the Prime 
Minister. Writing in the immediate wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, some 
were clearly enthused by his decisive action and wrote about his leadership favourably. 
They described the Blair government as an active player in the international sphere, 
helping to orchestrate a military response in Afghanistan: 
 
Tony Blair’s speech at the labour party conference was dynamic. He has picked up the message of 
the friends and relations of those who died on September 11th, that their memory requires a targeted 
response to the fanatics but also a targeted response to the causes of fanaticism... Tony Blair did the 
right thing in going to talk to all the Arab countries. He took on the chin their candid opinions in 
public but said they were more amenable in private. He may be classed as Bush’s envoy but now we 
know what Syria’s and other Arab leaders think.677  
 
In a manner similar to previous responses to the Kosovo intervention, Blair was often 
considered to be an active force on the international scene, regardless of their perceived 
effectiveness: 
 
Tony Blair goes to the east to try and keep up the support of the Muslim allies and get the peace 
talks going again in Israel but he is not very successful. All the Muslims seem to think there is 
too much bombing in Afghanistan and too many civilians being killed.
678   
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Mr Blair seems to have been all over the world. I think he has tried to act as peacemaker but in 
this country the media have rounded on him especially since things are not exactly perfect at 
home.
679  
 
Such responses revealed a continuity between responses written in 1999 and those written 
in 2001 and 2002. The Blair government was considered on the whole to be an active 
force in the international sphere and Britain’s position as a bridge between various parties 
was viewed favourably by most observers. Indeed, in only one case during the initial 
intervention in Afghanistan did an observer complain that “Blair was hoping for a 
Falklands Factor.”680 In the immediate wake of the September 11th attacks, observers 
characterised Blair as a leader attempting to lead in a complex situation and were, despite 
broad scepticism regarding the military intervention in Afghanistan, sympathetic to his 
efforts. 
 However, far fewer observers discussed leadership in relation to Afghanistan 
compared to those who connected it to the previous Falklands War, or, crucially, to the 
immediately subsequent invasion of Iraq. This is due, I argue, to a pervasive perception 
that the intervention in Afghanistan was particularly difficult to make sense of. Few 
observers were assured of its justification and therefore few made specific judgements 
about the Blair government’s decision to commit British forces. Observers who wrote 
about Blair’s leadership were focused primarily, as they had been during the Kosovo 
crisis, on his attempts to build multi-lateral and international consensus following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks, rather than the specifics of a military operation which 
they widely characterised as peripheral and difficult to make sense of. This brief window 
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of support from observers was largely shattered with the onset of the Iraq crisis, during 
which most were highly critical of Blair’s policies and, importantly, associated him 
personally with a desire to use military force without justification. It is interesting to note 
in retrospect the apparent support for the Blair government’s foreign policy and 
leadership style during the Kosovo intervention in the initial response to the 11 
September attacks. Within responses written throughout this period Blair seemed to 
embody for some observers a sense of national importance, increased diplomatic activity 
or a heightened British world role.  
 
The USA and the Absence of Diplomacy  
 
Unlike responses to previous directives, observers did not discuss the United Nations or 
other international institutions at length. In fact, as I have alluded to above, they often 
conceived of the Afghanistan War as one that was largely peripheral for Britain. This 
sentiment was articulated parallel to a representation of the conflict as one that was not 
particularly diplomatically controversial or divisive. This was a result, I suggest, of the 
circumstance of the initial intervention against the Taliban having been directed at an 
unrecognised regime.681  
What observers wrote about the international context during the Afghanistan War 
centred on discussion of Britain’s ally in the conflict, the United States. They wrote how 
“My real worry is that as long as we are tied to the US we could become targets of so 
called terrorists”682 and “I don’t like us being jackal to the American tiger.”683 Observers 
                                                     
681 The intervention in Afghanistan took place against the Islamic Emirate which was – in 2001 – only 
recognised by Pakistan. Certainly, the strategic interest of the leading international powers, notably Russia 
and China, aligned over the issue which further dampened the possibility of diplomatic dispute. See: 
Rashid, Taliban, 5. 
682 MO W2588, female, born 1923. 
683 MO H2410, female, born 1929.  
251 
 
 
 
suggested that the Afghanistan War was the product of purely American interests and 
revealed an American identity that was aggressive, irrational and reactionary: 
 
The war in Afghanistan is a war of American revenge and expansion. ‘If you are not with us, you are 
against us’ says it all.684  
 
…but I think the current events in Iraq and Afghanistan will make us more enemies and lead to more 
attacks on the West, not less, especially because we are so tied to the Americans who are so ignorant 
of the outside world and arrogant about imposing their own values on other countries.
685 
 
On Friday, 14th June, ‘The Guardian’ published a statement by 65 prominent Americans, including 
Noam Chomsky, Edward Said, etc. in which they stated their resistance to the rhetoric and public 
policy that has developed in the USA in the aftermath of 11th September. This comes as a breath of 
fresh air. What a relief it is to discover that there seems to be a burgeoning campaign against 
undemocratic American government hegemony. Their statement is headed ‘We won’t deny our 
Consciences’…686  
 
Some observers clearly felt that association with American policy not only revealed 
Britain’s weakness, but was not in Britain’s interests.  
The conflict was, of course, placed within the broader context of the War on 
Terror declared by President George Bush as a response to the September 11th attacks. 
While not denying the great suffering of that event, observers frequently interpreted 
reaction to it as an indication of the perceived differences in national identity: 
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If America could have done something quite outside their national character instead of swearing to 
get Bin Laden “dead or alive” within hours of the atrocities on 11th September they might have 
scuppered the ongoing organisations that are planning at this moment further acts of terrorism.
687  
 
No one in Britain is interested, we’ve had terrorist attacks here for years, mostly from the IRA and 
did America care. I’ve stayed on a farm, visited cafés and travelled on trains, been in pubs, I have 
not overheard a word about these attacks or of the actions, chiefly bombing, which America has 
taken. It is a non-event as far as the British public are concerned, and the huge media coverage is 
ignored.
688 
 
For another, a more sympathetic view of America’s military response to the September 
11th attacks was tempered by questioning perceptions of America abroad: 
 
The terrorist attacks galvanised American hearts and minds and ensured that the Middle East became 
top of the American agenda, after decades of dithering. America and allies could not possibly allow 
such an act to pass without retaliation. The Americans are right to actively seek out the terrorists 
who attacked them on 11th September but, and it is a big but, I feel that they should also be 
addressing the reason why they were attacked and this they appear to be ignoring… I feel very 
strongly that this is not being addressed, and I really resent the American attitude that if you do not 
agree with them 100% you must be against them.
689 
 
Within several responses the United States formed an important part of observers’ 
discussions and revealed specific ideas about the differences between America and 
Britain. The American reaction to the September 11th attacks and their immediate move to 
use military force was perceived as evidence of a belligerent, irrational and overbearing 
character. Observers dissatisfaction with Britain’s obviously junior position formed the 
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basis of a construction of American identity which could be contrasted with British 
moderation, tolerance, understanding and caution. 
For one observer, the contemporary contrast in national characters was linked to 
historical differences: 
 
No I do not think the whole world has changed since the horrific destruction of the world trade 
centre. Just as many people have been killed in other parts of the world and we have seen similar 
destruction and chaos in London during the Blitz for instance. I think the difference has been that 
this happened in America. No one has invaded or attacked the USA so naturally they were horrified 
and indignant.
690  
 
The circumstance of Britain’s involvement in the Afghanistan War, and its link to the 11 
September attacks, gave this observer an opportunity not only to attribute particular ideas 
of identity, but also to construct a narrative of British history rooted in the familiarity and 
moral clarity of British resistance during the Blitz.691 
 It is important to note that such responses were however, few in number and 
generally limited to the 2001 and 2002 directives. Though some individuals did engage in 
constructing narratives of British or American identity, based on sharp distinctions 
between the two, the characterisation of the conflict as one that was peripheral or poorly 
understood was reflected in the relative dearth of observers discussions of allied Others. 
They were, as with most aspects of the Afghanistan War, unable to clearly articulate a 
specific narrative of British identity during a conflict which was thought to be so complex 
and obscure.  
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The Enemy: Al Qaeda, the Taliban and Religious Extremism 
 
Observers characterised the Afghanistan conflict as one that affected cultural and 
domestic society in Britain. They focused on the religious and extremist character of the 
enemy faced in Afghanistan, and linked the Afghanistan conflict, the War on Terror, 
Britain’s domestic society and minority groups (namely, British Muslims). 
 In previous recent conflicts observers had identified a familiar enemy, framed by 
persistent referral to popular memories of Britain’s resistance to Nazi Germany and Adolf 
Hitler.692 Links between contemporary enemies and those in the past formed the basis of a 
construction of British identity rooted in moderation, tolerance and democracy. 
Concerning Afghanistan, responses were written much differently. They described an 
enemy that did not fit this familiar mould: 
 
[The aim of the military intervention is to] kill if possible Osama Bin Laden and Taliban members; 
are there 10,000 of them dotted around the Middle East, Pakistan, and elsewhere. Big, mainly 
American, task force already sailing the seas there and on friendly air bases. Newspapers full of 
predictions, war expectations, and pictures of armour, and the terrorists’ likely hiding places. Who 
reads this I believe very, very few are at all interested except the military minded.
693  
 
In another case, Bin Laden embodied the elusive and disparate character of the enemy: 
 
Meanwhile what of the great enemies Bin Laden and Al-Quaida? It appears that as little is known of 
the former today as was known eight months ago; it is no more clear whether he is dead or alive, or 
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indeed if he is, as was, in that country. He appears as a latter-day General Ned Ludd; a person who 
never existed, but whose ‘persona’ is needed by both sides...694  
 
The enemy faced in Afghanistan was described by observers as one operating below the 
level of the state, lacking control of state apparatus or an organised military force as the 
Galtieri, Hussein and Milosevic regimes had. They were a disparate group of individuals, 
without a diplomatic structure, who were able to hide within Afghanistan, and engage in 
guerrilla tactics.  The differences between this ‘new’ enemy and those that were more 
familiar were identified by one observer writing in 2003: 
 
The conflicts in both Iraq and Afghanistan are misguided by the initial idea that terror has to be put 
down with force. We have inherited that concept from President Bush. We are not dealing with an 
enemy in the same mode as those of the two world wars, but dedicated guerrilla fighters, kill one and 
another dozen take his place, no doubt in the belief that a heavenly reward will be given them. Try 
fighting an adversary with those concepts to guide them, very difficult indeed.
695 
 
As the conflict in Afghanistan intensified into a difficult occupation from 2006, observers 
remained interested in identifying Britain’s enemies and likewise did not describe their 
character or methods by reference to previous opponents or, importantly, popular 
memories of Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. Neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda could be easily 
understood as expansionary, aggressive or brutal dictatorships. Osama Bin Laden was 
often considered to be the figure-head of Britain’s opponents in Afghanistan, revealing a 
continued preference for focusing on a single specific individual in recent conflicts, but 
was thought to be an opponent unlike those encountered in Britain’s immediately 
previous military conflicts: 
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President Bush who appears to be confident of overwhelming terrorists in so many countries doesn’t 
appear to know any history – which I find very alarming. Afghanistan has been a problem for years 
– Bin Laden was not driven by poverty or envy of the West. He is/was a wealthy Saudi Arabian and 
his Al Quaida organisation obviously attracts fanatics.
696  
 
For one observer, Al Qaeda seemed particularly difficult to defeat military, given that 
they were so difficult to identify and were potentially shielded by allied states or regimes: 
 
I doubt any of this [including foreign interventions] will prevent terrorism which seems to have 
enjoyed a filip since the Afghanistan and Iraqi wars… Just because of the follies of Afghanistan and 
Iraq have resulted in radicalisation and associated terrorism, I do not feel as though this merits such 
limitations to UK citizens, the majority of whom did not wish to enter these conflicts in the first 
place. Most of the September 11th 2001 terrorists emanated from Saudi Arabia in any case, but we 
don’t see much in the way of sanctions, diplomatic moves or invasion there do we?697  
 
Observers condemned Al Qaeda and Bin Laden and lamented the prosecution of 
terrorism, but they also believed that Britain’s enemies could not easily be identified, 
captured or targeted. Observers sometimes identified Bin Laden as a figurehead for Al 
Qaeda and thus, Britain’s opponent in the Afghanistan War. Yet he was described as an 
elusive figure, more akin to an international criminal than an actor within the international 
system of states. His characterisation was indicative of the way in which observers 
thought about Britain’s enemies in the Afghanistan War; their method of operation was 
unfamiliar and could not be connected directly to Britain’s previous enemies or 
incorporated within a broader narrative of British identity rooted in resistance to 
dictatorship or fascism which prevailed among responses to previous directives.  
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Other observers were interested to explore exactly what motivated Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban. The answer was primarily religious fanaticism: 
 
It is not surprising that the people in the most god-forsaken countries are believers in a wonderful 
eternal life. Their time on earth is so miserable and hopeless that they put their faith in the hereafter. 
Give them food, water, education, housing and medicines, but most of all hope, instead of paradise 
to come. Religion used to work here in the UK to keep people obedient and enslaved with promise 
of heaven if you were ‘good’... Beliefs can enhance people’s perceptions of the needs of the country 
but cannot become the goal of legislation and still allow freedom of thought and expression of those 
of different beliefs.
698 
 
I can see that religious fanaticism is very dangerous. History shows this from time immemorial. 
How serious Jihad is I don’t know. I haven’t what I would consider good information about Islam. I 
know the basics, but they are complicated by local circumstances and patriotism probably distorts 
the words of the Koran. (I believe, for instance, that women were not obliged by Muhammed to wear 
the Burka. There is a great deal of ‘macho’ pressure in some countries). I was appalled to see a 
woman saying goodbye to her son – shown on TV news – as he set off on a suicide mission in Israel. 
She appeared to give him her blessing. Do they really believe that Paradise will be the reward?
699 
 
Observers were not dismissive of the Afghanistan War and wanted to understand who 
British forces were fighting and why. They described an opponent motivated by religious 
fundamentalism and attempted to explain the source of this ideology. For some, religious 
fanaticism was linked to a stereotypical account of a primitive, backward – ironically, 
‘God-forsaken’ – society in Afghanistan, while others took a more nuanced perspective in 
which religious ideology could not be separated easily from a range of factors 
exacerbating the expression of extremism or contemporary terrorism. What these 
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responses have in common however is an assessment of an enemy whose ideological or 
political motivation was difficult to fully comprehend or rationalise. This in itself is an 
important departure from what previous cohorts of observers wrote about Galtieri, 
Hussein and Milosevic. Those individuals were seen as brutal dictators; separate 
incarnations of a familiar fascistic or militaristic enemy, in many cases represented with 
clarity by persistent and direct comparison with popular memory of the ‘evil’ of Adolf 
Hitler. Neither the Taliban nor Al Qaeda was understood in this way. Observers 
conceived of an enemy in the Afghanistan War that was both elusive and lacked a state 
apparatus or military machine, but also one whose ideology was unfamiliar and unclear. 
The identification of an enemy motivated by an abstruse ‘religious fanaticism’ 
contributed to a difficulty in articulating Britain’s role in the conflict more broadly and 
did not permit the reconstruction of a narrative of national identity anchored in Britain’s 
legitimate entry into World War Two.  
Further, Al Qaeda in particular differed from previous enemies in that they were 
thought to pose a persistent and direct threat to civilians living in Britain and Western 
countries and were not confined to far-off warzones: 
 
There is depressing talk in the papers about Bin Laden being able to organise a ‘dirty’ bomb, 
uranium in a suitcase etc. which although nothing like as bad as a nuclear bomb would cause major 
disaster to smaller areas.
700 
 
I am… concerned about some idiot group getting hold of nuclear weaponry and nothing will protect 
us against blast and fallout… In a sense, I’m a little puzzled that there has been no terrorism aimed 
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at the UK given that Mr Blair has put us 100pc behind the US. I’d really rather parliament had had a 
vote on our involvement but as were stuck with it, we must be a target.
701  
 
Save for preceding fears related to Weapons of Mass Destruction before the end of the 
Gulf War, observers writing about previous conflicts did not suggest that contemporary 
opponents represented a direct threat to Britain. For observers, the Afghanistan War, as 
part of a broader effort against terrorism and extremism, yielded a threat to British people 
that had little precedent in more recent conflicts.702 
Further, for some observers this direct threat was conceived of not only as a threat 
to British people, but as a threat to British society or cultural norms. Some observers 
when attempting to make sense of the religious extremism represented by Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban, and the likelihood of terrorist attack, construed the war in Afghanistan with 
fears about extremists or minorities in Britain; “young British Muslims who have gone 
out to Pakistan… to join the Taliban”,703 or as another wrote after considering the effects 
of an intervention in Afghanistan: 
 
We now have to be on alert when we go out and about locally, due to a big increase in ‘car-
jackings’, muggings at knife point, and other crimes similar, which are mainly being carried out by 
Asian youths, around the Bradford area, against the white population, and since September 11th, this 
has increased.
704  
 
Observers often tied the war in Afghanistan to race and ethnicity within British society. 
This was not the case among responses submitted to previous directives. Enemies in the 
Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo wars and the initial invasion of Iraq had been represented in 
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fundamentally similar ways, but also shared the quality of being far-away, removed from 
British society, and therefore distinctly other. This was not the case in Afghanistan where 
the prospect of terrorism and religious extremism was often connected to Britain’s 
multicultural society and groups that were thought to pose a threat from within it. It was 
not characterised as a threat to the British nation, the international system or neighbouring 
states, but the British people and its domestic society. This could be read in another 
response in which Britain’s war in Afghanistan prompted a misinformed conflation of 
domestic terrorism, asylum, immigration and welfare payments: 
 
The average British citizen only has to look at the way we deal with those who stir up race hatred to 
feel the government is not dealing with the rise of those who threaten this country and what it stands 
for. In fact our government with the aid of human rights rewards them with somewhere to live and 
benefits equivalent to £10,000 a year. The government also provides their families with 
accommodation which many who work their socks off in menial but worthwhile jobs would give 
their right hand to have and give people who are a threat to our country, our democracy and whole 
way of life, more to live on than those slaving away, sometimes at two jobs as my daughter has, are 
ever able to earn.
705 
 
For another observer, the repatriation of those killed in Afghanistan involved divisions 
along religious lines. Protests by ‘a small Muslim group’ further undermined a sense of 
homogeneity or unity within Britain. The Afghanistan War intruded on domestic politics. 
The military sacrifices made overseas by British soldiers meant it was possible for 
Muslims to ‘come to’ Britain, though of course exactly where the protestors were born 
was not considered: 
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More recently we have watched the seemingly steady flow of bodies of military casualties from the 
war in Afghanistan returning to RAF Brize Norton and the corteges passing through the town of 
Wootton Bassett with the townspeople lining the route. This started as a local impromptu affair but 
more and more people have joined this show of pride in and support for our armed forces. It was 
therefore all the more disagreeable to see the anti-military protest by a small Muslim group. They 
need to be reminded that it was the predominantly young soldiers, sailors and airmen who have 
made sure that they have been able to come to this country and be given the chance to make such a 
protest. I can accept that there are people who disagree with the war but a funeral is not the place to 
show it.706 
 
I do not suggest here that observers were more inclined to prejudicial attitudes in the 
wake of the Afghanistan War than among previous cohorts, nor is it the case that such 
views are widespread among observers. However, discussions of race, culture, ethnicity, 
immigration or religion were not a feature of responses to previous directives in which 
state-led dictatorship, tyranny or fascism were considered to be the object of British force 
or part of contemporary crises. The above responses reveal how the specific 
circumstances of the Afghanistan War, and the interpretation of a terrorist, fanatic enemy, 
prompted a focus on and connection with Britain’s domestic society that was 
unprecedented within collected responses.  
 While I am aware that there is voluminous and important scholarship dedicated to 
exploring the ways in which British identity interacts with race, ethnicity and culture in 
contemporary Britain,707 I do not seek here to explore directly connections between these 
entities. Suffice it to say that, in the context of what observers wrote about Britain’s 
recent wars specifically, race, ethnicity and religion came to occupy a more prominent 
position in what they wrote. This does not reflect any material changes in the make-up or 
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nature of British society - something which I am not able to comment on within the 
context of this research – but that it does reflect a material change in the ways in which 
observers connected British identity to its recent military conflicts. 
 It is important to stress that not all observers were critical of ethnic minorities or 
immigrants, or viewed British Muslims as a potential fifth column. In other cases, 
observers lamented the apparent social disturbance resulting from Britain’s involvement 
in the Afghanistan War and the ‘War on Terror’: 
 
A friend and I, shopping in Batley, West Yorkshire, are served by a Muslim girl, in traditional grey 
and black complete with head covering (but not a burqa) and with a local accent. Wonder how she 
feels. Daren’t ask her. Here in the North-East, Sikhs at the local temple try to explain that it’s not 
their fight, after some nasty incidents. How can people be so ignorant? And, up here, ignorant means 
not only not knowing something but being ill-mannered too.
708 
 
I saw quite an interesting programme last week – Melvyn Bragg, two Muslims, one of them an 
advisor to the White House, one author and one journalist. The discussion was at quite a high level 
and informative, but again you could sense the frustrations of the Muslims – the debate was still very 
much run on WASP [White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant] assumptions.
709  
 
Again however, such responses show how the conflict in Afghanistan and the enemies 
confronted within it were connected to domestic society. Britain did not face another 
state, with a readily identifiable ideology or agenda. Contemporary terrorism offered a 
more elusive and fluid opponent, but also one that engendered discussion of religion or 
ethnicity within British society. Unlike previous conflicts, the enemy could not be 
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roundly condemned as far-off, other and alien, nor could they be understood any more 
clearly by invocations of fascism, Nazism, dictatorship or the person of Adolf Hitler.  
 As I have discussed within the introduction to this research, it is not possibly to 
know the precise religious or ethnic identities of observers. Yet the bias toward the white, 
English, southern middle class is an established feature of the archive. While the 
responses considered above reveal a range of views – certainly only a minority offered 
overtly prejudicial or racist assertions – it is evident that the contemporary context of the 
Afghanistan War elicited a discussion of British identity in which other layers of ethnic 
and religious identity were thought to be important. Whether through abuse, curiosity or 
criticism, observers wrote about Islam and British Muslims in a manner that was not 
apparent within responses to previous directives. They did not discuss fascism, 
dictatorship or state diplomacy because they were not relevant. It was thus difficult to 
narrate Britain’s opposition or resistance to a definitive Other against which a sense of 
homogeneity or unity could be constructed. While the ethnic structure of British society 
had not radically altered between 1999 and 2001, the ways in which military conflicts 
were linked to domestic society did, due primarily to their perceived circumstances, and 
the manner in which they were understood as markers of national identity.  
 Here then is the particular significance of the Afghanistan War within the context 
of this research. The War on Terror offered a context in which popular memories of 
British resistance to fascism and Nazi Germany in World War Two retained little 
relevance. When confronted with Al Qaeda and the Taliban observers were not sure what 
exactly motivated them, or what exactly they wanted, beyond a diffuse and abstract 
assertion of ‘religious fanaticism’ or belief in an afterlife. In the absence of an organised, 
identifiable enemy, whose ideological and political perspectives could be clarified 
through historical precedent, observers frequently made more uncomfortable and 
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challenging connections with domestic society and politics. Thus the specific context of 
Afghanistan War left observers without a secure narrative of identity, reinforced by the 
articulation of celebrated and familiar popular memories. Lacking the re-invocation of a 
‘ubiquitous’ Hitler,710 the Afghanistan War represents a radical departure from previous 
cases because of the much different ways in which observers constructed British identity 
within it. It did not permit a retreat into a secure narrative of British identity which 
centred on a fundamentally moral distinction between British tolerance, moderation and 
democracy, and the evils of Nazi aggression, brutality and totalitarianism.711  
 
Conclusions 
 
Representations of Britain’s war in Afghanistan differed from previous recent conflicts 
within collected responses. In fact, observers were generally less concerned about the 
Afghanistan War by comparison, describing it as a confusing, complex or peripheral 
engagement. This cannot be explained by material or political circumstance alone. In fact, 
as I explain above, the conflict was notable in the course of Britain’s recent history 
because of its length and its significant material and human cost. Though the period 
immediately following the initial intervention may have elicited less media or political 
focus, the increasing prominence of the war from 2006, as it claimed more British lives, 
did not seem to alter its relative importance within responses, particularly when compared 
to the much greater salience attributed to the invasion of Iraq. 
Instead, observers found it difficult to clarify Britain’s involvement in the 
Afghanistan War by including it within a broader narrative of British identity. Most 
importantly here, and in sharpest contrast to responses concerning the other conflicts I 
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consider in this research, it is memories of Britain’s Second World War that were absent. 
In order for the war in Afghanistan to be understood clearly it had to be interpreted 
coherently as a British experience; more than the sum total of the individuals deployed 
their or caught in its violence or politics. Without widespread referral to past events or 
conflicts which could offer a direct explanation in the present, the aims of British policy, 
the legitimacy of the conflict, and Britain’s role within it could not be clarified by 
comparison, connection or contrast. It is not the ways in which popular memories of the 
past were reconstructed or re-invoked by observers which distinguishes the Afghanistan 
War among the cases selected, but that popular memories of past wars – most notably 
related to World War Two - were rarely invoked at all.  
 Of course, this again demonstrates the extent to which contemporary 
circumstance, memory and identity were intrinsically linked when observers considered 
the use of British military force, and that it was the particular circumstances of the 
Afghanistan War that explained the comparative absence of popular memories that had 
been apparent in responses concerning previous cases. During the Falklands, Gulf and 
Kosovo conflicts (and the initial invasion of Iraq which is discussed in the next chapter), 
even among those who rejected the legitimacy of force, contemporary circumstances 
could be understood by referring to Britain’s legitimate and celebrated part in resistance 
against Nazi Germany. In particular, aggression and abuse on the part of the state – be it 
Argentina, Iraq or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – could be understood by reference 
to the abuses of the Nazi regime. Contemporary dictators were pervasively characterised 
by similarity with Adolf Hitler; their motivations and ideologies were understood to be 
similar and thus, more obviously illegitimate. Likewise, these enemies could be 
considered totally ‘other’, constructed in binary opposition to a unified and singular 
British resistance. Questions remained only about where exactly the standard for using 
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military force should lie; did contemporary abuse or aggression merit the use of force? 
Was it congruent with Britain’s history of resistance to dictators, tyrants or fascists? In 
Afghanistan, the circumstances of a conflict aimed at defeating terrorism rather than a 
specific aggression or political ideology, and defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda rather 
than a recognised regime or dictatorship, could not be explained any better by reference 
to World War Two or Nazi Germany, thus meaning observers more frequently 
characterised the conflict as complex, peripheral or a non-event. The circumstances of the 
War on Terror did not seem to engender the mobilisation of memories of Britain’s Second 
World War in the same way that they did, for example, in the United States where 
popular memory of the surprise attack on Pearl Harbour framed the destruction of the 
World Trade Center and thus offered a different perspective on the importance of the 
subsequent Afghan War.712 For observers, perceptions of military legitimacy and 
Britain’s historical identity were invested most heavily in an interpretation of the 
expansionist threat pose by Nazi Germany, and moral interpretation of the need to act in 
defence against such aggression. Neither seemed particularly relevant in relation to 
Operation Herrick. 
 From 2006, as the war in Afghanistan began to claim more British lives and 
engender a greater public focus, and the war in Iraq transitioned fully to a counter-
insurgency operation, observers remained unable and unwilling to invoke a celebrated 
British past or identity rooted in its Second World War. Instead they saw the Afghanistan 
War as one embedded more heavily in culture, race and religion, rather than politics or 
ideology. On the one hand they were clearly uncomfortable and less involved with this 
interpretation; the war was unclear, complex and generated fewer specific responses. Yet 
on the other, it represented a particular departure from previous conflicts, with observers 
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linking the warzone in Afghanistan to Britain’s domestic society. They were unable to 
reconstruct a certain or morally assured narrative of identity by resurrecting a familiar 
interpretation of a hostile, dictatorial, aggressive Other. While it might be acceptable to 
suggest that the Afghanistan case is relatively less important within the context of this 
research because it generated less interest among observers, it is surely more accurate to 
point out that this weak interest is the result of a fundamental (context-driven) shift in the 
way in which observers related Britain’s identity to contemporary conflict. Without 
widespread reference to Britain’s Second World War, the later years of the Afghanistan 
and Iraq conflicts represented a fragmentation of familiar ideas of British identity in the 
minds of observers, and a departure from trends that could be seen across responses 
concerning other recent conflicts. 
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The Iraq War 2003-2009 
 
Britain’s involvement in the Iraq War began with the US-led invasion in March 2003 and 
ended with withdrawal from combat operations in April 2009.713 Operation ‘Telic’ – the 
British codename for combat operations in Iraq – represented a significant deployment for 
the United Kingdom. Though committing a force just one tenth the size of the American 
contingent, Britain’s contribution to the initial invasion numbered some 25,000 military 
personnel. After the removal of the Iraqi regime in 2003, British forces maintained a 
sizeable presence – between four and five thousand combat troops at any one time – in 
the Shia-dominated south, focused on Iraq’s second city, Basra.714   
Telic was a shorter campaign than Herrick – the British deployment to 
Afghanistan – and claimed fewer British lives; 179 in total.715 However, the Iraq War is a 
notable case because of its controversial international and domestic context.716 The 
diplomatic divisions the invasion generated, without UN resolution or international 
consensus, mirrored the contested public debate which developed within Britain.717 The 
Iraqi regime was considered by Western intelligence agencies to be a specific security 
threat with a suspected stockpile of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and a history 
of their use on civilians. The British government took great effort to convince both the 
public in Britain and an international audience that the threat required armed intervention, 
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and was at pains to pursue a war with Iraq through multilateral means. The Blair 
government ultimately achieved neither of those aims.718  
The Iraq War has left a potent legacy within the domestic politics in Britain. 
Subsequent military interventions in Syria and Iraq have been conducted under ‘the 
shadow of Iraq’;719 a euphemism for a pervasive fear that the use of military force 
overseas would result in the same level of political controversy and operational 
difficulties as had been encountered from 2003. Indeed, it is a dynamic widely considered 
to have affected David Cameron’s decision to put intervention in Syria before parliament 
in a binding vote in 2013.720 Similarly, it is a matter of journalistic routine to ascribe the 
legacy of the Iraq War a prominent place within British party politics and leadership 
elections, particularly within the Labour Party.721 This fraught domestic context is 
perhaps surprising, given the shorter duration and lesser cost in lives the Iraq campaign 
accounted for when compared to the contemporaneous deployment in Afghanistan. 
Observers’ responses show, at a micro-level and in individual detail, how the Iraq War 
generated a much more potent political and social legacy because of the ways in which 
the conflict related to broader interpretations and understandings of Britain’s identity. 
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Observers were concerned less with the technicalities of government policy or military 
operations, and more with clarifying what British involvement in the invasion of Iraq 
revealed about Britain itself, and how it related to what observers knew about Britain’s 
history and past experience of war. 
I draw on a sample of 102 observers in this chapter. This figure is much higher 
than those considered in previous chapters. This is due largely to the more detailed and 
lengthier content of their responses, my ambition to achieve ‘saturation’ across a wide 
range of views,722 and the fact that the conflict lasted long enough to be included within 
multiple directives.723 I have not tracked the responses of a single group of observers 
through the 2002, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2009 and 2014 directives as most individuals only 
wrote responses to one or two. Instead I have drawn on a greater overall number of 
observers in order to capture perspectives across time. Furthermore, while I have included 
responses from nineteen observers from the generic ‘Issues in the News’ directives in 
2005, 2009 and 2014, the vast majority of observers considered in this chapter were 
writing in response to four separate directives: the two directives issued in the summer 
and autumn of 2002 which asked for observers’ views on “Iraq and US Foreign Policy” 
and “the possibility of war with Iraq” respectively; the Spring 2003 directive which 
included a sub-directive dedicated to “War with Iraq” asking observers to “note down 
your reactions and your opinions as and when you feel you can”; and the Summer 2008 
directive which included a sub-directive titled “War: experiences and reflections” and 
asked observers to comment on what they knew about war, how they found out about it, if 
they had experienced it, if they supported military charities, what they thought about 
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protests and how they engaged in commemoration and remembrance.724 The 2008 
directive also asked observers to “consider any historic conflicts you feel are relevant”. 
They responded by referring to a variety of cases, including most considered in this 
research, though they remained concerned primarily with the controversial invasion of 
Iraq which was seemingly still fresh in their minds. Consideration of responses from all 
of these directives meant that, in addition to giving a broad range of views from 
observers, reactions to the Iraq War could be analysed at all points from build-up in 2002, 
to invasion in 2003, and withdrawal in 2009; an important requirement when considering 
the manner in which changing circumstances in Iraq affected how observers related it to 
narratives and ideas of British identity. 
Most who wrote about the Iraq War were, even among those submitting to the 
earliest directives in 2002, not yet born during the 1930s and 1940s,725 or at least, could 
not draw on lived experience of that era. Yet responses concerning the initial invasion of 
Iraq contrast those concerning the Afghanistan War because of the clarity with which 
observers narrated Britain’s involvement, and the manner in which this clarity was 
assured by persistent invocation of popular memories of Britain’s Second World War. 
Observers were once again concerned with the legitimacy of the war, its military 
outcomes, the status of soldiers, domestic leadership and the international situation and 
other states. They were however, highly critical of Britain’s contribution to the invasion. 
They invoked Britain’s resistance to Nazi Germany most often as part of a contrast in 
which the present use of military force could be explained as both unjustified, but also a 
departure or deviation from a broader, morally secure narrative of historical British 
identity. Only after the initial invasion and the toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime, 
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when popular memory of Britain’s Second World War ceased to offer any particular 
explanatory power over the present, did these connections fragment.    
 
Legitimacy 
 
Similarly to responses concerning all the conflicts I consider in this research, observers 
who wrote about the Iraq War were concerned about its legitimacy and whether Britain 
was justifiably using military force. Unlike those immediately previous however, notably 
the initial intervention in Afghanistan and Britain’s involvement in the Kosovo War, 
observers were clear about the Iraq invasion. The vast majority were highly critical of 
Britain’s participation in the US-led invasion and, though based on a variety of reasons, 
offered definitive conclusions. Few were supportive or, importantly, equivocal about the 
legitimacy of the military campaign.  
 Indeed, of the 102 observers whose responses I have considered in this chapter, 
just eleven did not articulate a specific conclusion on whether the war was justified or not. 
Typical examples were marked by an explicit and intense difficulty in reconciling 
arguments for the use of force and those against: 
 
…should we stand up for justice for all? I want peace but are we prepared to stand back and wash 
our hands? I wish that there were more facts to go on but at some point there have to be people like 
presidents and prime ministers to make judgements.
726  
 
This is a difficult one. I don’t know what I think about the war. I wish it had not happened but – I 
did not take part in the anti-war demonstration on 15th February, because I am not certain enough to 
take any such action... I find it a bit irritating when people assume that of course I am opposed to the 
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war. I am afraid we have got ourselves in a corner there from which it is going to be difficult to get 
out with any credibility.
727 
 
Accounts like these, in which observers explained how they could not decide whether 
Britain should be using military force or not, were relatively common in regard to the 
contemporaneous war in Afghanistan. In relation to Iraq, they represented a very small 
number of collected responses. Those who did narrate the legitimacy of the invasion in 
this way were writing primarily during the crisis period before the invasion, or during the 
initial military operations. Few observers remained unsure as the military situation in Iraq 
appeared to worsen.  
Likewise, very few observers, as a proportion of those writing, believed that the 
conflict was fully justified and that it was right for Britain to use military force against 
Iraq. Twelve observers were supportive, though the ways in which they explained their 
views varied. Some, writing in 2002, clearly felt that the threat posed by Iraq’s alleged 
WMD programme was sufficient justification to use military force.728 They wrote that 
“Saddam Hussein is dangerous and determined to use his frightening arsenal of 
weapons”729 and that “He has an array of scientists who have been conducting 
experiments with chemical and biological weapons”.730 Another observer wrote a 
response typical of the minority who supported the invasion before March 2003: 
  
I think this has much to do with the fact that I feel my own feelings are probably out of touch with 
what the media has persuaded me and the rest of the British public believe. I have never wanted to 
see British soldiers fighting in Iraq or anywhere else in the Middle East. However I do feel, and have 
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always felt, that Saddam Hussein’s regime is a threat to peace, not only in the Middle East, but also 
in the world generally. He has had twelve years in which to disarm and stop producing and acquiring 
chemical weapons.
731 
 
However, as the invasion turned into occupation, and the limited extent of Iraq’s WMD 
threat became apparent, observers were naturally less likely to suggest that destroying 
Iraq’s unconventional weapons justified the use of military force. However, some 
continued to emphasise the legitimacy of removing the Hussein regime on humanitarian 
grounds: 
 
I agreed we should go to war with Iraq and found the BBC news reporting so irritating I started 
watching ITV News. I feel very sorry for the soldiers trying to cope with a people who have been 
treated as though it was the middle ages by their own leader. It will take a long time to get things 
straight. I hope Saddam Hussein is found.
732  
 
I would love to be anti-war but not going into Iraq would have condemned vast numbers to more 
violence... I believe in intervention and do not go along with the concept of an inviolate nation 
state.
733 
 
Like responses to previous conflicts, a minority of observers were clearly swayed most 
heavily by the possibility of humanitarian intervention, and characterised the Iraq War as 
a legitimate effort to liberate the Iraqi people and address their suffering under the 
Hussein regime. Another observer characterised the conflict against Iraq as one 
reminiscent of the defeat of Nazi Germany. Though very few observers were supportive 
of Britain’s participation, the response is indicative of the extent to which popular 
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memories of Britain’s involvement in the Second World War were thought to retain a 
particular relevance. Perspectives on the legitimacy of the contemporary conflict could be 
clarified by direct connection to a morally clear and assured use of military force in the 
past: 
 
It is like Hitler and the Nazis all over again. In that instance we and other countries held back till it 
was nearly too late. Only terrible loss of life stopped him. Saddam Hussein is the master of cunning 
and double talk. He’s got many of the Arab states on his side.734 
 
When compared to the contemporaneous war in Afghanistan, observers were far more 
likely to draw on popular memories of previous conflicts, including entry into the Second 
World War, and a specific narrative in which appeasement was again reconstructed as a 
failure to deal with a dangerous enemy soon enough.  
Some who supported the Iraq invasion drew on British involvement in the 
preceding Gulf War and suggested that, having failed to remove Hussein from power in 
1991, the current Iraq War represented a legitimate corrective: 
 
In my view it was ten years too late. George Bush senior allowed himself to be hamstrung by the 
Arab involvement when Iraq was removed from Kuwait. A vast swathe of the Shia population was 
misled by the US into thinking that an uprising against Saddam would be assisted. It is no wonder 
that there is now an anti-American feeling in many parts of the country.
735 
 
Our biggest mistake was not dealing with him properly at the end of the first Gulf war when the 
opportunity presented itself. However that is now in the past and it seems to me, that he has to be 
stopped now. It is no good bemoaning the fact that we had our chance 12 years ago. There is nothing 
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we can do to change the situation of 12 years ago, but we can try and stop his regime now. He has 
killed up to 2 million of his own people, so would not hesitate to kill other people.
736 
 
Evidently, observers who supported the Iraq War based their opinions on a wide range of 
interpretations and factors; they did not simply accept the official case based on the 
existence of Iraqi WMD. Indeed, a striking feature of these responses, aside from their 
being only a fraction of an overwhelmingly critical sample, is the fact that the American 
and British governments’ case for war informed so few responses, despite the widespread 
subsequent belief that the controversy surrounding the Iraq War – at least in Britain – was 
a product of its prosecution “on a false prospectus.”737 
 Indeed, the ‘false prospectus’ argument assumes that support for the Iraq War 
hinged on a perception of political failure; that those who supported a war to disarm Iraq 
were subsequently disenchanted when the true extent of Iraq’s WMD became known. For 
observers however, it is important to note that the threat posed by Iraq’s possible WMD 
programme was frequently dismissed as a justification for war before the conflict took 
place: 
 
I’m sure the Iraqi regime is dangerous for its own people and they may well have weapons of mass 
destruction but I don’t think anyone has provided enough proof of these weapons… and we seem 
unwilling to give the weapons inspectors the extra time they want.
738 
 
For another, even if Iraq did possess Weapons of Mass Destruction it would not 
necessarily justify a military conflict to disarm the Hussein regime: 
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If Iraq is supposed to have these weapons of mass destruction and have been building them up for 12 
years, I fear they would have used them by now. What about America? They certainly have 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, can we all demand to have inspectors there? And make them disarm! 
I don’t think so.739 
 
Observers writing before the conflict were as likely to be sceptical about official claims, 
or the existence of Iraqi WMD, as a justification for war as they were to support it. In 
fact, so many observers were unequivocally critical of Britain’s participation in the 
invasion of Iraq – eighty-one – that those who supported it, on whatever grounds, were 
necessarily always in a minority. The vast majority of observers did not support the war 
and, crucially, most had decided that they were against it before it began in March 2003.  
 Why exactly were observers so against British participation in the invasion of 
Iraq? Evidently, observers objected for a variety of reasons. Much of what they wrote in 
this regard had precedent within responses to previous directives. Once again, observers 
were often worried that the use of force in Iraq would be needlessly destructive, despite 
the abhorrent nature of Hussein’s regime, and could not be justified while peaceful or 
diplomatic options remained available to modify his actions or behaviour. Writing during 
the crisis period in 2002, some observers stressed that “[a] lot of people live in [Iraq] and 
they have a difficult enough time already [without war]”740 and that “[t]he Americans and 
the British or anyone else have no right to invade Iraq, and cause yet more bloodshed and 
suffering to the Iraqis”.741 Another wrote similarly: 
 
A war with Iraq will spark off terrible unrest in the Middle East and almost certainly will cause great 
suffering to those people already living under the most appalling conditions. The Iraqi people are 
currently starving and oppressed and the world health organisation predicts that a war could kill 
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upwards of five million people – either through the direct bombing, or through starvation and 
disease in the aftermath.
742 
 
As the campaign began, observers who objected to the war on these grounds felt 
vindicated as the destructive power unleashed by the US-led forces was revealed: 
 
As expected, this war caused the death and injuries of thousands of innocent civilians in Iraq as well 
as many casualties among the US and UK troops.
743 
 
I find that I lie awake at night, unable to dismiss from my mind the picture of the little boy with both 
arms blown off and his whole family killed. The fact that the war seems to be nearly over, that Iraq 
has been ‘conquered’, is no compensation for the terrible devastation, the loss of life, the destruction 
of priceless buildings and of people’s homes, the uncontrolled looting and the starvation.744  
 
Like those who had written about previous conflicts, a small number of observers 
believed that the use of force undermined any possibility of humanitarianism. They were 
often highly critical of the Iraqi regime, but believed that the contingencies and nature of 
armed conflict precluded its use while for a humanitarian purpose.  
 Other observers were concerned more specifically with the politics and diplomacy 
of the Iraq invasion. For them the nature of modern warfare was not a central feature of 
responses. Instead, the legitimacy of the conflict had to be understood within the specific 
circumstance of the Iraq crisis. As in the previous Gulf conflict, this was manifested 
within many responses as a suspicion that Western, namely American, interests in 
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securing oil reserves were really driving the move to war. 745 Observers wrote variously 
that the invasion seemed “more to do with oil and command of the Arab states”,746 that 
“It is surely about oil”747 or that “I do not know a single person who believes that this war 
is about anything other than American foreign policy and oil.”748 After the initial invasion 
one observer described the war as an acquisition by powerful American interests: 
 
The oil companies want cheap oil. The contracts for rebuilding Iraq are to be awarded mainly to 
American companies. One company associated with the vice president is rumoured to be doing quite 
well out of the arrangement. It would not surprise me to learn that McDonalds have the contract for 
feeding the troops and Disney has signed up for the film rights.
749 
 
Though the Iraq crisis and war represented a new and much different set of 
circumstances, some observers evidently focused their discussions of legitimacy on ideas 
that had been articulated by observers writing responses to previous directives. The 
destructive potential of modern war and the possibility of ulterior, largely American, 
interest in securing oil resources were both aspects that featured among responses 
concerned with the Gulf and Kosovo wars. Once more in Iraq, some observers felt that it 
was wrong for Britain to pursue war when it appeared to be unwarranted or needless, and 
driven so heavily by the United States. 
 However, the other conflicts which elicited similar objections to those above had 
not been criticised as frequently or as intensely. Britain had been involved in similarly 
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destructive, US-led campaigns previously, yet none of them were as roundly condemned 
or unpopular as the Iraq War among observers. Indeed, the latter represents an anomaly 
among collected responses because of the far more decisive and unambiguous rejection of 
its legitimacy by the vast majority of observers.  
I suggest here that concerns about WMD, the outcome of force or oil security 
were subordinate to a broader discourse in which the conflict was considered more 
fundamentally to be aggressive. Observers were united in their belief that the Iraq 
invasion was wrong because they were more confident in constructing narratives of 
British identity within it. They were, from its inception, overwhelmingly uncomfortable 
with the possibility of a pre-emptive assault, and it was this that set their collected 
responses apart from more supportive or ambiguous reactions to previous conflicts. 
Typical accounts were offered by observers who wrote that “People may not like his 
regime, but who are we to set ourselves up as God? At present, Iraq seems to be 
reasonably ‘contained’”,750 that “to make war on Iraq at this point would be an act of the 
grossest folly – a criminal act one could say if one was outspoken”751 and “Since when 
have we started invading countries or talking of changing their regimes just because we 
don’t agree with them?”752 
 During the previous Kosovo conflict many observers found it difficult to reconcile 
a desire to react to the violence occurring in the region with a belief that Operation Allied 
Force represented unwarranted interference in a state which had not threatened Britain, its 
allies, or neighbouring states directly. In 2002 and 2003 observers were generally more 
concerned that the United States and Britain were themselves threatening the status quo. 
One observer asked, “WHY DON’T WE AS BRITS KEEP OUR NOSE OUT OF 
OTHER PEOPLES’ PROBLEMS, WE ALWAYS SEEM TO COME OUT IN THE END 
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AS ‘PIGGY IN THE MIDDLE’”753 while another wrote after the initial invasion “I still 
don’t condone this war, in fact, I am very much against it... we weren’t provoked, we 
were, in essence, interfering in another country’s regime.”754  
 Indeed, similar ideas continued to be articulated by observers writing in the years 
following the overthrow of the Iraqi regime. The invasion was remembered clearly as an 
unwarranted and unjustified use of military force. Two accounts written in 2008 were 
typical: 
 
I opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Saddam Hussein was an evil man, but he did not, contrary to 
what we were told by Blair and Bush, constitute a regional or global threat… Along with one million 
people I marched through London to oppose the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
755   
 
We should never have entered a war that does not concern us, especially now that Iraq is in a worse 
state now we have butted in than it was when Saddam was their leader.
756   
 
The military outcome of conflict was of course an important aspect of responses (returned 
to shortly). Yet it is important to state once again that most observers believed war against 
Iraq to be illegitimate because it was unprovoked and aggressive regardless of the 
military outcome. For this latter observer the war had been one which did not ‘concern’ 
Britain; the perception of military and political deterioration in the intervening years 
simply compounded a pre-existing assessment.   
 Observers frequently concluded that war against Iraq in 2003 was not justified by 
invoking familiar narratives of British experience in previous conflicts: 
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When Iraq invaded Kuwait, and the US fought them, that was just, and at the time I thought they 
should have continued until they had killed Saddam, and the situation was resolved. They had cause 
then, but not now.
757 
 
Do they [Iraqis] all want to be liberated? I remember the Argentinians thought they were liberating 
the Falklands – I just hope we are not as misled.758 
 
I think we [the observer and his family members] all agreed there was a difference between a 
necessary war (such as going to the defence of the Falklands Islanders when the Argentinians 
invaded, or going to the aid of Kuwait following the Iraqi invasion) and war [in Iraq] which had no 
clear aim.
759 
 
Both the Falklands and Gulf wars were alluded to as examples in which the use of force 
had been legitimate and, importantly, predicated on a defence against aggression. Again, 
these responses show the extent to which invocation of the past helped observers to make 
sense of the present, lending weight to their conclusions on the legitimacy of the current 
campaign. In both the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars observers had often found it difficult 
to align a range of concerns, or make specific comparison with previous conflicts. The 
specific context of the Iraq War, conceived as a pre-emptive and unprovoked assault, 
meant observers turned to narratives of past conflicts which retained an explanatory 
power by putative contrast.  
 Importantly however, observers invoked memories of Britain’s entry into the 
Second World War as a benchmark for legitimacy, demonstrating how far short 
involvement in the Iraq War fell by comparison. In one instance, an elderly observer drew 
on lived experience – a rare occurrence among responses written after 2002 - during 
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World War Two to accentuate the seriousness of the contemporary situation regarding 
Iraq: 
 
A friend of mine from those days – a pilot with the RAF – tells me that were he in the Service today 
and was ordered to bomb ‘selected’ targets in Iraq he would refuse and accept the consequences. 
One never heard of such talk during the Second World War when we were united against the enemy 
who, after all, was the foul aggressor and may well have invaded us but for the battle of Britain.
760  
 
Most observers were, at this point, not old enough to remember the Second World War 
personally. Yet the controversial nature of the crisis and conflict with Iraq prompted 
observers to draw widely on popular memories of World War Two, and to clarify their 
conclusions on the legitimacy of the Iraq War by contrast. Observers commented on how 
the contemporary circumstance was “so different from defending your own country 
against invasion”761 and that “I know we eventually stopped Hitler but he was the actual 
aggressor all over Europe. But Iraq had not invaded anybody.”762 Another wrote a 
lengthier narrative in which the standards of legitimacy in Britain’s modern conflicts had 
collapsed: 
 
I am not against all military interventions. I have just been reading about the pacifists in the Second 
World War and, while I understand their principles, I think that was a war we had to fight. There are 
times when our troops are sent in to stop persecution and I think that is ok (e.g. Kosovo) but I think 
the current events in Iraq and Afghanistan will make us more enemies and lead to more attacks on 
the West, not less, especially because we are so tied to the Americans who are so ignorant of the 
outside world and arrogant about imposing their own values on other countries.
763 
 
                                                     
760 MO S2246, male, born 1923.  
761 MO Y2498, female, born 1912.  
762 MO C2570, female, born 1921.  
763 MO P3213, female, born 1966.  
285 
 
 
 
Though generally lacking personal, lived experience, popular memories of Britain’s road 
to World War Two were invoked to help clarify what observers wrote about a military 
conflict with Iraq, most frequently reinforcing a perception that Britain did not face an 
‘aggressor’ as it had done in the 1930s and 1940s. Popular memories of appeasement and 
resistance against Nazi Germany transcended generations, but had been prompted by the 
specific circumstances of the Iraq crisis; “My son says we are appeasing Saddam as we 
tried to appease Hitler, but I think we are more like Hitler.”764 
 The Iraq War stands out among collected responses to Britain’s recent conflicts 
because of the frequency and intensity with which observers objected to it. Within 
responses written in 2002 and 2003, both immediately before and during the initial 
invasion, observers described a conflict that was unambiguously wrong. Their accounts 
reveal the extent to which the ‘false prospectus’765 argument – that the invasion became 
unpopular after the lack of an Iraqi WMD arsenal became apparent - was a weak 
determinant of their conclusions on legitimacy. They were not swayed retrospectively by 
the apparent weakness of the ‘official’ case for war. Instead, they understood the conflict 
more broadly as one which was offensive. Their interpretations of its legitimacy were – as 
in all conflicts – linked intimately to what observers thought it revealed about Britain as 
its prosecutor, and were clarified by comparison with popular memories which were 
thought to be relevant. Indeed, observers were most confident about describing the 
invasion of Iraq as an unjustified use of force when they interpreted it as one which was 
incongruent with the legitimacy of British resistance to German aggression and 
expansionism. They persistently constructed a narrative of identity in the Iraq War the 
contours of which were defined by contrast with specific understandings of the past, and a 
broader interpretation based on what the invasion reflected about Britain.  
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 Thus the Iraq War offers an important case within the context of this research, 
revealing once again the importance of popular memories of Britain’s entry into the 
Second World War766 - increasingly further from lived experience – in acting as a 
benchmark for legitimacy in more recent conflicts. Yet the circumstances of the present 
determined the ways in which observers remembered the past, and thus reconstructed 
narratives of British identity in the Second World War. Observers were most concerned to 
identify exactly why Britain was fighting another military conflict in the present, thus 
leading them to focus on exactly why Britain had fought wars in the past. In doing so they 
recreated a narrative of British involvement in World War Two that was fundamentally 
moral, referring to a specific understanding based on resistance to the ‘evil’ of Nazi 
Germany’s aggressive expansion and militaristic brutality. In 2002 and 2003, as in 
responses submitted to the Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo directives, observers discussions 
of legitimacy not only meant that popular memories of British involvement in the Second 
World War were re-invoked and sustained, but also that they were refashioned into a 
moral guide. Observers were less inclined to consider combat, fighting, sacrifice or 
domestic and social re-ordering that occurred during the war. They were instead inclined 
to consider more narrowly why it had been right for Britain to fight in the first place, 
reconstructing Britain’s policy of appeasement in the 1930s as a mistake and a failure to 
deal with aggression soon enough.767 This helps to explain why these fundamentally 
popular memories of British entry into the Second World War remained so frequently 
invoked among responses as those with lived experience of the war – be it the violence of 
combat or domestic transformations associated with the Home Front – dwindled as a 
proportion of those writing. 
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Further, responses concerning the Iraq War show how the use of military force in 
highly controversial or discomfiting circumstances could be articulated as part of a 
broader history within which they seemed to be incongruent. The maintenance of a moral 
discussion of British involvement in the Second World War did not need to be associated 
directly with a contemporary conflict, but could be sustained as part of an explicit 
contrast. Far from undermining a belief in the legitimacy of British force or its identity as 
a force for good, observers were again engaged in reconstructing a specific interpretation 
of ‘good war’ against which failure in Iraq could be more clearly represented. Where 
involvement in the Afghanistan War offered a case in which such narratives of identity 
were not articulated, the initial invasion of Iraq prompted their reconstruction and 
reinforcement because as they retained a utility in helping to explain the present.  
In 2002 and 2003 observers engaged once again in a much more fundamental 
reconstruction of British identity that was not confined solely to its role in the 
contemporary military conflict. Only as initial, controversial conditions transformed – and 
the war moved into its counter-insurgency and occupation phase – did popular memories 
of British involvement in the Second World War cease to be relevant, and this broader 
narrative of identity, in which the absolute legitimacy of the Second World War was a 
crucible, fragment. The initial invasion at least offered a brief period in which those 
memories retained a power to help explain the present and were thus re-invoked and 
reinforced.  
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The Military, Invasion, Combat and Occupation 
 
Observers wrote about combat and the military at all stages of the Iraq War.768 The initial 
invasion was a short and decisive affair in which American and British forces defeated an 
inferior Iraqi military, much weakened by years of economic sanctions and embargo, just 
as comprehensively as in the previous Gulf War in 1990/1991. The invasion was, in John 
Keegan’s words, “mysterious in almost every aspect… Against the advance of an 
invading force only half its size, the Iraqi army faded away.”769 Likewise the ‘shock and 
awe’ campaign undertaken by US-led forces was similar in nature to previous operations 
involving massive air power in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan. However, the 
occupation of Iraq after the ‘de-Baathification’ of the state and the dissolution of its army 
rapidly transformed into a drawn-out counter-insurgency, marked by sectarian violence 
between Iraq’s various ethnic and religious communities.770 What observers wrote about 
serving military personnel, and returning dead, was figured heavily by the circumstances 
of the war and crucially, perceptions of its legitimacy. A narrative of soldierly victimhood 
was particular pronounced as observers frequently attempted to reconcile their admiration 
for military service with a pervasive belief that the invasion had been unjustified. 
During the initial campaign, observers wrote frequently of their fears that the war 
would be destructive for both British forces and Iraqi civilians. In only one response did 
an observer praise the “impressive” bombing which could “pinpoint such small 
targets.”771 Most observers were more critical and articulated familiar ideas of inhumane, 
indiscriminate and ineffective air power. They wrote about how US and British bombing 
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had managed to “paralyse the Iraqi command [but] destroyed a lot else besides”772 and 
had produced “showers of sparks rising up to the heavens from black smoking 
devastation… but to what effect we haven’t been told.”773 Another observer wrote a 
similarly typical account: 
 
I feel that on the whole all means of peaceful improvement should be tried and I do not like the idea 
of bombing these places [in Iraq] as in Afghanistan, bombs have a habit of falling on the wrong 
places even in these sophisticated times and their remains cause troubles for years.
774  
 
Like some who had written about Operation Allied Force in 1999, the opening of the Iraq 
War prompted recollection of Britain’s Blitz:  
 
Now the bombing has started I feel almost sick with despair… Reminds me of the bombing in 
London… The TV pictures of the bombing of Baghdad were horrific, I can’t help thinking a lot of 
the people there will be killed.
775 
 
We’ve seen the bombing of Iraq as it happens and how far away it all looks. Any sympathy I have 
for the people is overtaken by the thought that my parents and millions of others suffered five years 
of bomb attacks during WWII. No war can possibly go on for so long these days surely.
776 
 
The latter response in particular shows how the accuracy of historical information can be 
lost as observers re-invoked popular memories in order to ascribe meaning in the present. 
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Britain’s Blitz did not last five years777 yet it was referred to confidently as a guide to 
action in the present,778 framing the destructive power unleashed on innocent civilians. 
 The initial phase of ‘shock and awe’ was rapidly replaced by the occupation of 
Iraq. Initially some observers were enthusiastic about Britain’s frontline military 
personnel. Even among observers who were unsure of the legitimacy of Britain’s use of 
force in 2003, the possibility of ground combat focused attention on the heroism of the 
soldiers prosecuting it:  
 
In the event as soon as this undeclared war actually started the whole nation swung behind our 
heroic armed forces and opposition was muted… we must praise the skill, determination and 
courage of the allied forces which braved a very dangerous situation.
779 
 
The British it has to be said are coping well and they are a credit to their country. It is said that the 
troops have had so much experience in policing Northern Ireland that Iraq has come naturally to 
them. They have gone about their duties being firm but fair and befriending the people and it has 
paid off.
780 
 
Occupation and counter-insurgency led some observers to suggest that British soldiers 
had unique experience in Northern Ireland, making them more amenable to the local 
population.781 British troops were professional, humane and charitable: 
 
Their [British forces’] Northern Ireland experiences mean they have a much more relaxed attitude 
when dealing with the Iraqi people, they talk to them not at them, they smile, shake hands, whereas 
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the American troops grip their guns, shout and are alternately either all jumpiness or swagger. The 
English when they speak to the camera are calm and measured, the Americans loud and boastful… 
all I can say is, that when this is all over, any positive outcome will be in no small measure to the 
credit of the English contingent who seem to go in after where the Americans have been and smooth 
everyone down.
782  
 
Again, the military occupation of Iraq was an opportunity for some observers to contrast 
British personnel with American counterparts. The description of swaggering, loud and 
boastful American soldiers further revealed a broad anti-American sentiment that was 
articulated by many observers. Britain by contrast, as embodied by its frontline troops, 
represented a more thoughtful and compassionate actor throughout.  
 Despite the particularly controversial nature of the war, most observers remained 
supportive of Britain’s military personnel. Yet for some the specific circumstances of the 
Iraq invasion prompted them to question whether it was appropriate to support Britain’s 
forces given that they were volunteer professionals:  
 
With a professional army, well paid and, as they should be, well looked-after and compensated, I 
feel the forces do not now have the same relation to the nation at large as a conscript army which 
hasn’t chosen to be exposed to danger and death, but which may well be more patriotic and closer to 
civil population when it comes to a just war… I’m uncomfortable and uncertain when politicians 
mouth platitudes about courage and fighting for one’s country. Is this cynical? I’m not sure that 
politicians’ platitudes (rather than attraction of job security, good pay, travel, excitement and 
conditions) are uppermost in professional soldiers’ minds, although they’re certainly brave.783  
 
This observer interpreted the status of Britain’s contemporary forces by alluding to past 
conscription. The connection, without directly referring to a specific deployment or war, 
                                                     
782 MO P2819, female, born 1964.  
783 MO W3393, male, born 1932.  
292 
 
 
 
reveals a set of assumptions in which mobilised conscripts were thought to embody an 
existential, more legitimate threat to Britain. They were more representative of the nation 
itself; ‘closer’ to the population at large. These ideas helped explain Britain’s 
involvement in an illegitimate war in the present, through its use of professional forces – 
enticed by material benefits of ‘job security, good pay, travel’ – but also contributed to a 
narrative that, through the mass mobilisation of the population, Britain had been unified 
in facing legitimate threats in the past. Though there is no explicit mention of the Second 
World War here it is evident that ideas of ‘people’s war’ were important in informing 
interpretations of the legitimacy of using force itself.784  
In fact, as the occupation of Iraq became increasingly fraught for both American and 
British forces, particularly after the eruption of sectarian violence in 2006, other observers 
found it difficult to find anything heroic in contemporary military service. For one, the 
tactics deployed by occupying British forces seemed to mirror the illegitimacy of the war 
itself: 
 
I’ve been disturbed too by scenes of British troops removing pictures of Saddam Hussein from the 
walls of public places and bulldozing statues. How would we like that sort of thing to happen here if 
we were ever invaded? And the millions of pounds that have gone up in smoke in the form of tanks 
and helicopters and even civil airliners belonging to Iraqi airways. The coalition seem to be like a 
big bully, who not only knocks someone to the ground but then puts the boot in as well.
785 
 
Another, though more sympathetic, clearly also found it difficult to reconcile the 
legitimacy of military service with the illegitimacy of the current war: 
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It seems much simpler to honour those who served in wars which happened a long time ago than to 
reconcile my thoughts on the military and current conflicts in the present. I always buy a poppy and 
I think it’s very important to respect and honour people who served. Yet I know that I do not agree 
with most of the military action that has been taken by this country in recent years.
786  
 
I am not involved in either supporting our troops but nor have I been on any anti-war protests. I 
don’t support the current conflicts we are involved in but that doesn’t mean I don’t feel for our 
soldiers who are out there.
787 
 
For some, the efforts of the volunteer soldiers prosecuting an obviously illegitimate 
campaign meant they faced a share of responsibility. Yet few were openly hostile. Most 
observers seemed able to characterise the war in Iraq as illegitimate or unjustified, while 
simultaneously stressing their respect for Britain’s professional military personnel.  
 Within later responses observers frequently described the campaign in Iraq as a 
failure - something which seemed to compound a sense that the war had been unjustified 
from the beginning - and that the soldiers who fought it found themselves in a difficult 
and unenviable predicament: 
 
The early victory they had was, perhaps, all they [the British and American governments] thought 
they needed to quell any insurgency and they just found out they had bitten of more than they could 
chew. I think the average person wants the troops pulled out now because they don’t believe the 
price that has been and continues to be paid was worth the result.
788 
 
The British army leave Iraq for good, handing over to US troops. Was this adventure for good or 
bad? Hard to tell at this stage. The people who have lost loved ones would not consider it a success. 
I count all nationalities in this. Are all these deaths endured worth the downfall of a tyrant? I am not 
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sure about this at all. The people in Iraq are still living day to day with poor services of power, water 
and sanitation.
789 
 
It is important to note here the centrality of frontline ground forces within observers’ 
responses. Unlike previous conflicts in the Gulf and Kosovo wars, the Iraq War involved 
a short invasion and aerial bombardment, but soon turned into a lengthy occupation in 
which frontline soldiers were central. As such observers were concerned with Britain’s 
ground forces and identified conflicts in Iraq and then Afghanistan (particularly following 
the deployment to Helmand in 2006) fought not by jet pilots but by frontline troops. Yet 
the specific context of the occupation precluded any celebration or triumph that marked 
Britain’s victory over Argentina. Instead British forces were described as humane, 
professional and competent during the early stages of the Iraq campaign, but were 
increasingly considered to be fighting a losing war by the 2008 directive.790  
 One might expect support for Britain’s military to decrease within responses as 
observers became more critical of Britain’s continued involvement in the war. However, 
it is evident that most engaged in a more “personalised and domesticated”791 construction 
of combat personnel in the Iraq War. Its specific circumstances elicited a broad sympathy 
for the men and women caught up in it, including family and friends waiting anxiously at 
home: 
 
I feel sorry for our troops out there and for the many families (girl/boyfriends, partners, 
wives/husbands, parents, children) that they have left behind. Of course, my thoughts are with them 
as I look at my son, aged 21, and think that many of them are of a similar age. I can imagine my son 
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wishing he was at home and yet knowing he had a job to do. However, as a mother, I know how 
very scared he would be and how very frightened I would feel.
792  
 
The perceived conditions of the Iraq conflict, not only the vicissitudes of occupation and 
counter-insurgency, but also a pervasive belief in its lack of legitimacy, resulted in a 
representation of soldiers and soldiering foregrounded by empathy, sensitivity to trauma 
and emotional awareness. As British forces began to suffer more casualties, first in Iraq 
and then in Helmand Province, observers reflected sympathetically on soldiers as 
individuals, trapped in a difficult or traumatic situation: 
 
It would be impossible to write on this subject without saying something about our national attitudes 
to the men, and in these modern days women too, who fight our wars. It is determinedly shoddy, 
witness the squalid accommodation provided for military personal, the penny pinching approach to 
providing even basic equipment and the way maimed veterans are pushed out of the picture.
793  
 
There is also the end of our troops’ involvement in Iraq. Those coming home will no doubt be sent 
to Afghanistan where the war against terrorism seems to be getting nowhere, and one wonders if 
there is any point in our troops fighting and dying there, especially as they are under-equipped and 
their families have to live in substandard accommodation if the Army provides it.
794 
 
Such responses reflected an underlying similarity with responses related to previous 
conflicts based on an admiring and respectful attitude toward military personnel, as 
embodied by frontline, ground forces. Yet contemporary circumstances affected the 
specific ways in which Britain’s military forces were represented by observers. During 
and after the 1982 Falklands War most had conceived of soldierly heroism by referring to 
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the strength, courage and martial prowess of Britain’s soldiers, evidenced by the triumph 
of their military victory. Following the invasion of Iraq observers did not abandon a 
reverent attitude, but instead began to recast heroism as a form of victimhood; Britain’s 
soldiers persevered courageously and resiliently despite the conditions of the conflict and 
the cause for which they fought. Observers sought to contrast the legitimacy of military 
service with the political failure of the Iraq invasion. They concentrated their ire against 
government or elites who had betrayed Britain’s soldiers. This narrative pervaded 
responses submitted after the invasion, particularly to the 2008 ‘War experiences and 
reflections’ directive:  
  
Those who have to fight because of the stupidity of politicians deserve the greatest respect. It is 
utterly sickening to see politicians uttering ‘sincere regret’ for the fallen when they are ultimately 
responsible, being unable to negotiate without conflict.
795 
 
I am sickened by the way troops are treated by the establishment and the politicians… I always buy 
a poppy on Armistice Day and observe the silence even if I am on my own. The troops are not at 
fault but the politicians and diplomats who got us into the mess are to blame.
796  
 
I respect the job that the military do but do not support as much the political decisions which are 
made to send these troops out. I did not really support Tony Blair’s decisions to send troops to Iraq 
and Afghanistan but would not feel moved enough to march in an anti-war protest as I think that is 
disrespectful to the military.
797  
 
I do support our boys and girls BUT they should not be there [Iraq]… Yes we should have helped 
when he [Hussein] started war on Kuwait but that should have been the end of it but oh no, Tony 
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Blair PM decided to become George Bush’s lap dog and did whatever he was told to do at the 
expense of our young men and women… I would always support our services… they have my full 
support.
798  
 
Observers conceived of the Iraq War as a defeat. Yet, they rarely discussed actual 
combat, specific battles or locations, or the prospects for the counter-insurgency 
operation. As in all cases I consider, observers were not party to detailed information 
about the military campaign itself, and had not experienced it first-hand; they were 
imagining what the current conflict was like. This necessarily involved narrating its 
meaning as an experience for Britain and its military, and foregrounding it as part of 
Britain’s ongoing military tradition. Thus observers articulated familiar ideas rooted in 
what they knew about Britain’s past experiences. They described the use of ‘shock and 
awe’ tactics as a demonstration of the unethical and ineffective use of bombing. More 
striking however, is the extent to which the specific conditions of the Iraq War – its 
perceived lack of legitimacy in particular – resulted in a widespread articulation of 
soldierly victimhood. Observers on the whole remained supportive of the British military, 
embodied after the initial invasion by its frontline ground forces. They did not abandon or 
critique a broad belief in the legitimacy or heroism of military service, but instead re-
ordered the ways in which soldierly heroism could be articulated. The lack of a political 
or moral justification for their deployment was seen by most observers as a further 
obstacle overcome by soldiers who found themselves in a lamentable situation. They 
contended not only with a physical enemy, but contemporary political failures too. The 
emotionally sensitive, humane and personal manner799 in which observers approached 
discussion of soldiers was in marked contrast to the ways in which previous cohorts 
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799 For further discussion of remembrance in the wake of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, see: King, “The 
Afghan War”.  
298 
 
 
 
represented Britain’s ground forces in the Falklands War or even as part of the Kosovo 
Force. It was the result of their interpretations of legitimacy and Britain’s identity in the 
current conflict that helped determine this narrative structure. 
 Thus observers frequently articulated a paradoxical interpretation of Britain’s 
military forces in Iraq. On the one hand, their suffering and victimhood cast front line 
soldiers as an embodiment of Britain’s experience in the war; illegitimacy and failure. Yet 
on the other, they reveal that observers were able to detach military service from the 
specific context of the Iraq War as part of a wider support for Britain’s military 
institutions, tradition and identity. The perceived lack of legitimacy did not lead observers 
to say that Britain should stop fighting completely or stop recruiting soldiers, or that it 
had made observers rethink the appropriateness of using military force itself. Military 
sacrifice in Iraq prompted observers to construct wider narratives of legitimate military 
service, and to allude to popular memories of legitimate warfare, most often predicated on 
the moral surety of mass mobilisation, conscription and the idea of ‘peoples’ war’ they 
connoted. This characterisation of soldiers serving in Iraq, and later in Afghanistan, 
underscored a pervasive critique of contemporary conflicts, but also reinforced a sense 
that those conflicts deviated from a pre-existing and historically evident identity, one that 
was based on the moral and legitimate use of military force in defence against aggression.  
 
Leadership, Tony Blair and Trust in Politics 
 
Unlike responses to the Afghanistan War, most observers did not suggest that the initial 
invasion of Iraq was linked directly to religious extremism or international terrorism. 
Some did however, relate the effort to topple Hussein’s regime to religion, culture or 
Britain’s domestic society. One observer wrote that “a future in which other Arab and 
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Muslim countries believe it is right to attack our western democracy is unbearable”800 
while another worried about a conflict that could “set a whole powder keg alight, all the 
Arab states would get involved as would all the Moslems (sic) in this country.”801 Others 
were worried about the possible effects war in Iraq might have at home, exacerbating 
religious or racial tensions. One described how the conflict might make “the population 
turn against decent Muslims and asylum seekers. We are afraid we are nursing a viper to 
the bosom – so to speak.”802 Others lamented the actions of “the racists among us”803 and 
“the activities of extreme right wing racist groups”804 who peddled unrealistic 
connections between Hussein and British Muslims. In only one response was the Iraq 
War linked to a broader cultural clash between East and West: 
 
Maybe knowledge and education could defuse the situation, but eradication suggests force again. 
The initial and original reasons for their hatred of the West goes back centuries to the twelfth and the 
popular rise of the Crusades resulting in a desire of a Holy War of revenge in the heart of the 
Moslem world, the atrocities carried out by the Christian armies in Jerusalem at Christmas of that 
time and never forgotten by Islam.
805  
 
Though these observers discussed the perceived cultural or domestic impact of the Iraq 
invasion, it is important to note that most conceived of a military campaign that was 
similar in nature to those pursued in the Falklands, Gulf and Kosovo wars, namely that it 
represented a limited, conventional conflict with another state or regime. Likewise, the 
Iraq invasion was conceived of as a far-off, overseas engagement. For most observers it 
did not, at least initially, involve the sort of intense cultural overtone that discussions of 
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the Afghanistan War elicited, connecting a war against religious extremists to Britain’s 
domestic society and racial, ethnic or religious minorities.   
 Observers instead focused primarily on governmental leadership, reduced most 
often to the Prime Minister. Indeed, Tony Blair’s attempts to ‘sell’ the Iraq War to the 
public have become an important part of the academic historiography of the conflict.806 
Certainly, observers saw a personal connection between Blair’s foreign policy 
preferences and leadership style, and the use of British military force. However, what 
they wrote about Blair was not homogenous or uniform, and was affected acutely by how 
observers conceived of the circumstances and legitimacy of the war itself. Among the 
fraction of those who supported a military intervention against Iraq, Blair was accorded 
respect and praise. One observer offered an interesting response, re-invoking and 
reconstructing a narrative in which Britain’s pre-Second World War policy of 
appeasement was characterised as a failure to act soon enough: 
  
I have very little time for Tony Blair, but he went up in my estimation when he stood up to the 
pacifist whingers in the so-called Labour Party. There are still a few of the old guard who ought to 
remember what appeasement meant in 1938/9.
807 
 
Other observers, though they did not necessarily support the Iraq invasion, were willing 
to suggest that Blair had at least been acting in accordance with his principles or 
attempting to make the best of a bad situation: 
 
I am getting very fed up with the way the reporters talk of Mr Blair as though he was some sort of 
scally wag. I am a liberal but don’t like the unnecessary rudeness to any party.808 
                                                     
806 Bluth, “The British road to war”; Doig and Pythian, “The National Interest”; Holland, “Blair’s War on 
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On the one hand you have America wishing to exert its influence in the area and on the other, the 
British saying quite clearly that you cannot impose your own conditions on this country. I 
begrudgingly have to say that Tony Blair is actually saying all the right things on this issue. The 
country must quickly be given back to the Iraqi people to govern themselves.
809 
 
These responses were similar in content to several submitted to previous directives issued 
in 1999 and 2001. Blair was considered to be facing undue criticism, given the difficulty 
of the circumstance in which he was trying to lead. Regardless of the legitimacy or 
prospects of the war in Iraq, these observers at least suggested that his behaviour was 
principled or statesman-like. They reflected a continuing preference among some 
observers to characterise Prime Ministerial leadership as difficult, complex and 
constrained.  
 However, the Iraq War represents a departure in this respect because so few 
observers, as a proportion of those considered here, were willing to praise or sympathise 
with the Prime Minister. Instead, most who wrote about Blair’s leadership accorded him 
blame for an unjustified use of British military force: 
 
I’m sure Tony Blair believes he’s doing the right thing but I don’t think he is. It’s fair enough, 
exerting pressure on Saddam Hussein to reveal the extent of weapons programmes and to attempt to 
disarm Iraq, but flouting UN resolutions would be a very stupid way of going about it.
810 
 
He [Blair] is not a good statesman; he is not a good politician… He does not have the ability to 
avoid the war with Iraq and he is totally subservient to America... I’m more worried about what else 
Blair and Bush will dream up to get us into more conflict, just to satisfy their egos.
811  
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Other observers also characterised Blair as a weak figure, capitulating in the face of 
American pressure, writing variously that “Blair is his [ President Bush’s] puppet, nothing 
more”,812 and that “His [Blair’s] close association with a man like George Bush is part of 
the biggest misjudgement of his career.”813 Another observer queried; “Why Blair is 
hanging on Bush’s coat tails I don’t understand.”814 Blair was described as having 
inexplicably betrayed British interests in favour of those of the United States: 
 
I strongly oppose the current policy of the UK government in closely supporting the Bush regime in 
all of this. UK support is unnecessary, unjustified and ill advised… So why is Blair doing it? It is 
madness.
815  
 
The humiliation of being English in this situation and of seeing our Prime Minister aptly described 
as the poodle of a super power led, I sincerely believe by totally irresponsible and misguided so-
called Christian men and women, to war makes me feel physically sick as I write these words.
816 
  
Observers often attempted to rationalise the apparent illegitimacy of the Iraq invasion, 
and Britain’s role within it, by suggesting that it could be explained as a failure of 
leadership. For some observers this was articulated as a weakness in the face of pressure 
from the United States and formed part of a narrative in which blame for the war could be 
attributed to a more powerful ally. This discourse was, as I consider shortly, embedded 
heavily within constructions of both American and British identity.  
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 It is important to state however that observers did not suggest that war in Iraq was 
delegitimised by American pressure alone. In the previous Gulf conflict many observers 
had conceived of a justified US-led operation, despite the exposure of Britain’s relative 
weakness. Again in 2002/2003, observers were concerned with the specific reasons for an 
invasion and on what grounds it would be justified. Having conceived of an offensive and 
unjustified war, observers often subsequently conferred culpability on the American 
administration.  
 Other observers were particularly aggrieved by Blair’s apparent failure to heed the 
objections of the public. They lamented the uncompromising attitude of a Prime Minister 
who “must surely be aware the majority of people do not want to go to war”,817 who “has 
gone to war when he knows that the majority of people in this country are against it”818 
and had taken “the British to war against the wishes of the majority of British people.”819 
Where some observers had been critical of the British government’s subservience to the 
United States, others were critical of the strident and non-consensual manner in which 
Blair approached the Iraq crisis. Another vociferous opponent of the war wrote in 2002: 
 
This [Blair’s support for war] is despite opposition from many Labour backbenchers and members 
of the opposition parties – but when did Tony Blair listen to what other people say? If he thinks 
something is right, he goes for it – a laudable trait in a country’s political leader, perhaps, but in a 
democracy where time allows, the issues ought to be debated in the public arena.
820 
 
The occurrence of protest marches immediately before the conflict contributed to this 
pervasive belief that the Prime Minister had ignored the wishes of the people: 
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I joined the anti-war march at the start of the Iraq war because I thought our involvement was 
misguided at best rather than for any general pacifism. I rather wish I had been more vociferous not 
that the government was interest in the electorate’s views.821  
 
I did take part in our city centre march against invading Iraq in 2003. The march was incredibly well 
attended in Newcastle as in other cities, but instead of listening to Joe Public, Tony Blair decided to 
listen to a moron in Washington DC instead.
822 
 
Of course, the extent to which these protests represented public opposition to the war 
cannot be known as even the highest estimated attendance of those marches represents a 
fraction of the population.823  Yet they did indicate the uniqueness of the circumstances of 
Britain’s part in the Iraq invasion. Certainly, none of the previous cases I have considered 
generated this level of public opposition. Observers were often keen to stress that the 
Prime Minister had dismissed their views, as reflected through unprecedented public 
opposition to the war, and that this was reflective of a failure of political leadership or 
personal character.  
 In retrospect, as a consequence of this perceived failure to heed public protest, 
some observers articulated a feeling that Britain’s leaders and public institutions could not 
be trusted by the citizens they represented: 
 
In this country I have deplored the lack of involvement in politics by the population at large, but 
now get the point. The government does seem to have lost its grip on the feelings of the country. 
                                                     
821 MO A3434, female, born 1965.  
822 MO B4291, details not available.  
823 The exact number of people estimated to have attended the London protest march on 15 February 2003 
is naturally difficult to calculate. Police, media and the Stop the War Coalition estimates range from 
500,000 to over one million. An ICM poll conducted in February of that year found that 6% of respondents 
stated that a member of their household had attended the march. See: ICM, “February 2003 Poll”, Online, 
available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20060926081333/http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2003/guardian-
february-2003.htm (Accessed 03-11-2017). 
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Where is the opposition?... Like most people, I now have the feeling that most of Westminster is 
completely comatose.
824 
 
Two million people protested against the war and were ignored… It makes me rather apathetic about 
politics; the electoral system is crap, and no amount of mass demonstrations will stop the 
Government doing what they were always going to do anyway, so I lose interest in politics and 
occupy myself with personal concerns.
825 
 
Among responses to later directives this feeling of mistrust became more pronounced as 
the non-existence of Iraq’s threatening weapons stockpiles was revealed. Though the 
possibility of Iraq’s WMD programme featured less prominently with observers’ 
discussions of the legitimacy of the conflict, the revelation that the government’s 
argument had been based on, at best, an inaccurate assessment compounded a belief that 
Britain’s political leaders could not be trusted: 
 
I feel that we have all been fed such a lot of propaganda and misinformation in an effort to garner 
support for this conflict and yet few people seem to be swayed by what comes out of the White 
House and Number Ten.
826  
 
Tony Blair has been so keen to fall in as Bush’s puppet he would have agreed to anything. I never 
believed the claims the two leaders made about weapons of mass destruction, and I said so loudly at 
the time.827  
 
Questions are being asked but no doubt the same old lies will be trotted out. I will never believe 
another reason for going to war – not from the mouths of Blair and Bush… Clare Short denounced 
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Blair and implied that the war was pre-arranged and that the intention was to go to war no matter 
what the inspectors said or whether or not they found WMDs. The real objectives were kept from 
our two nations. The foreign affairs committee is going to investigate.
828 
 
In none of the previous cases I have considered in this research did observers suggest that 
the government or political leaders had lied to the public. While perspectives on political 
leadership had often been critical, it is the specific circumstances of the Iraq War – and a 
widespread and intense belief in its lack of justification – which elicited a more 
fundamental scepticism of Britain’s political institutions and leaders more broadly. For 
some observers, the invasion had not simply been a mistake, but had been an engineered 
act of deceit, eroding public trust in the state which prosecuted it.    
There was of course, a party political dimension to the Iraq War. Left-leaning 
observers felt particularly aggrieved by the fact that such a controversial war might be 
pursued by a Labour government. They wrote variously of their disappointment in Blair’s 
leadership describing how the pursuit of the invasion had challenged their loyalty to the 
Labour party: 
 
I am anti the war [in Iraq]. I am disappointed with Mr Blair to put it mildly. He is not the Prime 
Minister I had hoped he would be. In the archives you will see how positive and excited I felt in 
1997 in my opinions. I am since on the verge of tearing up my Labour Party card. I have voted 
Labour all my life.
829  
 
At [the time of the Iraq invasion] I felt quite robust in my allegiance to the labour party… But now, I 
feel I have been duped and cheated by the revelations regarding some of his most important 
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speeches being heavily influenced by spin and not based on the intelligence services information, as 
we were led to believe.
830  
 
Another described entering into membership of the Labour Party in order to more directly 
protest the Iraq invasion: 
 
I have been a Labour voter for my entire adult life, yet I believe the policy of the Blair government 
on Iraq is a betrayal of my vote and that of many others. In fact I believe that much of the policy of 
the Blair government is a betrayal of the Labour movement. I have now joined the Labour Party so 
at least I have more say than I would as a non-member, albeit a still derisory say.
831  
 
During previous conflicts observers’ political affiliations had affected what they wrote 
about the incumbent Prime Minister. Observers with conservative sympathies had, for 
example, been more willing to credit Margaret Thatcher personally with victory in the 
Falklands War. Others who did not support her politically suggested that she was instead 
opportunistically appropriating it. During the Iraq War, the conflict was so unpopular that 
those who supported Tony Blair were among the most aggrieved, describing it as a 
betrayal of their left-wing values.  
While it is not my aim here to outline how Britain’s involvement in the conflict 
has affected trust in political institutions, parties or leaders since, it is important to 
identify that observers repeatedly suggested that the particular circumstances of the Iraq 
War had profound political effects at home.832 Evidently a pervasive belief in the 
illegitimacy of the initial invasion translated not only into a generally dim view of Blair’s 
leadership – whose strident posture yet paradoxical obsequiousness toward America 
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seemed to embody Britain’s identity in the Iraq crisis and conflict – but one in which 
Britain’s domestic politics were thought to have been poisoned more fundamentally. 
Particularly among later responses from 2003, observers described how the conflict had 
undermined trust in the government, political class and in some cases, the Labour Party. 
This narrative was unique to the Iraq War among the cases I consider in this research, and 
was a function of the way in which observers interpreted the war’s lack of moral and 
political legitimacy.  
 Thus observers’ responses here demonstrate the extent to which they attributed 
blame for Britain’s involvement in the war on its political leaders and elites. As I have 
suggested previously, the Iraq conflict was highly unpopular but also served as a prompt 
for observers to construct and reinforce narratives of British identity which were more 
stable and secure, most often linked to the Second World War, and within which political 
failure in Iraq could be incorporated. In placing blame for the war with political leaders 
alone, observers contributed to a broader sense that the war represented an anomaly or a 
betrayal of Britain’s responsible, unobtrusive and defensive disposition. They could 
maintain that, despite contemporary failures, Britain remained a force for good with a 
celebrated past. They were, I suggest, particularly angry with Blair not only because of 
the policies he chose to pursue regarding the Iraq invasion, but because they were 
interpreted as antithetical to a pervasive and engrained perspective on British history. 
Blair served personally as an embodiment of Britain’s contemporary identity in the war – 
illegitimacy, weakness or failure – but also helped to separate the failures of the state 
from an interpretation of the nation. The conflict was not an expression of British failure, 
but was instead a failure of a much narrower group of people and institutions, embodied 
by the incumbent Prime Minister. 
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The UN, USA, European Allies and International Crisis 
 
Observers discussed Britain’s participation in the Iraq War within the wider international 
context. During the crisis period in 2002 observers wrote about diplomatic splits between 
Britain the United States, and European allies, and within the United Nations. Though 
previous conflicts had engendered discussion of American power and a persistent 
dissatisfaction with the apparent weakness of the UN, the Iraq crisis was widely 
considered to have been more controversial, reordering relations between Western states 
and European allies.   
 Observers repeatedly discussed divisions between the British government and a 
bloc of European opposition led primarily by French President, Jacques Chirac.833 For 
one observer European intransigence had forced the United States and Britain out of a 
diplomatic solution to the crisis; “I am not in favour of this war build up but I fear that 
France has messed up any chance of a negotiated settlement with their veto state making 
war inevitable.”834  For another however, blame was laid with Britain in supporting a 
military intervention which “flies in the face of the opinion of our major EU partners” and 
that was “contrary to the role of Britain in the past as a peacemaker.”835   
For others, the diplomatic crisis was thought to be a direct threat to the process of 
European integration and Britain’s status within the European Union: 
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It is a blow to my national pride and what I perceived to be my understanding I find that this is not 
so. Blaming France for the lack of another resolution at the UN sounds like schoolboy tactics… 
How can we hope to join Europe properly after this?
836 
 
Another observer was, however, “encouraged” to see the diplomatic spat caused by the 
Iraq crisis had meant that “we are now so at odds with the EU that maybe they will make 
life so uncomfortable for us that they will either turn us out, or we will decide to leave 
it.”837 Of course, observers often had pre-existing views on Britain’s relations with 
European states and the European Union. Yet it is important to note that all observers 
who discussed the diplomatic context for Britain in 2002 and 2003 noted the extent to 
which Britain appeared to be isolated form its nearest neighbours, having aligned so 
closely with the United States. Likewise, another observer offered a typical account in 
which the Iraq conflict threatened to mark Britain’s international reputation:  
 
Questions will be asked in the House and I know that this thing will not go away. I still feel 
discomfited – that hasn’t changed since I began the diary. I am concerned that the war will stir up 
anti-British feelings all over the world. Usually we have one of the better reputations but I feel this 
has now been jeopardised. I am concerned about our future relations with the European Community 
too… we seem to be drifting from Europe which I don’t really want to happen but neither do I wish 
to join in a federation, but I do want trading and entente.
838  
 
The Iraq crisis seemed to threaten not only Britain’s reputation internationally – assumed 
most often to be fundamentally positive - but also its place within Europe and the West. 
Within responses submitted before 2002, concerning previous conflicts, observers had not 
expressed these fears. The sort of international divisions that the Iraq War engendered 
                                                     
836 MO C2654, female, born 1942.  
837 MO B2154, female, born 1933.  
838 MO B1771, female, born 1936.  
311 
 
 
 
were an important part of observers’ responses and were widely considered to be 
detrimental to British interests. 
In fact, several observers suggested that the Iraq crisis reinforced their belief that 
the war would be a mistake for Britain. It revealed an uncomfortably close association 
with the United States and in some cases elicited praise and admiration for European 
leaders who seemed to be taking a stand in attempting to avoid an illegitimate war: 
 
I’m glad that most other countries are also against war – the French and the Germans and others. 
They are powerful countries so it would be a bad sign if they suddenly show support for the 
American campaign. I wish the Americans would take more notice of the outside world – although I 
heard someone say that ‘the French call what we call ‘Americanisation’ ‘Anglo-Americanisation’. 
We must not get wrapped up in all of this ourselves I think.
839  
 
I have also been greatly heartened by the refusal of some European countries, notably France and 
Germany not to be browbeaten by the US government. I do strongly believe that Europe needs to 
develop a more powerful coherence to resist American dominance.
840  
 
Perspectives on the legitimacy of the Iraq invasion affected the ways in which observers 
represented diplomatic dispute in 2002 and 2003. During the Falklands War observers 
had been critical of the perceived neutrality of the United States and European allies in 
not contributing more obviously to the British campaign. They characterised the distances 
between Britain and its allies as evidence of a dismal ‘neutrality’. During the Iraq crisis, 
this distance from European states was represented much differently, lamented by those 
who believed that the French and Germans were right to resist the current campaign. The 
diplomatic disputes generated by the conflict were considered by observers in light of 
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Britain’s identity in the conflict, and whether it could be considered to be using military 
force justifiably.  
 Observers frequently wrote about the United Nations and international diplomacy. 
The Iraq crisis offered yet another test of international resolve and the possibility of 
multilateral security. The high-profile failure to attain a UN resolution explicitly 
authorising the use of military force added an extra urgency to their discussions. Two 
observers offered typical accounts, stressing the desirability of international consensus 
reflected through agreement at the United Nations:   
 
I’d hope that certainly the British government, if not the Americans too, would have gone to the 
United Nations for a second vote but, alas, no.
841 
 
Are they [Bush and Blair] going to listen to the UN? I know the UN isn’t a perfect organisation by 
any means, but some semblance of acting within international law and convention would surely be 
better than appearing to show total disregard. Are they going to listen to all those other leaders who 
keep telling them to think again?
842  
 
Once again, the failure to avoid a conflict with Iraq revealed for observers the weakness 
of the United Nations as a forum for nations to resolve disputes peacefully: 
 
The effect on the UN will be long lasting. Had the UN agreed to the war I would have felt 
differently.
843  
 
The United Nations seems to be taking a back seat these days and its authority undermined. That is 
just what happened to the League of Nations, which was formed after the First World War. The 
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United Nations was formed after World War Two. Suddenly when it suits certain Heads of State 
they override the peaceful purposes of UN and the organisations become defunct.
844  
 
As in all cases considered in this research, observers believed that the Iraq crisis ought to 
be resolved multilaterally and peacefully. They were supportive of UN institutions, yet 
thought that the eventual recourse to war demonstrated their continuing weakness. 
Importantly however, few observers suggested that the lack of UN authorisation for the 
war delegitimised it. Observers were concerned with establishing whether the conflict 
was a legitimate act of defence or protection in the face of aggression. The lack of a UN 
resolution confirmed to most a much broader sense that the conflict was highly 
controversial and diplomatically divisive but observers remained concerned primarily 
with what involvement in the Iraq War reflected about Britain. They were far more 
concerned that Britain was using military force aggressively or in the offensive – contrary 
to what most observers believed about Britain’s historical identity as a bulwark against 
such aggression – rather than whether British force was being deployed within the 
strictures of international law.  
 Given that the Iraq conflict was an overwhelmingly American-led operation, 
observers were naturally concerned with representing the United States’ position within 
it, and Britain’s relationship with its more powerful ally. Where previous conflicts had 
elicited criticisms of American power, and its exposure of Britain’s relative weakness, the 
Iraq War was linked by some to American society and perceived national traits: 
 
…the people of the USA really have to address the issues as to why their country is so violently 
hated by a significant section of the World’s population. Instead of doing that, the American 
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government is taking the aggressively defensive line with Iraq which will only make the hatred 
worse, and lead to further international terrorism.
845  
 
The Americans really haven’t learnt anything from the September 11th attacks and the hatred with 
which they are viewed in large parts of the world. They are arrogantly strutting around without much 
apparent regard for what anyone else thinks. I hope that in recent days the UN has convinced the US 
to get UN approval for any action it takes, or better still try peaceful means.
846  
 
Values and actions are completely askew in America, and as Americans apparently dominate all the 
important parts of the entire globe, people there stuff themselves with food and support belligerence 
while allowing starvation to spread in Africa and people to exist in squalor at subsistence level in 
many countries.
847  
 
In previous conflicts observers had suggested that the United States represented a 
powerful but overconfident and arrogant ally. The Americans were brash and ‘gung-ho’ 
where the British were more considered, humane and tolerant. The Iraq invasion 
prompted a much more critical and all-encompassing discourse in which an illegitimate 
conflict was the product of failures and defects in American national character. The 
Americans, not limited by these observers to the governing administration, were arrogant, 
dismissive, belligerent and consequently ‘hated’ by the rest of the world.  
 Many were then, concerned about Britain’s relationship with such a belligerent 
power. One wrote how it seemed like “we [the British] are the only ones staunchly 
supporting the US”848 while another questioned Britain’s alignment with the United 
States; “I fear for Iraq and I fear for us if Tony Blair goes along with George Bush… 
Under Bush Junior US foreign policy has become more aggressive or I suppose 
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September 11th marks the start of it.”849 Again, another observer questioned whether “we 
really want to be allied to such a bunch of dishonest, unscrupulous and self-serving 
crooks?”850 During the Iraq crisis and the immediate invasion, when international tensions 
ran particularly high, many observers seemed genuinely concerned that the ‘special 
relationship’ with the United States was not in Britain’s interests.   
 Indeed, some observers invoked the United States’ late entry into the Second 
World War in order to suggest that Britain bore no historical obligation to follow the 
United States into its wars. One observer described how “the Americans waited three 
years before they joined us in the Second World War”851 while another suggested that 
“there is no reason why we should follow the USA – they did save us in WW2, but were 
very slow at joining in.”852 Britain’s ‘lone stand’ in 1940 was invoked by another 
observer to undermine any sense of obligation toward the United States: 
 
Why does Blair trot around at Bush’s heels? Bush doesn’t need our miniscule support and it only 
makes us another target for the terrorists whose real enemy is the USA, not piddling little UK. Nor is 
the USA grateful, after the last war they poured more money into renovating the Axis than their 
Allies. No wonder Germany and Japan had economic miracles. Not a brass farthing comparatively, 
for we who stood alone.
853  
 
While the overwhelming power and status of the United States did not automatically 
delegitimise the use of military force among observers (most writing previously had 
believed the Gulf War to have been justified, despite a similarly prominent role played by 
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the United States), it made it possible to suggest that Britain’s involvement in the Iraq 
invasion was out of character.  
 Indeed, consideration of Britain’s diplomatic position in the Iraq crisis, and its 
apparent subservience to the United States, prompted observers to reflect on Britain’s 
alliance with the United States in World War Two. Indeed, as Alex Danchev has 
described, the idea of a ‘special relationship’ necessarily indicates an historical narrative, 
rooted in shared experience and affinity.854 During the crisis of 2002 and the initial 
invasion of Iraq, observers attempted to subvert this interpretation contrasting American 
‘neutrality’ with Britain’s celebrated ‘lone stand’ in 1940. Observers were able to both 
describe the contemporary conflict as the product of American failures and flaws, and to 
engage once again in a process of reconstructing narratives of British national identity 
that were not confined to involvement in the current conflict, but were temporal and 
historical. Observers did not limit this process of othering of the United States to its 
contemporary policies. The distinctions they made formed part of a more comprehensive 
narrative of historical national differences, which were and integral aspect of popular 
memories of Britain’s Second World War.855  
 However, it is important to note here that though observers seemed highly 
uncomfortable with Britain’s association with the United States in 2002 and 2003, such 
responses largely tailed off among later directives. While the vast majority maintained 
throughout the subsequent occupation that Britain had been wrong to go to war with Iraq, 
it is the high profile international and diplomatic controversies of the crisis period that 
engendered the most critical accounts of the US role in the war. Likewise, this process of 
othering was focusing primarily on America rather than on European allies. Observers did 
not make particular effort to characterise the national traits or characteristics of, for 
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example, France of Germany because they were not thought to have had a salient role in 
the conflict itself or, importantly, were not blamed by observers for an illegitimate use of 
force. The specific circumstances of the initial invasion affected how observers conceived 
of allied others, and what observers thought about the alliance with the United States. 
Observers’ reactions to the invasion can be seen as part of a consistent reconstruction of 
ideas of British tolerance, competence and moderation which contrasted the perceived 
arrogance and belligerence of the Americans, a function of the particular circumstances of 
Britain’s involvement in US-led military conflicts. 
 
The Enemy: Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Regime Change 
 
Observers’ representations of the Hussein regime were similar to those submitted in 
response to the previous Gulf War in 1990. They overwhelmingly referred to a brutal and 
tyrannical dictatorship in Iraq. One observer gave a typical description, writing “Saddam 
Hussein is a dangerous dictator whose activities need to be curbed”856 while another, 
writing in 2003, focused on Hussein’s abhorrent domestic record: 
 
What is becoming clear is the absolute terror which the Iraqis have of the current regime there. 
When journalists ask them of their opinions of Saddam Hussein they cannot bring themselves to 
give their opinions due to the unseen terror that lurks within their communities where people are 
killed for speaking out against him. There was a story in the press of how a young woman waved to 
the coalition forces driving along the road, only for her to be hanging the next day.
857  
 
Like responses written in 1990 and 1991, observers writing about the Iraq War invoked a 
memory of Adolf Hitler in order to more clearly articulate the contemporary illegitimacy 
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and moral repugnance of Saddam Hussein. One observer suggested that the confrontation 
of Hussein’s regime was “like Hitler and the Nazis all over again”858 while another asked 
if “we want another dictator like Hitler to alter the courses of people’s lives?”859 Nor was 
this condemnation confined to responses in which observers supported military 
intervention. Those who objected to British involvement in the Iraq invasion were often 
keen to stress the abhorrent nature of the Iraqi regime: 
 
While we all agree that Saddam Hussein is a cruel tyrant who should be removed (just as other 
tyrants in the world need removing) we abhor the idea that thousands of innocents should be 
killed to get him. With all his money he would probably escape anyway and live the rest of his 
life somewhere in comfort just as Idi Amin has done.
860 
 
Yes, Saddam Hussein is a monster; but so are many other leaders of third world nations, and we 
do not attack them. We were told that the majority of Iraqis would like Saddam removed, and 
that their troops would not fight. The last two weeks have demonstrated that the second of those 
statements is not true; and we have little evidence that the first is true.
861 
 
Observers were, regardless of their views on the legitimacy of the US-led invasion, 
engaged in constructing a specific narrative of identity for the Iraqi regime, often reduced 
to its figurehead; Saddam Hussein. Like those who had attempted to represent the regimes 
of Galtieri and Milosevic previously, Hussein was once more described as a 
personification of evil and brutality; a ‘monster’ against which Britain assumed 
opposition. Invocations of Nazism and Hitler were likewise a feature of such responses, 
helping observers to clarify the singular illegitimacy of the Iraqi regime, and amplify their 
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disgust at Hussein’s brutal dictatorship. Further however, the invocation of these popular 
memories meant observers were once more engaged in a construction of a particular 
historical narrative of British identity based on moderation, tolerance and democracy, and 
a stark moral contrast between Britain and its dictator enemies. Though many observers 
felt military action was not justified in 2003, most were keen to represent Hussein and his 
regime as fundamentally other.  
 However, after the regime in Iraq was toppled by coalition forces, Saddam 
Hussein featured less prominently within responses as observers began to focus on a new 
range of enemies in Iraq that were not as easily identifiable, and whose tactics or 
motivations could not be better explained by connections with Hitler or Nazi Germany. 
The transition from invasion to counter-insurgency was identified by one observer writing 
in 2003: 
 
There is bound to be a resistance movement made up not simply of supporters of the Baath regime, 
but also of many other patriotic Iraqis, who regard the Americans and British as foreign 
occupiers.
862 
 
Existing below the level of the state, observers described a new enemy in Iraq that used 
guerrilla tactics, did not have notable leaders, could not be defeated conventionally, and 
was similar in character to that faced in Afghanistan. One observer drew stark comparison 
between the contemporary enemy faced in Iraq, and Britain’s enemies in previous wars: 
 
We are not dealing with an enemy in the same mode as those of the two World Wars, but dedicated 
guerrilla fighters - kill one and another dozen take  his place - no doubt in the belief that a heavenly 
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reward will be given them. Try fighting an adversary with those concepts to guide them, very 
difficult indeed.
863 
 
Unlike previous conflicts in the Falklands, Kosovo and Gulf wars, the Iraq War did not 
end after the defeat of the targeted regime. The overthrow of Hussein was followed by a 
military occupation in which British soldiers faced paramilitary and militia groups who 
became engaged in both sectarian violence amongst each other and resistance against 
‘foreign occupiers’.864 Observers noted these changed circumstances. The post-invasion 
phase of the Iraq War altered what observers wrote about Britain’s enemies there. It 
became uncommon for observers to include discussion of the Hussein regime and place it 
within a broader narrative of Britain’s resistance to dictatorship, tyranny or fascism. As in 
Afghanistan, the emergence of much different enemies during the occupation, in terms of 
their structure, methods and motivations, meant observers were unable to contribute to a 
specific construction of British identity, and were left wondering exactly who the British 
opposed in Iraq. Militia groups, paramilitaries or terrorist cells could not be more clearly 
represented by re-invoking memories of Nazi aggression. As I described in the previous 
chapter, observers discussing the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan after 2003 were 
unable to recreate a morally unambiguous history of resistance to fascism and 
dictatorship.  
 Evidently then, the Iraq War can be seen as a point of departure from a conflict 
involving a clearly understood and ‘familiar’ enemy in the form of Saddam Hussein and 
his regime, into one involving a much more obscure and unknown enemy. The war 
moved from an opportunity for observers to reconstruct a specific narrative of British 
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identity, rooted in the mobilisation of memories of fascism, Nazism and Hitler’s 
dictatorship, to one in which Britain’s continuing role seemed confused and less well 
understood, though still evidently unpopular. The legitimacy of the invasion was rejected 
most frequently because it seemed at odds with Britain’s identity as a force for good, 
acting militarily only when required and in the defensive against aggression. 
Representations of the Hussein regime in particular show how observers were able to 
articulate the illegitimacy of the invasion more clearly because, at least in part, its initial 
circumstances engendered the reconstruction of a clear and morally unambiguous 
narrative of British identity against which it could be gauged. After the defeat of the Iraqi 
regime, observers remained highly critical of the legitimacy of the initial invasion and 
Britain’s continuing role in it. However, as the occupation drew on, its connection with 
popular memories of Britain’s Second World War, and Britain’s identity within it, 
became increasingly fragmented as they seemed to retain much less explanatory power 
than they had during the pre-invasion crisis period or the invasion itself.  
 
Conclusions  
 
Observers represented Britain’s involvement in the Iraq invasion clearly. They 
overwhelmingly conceived of a conflict in which Britain had used military force without 
justification. Very few observers were either supportive of the Iraq invasion (in some 
cases describing it as a humanitarian operation or a legitimate pre-emptive strike) or were 
unsure about it. They were evidently aware of the context of the Iraq crisis and the 
subsequent military operation, alluding to the diplomatic crisis it elicited, the initial 
campaign of ‘shock and awe’ and the subsequent occupation and counter-insurgency. 
They identified the Hussein regime as the target of the operation and were aware of the 
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circumstances of its downfall. However, perhaps surprisingly, few observers discussed 
legitimacy in relation specifically to either oil security or a direct threat from the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In fact, most observers had made their 
minds up about the invasion’s legitimacy from the beginning and were thus largely 
unmoved by subsequent revelations about the lack of Iraqi WMD. Few observers 
objected retrospectively on the grounds that the war had been sold “on a false 
prospectus”.865 The Iraq invasion is unique within the context of this research not only 
because it was so unpopular, but because observers were so unambiguously sure that it 
was wrong to use military force from the beginning.  
 Why then were observers so critical of the use of British military force against 
Iraq, if they were not wholly concerned by oil security or WMD specifically? Likewise, 
why were they vocal and clear about Britain’s involvement in Iraq when they had been so 
unsure and confused about contemporaneous involvement in Afghanistan? Observers 
clearly cared about Britain’s involvement in both wars, particularly so in Afghanistan as 
military deaths began to rise after the Helmand redeployment. These differences can be 
accounted for by considering the varied ways in which observers attempted to make sense 
of Britain’s identity within these conflicts. The circumstances of the Iraq War 
engendered, during the initial crisis and invasion, persistent invocation of popular 
memories which helped to clarify or explain observers’ perspectives in the present. They 
represented the enemy faced in Iraq as a familiar one, understood through its similarity to 
the evil of the Nazis and Adolf Hitler.866 They understood the initial bombing campaign 
by referring to popular memory of the Blitz.867 Most importantly however, they 
understood the Iraq War to be aggressive or offensive by contrasting Britain’s present 
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involvement in a pre-emptive conflict with a secure and celebrated popular memory of 
Britain’s entry into World War Two.868 It is this incongruence that explains observers’ 
overwhelmingly critical attitude; they were generally less concerned about the specifics 
of oil or WMD – at least initially – than they were about the apparent contrast between 
Britain’s resistance to German aggression and its pre-emptive war in Iraq. Thus the bases 
on which observers had understood legitimacy in previous campaigns – as acts of defence 
against aggression or expansion, clarified by invocation of British entry into World War 
Two - remained essentially the same. Unlike those previous conflicts however, observers 
came overwhelmingly to a critical conclusion, linking Britain’s Second World War to the 
present by contrast rather than association.  
 Further, as in all cases I consider in this research, observers’ invocations of 
popular memories and their constructions of British identity in past conflicts were 
determined by the contemporary context over which they were thought to retain an 
explanatory power.869 In attempting to explain the legitimacy of the invasion of Iraq 
observers once more focused on the legitimacy of Britain’s Second World War. They 
invoked popular memories of Britain’s defensive resistance to Nazi aggression, the 
patriotic unity of mass mobilisation, the stoic resistance of Britain’s ‘taking it’ during the 
Blitz,870 and the evil of Hitler’s dictatorship. Thus they not only remembered the Second 
World War, but they reconstructed Britain’s identity within it. They characterised 
Britain’s experience as one that was fundamentally moral, a representation influenced, I 
suggest, by observers’ collective desire to understand the specific moral and political 
legitimacy of a conflict in the present. This was, as in responses to previous directives, 
done at the expense of some of the most familiar constituent events of the Second World 
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War, or the ‘big facts’ of 1940 such as Dunkirk or the Battle of Britain,871 which 
seemingly retained little relevance for observers. Likewise, observers were not concerned 
with whether the Iraq War was possible or risky. The conditions of another ‘war of 
choice’ and associated deliberations over legitimacy helped determined what sort of 
British Second World War was remembered.  
Observers were able to construct a narrative of British identity that was assured 
and morally secure, and explain the Iraq invasion as a political failure. They were 
extraordinarily critical of Tony Blair during the initial invasion period not only because 
they believed he had made a mistake or was misguided but because his government had 
committed Britain to an invasion that seemed incongruent with what observers knew 
about its historical identity. The Iraq War did not, for most observers, offer a challenge to 
the legitimacy of British force itself. Instead, in prompting the invocation of celebrated 
and morally assured popular memories, the prosecution of an unpopular conflict 
represented an opportunity in which Britain’s historical status as a force for good could be 
further reinforced, and its prosecution blamed on contemporary leadership, elements of 
the British government and state, or the United States. Contemporary circumstances were 
separable from a longer history and an authentic British identity.  
 However, after the defeat of the Hussein regime, observers’ allusions to the 
Second World War largely ceased. The occupation, involving a sectarian, ‘guerrilla’ 
insurgency, could not be understood by comparison. Observers maintained a retrospective 
belief that the Iraq War had been a mistake, but a perceived change in circumstances 
meant popular memories of British entry into World War Two, or involvement in any of 
its constituent events, did not retain the explanatory power over the present that they had 
done during the (highly controversial) initial invasion. As the war drew on, observers less 
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frequently articulated an assured narrative of British identity as a bulwark against brutal, 
dictatorial aggression; they were increasingly unable to delve into this more secure or 
celebrated national past. 
The limited, conventional conflicts that British forces fought in 1982, 1990, 1999 
and 2003 varied dramatically in terms of context, circumstance and, most strikingly, the 
extent to which they were supported by observers. They represent a series of deployments 
which were increasingly unpopular; the justified effort to reclaim the Falkland Islands 
represents a high point before a nadir with the invasion of Iraq. Yet, despite the constant 
change and transformation in what they wrote about these wars, they all represented 
events which prompted observers to sustain (through both direct association or contrast) a 
broader belief in the moral certainty of Britain’s historical identity, the crucible of which 
was a singular popular interpretation and memory of its entry into the Second World War. 
In both post-invasion Iraq and the Afghanistan War, as those connections fragmented 
because of changes in contemporary circumstance, observers became both unsure about 
Britain’s identity in present conflicts, and less explicitly certain about Britain’s historical 
identity as a force for good. It is the period following the fall of the Hussein regime which 
represents the most distinct departure among observers’ collected responses, not because 
it was interpreted or understood differently to previous cases, but because it engendered a 
fundamental alteration in the ways in Britain’s broader national or military identity was 
constructed. Observers largely ceased to recreate a narrative of identity based on morality 
and the absolute legitimacy of British military force, the vacuum seemingly filled by 
more unsettling and discomfiting discussions of terrorism, religion, culture and ethnicity.  
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Conclusions 
 
Military Force, Legitimacy and British National Identity 
 
The Mass Observation Project offers a unique source of written material volunteered by 
individual British citizens. The responses I have considered in this research show – as I 
argued in the introduction to this thesis – that ‘ordinary’ British people care about the use 
of military force, even when it does not directly impact on their lives, that they are 
informed about Britain’s foreign policy and that, most importantly, they create and 
recreate complex narratives of identity, history and nationhood. The overseas military 
campaigns pursued by the British state between 1982 and 2014 were thought to be both 
material and physical conflicts in the sense that they involved armed combat, but also 
social and cultural in the sense that they were an important marker for constructions of 
British identity by those who did not necessarily experience them. Thus, the prosecution 
and outcomes of those campaigns affected what observers thought and wrote about 
Britain as an ‘imagined community’ with a unique history and sense of collective self.872 
 Of course, there was no homogenous or universal account of British involvement 
in its recent wars. Observers made sense of military conflict by referring to a variety of 
aspects and phenomena, the most important of which was a consistent attempt to 
articulate the moral and political legitimacy of using military force. Indeed, observers 
were not concerned about whether the use of force was risky or possible, but whether it 
was right or wrong. The notion that conflict potentially offered an existential threat for 
Britain was apparent only during the build up to the Gulf War. Its rapid conclusion altered 
what observers thought about conventional limited conflict, and revealed a sharp 
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departure from the anxieties and tensions associated with Cold War escalation, 
conflagration and mass destruction. Britain’s campaigns in the Falklands, Gulf, Kosovo, 
Afghanistan and Iraq were instead conventional, limited and confined to far-away places. 
Yet the possibility of killing and sacrifice drew observers to question, often with 
emotional urgency, why Britain pursued force, and whether it was justified. Legitimacy 
was thus a key marker of identity, its discussion prompted observers to construct Britain’s 
role in contemporary conflict in order to explain military violence. 
Within the context of the cases I have considered, the general perception was one 
of a decline in standards of legitimacy. The British were, for most observers who wrote 
about them, right to defend both themselves and others from outright aggression in the 
Falklands and Gulf campaigns. Interventions in both Kosovo and Afghanistan were 
characterised as complex and difficult, complicated by their association with 
humanitarian ideals and anti-terror objectives respectively. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 
was a further departure in which Britain’s use of pre-emptive force was widely 
represented as aggressive and therefore unjustified. Though observers’ collected accounts 
of legitimacy shifted radically, they do however reveal a persistent belief in the 
legitimacy of force itself (in that observers were concerned with understanding whether 
force could be used in those particular instances, not whether it could be used at all) and 
that this legitimacy derived from its use in defence against aggression. Observers rarely 
went into specific detail about the nuances or historical context of the various crises 
which led to war, nor did they interrogate the specific policies or histories of those 
regimes and groups against which Britain deployed force. They were most enthusiastic 
about supporting a military campaign when they could describe Britain as provoked, 
defending itself or those who could not defend themselves, and reacting to an aggressive 
or expansionary Other. By contrast, observers were most critical about the use of force 
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when it appeared to reveal Britain to be the aggressor. For a group of British people 
whose personal circumstances were generally unaltered by these wars, armed conflict did 
not simply contribute to a sense of collective identity; it could not be understood as 
anything other than a collective, national experience. 
 However, observers’ constructions of British identity were not linked solely to 
legitimacy, though they were nearly always informed by it. They often identified Britain 
with its military forces specifically, suggesting both that Britain represented a power with 
a military history pre-existing and separate from current conflicts, and that its military 
forces could embody ideas of national identity more broadly. Written responses revealed 
entrenched ideas related to what military conflict was like, and what it should be like. 
They were frequently critical of the use of airpower, placing Britain within the realms of 
an indiscriminate, inhumane and unfair actor. However, ground combat in the Falklands 
War and then later in Afghanistan and Iraq revealed the extent to which Britain’s 
frontline, ‘Soldier-Heroes’ embodied a sense of professionalism, duty and resilience. 
They were, despite changing circumstances and contexts, largely wedded to an idea of 
heroism based on, as Graham Dawson has described, “the natural and inherent qualities 
of manhood, whose apogee is attainable only in battle”.873  
 Perhaps most striking is the extent to which observers were able to cast soldiers as 
the victims of illegitimate campaigns – particularly those in Iraq and, later, Afghanistan – 
deliberately separating Britain’s military history and identity from contemporary political 
failure. Soldiers came to embody a complex narrative of identity in which the 
contemporary conflict could be blamed on politicians, elites or the state. Thus, 
perceptions of legitimacy affected the ways in which observers narrated Britain’s 
involvement in recent conflicts, but it did not necessarily determine how observers 
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thought about Britain, and whether it could be thought of as a force for good more 
broadly. Observers were able to explain contemporary failures within a comprehensive 
discourse linked to other aspects or focuses of identity, part of which was a persistent 
belief in the legitimacy of British military force itself, and a trend toward articulating 
combat and service in a more sympathetic, sensitive and reverent manner.874 As British 
society has moved further away from conscription and national service, and observers 
were less likely to have experienced it themselves,875 it is striking to note how they 
continued to celebrate military service, and in particular, an admiration for those involved 
in frontline, ground combat. Soldierly victimhood was a discourse laden heavily with a 
persistent reverence of British soldiers, but also saw them come to embody Britain’s 
position in an unpopular and illegitimate conflict; a fundamentally legitimate or ‘good’ 
power, dragged or misled into war. 
 Likewise, observers persistently constructed and reconstructed narratives of 
British identity by articulating ideas of identity for the Others with which it came into 
contact. While this process of othering is of course an ever present aspect of the formation 
of any structure of identity,876 it is clear the possibility of armed conflict drew observers 
into constructing national divisions with greater urgency. They did not, for example, 
consider the character of Saddam Hussein or the nature of his regime in detail until the 
invasion of Kuwait and the beginning of Desert Shield. While the specific circumstances 
of each conflict were radically different, this process remained pervasive and important. 
Most frequently, observers were able to identify other states and groups whose 
intolerance, illiberalism, authoritarianism or extremism were characterised as totally alien 
or other. In both the Kosovo and Afghanistan wars in particular, a pervasive 
characterisation of the violence in those regions resulting from perennial, uncivilised 
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ethnic strife reinforced a dichotomy in which Britain was placed safely within the 
modern, ‘civilised’, Western world.877 Repeatedly the possibility of conflict, and the 
identification of both various Others, led observers into expressions of British tolerance, 
moderation, peacefulness and democracy by comparison. 
 Indeed, observers did not focus necessarily on groups or nations against whom 
British force was deployed. With the exception of the Falklands War, all the conflicts I 
have considered in this research were US-led operations. It is then not surprising that 
constructions of British identity across the period were related heavily to certain ideas, 
tropes and stereotypes of American identity. Observers characterised the Iraq invasion in 
particular as one which reflected the belligerence and overweening self-interest of its 
American ally. This characterisation not only served to differentiate Britain from an 
Other, but helped explain Britain’s role in the conflict. Observers’ did not suggest in 2002 
and 2003 that the Iraq invasion revealed Britain to be a malign force, but that is was a 
mistake thrust upon the nation from without.  
After the invasion of Iraq observers began to discuss hostile Others differently. 
The Taliban, sectarian groups in Iraq, and Al Qaeda could not be understood as 
manifestations of a familiar ideology, or as singular, far-off entities. These circumstances 
engendered a shift in the ways in which observers conceived of Britain’s identity by 
contrast, who no longer engaged in more familiar constructions of democracy, 
moderation or tolerance, and instead began to connect overseas conflicts with domestic 
politics, culture, religion and ethnicity. The notion that Britain could be separable from its 
various enemies – a constant feature of responses written between 1982 and 2003 – 
seemed to fragment as observers confronted the consequences of drawn-out occupation 
and counter-insurgency. Thus the occupations in both Afghanistan and Iraq, occurring 
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within the broader context of the War on Terror, offered a more profound challenge to 
this stable process of Othering, and elicited a broader discussion that was unmoored from 
previous limited, conventional conflicts against dictatorial or fascistic ‘Strong-man’ 
regimes.  
 Observers were of course, driven by contemporary circumstances when describing 
conflicts. What they knew about recent wars affected what they wrote about Britain, thus 
the sources of their information – be it government, media, TV or press – should be 
treated as important determinants of their discourse. Yet observers often arrived at 
different conclusions regarding the same events. Their knowledge of contemporary 
circumstance had to be given meaning and, as a consequence, what they wrote was 
always embedded within a broader discourses related to identity. They did not simply 
describe events or regurgitate governmental or media analyses but were instead 
consistently occupied with understanding how these military deployments affected the 
“problematic, protean and artificial”878 construct of the British nation, and how this 
interacted with the politics and policies of the British state. Even as the perceived 
circumstances of these conflicts changed radically, and new cohorts entered the pool of 
those writing about them, observers remained concerned with connecting them to 
Britain’s national identity. In some cases these connections appeared to be obvious or 
clearly understood. In others, particularly after 2003, those connections seemed to be 
more unclear, ambiguous or uncomfortable. What remained remarkably stable throughout 
was the process by which observers persistently recreated a sense of national self as they 
attempted to make sense of Britain’s involvement in war. 
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Military Force, History and Memory 
 
In placing Britain’s recent military conflicts within broader, pre-existing narratives of 
identity observers necessarily had to draw on their knowledge and memories of the past. 
In a number of respects this thesis has confirmed findings and arguments that are central 
to the academic literature related to popular, social and collective memory considered in 
the introduction. Observers re-invoked popular memories in order to explain better the 
circumstances of the present and thereby engaged in a process of construction and 
reconstruction of specific narratives of historical identity, creating a “common sense of 
the past”.879 This active re-invocation was affected by the contemporary context over 
which popular memories were thought to retain an explanatory power.880 Therefore as 
contemporary circumstances changed so did observers’ interpretations of this common 
national history and identity. However, I have used the words ‘re-invocation’ and 
‘reconstruction’ throughout this research in order to capture both the extent to which 
remembrance of the past occurred within, and was evidently affected by, the 
circumstances of the present, but also to emphasise that observers were persistently 
recovering familiar interpretations and memories that existed apart from contemporary 
conflicts. They were not inventing particular narratives of Britain’s history or its identity 
so much as selectively refashioning them in order to make coherent connections with the 
present. They drew on popular memories that clearly had a much broader social and 
cultural purchase and are transmitted through wider society and popular culture.881  
 As I have shown in the previous chapters, the Second World War was persistently 
the most important event re-invoked by observers in this regard. Among responses to the 
Falklands and Gulf wars in particular, personal experience of ‘the last war’ served as a 
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generational marker,882 often recalled by observers in order to narrate the grief and 
suffering inherent in war, or lend weight to their opinions on military conflict and combat 
in the present.883 However, these personal memories were almost always articulated as 
part of popular or social memory which informed specific narratives of British national 
identity. Lived experience leant authority or authenticity to their accounts but observers’ 
efforts to make sense of Britain’s identity rather than their own meant the articulation of 
personal and popular memories were never separable; the two remained mutually 
constitutive.884 
As such, even as the Second World War faded from living memory across the 
period between 1982 and 2014, observers’ search for meaning in contemporary conflicts 
meant World War Two was persistently revealed to be an important historical event and a 
crucial marker of national identity even for those who had not been alive during it. The 
invasion of Iraq in 2003 was highly unpopular, yet it was understood as such by a cohort 
of observers who were able to draw on popular memories of the legitimacy of Britain’s 
resistance to German expansion. As a marker for generation, the Second World War was 
particularly salient. Yet it is also important to note that the manner in which Britain’s 
contemporary conflicts prompted observers of all ages – those with and without personal 
memories of that era – to re-invoke popular memories and discuss Britain’s national 
experience as they sought to make sense of the circumstances of the present. Indeed, it is 
interesting to note the extent to which different generations of observers articulated 
broadly similar accounts of the Second World War.  
 Thus, observers’ written responses show how wars – even ‘small’ wars fought at 
distance by professional soldiers – are an important determinant of national identity. 
Observers were, by invoking these popular memories, not only constructing a narrative of 
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British identity in the current conflict, but were also reconstructing more fundamentally 
much broader narratives of historical British identity. Indeed, the desire for an 
explanation over present circumstances necessarily led observers to reconstruct the past 
selectively, focusing on a narrow range of aspects of Britain’s Second World War, the 
most important of which was a pervasive narrative of Britain’s road to World War 
Two.885  
 As Patrick Finney has written, “[k]ey texts on British collective memory of the 
war often marginalise appeasement, implying that the epochal events of 1940 and beyond 
– Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain and the Blitz – have overshadowed the antecedents of the 
war in the popular imagination.” While this may true of the cultural representation of 
Britain’s Second World War broadly conceived, it is evidently not the case when 
considering the ways in which observers referred to World War Two. Appeasement, often 
involving direct reference to the “myth of Munich”,886 was persistently at the heart of 
their accounts, at least until the period following the invasion of Iraq.  
This focus on the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war was a 
function of observers’ attempts to understand the present. They were not worried about 
whether Britain’s recent campaigns would be possible, risky or whether they could be 
won (save for fears preceding the Gulf War which were rapidly dispelled after the one 
hundred-hour ground war), but rather whether they were right or wrong. It was this 
consistent fixation on the legitimacy or morality of using military force which led 
observers to continually re-invoke a narrative of British identity that was definitively 
moral, and which rested not on recollection of the Second World War’s constituent 
events, but on the absolute legitimacy of British entry into it. Thus, in focusing so heavily 
on why Britain had been involved in World War Two, observers refashioned a narrow 
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memory of the Second World War saturated in discussion of the evils of Nazi Germany’s 
expansionary aggression, the brutality of Hitler’s regime and the morality of British 
resistance by contrast.  
Further, without any apparent existential threat during the period of Britain’s 
recent wars observers largely ignored Britain’s Cold War history and, likewise, did not 
draw on ambiguous memories of Empire or (post-)colonial conflicts which could not be 
articulated as a benchmark or guide to action.887 As popular memories of the Second 
World War have continued to be contested in post-Cold War Europe, observers’ 
responses demonstrate how contemporary military conflicts can engender and sustain a 
uniquely British and peculiarly moralistic understanding of a martial, national past.  
 Nor did the maintenance of this specific narrative of British identity require like 
circumstances in the present. This is revealed most obviously during the invasion of Iraq 
in 2003 when observers once more engaged in the recreation of Britain’s legitimate entry 
into the Second World War as part of a contrast rather than by direct association. 
Observers could identify the illegitimacy of the Iraq invasion by its dissimilarity with the 
legitimate defence against German aggression and thus, in reconstructing Britain’s 
Second World War identity as such, they were also able to explain British involvement in 
the contemporary conflict as a sort of anomaly or deviation. Allied states and political 
elites were blamed for mistakes which went against the grain of Britain’s celebrated and 
assured identity in resisting aggression and ‘evil’. A belief in a moral and assured national 
past was reinforced, refracted through observers’ critiques of British policy in removing 
the regime of Saddam Hussein.   
These popular memories were then, sustained and refashioned during the limited, 
conventional conflicts pursued in 1982, 1991, 1999 and 2003, where the fighting was 
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between conventional militaries, between states, and the enemy was characterised as 
singularly familiar and illegitimate, often represented as a ‘new Hitler’.888 As I have 
shown in the final two chapters of this research, during the lengthy occupations following 
the invasion of Iraq and, contemporaneously, in Afghanistan, observers seemed far less 
willing or able to try to explain Britain’s contemporary identity by reference to popular 
memories of the Second World War which did not retain the explanatory power they had 
done previously.  Thus observers not only struggled to make sense of contemporary 
conflict by incorporating it within a broader, historical narrative, but also as a 
consequence rarely rearticulated a belief in a singularly legitimate, heroic and celebrated 
British involvement in World War Two.  
The specific circumstances of the ‘War on Terror’ and, in particular, the 
occupation/counter-insurgency phases of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars reordered the 
way in which observers remembered and reconstructed Britain’s past, and offered a 
challenge to a broadly stable narrative of identity that had prevailed among responses 
from the Falklands War in 1982 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. No longer anchored in a 
persistent reconstruction of the Second World War, observers’ reconstructions of an 
assured and moral British identity as a force for good appear to have given way to a more 
introspective discourse in which contemporary occupations during the War on Terror 
were linked instead to race, religion, ethnicity and domestic society. Of the cases I have 
considered, it was the occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq which elicited discussion of 
Islam, immigration, or a connection between the battles fought overseas by British 
soldiers and “those who stir up race hatred”,889 supposedly given “somewhere to live and 
benefits equivalent to £10,000 a year”.890 Though it is difficult to know how individual 
observers conceived of British identity more broadly, or connected race, religion, 
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ethnicity and nation, it is obvious that the ways in which observers connected British 
identity with military force altered as they negotiated the new and unfamiliar contexts of 
the War on Terror, and the lengthy, unpopular occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
Stability, Continuity and Fragmentation 
 
This thesis seeks to make an original contribution to knowledge by showing the 
fundamental and intricate connections between British identity and its prosecution of 
military force, namely those campaigns undertaken in recent decades. I do not suggest 
that observers’ written responses can be generalised or considered representative. Only 
that the volunteered and detailed accounts which they wrote, and the method I have 
employed in analysing them, show that Britain, its national identity, contemporary 
conflict, history and popular memories of past wars were inextricably linked across the 
period. Thus, Britain’s ‘small’ wars, pursued between 1982 and 2014, are important 
because they pertained to a fundamental process of identity investments,891 prompting 
people who were not physically or materially involved in them to imagine and represent 
the nation itself. I argue that Britain’s military conflicts since 1982 were understood by 
observers by referring to popular memories of the past, were incorporated within much 
broader, historical interpretations of national identity, and that the circumstances of 
Britain’s campaigns permitted observers to reconstruct and reinforce a narrative of British 
identity rooted in its moral and legitimate resistance to Nazi Germany. After the invasion 
of Iraq, circumstances were such that this narrative of identity began to fragment within 
collected responses. 
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It is then, difficult to assess what impact Britain’s recent military conflicts have 
had, and continue to have, on wider debates around British identity. Certainly, national 
identity is not affected solely by changing circumstances in foreign policy. Yet for 
observers at least, it appears that Britain’s most recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq 
represented a challenge to a secure narrative of identity which had been periodically 
reinforced during previous conflicts. This, combined with the possible fading or dilution 
in importance of the Second World War as an object of personal experience or lived 
memory, means that, at least partially, a secure sense of the national self seems to have 
been challenged. While on the one hand British retreat from foreign military conflicts 
may remove the opportunity or incentive for British people to withdraw into a nostalgic 
national past,892 it may also contribute to a broader unravelling of the ‘anti-Fascist’, post-
War consensus.893 As observers responses show, in circumstances where a morally 
assured national past is not possible to reconstruct, the result is not necessarily a more 
forward-thinking or progressive conception of British identity. Without this anchor it 
seems, anxieties related to race, ethnicity, religion and culture within Britain were brought 
to the surface, colouring what observers wrote about British involvement in later 
conflicts.  
Mass Observation Project material represents an important resource in uncovering 
in detail, and on an individual basis, connections that are important in understanding how 
history and memory support interpretations of the national community, which in turn 
inform contemporary political debate and policy. Though not the sole determinant, 
Britain’s period of overseas military conflict between 1982 and 2014 may well be of a 
particular importance in explaining the recent political and social upheavals within a 
nation that has at times seemed so ill at ease with itself. 
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Appendix I 
Demographic details of Mass Observers cited in this research 
 
Observer Gender DOB Location Marital 
Status 
Home Situation Job 
A1223 Female 1925 Newark, 
Nottinghamshire 
Married Living with 
partner 
Free Lance operator of 
Machinery 
A1292 Female 1933 Croydon, Surrey Widowed Alone Part-time Teacher 
A1473 Female 1942 Lincoln, Lincolnshire Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Teacher, but working as 
playground assistant 
A1530 Female 1937 Woodford Green, 
Essex 
Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Part-time English 
teacher for foreigners 
A1646 Female 1932 Swanage, Dorset Divorced Alone Housewife since 24 
A1733 Female 1928 Birmingham 
 
Retired, formerly 
factory worker 
A18 Male 1944 Addlestone, Surrey Single With other adults Unemployed, previously 
principal officer with 
local authority building 
division 
A21 Female 1931 Gomshall, Surrey 
 
Carer 
A2168 Female 1930 Banbury, Oxfordshire Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly 
auxiliary psychiatric 
nurse 
A2212 Female 1956 Watford, Hertfordshire Married Living with 
partner and 
relatives 
Various and disability 
benefit 
A23 Female 1912 Lincoln, Lincolnshire Retired, formerly Nurse 
A2464 Male 1960 Yarm, Cleveland Single Alone Sixth Form teacher 
A2801 Female 1965 York Single living with other 
adults 
Unemployed 
A2848 Male 1958 Preston, Lancashire Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner 
Computing consultant 
A3434 Female 1965 London Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Retired 
A4348 Female 1982 Loughborough 
  
A883 Male 1933 Chelmsford, Essex Married Living with 
partner 
Redundant senior 
architectural assistant 
B1426 Male 1935 Bracknell, Berkshire Married Living with 
partner 
Maintenance cleaning 
supervisor 
B1442 Male 1923 Staines, Surrey Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly quality 
control supervisor with 
BA 
B1533 Female 1926 Llanon, Dyfed Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Retired, formerly social 
worker 
B1654 Male 1931 West Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Managers and 
Administrators 
B1665 Female 1934 London Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner 
Clerical worker in NHS 
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B1713 Female 1948 Preston, Lancashire Married Living with 
partner 
Part-time receptionist 
and cashier 
B1771 Female 1936 Mitcham, Surrey Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Part-time word 
processor for legal 
agency 
B1819 NO RECORD 
    
B1939 Female 1939 Ipswich, Suffolk 
 
Radio Monitor 
B1989 Male 1927 Tunbridge Wells, Kent Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly 
English teacher 
B2154 Female 1933 Moreton in Marsby, Single living with 
relatives 
Retired, formerly 
therapy radiographer 
B2240 Male 1921 South East Married Living with 
partner  
Retired 
B2605 Female 1931 Staines, Middlesex Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly part-
time typist 
B2728 Female 1955 London Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner and 
children 
Local government 
officer 
B2810 Female 1967 Mytholmroyd, West 
Yorkshire 
Married Living with 
partner 
Nurse 
B2969 Male 1951 Hastings, East Sussex Married Living with 
partner 
Retired (through 
illness), formerly social 
worker 
B2978 Female 1969 Lewes, East Sussex Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Part-time freelance 
writer and musician 
B35 Female 1941 Sutton, Surrey 
 
Fitness Instructor 
B36 Female 1914 Bayleigh, Essex Widowed Living alone Retired, formerly 
shorthand typist 
B3968 Male 1966 Eastbourne, East Sussex Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner 
Unemployed due to 
illness 
B4236 Male 1928 Wales 
   
B4290 Female 1970 North East 
  
B4291 
      
B43 Male 1956 Deal, Kent 
 
Customs Officer 
B45 Female 1925 Welwyn Garden City, Hertfordshire Nurse 
B4527 Female 1980 Cambridge Single Alone Teacher (unemployed 
due to illness) 
B48 Male 1908 Hull, Humberside 
 
Engineer, Fire Brigade 
B53 Female 1926 Leeds Married Living alone 
from husband 
with dementia 
retired 
B55 Female 1921 Tunbridge, Kent Married Living with 
partner 
Company secretary 
B66 Female 1930 Preston, Lancashire Clerk, Accountants 
B68 Female 1931 Sidcup, Kent 
 
Housewife 
B70 Female 1950 Uxbridge, Middlesex Lecturer 
B736 Female 1918 Harrogate, North 
Yorkshire 
Married Living with 
partner and son 
Retired 
B83 Female 1944 Birmingham 
 
Writer, Dry-Clean 
worker 
B84 Female 1921 Chelmsford, Essex 
 
Teacher 
B89 Female 1931 Leighton Buzzard, 
Bedforshire 
Divorced Living alone Retired, formerly typist 
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B91 Female 1930 Romford, Essex 
 
Teacher 
C1043 Male 1960 London 
  
Library Assistant 
C109 Female 1949 Brentwood, Essex 
 
Primary Teacher 
C125 Male 1916 Hornchurch, Essex 
 
Automotive Engineer 
C138 Female 1944 Lydney, Gloucestershire Shop owner, Oxfam 
C140 Female 1951 Sittingbourne, Kent Part-time secretary and 
housewife 
C142 Male 1930 Bath, Avon 
 
History Lecturer 
C143 Female 1932 Edgeware, Middlesex Secretary 
C1713 Female 1948 Preston, Lancashire Married Living with 
partner 
Part-time receptionist 
and cashier 
C1786 Female 1950 Haddenham, 
Buckinghamshire 
Married Living with 
partner 
School secretary 
C1939 Female 1939 Ipswich, Suffolk 
 
Radio monitor 
C2078 Female 1944 Odiham, Hampshire Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Medical receptionist 
C2256 Male 1949 West Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Professionals 
C2570 Female 1921 Belfast Married Living with 
partner 
Housewife 
C2654 Female 1942 West Midlands Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Professionals 
C2844 Female 1960 Southampton, 
Hampshire 
Married Living with 
partner 
University 
Administrator 
C2865 Male 1957 Norwich, Norfolk Married Living with 
partner 
Internal auditor with 
local special needs 
housing authority 
C2908 Female 1964 North West Single Living with 
related adults 
Employee 
C3167 Male 1971 Stoke on Trent Single Living with 
relatives 
Warehouse operative 
C4026 Female 1974 Stratford Upon Avon Single Alone Librarian 
C4131 Female 1982 Edinburgh 
  
C602 Female 1922 Hereford, Worcester Divorced Alone Retired, formerly 
secretary, now political 
activist 
D1419 Male 1923 Scotland Married 
 
Retired 
D1527 Female 1960 South East 
 
Employee 
D153 Female 1912 London 
  
Retired 
D1559 Female 1927 West Midlands Widowed Alone Retired 
D157 Male 1918 Surrey Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
D1602 Male 1942 London Single Living with non-
related adults 
Managers and 
Administrators 
D169 Male 1949 Cheadle Hulme, Manchester Producer, Granada TV 
D1697 Female 1923 Blanefield, Central 
Region 
Divorced Living with 
partner 
Retired, school assistant 
but mainly housewife 
D2092 Female 1919 South East Widowed Alone Retired 
D2205 Female 1929 London 
  
Retired 
D2438 Female 1924 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
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D3157 Male 1955 Altrincham, Cheshire Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner 
Pay processing officer 
Royal Mail 
D3906 Male 1966 East of England Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Personal and protective 
services 
D4101 Male 1960 Hilton, Derbyshire Single Alone Cinema Projectionist 
D826 Female 1950 South West Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Employee 
D944 Male 1940 Colchester, Essex 
 
Bank Worker 
D966 Female 1927 London 
   
D996 Female 1927 London Divorced Living with rest of family 
E1510 Male 1926 West Midlands Windowed Retired 
E2836 Female 1950 Andover, Hampshire Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner 
Self-employed 
marketing consultant 
E2977 Male 1981 Newcastle upon Tyne Single Living with 
other 
adults/relatives 
Student, Plymouth 
University 
E743 Female 1951 Warrington, Cheshire Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Special needs teacher 
F1560 Female 1921 Wales Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
F1589 Female 1932 Audley, Staffordshire Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Retired 
F1634 Female 1943 Ely, Cambridgeshire Divorced Living with 
partner 
Market Research 
interviewer 
F193 Female 1937 Hayes, Middlesex 
 
Secretary 
F194 Female 1918 London 
  
Retired 
F210 Female 1925 Newport, Dyfed 
 
Journalist, Freelance 
F2218 Male 1929 Seaton Delaval, 
Northumberland 
Single Alone Retired, formerly NHS 
supplies officer 
F2949 Female 1954 Colmworth, 
Bedfordshire 
Co-
habiting 
Living with 
partner and 
children 
Local historian 
G1041 Female 1925 Purley, Surrey Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly 
librarian 
G1241 Female 1933 Beckington, Somerset Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Part-Time receptionist 
G1416 Female 1922 East of England Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
G2134 Male 1919 Cheam, Surrey Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly 
manager in Dept. Health 
and Social security 
G2867 Male 1978 London Single Living with 
other adults 
Civil servant 
G2883 Female 1950 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Unemployed 
G3655 Male 1939 Winlaton, Tyne Wear Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly auto 
company director 
H1541 Male 1944 Dumbarton 
 
Freelance Film editor 
H1543 Male 1930 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
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H1705 Female 1951 St.Helier, Jersey Married Living with adult 
relatives 
Unemployed 
H1709 Female 1925 Oswestry, Powys 
 
Farmer 
H1745 Female 1951 London Widowed Alone Social researcher in 
Academia 
H1806 Male 1925 Bisley, Surrey Married Living with 
partner 
Retired, formerly 
printing and general 
manual work 
H1820 Female 1955 Callington, Cornwall Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Housewife and farmer 
H2410 Female 1929 Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
H2447 Female 1935 Oxford, Oxfordshire Divorced Living with 
children 
Part-time acupunturist 
H2639 Female 1940 Ipswich Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Library assistant 
H266 Female 1923 Kenninghall, Norfolk Widowed Living with 
partner 
Retired 
H277 Female 1920 Harrow, Middlesex Widowed Alone Personal Secretary 
H2825 Male 1961 Liverpool Married Living with 
partner 
Nurse 
H2911 Female 1964 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Student 
H3821 Male 1952 West Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Professionals 
K315 Female 1949 East of England 
  
L2281 Female 1933 Wrexham, Clwyd 
 
Retired, formerly 
teacher 
L2669 Male 1926 South West Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
M2986 Female 1956 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Professionals 
M3147 Female 1960 Conwy 
  
Shopkeeper/Postmistress 
M3408 Female 1946 West Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
M354 Female 1948 Braintree, Essex 
 
Retired? 
M359 Male 1937 East Midlands 
 
Student 
M374 Male 1948 London 
  
Student 
N1592 Female 1931 Yorkshire and the Humber Managers and 
Administrators 
N3588 Female 1960 Scotland Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Associate professionals 
and technical 
N395 Male 1931 London 
   
O409 Female 1910 London 
  
Retired 
P1326 Female 1938 South West Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Employee 
P1796 Female 1946 South West Married Living with 
partner 
Managers and 
Administrators 
P2546 Female 1925 South West Married Living with 
partner 
Professionals 
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P2819 Female 1964 South West Married Living with 
partner 
Clerical and secretarial 
P2973 Male 1947 London Married Living with 
partner 
Professionals 
P3209 Male 1939 Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
P3213 Female 1966 Wales Married Living with partner and children 
R1389 Male 1914 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
R2065 Male 1916 London Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
R450 Male 1926 London 
  
Retired 
R456 Male 1915 London Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
R470 Male 1934 East of England Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
S2246 Male 1923 East Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
S2581 Female 1951 Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Clerical and secretarial 
T1277 Female 1922 South East Widowed Alone Retired 
T1285 Male 1948 London 
  
Volunteer 
T1826 Female 1957 Scotland 
  
Associate Professions 
and Technical 
T1843 Female 1949 North West 
  
T1961 Female 1948 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Personal and protective 
services 
T2003 Female 1949 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Professionals 
T2071 Female 1933 South West 
 
Retired 
T2150 Male 1943 Scotland Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
T2222 Male 1922 South East Divorced Living with non-related adults 
T2245 Male 1959 Yorkshire 
  
Professionals 
T2335 Female 1920 East Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
T2345 Female 1957 Yorkshire Cohabiting, 
civil 
partnership 
Living with 
partner and 
children 
Associate professionals 
and technical 
T2459 Male 1915 North West Widowed Alone Clerical and Secretarial 
T2543 Female 1933 West Midlands Cohabiting Living with 
partner 
Clerical and secretarial 
T2544 Female 1952 Wales Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Process, plant and 
machine operative 
T2741 Male 1921 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
T3129 Male 1968 South West 
 
Managers and 
Administrators 
T3775 Male 1936 East Midlands Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
T3902 Female 1984 North East Single Living with 
related adults 
Professionals 
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T534 Female 1952 South East Single Living with 
related adults 
Personal and protective 
services 
T537 Male 1897 East of England 
 
Retired 
T540 Female 1927 Yorkshire Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
T544 Female 1926 South West Married Living with 
partner 
Employee 
V2327 Male 1943 West Midlands 
 
Associate professionals 
and technical 
W1382 Male 1924 South West Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Retired 
W1388 Male 1946 North West 
 
Processm plant and 
machine operatives 
W1398 Male 1929 Carlisle, Cumbria 
 
Retired, Deputy head 
teacher 
W1476 Male 1919 Rayleigh, Essex 
 
Retired, Editor 
W1813 Female 1950 Stone, Staffordshire Housewife, mother 
W1893 Male 1924 Felixstowe, Suffolk 
 
Retired, Chemist food 
industry 
W1914 Female 1917 South East Widowed Alone Retired 
W1918 Female 1951 South West 
 
Managers and 
Administrators 
W1923 Female 1938 High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire Housewife 
W2117 Male 1924 Chalfont St Peter, Buckinghamshire Retired, Manager 
shipping company 
W2174 Male 1944 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Employee 
W2244 Female 1929 Kendal, Cumbria 
 
Retired, Infant teacher 
W2267 Female 1926 Hanworth, Middlesex Retired, teacher 
W2322 Male 1944 South East Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Professionals 
W2338 Female 1932 York, North Yorkshire Retired, College lecturer 
W2529 Male 1925 Morecambe, Lancashire Retired, Day centre 
manager 
W2588 Female 1923 Ely, Cambridgeshire Retired, Primary teacher 
W3163 Female 1958 West Midlands Cohabiting Living with 
partner 
Clerical and secretarial 
W3176 Male 1941 North West Widowed Alone Retired 
W3393 Male 1932 North West Married Living with 
partner 
Retired 
W3731 Male 1961 Yorkshire and the 
Humber 
Married Living with a 
partner 
Associate professionals 
and technical 
W3740 Female 1965 Wales Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Personal and protective 
services 
W3895 Female 1965 North East Married Living with 
partner 
Unemployed 
W4092 Male 1974 East Midlands Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Associate professionals 
and technical 
W565 Male 1927 South East 
 
Retired 
W571 Female 1937 Bingley, West Yorkshire Shop worker 
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W632 Female 1941 South East Married Living with 
partner 
Professionals 
W633 Female 1942 Darlington, Durham Freelance Journalist 
W853 Female 1936 Wirral 
  
Retired, Picture framer 
Y2498 Female 1912 London Widowed Living with 
related adults 
Managers and 
Administrators 
Y2926 Female 1958 East Midlands Married Living with 
partner and 
children 
Clerical and secretarial 
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Appendix II 
Copies of directive sheets to which responses cited in this research were submitted 
The Falkland Islands Crisis: War with Argentina 
 
382 
 
 
 
The Gulf Crisis 
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Spring 1999, Current Issues 
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Summer, 1999, Current Events 
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Special Directive 2001: The USA: Tuesday, 11 September 2001 
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388 
 
 
 
Summer 2002, Issues in the News 
 
 
389 
 
 
 
Spring 2003, War with Iraq 
 
 
 
390 
 
 
 
Summer 2005, Postscript: London 
 
 
 
391 
 
 
 
Summer 2008, War: Experiences and Reflections 
 
 
392 
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Spring 2009, Issues in the News 
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Summer 2014, Current Affairs in Summer 2014 
 
